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ABSTRACT 
U.S. Navy and commercial ships have been lucrative targets for terrorist 
organizations. Realizing that ships are most vulnerable while in-port, adequate measures 
must be employed by port facilities to ensure vessel security. Commercial and naval ports 
have been set as a national priority in Homeland Security Presidential Directive 13. A 
successful terrorist strike against a port could produce long-term economic impact. In an 
attempt to develop a system of systems to prevent and defeat terrorist attacks against 
foreign and domestic ports, this study approached the threat from three different aspects: 
terrestrial, seaborne, and internal. This report uses the Systems Engineering Design 
Process to define the problem, generate alternatives, model scenarios, and analyze results 
to produce feasible and cost-effective solutions. No single system can address all issues 
prevalent in the port security problem. The recommended solutions individually address 
specific threats, namely vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices, small boat swarm 
tactics, importation of contraband or weapons of mass destruction, and employee 
sabotage. Although each solution effectively increased port security, improved port 
security measures resulted in greater cost. Some solutions yielded only marginal gain in 
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The 2007 Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) Systems Engineering and Analysis 
(SEA) Integrated Project titled “Port Security Strategy 2012” (PSS12) was a joint product 
developed by eight NPS SEA students and 17 National University of Singapore (NUS) 
Temasek Defense Systems Institute (TDSI) students. The tasking letter from the Wayne 
E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering directed the Integrated Project to design a 
conceptual system of systems to improve port security measures for U.S. ports and force 
protection options for U.S. forces in U.S. and foreign ports. Port Security Strategy 2012 
used the Systems Engineering Design Process as a tool to create a relevant and feasible 




Systems Engineering Design Process 
 
Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the U.S. government shut 
down the air traffic system for two days and temporarily suspended the maritime 
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transportation system, preventing ships from entering U.S. ports. The United States 
realized that if a plane could be used as a feasible weapon, a ship and its cargo may also 
be used in a similar manner, shutting down a port and resulting in severe economic 
ramifications. For example in June 2002, an International Longshore and Warehouse 
Union strike ceased operations on all major U.S. West Coast ports. According to a Martin 
Associates study, a 10-day shutdown of the west coast ports cost the U.S. economy $19.4 
billion. If the shutdown had extended to 20 days, the economic impact was postulated to 
increase to $48.6 billion dollars [1]. 
PSS12 involves a variety of stakeholders, each of whom holds different 
responsibilities. Their scopes of concerns were defined by local geography, economic, 
and political considerations, which led to four isolated but related areas of interest; 
consequently, PSS12 examined four areas concerning the range of issues raised by 
stakeholders. Organizations interested in port security include the Department of 
Homeland Security, United States Coast Guard, Marine Terminal Operators, Department 
of Defense, Regional & Local Police, Republic of Singapore Navy, Singapore Coast 
Guard, Singapore Civil Defence Force, among others. Each potential stakeholder 
presented different concerns, needs, and requirements, which were used to scope and 
bound the port security problem. Different stakeholders identified four primary areas of 
concern: threats originating from land (terrestrial threats), threats originating from foreign 
ports (source seaborne threats), threats originating from local waterways (regional 
seaborne threats), and threats originating from port employees (internal personnel 
threats). In order to address these primary areas in enough detail, it was essential to 
divide the team into four subgroups of five to six students each to address each issue. 
Port Security 2012 formed the Terrestrial Threats Group (TTG), the Source 
Seaborne Threats Group (SSTG), the Regional Seaborne Threats Group (RSTG), and the 
Internal Personnel Threats Group (IPTG). The TTG considered threats from the land 
perimeter of the port to the pier-side ship. The scenario the TTG examined involved a 
container truck laden with explosives, which attempts to gain access to a terminal in a 
major U.S. port by speeding past security at the terminal’s entrance. The SSTG 
considered threats arriving from overseas ports. The SSTG scenario involved terrorists 
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coordinating a flood of containers holding weapons of mass destruction onto cargo ships 
bound for a domestic U.S. port. The RSTG considered waterborne surface threats from 
within the port boundary to the pier-side ship. The RSTG scenario involved multiple 
small boat attacks against moored ships and port infrastructure. The IPTG considered 
threats from personnel, who may or may not be employed by the port facility. The 
scenario the IPTG examined involved personnel collaborating to create maximum port 
infrastructure destruction. 
Using the Systems Engineering methodology, PSS12 defined the problem and 
created threat scenarios. Each team constructed alternative system of systems for each 
scenario considered. Performance for each alternative was modeled, analyzed, and 
compared using predetermined measures of performance and effectiveness. 
Implementation deadlines and constraints contributed to alternative risks. The system 
implementation must be feasible within five years.  
Consensus amongst the stakeholders required minimal impact on the flow of 
commerce in a commercial port and the flow of operations in a military port. Each 
alternative examined will incur research and development, procurement, and operating 
and support costs. Performance based on the modeling metrics, risk based on the 
economic or operational impact, and cost based on the total system cost are determining 
factors among system alternatives.  
A number of modeling tools (e.g. MANA, Arena, Extend, Simkit, and/or Excel) 
were used by the TTG, RSTG, SSTG, and IPTG to evaluate the measures of performance 
effectiveness for each alternative and the status quo. Data from these models were 
collected and analyzed to compare these alternatives against current systems. Cost data 
and measures of effectiveness were coupled to determine a system that provided adequate 
effectiveness for reasonable cost. The model results and analysis would enable the 
stakeholder to make a well-informed decision regarding the employment of future 
systems in port security. 
The key findings of the four operational scenarios are described on the following 
page: 
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Terrestrial Threats Group 
• The TTG considered a possible vehicle-borne IED attack on a port facility. 
Perimeter security requirements significantly differ amongst all ports. 
Geographic, social, and legal constraints directly influence the feasibility 
of employing certain systems. The most important step in defending 
against vehicle-borne IEDs is to harden the perimeter barriers by steel-
reinforced concrete blocks to the base of the existing chain link fencing. 
 
• With the perimeter barriers in place, the gate is the only alternative point 
of terrestrial entry for vehicle-borne IEDs. Based on the modeling results 
and the cost benefit analysis, additional armed guards should not be 
employed due to their marginal improvement in effectiveness at high cost. 
Either the spike strips or pop-up barriers alternatives should be employed. 
While pop-up barriers are twice as effective as spike strips, they are also 
twice the cost. 
Regional Seaborne Threats Group 
• The RSTG considered multiple small boat attacks on the Port of Oakland.  
The small boat attack consisted of the simultaneous attack of 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 
6, 9 or 12 boats. The RSTG deployed various sensors and platforms in an 
attempt to successfully interrogate potential contacts of interest in order to 
avert an attack. A successful interrogation required the contact of interest 
to be in the sensor’s classification/recognition/identification range for 
three minutes of simulation time.  The percentage of terrorist successfully 
interrogated was the primary MOE. 
  
• Based solely on the cost benefit analysis, the RSTG found that the 
addition of an Unmanned Surface Vehicle and two additional X-band 
radar stations (located on southern Tiburon Peninsula and at the southwest 
point of the former Alameda NAS) provided the most effectiveness for the 
least cost in one half of the scenarios.  The addition of Sonar to the 
defense package drastically increased cost with marginal benefit. In six of 
the eight cases examined, the addition of a single X-band radar yielded 
largest improvement in terrorist detection rate over cost.  
Source Seaborne Threats Group 
• The SSTG considered the importation of 12 dirty containers from foreign 
ports. Using a transshipment hub, where thousands of containers are 
handled daily, terrorists can potentially introduce containers containing 
contraband into the shipping network. Sensors are deployed at the port of 
entry, crane spreaders, and holding yards to detect the presence of dirty 
containers. Customs inspections team would further be utilized to 
intrusively inspect all flagged containers suspected of container weapons 
of mass destruction. The primary MOEs considered include the probability 
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of detection, false alarm, missed detection, productivity, and average time 
to inspect each container. 
 
• The best alternative is the high performance alternative which employs the 
Automatic Targeting System+, a gamma scanner and HAZMAT detector 
at the container holding and loading areas, and a fully equipped inspection 
station. These alternatives results in a cost of $82.67 million. A significant 
sensor mix is necessary for a high probability of detection. This sensor 
configuration should include a gamma scanner at the port of entry, 
radiation detectors and gamma scanners at holding areas, a scale and 
gamma scanner at loading areas, and a gamma scanner, HAZMAT 
detector, and trained animals at the intrusive inspection station. 
 
Internal Personnel Threats Group 
• The IPTG considered unauthorized employee physical access and 
unauthorized employee data access. Three models (Excel, Extend, and 
MANA) were used to determine the effectiveness of each alternative. The 
Extend and MANA models were integrated to produce the probability of 
interdiction for unauthorized physical access. Unauthorized data access 
was modeled using Excel. 
 
• The current system has a 12 percent probability of interdiction for 
unauthorized physical access and 81 percent probability of interdiction for 
unauthorized data access. The presence of a mid-terminal fence with an 
open gate policy improved the probability of interdiction by 97 percent 
over the baseline. Combining communications, mid-terminal fence, and a 
triggered shut gate policy increased the probability of interdiction by 172 
percent over the baseline. 
 
While specific threats were examined by each of the respective groups, there 
remain other unexamined threats. The threats not examined in this report were not high 
priority threats as indicated by the PSS12 stakeholders. Some of these threats include air, 
mine, swimmer, underwater vehicle, and unmanned system threats. 
Different agencies, whose efforts collectively provide port security, have different 
jurisdictions, organizational structures, and funding. A coordination problem exists 
amongst different agencies. The information received from the agencies must be rapidly 
received, displayed, interpreted and responded to in order for many of the modeled 
alternatives to be effective.  From conducting this study, PSS12 recognized that the 
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fusion of data is a critical issue that needs to be addressed.  Data fusion was beyond the 
scope of this project; however, is an area where future study is required. 
Section I introduces the purpose of this study to include the background, concept 
of operations, operational environment, threat scenarios, scope, method, and chronology. 
Sections II, III, IV, and V introduce the needs analysis, alternatives generation, models, 
results, and analysis for the terrestrial threats group, regional seaborne threats group, 
source seaborne threats group, and internal personnel threats group, respectively. Section 






1. Port Security, Shipping, and Commerce 
The Global presence of U.S. Navy and Commercial Ships has always presented 
lucrative terrorist targets. U.S. Navy and Commercial ships are the most vulnerable while 
pier-side. Incidents such as the USS Cole (DDG 67) bombing in 2000 and the USS 
Kearsarge (LHD 3) rocket propelled grenade (RPG) attack in 2005 confirmed that even 
the mightiest warships are vulnerable to terrorist attack while in-port. Another lesson 
learned from these incidents is effectively attacking an in-port ship does not require 
advanced tactics or hardware. The USS Cole was almost sunk by a slow, explosive laden 
surface vessel. The USS Kearsarge was missed by terrorists shooting RPGs from a 
rooftop in close vicinity to the port.  Defending a pier-side ship presents many challenges. 
There are several avenues from which a terrorist threat may originate. If the threats are 
allowed port entry via water or land, protecting an in-port ship presents a difficult 
challenge. The identification and neutralization of terrorist threats before port infiltration 
will provide the best results. The task of protecting an in-port ship is best accomplished 
by defending the hosting port from potential terrorist threats or incursions, but measures 
to accomplish this might cause unacceptable impediments to port operations.                 
Commercial ports and naval bases are high profile terrorist targets. Commercial 
and Naval Ports are often located near major metropolitan areas with high population 
densities. A successful terrorist attack on one of these facilities could endanger the local 
populace. The geographic locations of the top ten U.S. Container ports are shown in 
Figure 1.  
A successful terrorist attack on a maritime port causes enormous economic 
ramifications.  The safe and efficient operations of Commercial Maritime Ports are 
critical to the world’s economy. Over 60 percent of U.S. petroleum and 93 percent of all 
U.S. imports and exports are transferred through maritime ports [2]. A successful terrorist 
attack on a ship in a major port could disrupt commerce at other major commercial ports 
as emergency procedures and extra security measures are enacted.  Each day that a major 
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U.S. port is not operational costs the United States’ economy and average of one billion 
dollars [3].  The shipping industry directly provides for hundreds of thousands of 




Figure 1.  Locations of Major U.S. Container Ports 
 
Major U.S. Container Ports are located near densely populated areas.  In close 
proximity to the numbered ports are: 1 & 2. Los Angeles, 3. New York City, 4. 
Charleston, SC, 5. Savannah, GA, 6. Norfolk, VA, 7. Oakland, CA, 8. Houston, TX, 9. 
Tacoma, WA, 10.  Seattle, WA.  
 
2.  National Directives 
Security of Commercial and Naval Ports has been set as a national priority in 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 13 (HSPD-13). The directive emphasizes that 
security in the Maritime Domain is a global issue. The directive states that securing only 
domestic ports is not sufficient when dealing with hazardous cargos which are 
transported from foreign ports. Security policies must actively involve these ports to 
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maintain safety in domestic ports. HSPD-13 directs the Department of Defense and the 
Department of Homeland Security to form and implement a National Strategy for 
Maritime Security. Furthermore, HSPD-13 states this strategy should prevent terrorist 
attack and criminal acts in the Maritime Domain, protect population centers and critical 
infrastructures, and enhance international relationships by promoting the integration of 
U.S. allies and international and private sector partners to advance common security 
interests [4]. 
 Ports are vulnerable from many different aspects. These aspects include but are 
not limited to the terrestrial perimeter, maritime domain, hazardous cargo, and internal 
personnel. Port security cannot be accomplished by a single system that addresses each of 
these potential problems. The chosen security measures in these realms must all 
contribute to the overall goal of securing a port which will result in securing the in-port 
ships.  
The National Strategy for Maritime Security directs the deployment of a layered 
security system.  To meet this requirement, the cooperation of many government, non-
government, and foreign agencies is essential. The National Strategy for Maritime 
Security addresses this need by stressing that international cooperation is critical for 
ensuring that lawful public and private activities in the maritime domain are protected 
from attack.  It further states that trust and confidence among the U. S. and its allies must 
be increased [5]. 
 
B. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this study was to serve as the Systems Engineering and Analysis 
Integrated Project for SEA Cohort 11 (SEA-11) and Temasek Defense Systems Institute 
(TDSI) of Singapore. The objectives of the Capstone Project are to provide educational 
content appropriate to future professional careers as senior leaders and apply course 
content to the execution of the project. The SEA Cohort 11 and TDSI addressed a 
problem that is relevant to the U.S. Navy and other government agencies. The tasking 
letter from the Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering, dated 6 December 
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2006, titled this study Port Security/Force Protection (PS/FP) and presented the following 
guidance: 
 
Design a conceptual system of systems to improve Port Security measures 
for U.S. ports, and Force Protection options for U.S. forces in U.S. and 
foreign ports. Potential Focus Areas: 
• Develop a system of systems to provide individual ship self protection 
for U.S. Navy combatants 
• Develop concepts and systems for the integration of U.S. Navy 
shipboard self protection systems with U.S. Navy shore based systems. 
• Develop concepts and systems for U.S. commercial port security 
systems and the integration of U.S. Navy combatants and commercial 
vessels into these systems. 
 
The tasking letter provided the PSS12 team with initial guidance. Research 
dictated that a current primary concern in the maritime domain is in the security of ports, 
thus shifting the focus from force protection and port security of U.S. ports and U.S. 
forces to port security of U.S. commercial ports. This study was directed to remain fully 
Unclassified with the cooperation of the TDSI of Singapore.  The initial guidance was 
provided in HSPD 13; “Maritime Security Policy”, National Strategy for Maritime 
Security, and National Plans for Maritime Security. Additionally, the study is to examine 
alternative technical solutions looking within a five year timeframe. This restricted the 
examined alternatives to those already at technical readiness level four (laboratory 
component validation) or higher.   
Each group was designated to consider: 1) what is the biggest threat to in-port 
ships? and 2) how much of an impact on normal operations are tolerable to increase 
overall security. 
 
C. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS (CONOPS) 
A CONOPS was established to resolve issues that surfaced while addressing the 
problem of port security. The SEA 11 PS/FP Team discussed different options on how 
this problem should be addressed. The SEA 11 PS/FP Team determined the best method 
to address the problem was to divide the problem into avenues from which threats could 
originate. The avenues were defined as: 
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• Terrestrial Threats 
• Regional Seaborne Threats 
• Source Seaborne Threats 
• Internal Personnel Threats 
In effect this approach defined four loosely integrated areas of concern which 
would each be analyzed using our systems engineering methodology. The team divided 
into groups consisting of five to six personnel to examine each avenue.  Each group used 
the SEDP to define their problem, design alternatives, model the alternatives, analyze the 
data, and report the results. 
The terrestrial threats group (TTG) examined the threats that originate from the 
landward perimeter of the port.  These threats included vehicle borne improvised 
explosive devices (IEDs) or unauthorized personnel entering the port perimeter.  The 
TTG examined and modeled alternatives to detect and engage the possible threats.  The 
goal of these systems was to protect port assets from threats that originate from land.  
The regional seaborne threats group (RSTG) examined the threats that originate 
from the seaward side of an in-port ship to the port boundary.  Possible threats from this 
realm include explosive laden boats, seaborne RPGs, mines, swimmers, and hijacked 
commercial vessels.  The RSTG also examined and modeled alternatives to deter, detect, 
track and engage threats from this realm.  The goal of such systems was to protect port 
assets including in-port ships from threats in the local maritime environment. 
The source seaborne threats group (SSTG) studied the threats that could rise from 
the originating ports of arriving ships. Threats from these ports include the smuggling of 
illegal personnel, weapons of mass destruction, or sabotaging volatile cargo. The SSTG 
examined measures that could be implemented in source ports to reduce the hazards 
associated with arriving ships and their cargo. The goal of the system is to reduce the 
probability of these personnel and weapons threats from entering a port on an inbound 
ship. 
The internal personnel threat group (IPTG) considered the threats that originate 
from personnel who may or may not be employed in the port facility.  Threats include but 
are not limited to internal security breaches by employed personnel or security breaches 
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into the port and ships by personnel who are not employed at the facility.  The IPTG 
studied measures to reduce the in-house threat presented to the facility. 
 
D. OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 
The Port of Oakland and Port of Singapore were the primary stakeholders for 
PSS12. The close proximity of the Port of Oakland allowed easy access to port facilities 
and personnel. The TDSI students from Singapore had points of contact for personnel at 
the Port of Singapore to aid the PSS12 research. Each of the groups analyzed the 
operational environment for the Port of Oakland and Port of Singapore. 
 
1. Terrestrial Threats Group (TTG) 
a. Boundaries of the Area of Operation 
The boundaries of the area of operations for both the Port of Oakland and 
the PSA Singapore Terminals (PSA) are defined as the area from the waterside to port 
inland boundaries which are demarcated by perimeter fences. At both ports, the 
geographical boundaries are well defined.   
In the Port of Oakland, there are a total of 11 terminals, and adjacent terminals are 
separated by 8 ft wire mesh fences with barbed wire outriggers.  A different port operator 
operates the individual terminals.  The security of the individual terminals is the 
responsibility of the respective port operators.  The Oakland Railport will not be included 
in the study as they are not under the purview of the port operators.  The Oakland 
Railport includes the Burlington Northern Santa Fe Intermodal Yard and the Union 





Figure 2.  Terminals at the Port of Oakland 
 
PSA has a total of four container terminals and two multi-purpose terminals.  The 
security of the terminals is also the responsibility of PSA. The physical layout of the Port 




Figure 3.  Terminals at PSA Singapore 
 
Following the completion of the Pasir Panjang Container Terminal, there 
will be 45 container berths. Twenty-three multi-purpose berths are located within the two 
terminals.  
 
b. Size of Area of Operations 
Both ports contain large geographical areas that the terminal/port 
operators are responsible for securing.  At the Port of Oakland, the size of the entire port 
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is approximately the area of 590 football fields, while the combined area of all PSA 
terminals is approximately 790 football fields.  The ports have long length wharfs that are 
easily accessible from the open harbor channels. Table 1 summarizes and compares the 
physical size of the Port of Oakland and Port of Singapore. 
 
 Port of Oakland [6] Port of Singapore [7] 
Total Terminal Area ~ 318 hectares ~ 423 hectares 
Total Number of Berths 20 45 
Total Berth Length ~ 6 km ~ 13 km 
 
Table 1.  Physical Port Size for Port of Singapore and Oakland 
 
The physical dimensions of both the Port of Oakland and the Port of 
Singapore are large. Each hectare is equivalent to an area of 10,000 square meters or 
107,639 square feet. While the Port of Singapore is only 1.33 times larger than the Port of 
Oakland, the Port of Singapore houses more than twice the number of berths and exceeds 
twice the length. 
 
c. Port Topology and Characteristics 
The entire terrain of both ports is flat in order to better facilitate the 
movement of containers.  However, containers are usually stacked vertically for storage, 
sometimes up to four containers high (4m x 2.59m). The stacks of containers present 
challenges for ground surveillance as they obscure lines of sight.  
The Port of Oakland is served by a variety of transportation networks that 
include freeways, public roads, service roads and railroads. Major transportation 
networks at the Port of Oakland include: 
• Freeways: I-80 Northbound & Eastbound, I-880 Southbound, I-580 
Eastbound, I-980 Eastbound 
• Railroads: Burlington Northern Santa Fe, Union Pacific 
• Bridges: San Francisco Bay Bridge 
• Landing Beach and Sites: All Wharfs, Middle Harbor Shoreline Park 
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The San Francisco Bay Bridge located north of the Port of Oakland 
provides a visual vantage point for the wharf fronting the Oakland Outer Harbor Channel.  
The Port of Singapore is served by a network of expressways, public roads 
and service roads within the port area.  However, it is not served by any railroads or 
bridges. Possible landing sites for vessels from the harbor channel include all wharfs on 
the Port of Singapore waterfront. 
Defensive barriers are critical in securing critical port infrastructures. 
Perimeter fences and guard gates are some of the capabilities that the Port of Singapore 
and the Port of Oakland employ. Physical defensive measures in use by both Port of 
Oakland and PSA to deter unauthorized intrusion are shown in Table 2. 
 
 Port of Oakland Port of Singapore 
Perimeter 
Fences 
• 8 ft single layer wire 
mesh fences with 
barbed wire outriggers 
• 3 m wire mesh fence 
Guarded 
Gates 
• Entry points guarded 
by unarmed security 
personnel throughout 
day 
• Gate arms employed 
to control traffic flow 
at selected gates 
• No physical obstacles 
(concrete barricades, 
pop-up barriers) to 
force incoming 
vehicles to slow 
down. 
• Employ “pop-up” 
barriers to block or 
puncture vehicle tires 
to slow down forced 
vehicular entry 
 
Table 2.  Defensive Barrier Employment 
 
The Port of Oakland has significant disadvantages in physical security 
compared to the Port of Singapore. While the Port of Singapore employs pop-up barriers, 
no physical barriers at the Port of Oakland can adequately slow down traffic. 
The key terrestrial features that surround the Port of Oakland include the 
Middle Harbor Park at the Port of Oakland. This territory is considered a public access 
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area. A public park in the midst of the terminals means that the entire port area could not 
be totally restricted to better control accessibility. The park is bounded by the Trapac 
Terminal (Berths 30 to 33), the Evergreen Terminal (Berth 34), the Ben E. Nutter 
Terminal (Berths 35 to 38), the Hanjin Terminal (Berths 55 to 56), and the Burlington 
Northern Santa Fe Intermodal Yard on the west side. The Port of Oakland also houses the 
Alameda-Oakland San Francisco Ferry Terminal with close proximity to the Charles P. 
Howard Terminal (Berths 67 to 68). 
Critical infrastructures located in and around a port can stop or slow down 
port operations. At the Port of Oakland, the power substations and computer network 
servers, located within the port area, maintain continued port operations. Telephone poles 
along roads, protected by small mesh fencing and bollards, constitute the lines of 
communication between terminals, authorities, and other outside agencies and 
organization. Similar to the Port of Oakland, power substations and computer network 
servers are two readily identifiable PSA critical infrastructures. 
 
2. Regional Seaborne Threats Group (RSTG) 
a. Port of Oakland 
The Port of Oakland is one of the United States’ busiest container ports on 
the West Coast because of the renovation to the berths, installation of new container 
cranes, and the deep water channels. Oakland is the container port gateway for the fourth 
largest U.S urban market, serving more than seven million people.  The Port of Oakland, 
which encompasses 759.3 acres, is not owned by one corporation but multiple 
corporations where business is exporting and importing commerce to the U.S. and other 
countries. With the increase of vessel traffic, the need to maintain productivity while 
insuring security of the merchandise is of extreme importance.  Through the process of 
running security drills and scenarios, as well as working with the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS), in particular United States Coast Guard (USCG), the Port of 
Oakland believes its security is acceptable.  As the assets of DHS are occupied with more 
critical and time sensitive issues, the role of protecting the ports of commerce will fall by 
the wayside. Therefore, there is a gap in the port security aspect pertaining to the 
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waterside access to the pier as well as to ships tied to the pier.  Port of Oakland provides 
waterway access throughout the Oakland metropolitan area for the recreational sailors to 
motorboat operators.  In the United States, the limit to infringe upon the rights of free 
passage of the waterways for the pleasure crafts is difficult to enforce and maintain.  
From this aspect alone, the port is a soft target for those wishing to cause damage. 
 
b. Port of Singapore 
Situated at the maritime crossroads between the East and West, Singapore 
has been the world busiest port since 1986 in quantity of shipping tonnage. Singapore is 
the focal point of some 200 shipping lines with links to more than 600 ports in 120 
countries. More than 50,000 ships pass through the straits of Malacca and Singapore 
annually, carrying half of the world’s oil and almost one-third of the world’s trade [8].   
The maritime trade plays a crucial role in the development of Singapore’s 
economy. Since its independence, Singapore’s continued prosperity and development 
hinges greatly on the security of the straits and ports. Singapore’s strategic location, 
coupled with her excellent physical infrastructure and stable government, enables this 
country to be an effective shipping hub and capitalize on the shipping trade by providing 
the necessary services to passing ships. 
Singapore is one of the world’s busiest container ports having handled 
24.8 million TEUs (Twenty-Foot Equivalent Units) of containers in 2006. As the world’s 
busiest seaport and largest transshipment hub, the port of Singapore attracted 
approximately 140,000 vessel calls. At any one time, there are some 1,000 sea-going 
vessels operating within Singapore’s waters [8]. Singapore also received approximately 
50,000 calls by regional ferries and cruise vessels. 
Singapore is the third largest oil refining center in the world with major oil 
companies such as Shell, ExxonMobil, Chevron, and Texaco operating at Jurong Island. 
More than 12,000 oil tankers and 3,000 chemical tankers call at Singapore a year. With 
the rapid and continuing development of Jurong Island into a major petrochemical hub, 
an increase in the number of tanker calls can be expected [8].   
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There are a total of thirty-two anchorages and forty-one container berths 
along seven and one half miles of quay length in the port infrastructure. The anchorages 
are designated to serve specific purpose for different types of vessels, depending on the 
type of vessels and the type of goods the vessel is carrying. An example is shown in 
Table 3 on the following page. The port infrastructure is situated along the southern coast 
of the island [9].   
The Port of Singapore is comprised of four container terminals and two 
multi-purpose terminals. Following the completion of the Pasir Panjang Container 
Terminal, there will be 45 container berths. Twenty-three multi-purpose berths are 
located within the two terminals. 
Singapore maritime territorial sea claim is three nautical miles from its 
coastal line [10]. The transit waterway is in between islands belonging to Singapore and 
Indonesia.  
The Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore (MPA) is the statutory 
board which regulates and licenses port and marine services and facilities for port of 
Singapore.  It also manages vessel traffic in the Singapore port, ensures navigational 
safety and port/maritime security, and a clean marine environment [11].  
PSA Singapore Terminals is presently the port operator for port of 
Singapore. In addition to Singapore’s throughput, it handles about one-fifth of the world's 




Table 3.  Eastern Sector Anchorages Examples 
The examples of Eastern Sector Anchorages indicate special locations for 
temporary barges, warships, explosive lighters, small craft, petroleum, and general 
purpose vessels.  
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c. Naval Assets 
In the case of a Navy ship, the ship and its crew are not as helpless as that 
of a containership.  There are a lot more assets available at the Commanding Officer’s 
(CO) disposal to protect and defend his ship.  More avenues are given to a ship that is 
underway rather than pierside.  It is during the moored time when a naval ship is at high 
risk to terrorist attack.  When a naval ship is moored in its homeport, such as: Norfolk, 
San Diego, Mayport, and Pearl Harbor, the chance of a terrorist attack is reduced because 
of Naval Installations Command providing port security and force protection measures 
needed, but the threat still exists. It is up to the CO, as well as the crew to protect the ship 
when it is in port.  A naval vessel is most vulnerable when it is in a foreign port 
implementing its own force protection measures. When an issue arises for a naval ship in 
a foreign port, a vital question is should it employ lethal or non-lethal force.   Besides 
standing watches that provide 360 degree coverage of the area around the ship, there are 
also random measures placed to keep the activities onboard a naval ship variable and not 
repetitive.  To help with the operational environment, the concept of the imaginary 
boundary is created around the ship to provide time to react to the threat in a timely 
effective manner. Even though the naval ship has means at their disposal to react to a 
waterside threat, the threat remains similar to that of commercial ships. 
 
3. Source Seaborne Threats Group (SSTG) 
The area of operations considered by the SSTG includes the PSA and the open 
ocean transit waters to the waterside boundary of the Port of Oakland. In 2006, PSA 
processed 23.98 million twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs). PSA operates the four 
major container terminals in Singapore: Brani Terminal, Kepple Terminal, Pasir Panjang 
Terminal and Tanjong Pagar Terminal. These four terminals have a combined area of 
1077 acres containing 28 main and 16 feeder berths.  These terminals also enclose the 
world's largest refrigerated container (reefer) facilities with approximately 4900 reefer 
points and servicing more than 500,000 reefers in 2006. Figure 4 shows the location of 
the Tanjong Pagar Terminal and Brani Terminal located in the southern region of 
Singapore. Each of these terminals operates 38 quay cranes and 165 yard cranes to handle 





Figure 4.  Tanjong Pagar and Brani Terminals 
 
The Tanjong Pagar Terminal and Brani Terminal operate 38 quay cranes to 
provide stevedore services and 165 yard cranes to manage the transshipment containers.  
The total area of the open ocean transit environment comprises 165.384 million 
square kilometers, 18 times the size of the continental United States and larger than the 
Earth’s land area. The major shipping lanes that may be involved with a shipment from 
Singapore to Oakland are the trans-Pacific, Far East Europe, intra-Asia, South-East Asia 
and Australasian lanes [13]. The various shipping lanes centered on Singapore are 





Figure 5.  Shipping Lanes of Asia 
 
4. Internal Personnel Threats Group (IPTG) 
The workers at the Port of Oakland are divided into four major categories: 
longshoremen, clerks, foremen, and watchmen. The longshoremen are mainly the 
workers loading and unloading the containers. They are the main bulk of the workers at 
the port, and there are about 1800 longshoremen employed in the Port of Oakland. The 
clerks are mainly the administrative workers tracking the cargo movement. There are 
about 100 clerks employed in the Port of Oakland. The foremen are the supervisors of the 
workers, and there are approximately 40 foremen employed at the Port of Oakland. The 
watchmen are responsible for carrying out the security measures to monitor and report 
any discrepancies. There are approximately 60 watchmen in the Port of Oakland. 
Screening at the Port of Oakland is accomplished by the National Vessel 
Movement Center (NVMC) and the Customs Border Protection (CBP). The NVMC is an 
intelligence coordination center that is part of the United States Coast Guard. It 
extensively screens passengers, crew and cargo based on the information provided by the 
ships. However, this only applies to all ships over 300 gross tons, and the information 
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must be provided 96 hours before arrival. In addition to the NVMC, the CBP plays a vital 
role in ensuring port security. Shipping companies are required to provide a cargo 
manifest at least 24 hours before the cargo containers arrived in the United States. This 
data is used by CBP’s National Targeting Center to identify high risk cargo. The CBP 
uses a risk based analysis and intelligence to pre-screen, assess and examine 100% of 
suspicious containers. The remaining cargo is cleared for entry using advanced inspection 
technology. The CBP also work with foreign customs authorities to examine all U.S.-
bound high risk cargo while they are still at foreign port.  
The Maritime Transportation Security Act, 2002 (MTSA) documented two key 
pieces of legislation that play a role in port internal threats: prohibition and issuance of 
identification cards. 
 
Prohibition. “ The Secretary shall prescribe regulations to 
prevent an individual from entering an area of a vessel or 
facility that is designated as a secure area by the Secretary 
for purpose of a security plan for the vessel or facility… 
unless the individual holds a transportation security card 
…or is accompanied by another individual who holds a 
transportation security card..”  
 
Issuance of cards. “ The Secretary shall issue a biometric 
transportation security card to an individual… unless the 
Secretary decides that the individual poses a security risk.. 
warranting denial of the card. 
 
The Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) is a biometric card 
that has digital photograph, fingerprints and pin of the worker. It has multiple level of 
authentication through possession of card, photographs, fingerprints and pin verification. 
Every employee of the port will be required to have a TWIC. These include port facility 
employees, vessel operators, truck drivers, contractors, maintenance personnel, 
longshoremen, train crews and other dock workers. It is expected to be implemented in 
all ports by 1 January 2009. Currently, the TWIC reader requirement is withdrawn and 




E. THREATS AND THREAT SCENARIOS 
1. Terrestrial Threats Group 
Threats of the land component can be defined as elements that support actions 
intended to disrupt the operation of the port or use the port as a means to facilitate the 
unauthorized importation of WMDs or terrorist cells. The disruption of port operations 
may come in three forms: 
• Injuring and/or evacuation of port workers 
• Damaging infrastructure of the port 
• Contaminating port facilities with a chemical weapon or a dirty bomb 
Vehicle-borne IEDs and pier-side release or detonation of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) have been identified to be the prominent land threats to port 
operations. 
Vehicle borne IEDs are improvised explosive devices carried either in a vehicle or 
inside a shipping container.  IEDs can be made easily from readily available materials. 
The delivery of such devices is noted to be either by personnel (suicide bombers) or 
vehicles. From the various IED bombing incidents on 1 October 2005 in Bali, Indonesia, 
on 9 September 2004 at the Australia Embassy in Indonesia, on 5 August 2003 at the 
Marriott Hotel in Indonesia, and on 19 April 1995 in Oklahoma City in the United States, 
it was noted that vehicle borne IEDs are preferred mode of terrorist operation as it has 
enough explosive power to cause significant damage to infrastructure which, in the case 
of a port, may severely impact port operation.  
WMDs are weapons that possess the capacity to inflict extensive damage to 
infrastructure or the populace, or deny the use of critical geography through 
contamination.  The successful deployment of a weapon of mass destruction would result 
in large economic loss and/or loss of life.  A detection or activation of a WMD in the port 
would result in the disruption all port operations.  Importation of a WMD provides 
terrorists the ability to inflict severe damage in the importing country.  Weapons of mass 




• Fissionable or fusionable nuclear weapons 
• Chemical weapons 
• Biological weapons 
• Non fissionable or fusionable radiological weapons (dirty bombs) 
Containers provide terrorist a method to gain unauthorized access into a country.  
It is possible for terrorist to infiltrate a shipping container in the container’s country of 
origin and travel inside the container to its destination with WMDs.  If the terrorists are 
not detected, they will have unauthorized access to the importing nation, enabling them to 
execute malicious intentions. 
The possible security threat scenarios from the land component were classified 
into two categories: Minor threat scenarios and Major threats scenarios. Minor threats are 
defined as those when executed, will not have significant economic impact on the 
economy. It is suggested that any land security threats that result in the disruption of port 
operations for one terminal is classified as a minor threat. Major threats, on the other 
hand, are defined as threats when executed, will result in significant economic impact. It 
is suggested that the disruption of more than one terminal be classified as a major threat.  
Major threats include the unintentional importation of WMDs and terrorist operatives. 
 
a. Minor Threat Scenarios 
The first scenario considered was a minor threat scenario that involved 
localized damage to non-critical port infrastructures by forceful vehicle entry with an 
IED. A truck loaded with an IED either penetrates the eight-feet perimeter fence with 
barbed wire outriggers or refuses to stop at a gate and detonates at non-critical 
infrastructure.  While this would likely result in minor economic losses and possibly 
some loss of life, the majority of the port would likely remain operational.   
 
b. Major Threat Scenarios 
The second scenario considered localized damage to power sub-stations, 
fuel storage/distribution location, or passenger cruise ship terminal by forceful by a 
vehicle-borne IED. The non redundant power supply to the port’s cranes is located within 
the premises of the port, but only protected by small mesh fencing and bollards.  It is 
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possible for a vehicle carrying an IED to penetrate the port’s perimeter fencing, or refuse 
to stop at the gate, and proceed to drive through the fencing protecting a power substation 
and detonate the IED. This action would result in damaging the power substation which 
disrupts the power supplied to a substantial portion of the port’s cranes.  If the ports’ 
cranes lost power, the port would loose ship on-load and off-load capabilities.  This 
action would halt port operations in the affected portions of the port until the power 
substation could be repaired. An attack on a fuel storage location would likely causes 
severe pollution. If a terrorist was able to attack a cruse ship, they would likely kill 
several people, and decimate the cruise industry by inducing fear in its customers. 
Localized damage to power sub-stations can also occur if a vehicle 
carrying an IED successfully penetrates the security gate. This third scenario considers a 
vehicle that obtains access to the port by driving through the gate with an undetected 
IED.  The driver will then proceed to detonate his IED near a power substation and 
disrupt the power supply to the port’s cranes. 
Scenario four considered the successful importation of WMDs. Weapons 
of mass destruction in a container is imported and offloaded from a container ship, loaded 
onto a truck, and driven off the port facility without detection.  This WMD (nuclear, 
radiological (dirty bomb), biological, or chemical) can be used to inflict severe damage 
on the importing nation. 
Scenario five considered the successful detonation of WMDs in an 
imported container. Containers are scanned for radiological contents before leaving the 
port.  It is possible for terrorists to detonate either a nuclear weapon or a dirty bomb in 
the port facility before the container is scanned.  This action would result in the 
destruction or severe contamination of a substantial portion of the port.  This would 
render the port unoperational for a substantial period of time. 
Scenario six considered the successful importation of a terrorist cell. A 
terrorist cell is able to infiltrate a cargo container at the container’s source port and is 
unintentionally imported to the destination country.  They are not detected at the port and 
gain unauthorized access to the importing nation. 
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2. Regional Seaborne Threats Group 
The team had identified the following threats as possible aggressive actions which 
will have a high severity and hinder the operations of the ports. The threats are as 
follows: 
• Small boat attack on the port 
• Large ship attack on the port 
• Sabotage from swimmers 
• Remotely launched projectile  
The first scenario considered small boat attacks on ports. Small boats loaded with 
explosives can penetrate the waterside of the port and detonate in the port vicinity. This 
action would cause damage to the ports’ systems and equipment and disrupt the normal 
operations of the port. From the military point of view, a small boat attack would elevate 
the force protection level of the ship. It would also create psychological effects within the 
U.S. populace and generate retaliatory outcries. The USS COLE (DDG 67) attack in 
Yemen in October 2000 and French tanker Limburg’s attack in October 2002 
demonstrated the potential major threat from the explosive-laden boats. 
The second scenario considered was a large ship attack on ports. Ships laden with 
WMDs pose a potential threat. Another aspect to study is the use of the ship itself.  
Because of their large size and weight, the use of the ship as a kinetic weapon to port 
operations or to the military installations is a very viable threat.  The large amount of 
momentum created by the large ship enables the infliction of severe damage to any 
vessel. If the large ship is laden with volatile cargo, the ship presents a major concern for 
port operations. Explosives from the ship can cause severe damage to the port, severely 
disrupting normal port operations.  
Sabotage from swimmers was the third scenario considered. For example, the 
Straits of Singapore is narrow and busy and infiltrations may be launched from the 
neighboring secluded islands or small boats. The intent of the infiltration is to sabotage 
the key installations of the port by denying the operations of the port or by targeting high 
value contents in the containers. This is a minor threat that is applicable to ports that have 
islands in the vicinity of the port.    
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The fourth scenario considered remotely launched projectiles. Terrorists can 
launch missiles from boats in the harbors, straits or from neighboring islands. Portable 
projectiles can travel across the straits or be launched from a considerable distance from 
the port. These projectiles (i.e. RPGs) are equipped with high explosive warheads that 
may severely damage installations and port infrastructure.  This is a moderate threat with 
more of a physiological and political effect rather than an economic effect.         
The impact of the damage caused by the above threats has the potential to affect 
operations for extended periods of time. 
 
3. Source Seaborne Threats 
Threats are classified as elements whose purpose is to disrupt the activity of 
container ships or military operations within a port. The objective is to inflict damage to 
key infrastructure within the port and deliver undesired cargo into the U.S. that could be 
used in the execution of terrorist plots. Undesired cargo is categorized as: 
• Human Operatives and Aliens 
• Biological Agents 
• Chemical Agents 
• Radiological Material 
• Explosives 
• Drugs 
• Smuggled Contraband 
• Conventional Weapons 
• Weapon Systems Parts 
The SSTG identified four possible threats that may originate from the source port 
or in-transit between the source and destination ports. 
• The smuggling of WMDs and other undesired cargo into United States. 
• The infiltration of terrorists into the ship’s crew and use of the ship as a 
kinetic weapon inside a U.S. domestic port. 
• The sinking of a large vessel in restricted navigation waters disrupting 
shipping traffic into a port. 
• The use of an aerial vehicle to contaminate merchant ships with 
explosives, radiological, biological and chemical materials for delivery or 
detonation within a port. 
Several studies have examined the use of container ships to deliver undesired 
cargo to a United States seaport [14]. Explosives may be denoted upon container ship 
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arrival or after transportation to a high-value installation within the United States. 
Detecting undesired cargo, especially biological and chemical agents, inside a container 
presents technical challenges. Coupled with the vast amount of containers arriving at 
domestic ports, the task of detecting WMD and other undesired cargo is difficult. In most 
cases, sensors need to be placed in close proximity to the container to be effective.  
Scanning every container is time consuming and delays container shipment.  In addition, 
cargo containers en route to the United States from overseas ports are not subjected to a 
consistent, rigorous inspection system. The inconsistent inspection system of these 
containers creates gaps in security where WMD and even terrorist operatives could enter 
the United States. If the WMD is missed during the subsequent security check conducted 
in the United States, terrorists could use these WMDs to wreak nationwide havoc. The 
SSTG proposes introducing additional security layers at the source port to prevent 
WMDs from being loaded onto container ships.     
Terrorists also have the tactical advantage of timing which enables them to strike 
unexpectedly at various locations. They may infiltrate a ship’s crew by progressing 
through the ranks and eventually attaining a key position. The infiltration option provides 
opportunities for the terrorists to seize control of the container ship and using the ship as 
a kinetic weapon against other shipping and port infrastructure. The examination of this 
scenario would involve looking at the possibility of continuous background checks to 
disrupt the terrorists’ ability to infiltrate the commercial shipping industry.  
The sinking of a large vessel in a strategic chokepoint can disrupt normal water 
traffic flow for extended periods of time.  At the Port of Oakland, the width of the main 
estuary is slightly less than 150 yards, which is approximately the width of two container 
ships. The estuary has been dredged to 50 feet. The channel could be easily obstructed by 
sinking a large container ship in the center of the channel.  Other than the financial loss 
associated with disrupted port operations, the impact of such an act would affect the 
military sealift capability as the Port of Oakland is designed for military use during 
national crises.  
The technological advancement of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) makes 
them more difficult to detect. One UAV could be used to conduct an attack on merchant 
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vessels. With increasing payloads and range, UAVs could be launched from land sites or 
afloat platforms over the horizon to deliver their payload onto the transiting container 
ship. The payload could consist of radiological materials, explosives, and a remote 
detonator. Under the camouflage of darkness, UAVs can fly over the container ship 
undetected and drop the payload in the cavity created by the rows of containers.  The 
potential bomb dropped would remain hidden among the containers until the ship arrives 
at the domestic port. An accomplice could remotely detonate the bomb while the ship is 
berthed. 
Given the four primary threats considered by the SSTG, three different scenarios 
were hypothesized below. 
Scenario One 
Consistent oversight and enforcement compliance driven by the same inspection 
standards for every source port is impossible due to laws, politics, and regulations. 
Focusing on the largest transit port, Singapore, narrows the scope.  A thorough system in 
Singapore, the busiest port in the world, would search the majority of the cargo and 
provide an additional layer of security for the destination port.  The scenario involves 
WMDs being loaded onto a vessel in Rangoon, Myanmar and transiting through PSA. 
The WMDs are reloaded onto another container ship bound for the United States.   
Scenario Two 
Members of a terrorist cell have trained for several years as ship’s crew. They 
have worked for several ocean carriers in a variety of jobs ranging from riggers to a ship 
captain. The terrorist cell has been activated and reports to work onboard a container 
ship, whose destination is the United States. Approximately half of the ship’s crew is 
associated with the terrorist cell.  The terrorists would seize control of the vessel while 
underway. The ship could rendezvous with a vessel laden with explosives and chemical 
agents, which are transferred to the ship. At the U.S. port, the ship could be detonated 
with explosives and sunk in restricted navigation waters, causing shipping traffic 




Terrorists load weapons onboard a container ship in transit from Singapore to 
Oakland. Abu Sayyaf, an active terrorist organization, prepares at Mindanao for UAV 
operations. The UAV has either biological agents or explosives as its payload. The 
terrorists launch the UAV under the cover of darkness and fly it over the container ship 
identified by spotter vessels or aircraft. The biological agents and explosives are then 
dropped onto the container ship. At the Port of Oakland, the hazardous payload could be 
remotely detonated. 
 
4. Port Internal Threats Group 
Despite the security measures at the Port of Oakland, Mathew Gaines managed to 
bypass these measures and stowaway on two occasions. In the first incident, he was 
caught after a security watchman noticed Mathew Gaines in a maintenance uniform 
walking along a U.S. maritime vessel. Because no employee was scheduled to work that 
day, he was caught. In the second incident two months later, he was caught after setting 
sail across the Pacific to Japan and Taiwan.  
Mathew Gaines’ mode of operation was deceptively simple as he infiltrated 
security measures by stealing a jumpsuit, coat, radio and hard hat and disguising himself 
as a dock worker. Once aboard the vessels, he hid amongst the containers. Clearly 
implemented control measures were inadequate and need to be reviewed to prevent future 
occurrences.  
Currently, all containers that come into the United States from foreign ports are 
screened using a manifest. The current inspection system relies on a computer which 
analyzes certain criteria of the shipment before determining the level of risk and 
requirement for inspection. With the illegal trafficking trade estimated at hundreds of 
billions of dollars, information that helps traffickers avoid inspection of illegal goods 
coming into the ports is extremely valuable. There are four classes of threats to a port.  
• Organization that looks upon illegal act as a weapon to reach their goal. 
Eg. Terrorist cell. This is the most potent form of threat as their actions 
may lead to loss of infrastructure, income and impedance to the free flow 
of trade and goods. 
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• Organized Crime. Eg. Drug traffickers. This threat is possibly most likely 
but difficult to guard against as it would likely involve inside personnel 
working in the port. 
• Single person on a mission who has the necessary knowledge and resource 
to cause problems. This form of threat is less likely but is potentially 
dangerous as this person is motivated by revenge, race, or religion. 
• Small time criminal. Eg. Thieves. It is the most likely form of threat 
during day to day operation but it is likely to have the least impact on the 
Port.  
The first scenario considers an individual or group with the purpose to cause 
maximum destruction to the port facility and the in-port ship. One way to achieve this 
goal is to break up the explosive weapons into various parts carried by different 
shipments into the port. The insider would coordinate the different shipment of weapons 
by selecting a shipment that is less likely to be marked for inspection. It is difficult to 
detect any possible existence of weapons since most components can be mixed with other 
legitimate items such as electronics, machinery and raw manufacturing materials. 
Alternatively, the random check conducted can also be exploited.  Assembly of the 
weapons would be done by the insider(s) disguised as workers of the port (e.g. machinery 
operators, dock workers etc). Detonation of explosives would be coordinated in 
conjunction with the docking of a ship. The explosives could be installed near the bay 
and cargo landing areas (near to the fuel tanks of the ship). The attack potentially could 
generate enough fuel explosives to cause substantial destruction to the port. 
The second scenario considers the targeting of critical information with respect to 
shipping schedules and detailed inspection plans. A group of workers currently employed 
by the port of Oakland have recently become more disgruntled by America’s attack on 
Muslim societies in the Middle East.  Over a period of several months, they have been in 
contact with some members of their local mosque. They have been asked to help obtain 
access to shipping information. The purpose is to order the ship to smuggle goods into the 
U.S. to help fund organizations and their plans to “liberate” their fellow believers from 
the U.S. oppression overseas.  In order to do this, shipping logs and patterns from 
Afghanistan and nearby neighbors are required.  They would like to export the every 
growing supply of opium grown in the fringes of Afghanistan to the United States.  This 
accomplishes 2 things:  Money for the “war” and also, further deteriorates the moral 
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fabric of the United States.  They hope that by finding regular shipments and information 





Port Security Strategy 2012 (PSS12) consisted of eight students from the resident 
NPS Systems Engineering and Analysis Program (NPS Curriculum #308) in addition to 
17 students from National University of Singapore’s TDSI program. The members of the 
group hailed from various backgrounds to include seven U.S. Navy, three Singapore 
Navy, two Singapore Air Force, one Northrop Grumman, two Singapore Technologies 
Engineering, one DSO National Laboratories, and eight Singapore Defense Science and 
Technology Agency representatives.  
In addition to direct contributors to the research, the SEA-11 and TDSI students 
consulted students, staff, and faculty from other NPS departments and curricula, the 
Department of Defense, the Department of Homeland Security, the Port of Oakland, and 
the Port of Singapore to obtain relevant research related to the field of port security and 
force protection. A summary of the primary participants involved in this study is shown 
in Figure 6. 
 
 
Figure 6.  Integrated Project Participants 
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The SEA-11 port security and force protection project is fully integrated with 
various cross-campus departments, nearby and overseas ports, the Department of 
Defense, and the Department of Homeland Security. Other stakeholders were also 
contacted with minimal contribution. 
 
2. Organization 
The SEA-11/TDSI team members were organized into the four different threat 
categories (terrestrial, regional seaborne, source seaborne, port internal) according to 
their interests. Each individual group employed a group leader accountable to the team 
leader. Whether the student was in the Systems Engineering and Analysis, Sensors, 
Communications, Information Assurance (IA), Operations Research (OR), or Modeling, 
Virtual Environments and Simulation (MOVES) curriculum, integrating the students into 
threat categories rather than their subspecialty curricula enabled all members of the team 
to have an exposure to the Systems Engineering Design Process from problem definition 
to design and analysis. The organization structure along with the curricular make-up of 
each group is shown in Figure7. 
 
 
Figure 7.  Port Security 2012 Organizational Layout 
 
The Port Security 2012 organization was defined by four threat categories 
(terrestrial, regional seaborne, source seaborne, port internal). While each team consisted 
of at least one SEA member, there was an unbiased assignment of TDSI members based 
on curricula. 
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 While the unbiased assignment of team members permitted the entire team to 
learn the fundamentals of the SEDP, this organizational structure created expertise 
deficiencies in some of the groups. While the IPTG had most of the information 
assurance students, the regional seaborne threats group did not have any MOVES 
personnel. Individual groups were permitted, when necessary, to seek advice and 
expertise from other groups and outsource their own expertise to different groups. This 
created an interactive culture that prevented groups from becoming isolated. Each group 
maintained a fundamental understanding of the purposes for each of the other groups. 
Meeting with the team leaders on a weekly basis, the project leader also disseminated key 
information to the entire team, facilitating interaction. 
 
E. METHOD 
PSS12 employed the SEDP to define, analyze, and articulate the port security and 
force protection issue. The SEDP consisted of three primary phases: problem definition, 
alternatives development, and modeling and analysis. The SEDP allowed PSS12 to look 
at the tasking requirements and the current situation to produce a relevant and feasible 
solution. When presented with the current conceptual issues, PSS12 defined the problem, 
analyzed the problem in terms of plausible alternative solutions, and articulated the 
feasible alternatives to decision-makers. It was the decision-maker’s responsibility to 
decide which alternative, if any, should be executed. The SEDP is designed to be a 
cyclical and iterative process. Following execution, the SEDP could be employed again 
to look at the future situation to devise a better relevant and feasible solution. 
Problem definition was the first and most important phase in the systems 
engineering design process. This phase provided the foundation in identifying the exact 
problem to solve. By performing the needs analysis, the group developed a clearer 
understanding of system components and functions necessary to carry out the desires of 
the various stakeholders. A clear understanding of system inputs and outputs in addition 
to the system composition aided in the formulation of an objectives hierarchy from which 
metrics were defined. 
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The second phase of the SEDP included the alternatives generation and the 
modeling & analysis processes. Several tools were used to generate all probable 
alternatives, eliminate infeasible alternatives, and obtain design alternatives that were 
able to be modeled. Using stochastic modeling through various agent-based modeling 
programs, measures of effectiveness for each alternative were obtained. These raw data 
elements were then used in the decision-making process to determine the best alternative. 
The decision-making process was the third phase of the SEDP. Using alternative 
scoring methodologies such as multi-attribute utility theory, sensitivity analysis, and cost-
benefit analysis, the measures of effectiveness amongst the different alternatives were 
compared and the alternatives themselves were ranked. The final decision was ultimately 
based on the decision-makers needs.  
The final phase of the SEDP was implementation. During this phase, the decision-
maker planned for action, executed the action, and constantly monitored and assessed that 
action. The implementation process also exceeded the scope of this project. As a new 
system is implemented, it could again be subject to the SEDP. The cyclic SEDP process 
organized and structured a problem and aided the development of a solution. 
 
F. CHRONOLOGY 
The SI3002 Project Management course from September to December 2006 
established the foundation for the integrated project. The course introduced SEA-11 to 
the two proposed integrated projects, the requirements for each of the projects, as well as 
a detailed tasking letter dated December 2006. A video teleconference was held between 
the SEA-11 and TDSI students in November 2006 to introduce TDSI students to the two 
projects and their scopes. From November 2006 to February 2006, PSS12 was involved 
in the problem definition phase of the SEDP. During this phase, the first Interim Progress 
Review (IPR) was held on February 15, 2007 to generate interest and feedback, to gain 
subject matter expertise from faculty, and to generate collaborative work with students 
from other NPS departments. 
Between the first IPR of February 15 and the second IPR of April 19, PSS12 
executed the design and analysis phase of the SEDP. This period was focused on 
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alternatives generation and feasibility screening as well as learning about the modeling 
resources available for use. Following the second IPR, inputs were used to fully develop 
mature models which simulated alternative courses of action. From April 19 to mid-May, 
PSS12 documented performance modeling, cost benefit analysis, and scenario results. 
The final results were shown to the NPS community and visitors during the final 
presentation on May 31 and documented in the final report submitted on June 1.  
In this report, four areas of port security were studied (terrestrial, regional 
seaborne, source seaborne, and port internal threats).  The Sage and Armstrong’s Systems 
Engineering Design Process was applied to each individual area.  The three phases of the 
Systems Engineering Design Process are the definition, development, and modeling and 
analysis phases.  Application of the process resulted in defining the problem for each 
area.  The purpose of the definition phase is to identify, quantify, and clarify the need that 
creates the problem and determine appropriate metrics to evaluate a systems utility.  It 
involved the identification of these needs and constraints so that a designed system may 
adequately address the needs whole remaining within the bounds of the constraints.  The 
development phase involved the construction of various alternative architectures and 
evaluating these architectures in regards to feasibility and quality (ensuring the 
architectures addresses stakeholder requirements).  The final stage was the modeling and 
analysis phase.  In this phase, software models were constructed to model the 
architectures selected by analyzing the feasibility and quality.  Some of the metrics 
selected in the definition phase were used to evaluate each modeled alternative.  The 
status quo and alternate architectures were implemented in the model by varying 
modeling parameters.  Data was collected from the model for analysis.   
Following the analysis of the collected data, a cost benefit analysis of each 
alternative was conducted.  The purpose of the cost benefit analysis was to evaluate the 
fiscal efficiency of each modeled alternative.  From this analysis, a stakeholder may draw 
a conclusion of where his money would be most effectively spent. 
In the final portion of this report, each group addressing the areas of port security 
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II. TERRESTRIAL THREATS GROUP 
A. PROBLEM DEFINITION 
1. Needs Analysis 
a. System Decomposition 
System decomposition allowed the TTG to identify the basic structure and 
major components of Port Security Strategy 2012. It enabled PSS12 to examine the 
complex interrelationships and limitations involved in handling and understanding the 
issues in planning, design, and management of port security.  The security of a port itself 
was a part of enlarging security of the surrounding area. The enlarged system relative to 
the PSS12 included the nation’s security, its economy, international trade and 
International Maritime Organization (IMO) standards, practices, and policies.  
Critical physical infrastructure includes power stations, command centers, 
the main access road to the port, fuel storage/distribution location, or passenger cruise 
ship terminal. Power disruption on the incoming electrical supply can cripple the daily 
operation of the port. Any physical damage to the command center may hinder port 
operations and any blockage on the main axial would prevent the access to the port. An 
attack on a fuel storage location would likely causes severe pollution. Other physical 
infrastructures which are less critical include cargo cranes, cargo containers and trailer 
vehicles 
Figure 8 displays the TTG subsystems. The Terrestrial Component 
consists of structural, operating and information flow within a set of boundaries restricted 





Figure 8. TTG System Decomposition 
 
The six subsystems of the TTG are the physical infrastructure, security 
measures, human factors, weather & environment, policy & standards, and the C4ISR 
network. Each subsystem played a role in analyzing terrestrial threat scenarios. 
The security measures subsystem includes private security forces hired by 
the port operator, Longshoremen, local police force, military force, civil defense force 
and security measures taken by the forces in the event of incident.  The security measures 
subsystem includes equipment used by the security forces for port protection. Existing 
port security measures includes guard patrols, guard post, physical barriers, personal 
identification cards and closed circuit television (CCTV) surveillance. Presently, there is 
no impetus for port operators within the same vicinity to enhance current security 
measures and co-sharing of information and incident reports. The layered defense 
implemented by the port operators is almost nonexistent.  
The human subsystem includes anyone who has dealt with the port 
including the Longshoremen’s Union. A human subsystem is included as part of the 
system because human error accounts for most of the incidents and events. The cognitive 
thinking and behavior of humans could be influenced by psychological operation. The 
emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and behavior of a terrorist must be synthesized 
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when security measures are initiated. Including the human factor in the system enables 
PSS12 to address the security strategy for the port in consideration of all aspects. 
The weather and environment subsystem could influence the 
implementation of port security measures. The performance of sensors and 
communication devices varies dependent upon the weather. The terrain and built up area 
surrounding the port can affect the link budget of the sensor as multi-path is a possibility. 
Weather was considered as an uncontrollable input as these conditions may influence 
daily operations.  
The policy and standards subsystem can be classified under the local and 
international segments. Local policy includes port operator’s internal rules, procedures, 
transactions and business processes. Local policies include state regulations, laws, and 
orders. International policies include international trade agreements, IMO standards, 
regional trade and co-operational agreements. The port operators must adhere to these 
standards and regulations in order to operate a port. International Policy and Standard 
was considered as a super system relative to the TTG. It was included in the studies 
because the terrestrial component’s daily operations are affected by the international rules 
and standards.   
The C4ISR subsystem is considered as one of the important subsystems 
for the TTG as the daily operations of the port depends on it. Presently, the port operator 
operates CCTV, High Frequency (HF) radio and walk talkie with some computers and 
networking devices in a stove-piped manner. 
 
b. Stakeholder Analysis 
The primary stakeholders concerned with the terrestrial threats aspect of 









Authorities & Agencies Port Operators & Users 
• Customs/ICE/CBP 
• USCG 
• Port Authority / MPA & 
PSA (Singapore) 
• Enforcement and security 
agencies (Singapore) 




• Ship Owners 
• Private Companies 
• Navy Captains 




Table 4.  TTG Stakeholders 
 
The TTG stakeholders were divided into two separate categories. The 
authorities and agencies had specified needs and constraints, while the port operators and 
users had another set of needs and constraints. Most authorities and agencies are 
associated with a level of government. Most port operators and users are associated with 
the private industry. 
The needs and constraints of each stakeholder can be further divided. 
Authorities and agencies are interested in continued port operations. From the perspective 
of the authorities, port operations must be maintained for region-wide economical 
reasons.  For example, when the west coast ports of the U.S. were shut down for 10 days 
in 2002, it resulted in $1B loss per day to the U.S. economy [3]. A stable and secure 
business environment would attract investors and promote economic growth.  Hence, the 
safety and security of the ports, harbors, facilities, and port premises are the major 
concerns against terrestrial threats [15].   
Security measures such as cargo checks and screenings are critical for 
deterring and denying terrorist threats and are of concern to port authorities and 
government agencies. It is desired that checks in addition to those provided by radiation 
portal monitors (radiation emission scanners) or similar systems be incorporated. The 
majority of the additional screening should be based on intelligence of possible threats. 
However, such measures have significant effects on the efficiency of cargo processing 
and shipment. The screening of each container for suspicious material would take time, 
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posing significant problems when all the containers are subjected to such checks.  Hence, 
a balance of commerce and security must be achieved. 
Proper access control is a vital requirement in stopping terrestrial threats.  
Occurrences such as Matthew Gaines’ three successful attempts in port security breaches 
in less than six months must be avoided [16].  The access to facilities by personnel and 
their vehicles such as visitors, vendors, truckers, employees and longshoremen must be 
controlled.  The implementation of biometric ID cards could minimize security breaches. 
Additionally, in the event of an attack/incident, the recovery process ought 
to be prompt so that normal port operations could resume expeditiously.  If port 
operations cease due to an incident and requires more than three days to recommence, it 
would have a national economic impact [3].  Reconstruction efforts would require 
consideration of economic, physical, social and psychological aspects as the port returns 
to normalcy.  This issue has not been addressed by PSS12 because it was beyond the 
scope of the assigned problem. 
The port operators must adhere to the security measures and guidelines 
laid down by the authorities in order for the overall security plan to be effective.  
Breaches or non-compliance to security legislation by port operators would cause a 
breakdown to the global security arrangement. 
The protracted time required for comprehensive screening of suspicious 
compounds has limited the number of scans conducted.  Screening systems with faster 
response and greater coverage could increase the screening rate. 
The port operators are primarily concerned with continued operation with 
minimal cost while maintaining an efficient and continuous flow of cargo. Additional 
costs incurred in enhancing security will erode profit margin. Since the port operators are 
profit-conscious, it is desired that the terminals continue to operate with minimal cost. 
While superior security measures are welcomed, they must not result in significant delays 
to cargo clearance as delays will reduce profits.  Hence, an efficient cargo flow is a 
priority among port operators. 
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c. Input-Output Model 
The input-output model illustrates the inputs required for a system to 
function and the outputs a system produces. The system described here is the terrestrial 




Figure 9.  TTG Input-Output Model 
 
Controllable inputs are items that are controllable by the port authority and 
port operators. There are two controllable inputs identified for the TTG: manpower and 
security measures. 
The effectiveness of the security personnel and port workers is partly 
determined by the training received. If sufficient training on security was provided, the 
probability that intrusions were detected increased. The manning of security personnel is 
also crucial. Training and manning levels are important controllable inputs to the port’s 
security. 
The security measures undertaken by the port authority and port operators 
play a key role in deterring intrusions. First, the infrastructure that port operators install, 
such as container scanners, would help to defray intruders from planting contraband in 
containers. In addition, the procedures that the port authority and port operators devise, 
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such as the harmful items for which to scan, will determine the effectiveness of these 
measures. The patrolling profile of all the security personnel will aid to deter intrusions. 
For example, areas identified as having higher probabilities of intrusions need to be 
patrolled more often. Communication among the stakeholders will address the speed and 
effectiveness of information flow, which is critical for situational awareness. Therefore, a 
good and robust communications network will ensure that all stakeholders are informed 
of any situations in the shortest time. Lastly, the types of sensors the port authority and 
port operators install will help detect the occurrences of intrusions. For example, 
chemical sensors can help sense the presence of certain chemical compounds and initiate 
an alarm to alert the operators. 
Uncontrollable inputs were items that are not in the domain of the port 
authority and port operators. There are four uncontrollable inputs identified for the 
terrestrial component: intelligence, legislation, terrorist intentions, and weather. 
The intelligence provided by the relevant government agencies involved in 
intelligence gathering will be important to the port authority and port operators as it will 
help alert them of any potential intrusions. Port authority and port operators can thereby 
heighten their security measures in hoping to avert these intrusions. 
The legislations that the federal and state governments enforces and 
determines the security measures that port authority and port operators take in order to 
meet the requirements. 
The intentions of the terrorists and the harm they are trying to cause are 
correlated to the funding received and their motivation. The scale of the attack is directly 
correlated to the amount of funding received. For example, if terrorists have the funding 
and opportunity to acquire WMDs, their attack will likely be of a much larger scale than 
using conventional bombs.  
Weather also determines the effectiveness of the in-place security 
measures. For example, a rain storm would greatly affect the performance of sensors or 
communications equipment along with the patrolling profile of the security personnel.  
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Intended outputs were the desired outcomes of the system which involved 
deterring any intrusions and keeping the port safe for prolonged operations. The 
identified intended outputs were a safe port with no WMDs and sustained port operations.   
A safe port will increase the customers’ confidence and ensures the 
customers continue to employ the port as a means for shipping goods. On the other hand, 
an unsafe port will increase insurance premiums and raise the cost of business. Customers 
would employ another port instead. For example, a series of intrusions causing 
explosions that destroyed goods would create doubt on the safety of any port. Hence, a 
safe port is a vital component to ensure the port’s continued economic survival.  
WMDs in port present enormous problems. Hence, it is crucial that 
security personnel maintain their vigilance in scanning for any incoming WMDs. A 
WMD detonation in port would cause panic and massive destruction that will take 
extensive amounts of time for the port to recover its operations. The customers’ 
confidence would decline and the morale of the port workers would be negatively 
affected.  
The port has to remain operating for the movement of cargo and the 
support of economic activity. A closed port would increase the transportation cost of 
goods coming into the region as goods would have to be transshipped elsewhere before 
using another mode of transport into the region. Hence, sustained port operations are 
imperative for commerce. 
The by-products are the undesired outcomes due to the security measures 
implemented to enhance the security of the port. They are identified as slower commerce 
and higher operating cost. The installed security measures will inevitably reduce the 
movement rate of goods in and out of the port. Containers need to be scanned more 
thoroughly. Any legitimate goods that can be used for masquerading as WMDs need to 
be checked more frequently to err on the side of safety. All these measures will lengthen 
the time the container will remain in the port and therefore, slow down commerce. To 
enhance the security, more equipment has to be purchased and more security personnel 
have to be hired. Extensive training has to be provided to the port workers and more 
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frequent patrols have to be allotted. All of these will definitely increase the operating cost 
for the port authority and port operators. 
 
d. Functional Analysis 
PSS12 used functional flow diagrams to help better understand the process 
of functions in denial and deterrence of terrorist threats. Figure 10 shows the flow of 




Figure 10.  TTG Denial Functional Flow Diagram 
 
For denial to be achieved, first it is essential to collect all available 
intelligence, then scan for threats. When a threat presents itself, it is necessary to identify 
the threat. If the potential threat turned out to not be a threat, the process reverted to 
scanning for threats. If the threat was actual, the next step was to neutralize the threat. In 
order to neutralize the threat, it is possible to use either lethal or non-lethal force. Figure 





Figure 11. TTG Deterrence Functional Flow Diagram 
 
The functional flow diagram is similar to a two player sequential game.  
First the port makes a decision on how much security to implement.  Secondly the 
terrorist views the port’s apparent security, and if the security was adequate the terrorist 
determines that attacking the port is too risky and attacks a different target.  If the 
security is not adequate, the terrorist attacks the port.  Following a terror attack on the 
port, the port is forced (through political pressure) to implement additional security.  At 
this point, the process repeats with a new terrorist viewing the port’s security measures. 
 
2. Objectives Hierarchy 
PSS12 uses the threats, scenarios, operational environment, system 
decomposition, input/output model, and the stakeholder analysis to develop an objectives 










































Figure 12.  TTG Overall Objectives Hierarchy 
 
The objectives hierarchy is further expanded in Figure 13 and Figure 14 with the 
objectives hierarchy for deter and deny.  It is important to note that respond (post attack) 









Figure 14.  TTG Deny Objectives Hierarchy 
 
The objectives hierarchy is useful because as the reader looked up in the diagram, 
it answers the question “why” and when looking down it answers “how.” The top 
objective of the objective hierarchy is to prevent undesired vehicular traffic from 
achieving access to the port. After PSS12 conducted its stakeholder analysis and system 
decomposition, it was determined that the stakeholder does not only want a safe port, but 
also an efficient port. This need is expressed in the next lower level of objectives which 
includes both port security and the flow of commerce.  The flow of commerce divides 
into two lower end functions, import cargo and export cargo.  Port security had more 
complex sub-objectives.  
The systems attributes objectives accounted for the attributes that the stakeholders 
wanted in the system. The sub-objectives of reliability, availability, and maintainability, 
social acceptability and ease of implementation represent the properties desired in the 
system. The stakeholders preferred that the system perform when needed without 
excessive maintenance or downtime. The stakeholders wanted the system to be 
acceptable to the public to avoid public outcry, boycotts, or lawsuits. The stakeholders 
also desired the system to be easily implemented so that it would not hinder normal port 
operations. 
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The sub-objectives of security are to protect (pre-attack) and respond (post 
attack). Protect is described by its sub-objectives of deter and deny.  Deterrence is 
keeping the terrorist from attempting an attack on the port, and denial is stopping an 
attack while in progress.   
The objective of deterrence has its own objective hierarchy and its two sub- 
objectives which are to prevent physical attack attempts and to prevent the attempted 
importation of WMDs and terrorist cells. In order to prevent an attempted physical attack, 
it is necessary for the port to maintain the perception that it has adequate security 
measures.  In order to accomplish this task, the sub-objective of preventing physical 
attack attempts is adequate sensors in place: adequate visible physical barriers, visible 
security checkpoints, and physical patrols.  The sub-objectives of preventing attempted 
importation of WMD or terror cells are similar to those of prevent physical attack 
attempts. They include: random inspections, intelligence-based inspections, sensors (both 
the right type of sensors and an appropriate number), and an effective manifest screening 
process.   
The sub-objectives of denial include: the neutralization of threats, gathering 
available intelligence, identification of threats, and employment of C2. In order to 
neutralize threats PSS12 either uses lethal or non-lethal force.  The sub-objectives for 
identifying threats were to localize, detect, scan, classify, and track.  There were two sub 
functions of C2 and they included report and direct. 
The primary metric to be modeled is the total system effectiveness, which is 
defined by the number of attempted attacks that failed divided by the total number of 
attacks. Tracing up the objectives hierarchy, this metric measures the system performance 
in denying terrorists from accessing the port.  
Table 5 depicts the measures of effectiveness and measures of performance that 




Table 5.  Evaluation Metrics for TTG Objectives 
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It is important to note that the port equivalent operating days were a factor that 
accounted for the fraction of the port that was not operational for a specific period of 
time.  For example, if 30% of the port was non operational for 10 days, the port would 
have been non operational for 3 whole days. 
 
B. DESIGN AND ANALYSIS 
1. Alternatives Generation 
The TTG began its alternative generation phase by examining the functions that 
the system needs to perform.  These functions are derived from the threat scenarios in the 
introduction.  Once these functions were identified, the group used a morphological chart 
and divergent thinking to identify the possible alternatives for each function. Tables 6, 7, 
and 8 on the following page show the morphological chart developed by the TTG to 
address the terrestrial threat aspect of port security. 
During the modeling and analysis phase of the project, the TTG scoped the 
problem to the “truck runs the gate” scenario. During this analysis, the TTG considered 
four alternatives (status quo, armed guard, spike strips, and pop-up barriers) under several 
different configurations described in detail in the modeling plan. The remainder of the 
alternative generation phase was not included in the TTG’s modeling and analysis and 





Table 6.  Terrestrial Threats Morphological Chart (Section 1) 
 
Truck Bomb sneaked through gate Terrorist Importation Nuke/Dirty Bomb Importation
Status Quo Status Quo Status Quo
Biometric driver ID Increase existing random checks Increase random checks
consolidated access list Container embedded sensors increase Intel based checks
at gate container inspections Ammonia/CO2 sensors Container embedded sensors
hand held sensors for guards Thermal sensors PsyOps deterrence on the level of scan check
scannable appointment ticket (for truck driver) Air vent sensor
Multiple layer checks RFID on containers
Enhancing robustness of security procedures Weight discrepancy measurement
RFID on trucks with cleared access Sniffer dogs
Sniffer dogs
Sensor Sensor Sensor
Status Quo Status Quo Status Quo
Biometric driver ID detector container sensors
Explosives detection system (dogs, handheld sensor etc ammonia sensors
Receiver for transponder on trucks thermal sensors










increase Intel based checks
Increase # available sensors
Container embedded sensors
PsyOps deterrence on the level of scan checks
Sensor
Status Quo
Chemical swab detector  
 
Table 8.  Terrestrial Threats Morphological Chart (Section 3) 
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In most cases, after the alternatives addressing each function of the system were 
generated in the morphological chart, each function was linked to form a complete 
alternative.  The TTG did not link the different function alternatives together to form 
complete alternatives because each function alternative was assumed to be a stand alone 
subsystem that had little dependence on the other elements of the system.  When 
combining all possible permutations of alternatives, there were tens of thousands of 
alternatives. This vast number made selecting complete alternatives unrealistic. Instead of 
examining complete alternative systems, the TTG decided to look at each function 
alternative individually.  This method would allow the group to select the best alternative 
for each function and then link the optimal subsystems together to form the optimal 
complete system.  It is important that to note that each proposed alternative was in 
addition to the status quo, and in under no circumstances would the security be reduced 
from the status quo. 
 
a. Truck Running Fence Scenario 
In this scenario, the perpetrators attempt to make a forced entry into the 
port by penetrating the perimeter fence. If the perimeter protection of the port is weak and 
the attackers have no reason to make a stealthy entry into the port, this scenario is 
plausible. An example is a suicide bomber in a vehicle bomb employing this method of 
entry to get to his target within the port. Commercial perimeter fence is composed of a 
single layer of chain-link (mesh) fence that could not withstand a large impact force. If a 
heavy vehicle, such as a full-size truck, impacted the fence with sufficient momentum, it 
could easily penetrate the fence.   
To prevent this scenario from happening, the perimeter fences of the ports 
need to be strong. There were several alternatives than enhanced the strength of the 
perimeter barriers. They could have been implemented as a replacement to existing 
defenses or added to existing defenses to make them stronger. Combinations of them 
could have also been implemented to form a layered defense. 
 
  50
• Concrete Fence.  Concrete walls can be erected along 
the entire perimeter of the port, instead of the chain-
link fence.  They are structurally stronger than chain-
link fences, however they are more expensive. 
 
• Concrete Blocks.  Concrete blocks can be used in 
combination with chain-link fences.  They would be 
lined outside the fence to form an additional layer of 
barrier that is heavier and sturdier. 
 
• Road Rails.  Road rails, similar to those used along 
highways, can be used to complement existing chain-




• Spike Strips.  Spike strips can be used to line the 
perimeter to stop vehicles by puncturing the tires.  




• Ditch/Moat.  A ditch or moat bordering the perimeter 
of the port can be used as a barrier.  It would have to 
be physically wide and deep enough to stop a vehicle 
trying to breach it.  This method would occupy much 
space when installed. 
 
• Embankment.  An embankment is a barrier made of 
earth wall.  Just like the ditch/moat, it would occupy 
much space when installed and also it would have had 
to be high enough to stop a truck. 
  
• Remote Machine Gun.  A weapon system can be 
strategically positioned along the perimeter to 
neutralize any vehicle that attempted forced entry. 
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b. Truck Running Gate Scenario 
Similar to the scenario of truck penetrating fences, threats could have also 
made a forced entry into the port by driving through the gates.  Gates with simple barriers 
like “drop-down” arms were generally inadequate against any deliberate forced entry.  To 
reduce the possibility of such a scenario requires measures that accomplish two things.  
First, the measures have to be able to effectively slow down any vehicles approaching the 
gates.  Secondly, the measure has to be able to effectively stop or prevent any vehicle that 
attempted to crash though the gates. 
The alternatives are shown below.  Several of them are similar to those 
presented for the Truck Runs Fence scenario.  They can be implemented individually or 
combined to form a more effective layer defense. 
 
• Concrete Blocks.  Concrete blocks can be arranged in 
a formation at the final approaches to the gates.  They 
serve to force vehicles to slow down while 
approaching the gates. 
 
• Spike Strips.  Spike strips can be used to stop vehicles 
by puncturing the tires.  They can be activated 
manually or automatically when a vehicle attempts to 
run through the gate.  
 
 
• Pop-up Barriers.  Pop-up barriers could be embedded 
in the road, usually immediately after the gate.  They 
can be activated remotely when a vehicle makes a 
forced entry.  These barriers would stop vehicles from 
advancing further by puncturing tires, presenting a 
strong barrier such as bollards, etc. 
 
• Drop-down Arm.  Though drop-down arms are 
generally ineffective against forced entry, they serve 
the purpose of clearly indicating a controlled access 
through the gate.  They provide a convenient way of 
controlling flow through the gate and make any 




• Draw Bridge.  A draw bridge would be very effective 
in preventing entry through the gate if it can be drawn 
before the attackers reach the bridge.   
  
• Armed Guards.  The existing guards at the gates can 
be equipped with firearms.  The firearms could be 
fired at the intruding vehicles to immobilize them. 
   
• Speed Bumps.  Speed bumps are used to force vehicles 
to reduce their speed while approaching the gate.  By 
slowing the speed of approach, the vehicle had less 
momentum to crash through the gates. 
 
• Electromagnetic Pulse Gun.  EM pulse can be used to 
cause the electronic circuitries onboard vehicles to 
malfunction, causing the vehicles’ engines to shut 
down.  This technology is not yet mature. 
 
c. Truck Bombing Power Substation Scenario 
This scenario was similar to the two above, but it was made under the 
assumption that a truck with a bomb had penetrated the port’s perimeter and intended to 
attack the port’s critical infrastructure which could include a power substation, fuel 
storage/distribution location, or passenger cruise ship terminal. All of the alternatives for 
this scenario were similar to those for the previous two scenarios, but instead of 
protecting the entire port perimeter, they kept the truck from reaching the critical 
infrastructure (power substation). 
 
d. IED Smuggled Through Gate Scenario 
In this scenario, the terrorists would attempt to enter the port legitimately 
under the cover of disguise and/or false pretence. The attacker driving the truck could be 
an employee of a trucking company who had infiltrated into the trucking network for the 
purpose of a terrorist act in the port. The terrorists could also be disguised with forged 
documents. There is the possibility of assistance from within the port if the terrorists have 
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infiltrated into the port security network. A sizable amount of explosives would have to 
be smuggled into the port by the attackers. 
The solutions to this scenario address two issues. First, the integrity of the 
security procedures at the port entrance have to be intact at all times. The procedures 
have to be robust to prevent attackers from infiltrating with forged documents and insider 
help.  Next, the checks and inspections measures at the port entrance must have a high 
probability of detecting explosive devices.  
 
• Biometric Driver ID.  All authorized truck drivers 
would have biometric identifications.  These IDs 
would allow for the matching of the drivers’ biometric 
data with the security system’s data.  These features 
would make forgery difficult.   
  
• Consolidated Access Lists. These lists serve to 
enhance the robustness of port security measures. It is 
a list containing information on authorized entries into 
the port for a given day.  The lists could have 
information such as the driver’s information, truck 
license number, and cargo manifest.  Any driver 
and/or truck not listed will be subjected to more 
stringent checks and inspections.  The list can be 
complemented by a barcode appointment ticketing 
system.  This is an appointment slip with barcode for 
all trucks that are scheduled to enter the port.  Barcode 
scanning allows for a faster rate of processing.  
  
• Multiple Layer Checks.  This serves to enhance the 
robustness of port security measures.  Multi-layered 
checks remove the reliance on a single point of 
defense.  The probability of the perpetrators slipping 
through a few layers of defense would be less than that 
of a single layer of defense. 
   
• Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) on Trucks with 
Cleared Access.  Trucks certified for access into the 
port would be tagged with RFID.  This system allows 
for the quick processing of incoming trucks when 
scanning for unauthorized trucks that attempt to sneak 
into the port.   
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• Container Inspections at Gates.  Inspections of 
containers can be conducted at the gates.   The 
inspections can be done by x-ray machines which are 
less labor intensive and have a faster processing rate 
than humans.  Inspections can be carried out by 
guards, but it would be more labor intensive and much 
slower. 
  
• Handheld Sensors for Guards.  Guards could use 
handheld explosive detectors to scan for hidden 
explosives in trucks. 
  
• Dogs.  Dogs can be used to detect certain explosives in 
trucks.   
 
e. Radiological Weapons Scenario 
The international Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was initiated 
for countries to commit themselves in limiting the spread of nuclear weapons since 1968 
[17]. Not all countries have endorsed this treaty. The smuggling of nuclear bombs by 
terrorists into a country is less likely as considerable international efforts and policy such 
as NPT have been put in place to reduce the proliferation of nuclear weapons and 
material. Nevertheless, sufficient measures have to be implemented in case a radical state 
in possession of nuclear weapons decided to support a terrorists group. Failure to detect 
nuclear weapons importation will result in tremendous consequences.  
Radiological Dispersal Devices (RDD), commonly known as dirty bombs, 
are different from nuclear bomb because they do not use fission or fusion to produce an 
explosion; however, they use conventional explosives to scatter radioactive material in 
order to contaminate a large area. Based on the United States Regulatory Commission 
(URC), more than 2100 organizations in the state are licensed to use radioactive materials 
[18]. Therefore, the possibility of terrorists obtaining the radioactive material combined 
with a detonator to form a dirty bomb does exist. Dirty bombs are considered WMD 
because they cause extensive economic damage, through the expensive cleanup required 
following an attack, and by preventing real estate from being used for its intended 
purpose. The detonation of a dirty bomb would also result in illness of the victims within 
the vicinity. The physical damage caused would not be catastrophic. It would create 
  55
inconvenient, massive disruption and adverse psychological effects on the victims as well 
as contaminate a large area, resulting in large economic losses.  
Detecting radioactive materials has always been challenging. Nuclear 
weapons contain large amounts of plutonium and uranium required for nuclear fission 
[19]. The weapons grade plutonium and uranium are very dense and exhibit unique 
properties. There are three basic ways of detecting these materials based on their 
properties. Passive detection of the radiation emitted by these radioactive materials, 
active detection involving radio-graphing (“x-raying”) the materials, and irradiating an 
object with neutrons or high energy photons and detecting the particles emitted by the 
resulting induced fissions. The first method is the safest but least efficient as it may be 
evaded by terrorists. The second method can overcome some evasion but it is costly, 
inconvenience and complicated. The third method poses a human safety risk.  
According to the CBP website, CBP operates the following inspection and 
surveillance technologies to detect nuclear and radioactive materials [20]: 
 
• Radiation Portal Monitor (RPM): A passive, non-intrusive means to 
screen trucks, cargo containers, vehicles, and other conveyances for 
radiation emanating from nuclear devices, dirty bombs, special nuclear 
materials, natural sources, and isotopes. 
 
• Personal Radiation Detector: A small, but highly sensitive, device carried 
by CBP officers at ports of entry and CBP Border Patrol agents at 
highway checkpoints. It will sound an alarm if radiation is detected during 
an inspection 
 
• Radiation Isotope Identifiers: A hand-held instrument capable of detecting 
gamma and neutron emissions from radioactive sources, including nuclear, 
medical and industrial isotopes. CBP officers use this device to determine 
the exact identity of a radioactive source causing an alarm 
 
• Large-scale Gamma-ray/X-ray Imaging Systems: Produce transmission 
and reflected images of the contents of a cargo container, rail car, vehicle 
or trailer-truck. CBP officers analyze these images to determine where 
there are anomalies associated with the cargo listed on the manifest. There 
are 166 systems in use, with more to be added shortly.  
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The CBP works closely with the port operators, port authority, USCG and 
other agencies and use the most recent technology for the detection of nuclear and 
radioactive materials at the various check points. In addition, they have implemented a 
layered defense security strategy by extending the surveillance zone to the host countries 
through the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT). These initiatives 
and activities have hardened the security of the border but presently not every port is 
equipped with the same capability. To deter and prevent the smuggling of radio active 
materials, every port needs to be equipped with the nuclear and radioactive detectors.  
Alternatives for detecting the importation of radioactive material are as 
follows: 
• Status Quo. All containers are scanned for radioactive 
cargo before leaving the source port.  Detection of 
radiation triggers further screening. 
  
• Increase the number of in-depth inspections. These 
inspections could be both intelligence based or 
completely random  
  
• Smart Container. The general purpose containers 
usually come in standard sizes. The container number 
and owner information are displayed on the external 
wall of containers. A sensor integrated with radio 
frequency could be housed inside of a container to 
detect radioactive material. If the container detects 
radiation, it would signal that it requires additional 
screening. 
  
• Psychological Operations (PSYOPS). PSYOPS are 
planned operations to convey selected, truthful 
information and indicators to foreign audiences to 
influence the behavior of their governments, 
organizations, groups, and individuals favorable to the 
originator’s objective [21]. The methods of delivering 
PSYOPS could be through email, leaflets, TV 
broadcast and radio. In this context, PSYOPS could be 
implemented within the port to mislead terrorists, 
making them believe that every port is equipped with 
adequate biological, chemical and nuclear sensors. This 
likely would deter many terrorists from using the port 
as a means to smuggle WMDs.  
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f. Biological and Chemical Weapons Scenario 
Biological and chemical weapons are considered WMDs. The 1925 
Geneva Protocol and 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention treaties restrict 
countries from acquiring, developing, stockpiling biological agents outside of peaceful 
purposes [22]. However, not every country signed these treaties.  
Detecting biological and chemical weapons at the port proves to be a 
challenge since a small amount of these microorganisms and materials can be easily 
concealed. Nerve agents such as VX and biological agents such as anthrax are extremely 
lethal and pose a significant risk as terrorist weapons. The material and equipment used 
for biological and chemical weapons production are similarly used for normal scientific 
research as well. According to Dr. Kosal, the detection of chemical and biological agents 
proves to be almost impossible for “detect to warn” scenario when the agents or 
chemicals are contained in a sealed environment [23]. Evaluation time for some of the 
biological bacteria could exceed 24 hours. In addition, there is no single detector that can 
be used to detect various biological and chemical weapons because of their unique 
characteristics and each detector has its own drawbacks and limitations. Nevertheless, 
appropriate biological and chemical detectors must be used in port to detect any leakage 
or smuggling of such materials.   
Alternatives for detecting the importation of chemical and biological 
weapons are as follows: 
 
• Status Quo. In depth screening of random containers as 
well as containers that CBP determined to be of 
increased risk through a manifest screening process. 
  
• Increased in depth inspections. These inspections could 
be both intelligence based or completely random.   
  
• Smart Container. A sensor integrated with radio 
frequency can be housed inside a container to detect 
chemical and biological compound. Some nerve agent 
gases are denser than the others and exhibit certain 
properties when released. Therefore, the placement of 
sensor within the container needs to be studied for  
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effective detection. When the sensor detects some 
abnormality, it would send the information to the 
nearest base station to alert the authority.  
 
• PSYOPS. The same as PSYOPS previously discussed 
in the radiological weapon section. 
  
• Increase the number of sensors available to CBP. This 
alternative required CBP to procure more chemical and 
biological sensors and to use these sensors to screen 
imported cargo.  
 
g. Terrorist Cell Importation Scenario 
In this scenario, a terrorist organization attempts to import a terrorist cell 
inside a modified cargo container.  The successful importation of terrorists would allow 
the cell uncontrolled access to the importing country, where they would present a 
substantial threat to the populace and infrastructure. 
Alternatives for the terrorist cell importation scenario are as follows: 
 
• Status Quo. In depth screening on random containers as 
well as containers that CBP determined to be of 
increased risk through a manifest screening process. 
  
• Increase the number of in-depth inspections. These 
inspections could be both intelligence based or 
completely random  
  
• Smart Container. A sensor could be housed inside a 
container to detect the presence of personnel. 
  
• Weight Discrepancy Measurement. This alternative 
requires that each imported container be weighed, and 
its weight compared against the anticipated weight of 




h. Sensor Solution Alternatives 
This section includes the available sensor alternatives to prevent or detect 
the occurrence of the above scenarios.  It is important to note that several of these sensors 
are part of the status quo and others would be useful additions to those currently 
employed.   
Truck Running Fence Sensor Alternatives 
• Visual 
 
• Guard Tower 
 
• Intrusion Location and Video Assessment System (RBtec VIDAlert System) 
[24] 
 
(1) This is a PC-based Intrusion Detection & Video Monitoring 
System is capable of integrating with other sensors, thus fulfilling the 
operational need for intrusion detection and video assessment. 
 
(2) Any intrusion attempt is identified by a real-time presentation of 
alarms and video picture by automatic synchronized camera movement in 
the direction of the affected alarm zone.  The intruder's picture is 
presented either in motion or in still "freeze" mode and is stored in the 




Figure 15.  VIDAlert CCTV System 
 
• Microphonic Cable Fence Disturbance Sensor (IntelliFLEX) [25] 
 
(1) IntelliFLEX uses microphonic intrusion detection for outdoor, 
fence-mounted perimeter security applications. Utilizing signals generated 
by the minute flexing of a coaxial sensor cable, specific characteristic 
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intrusion signatures are analyzed. It could detect an intruder cutting 
through, climbing on or lifting the fence fabric. 
 
(2) Each IntelliFLEX zone (two per Signal Processor) could protect 
approximately 950 ft of eight ft high metal fabric fence. For fences up to 
12 ft, a double pass of the cable at equal vertical distances is required. In 
most cases, facility perimeters were configured in shorter zones to match 





Figure 16.  Intelli-FLEX Network Configuration  
 
• Fiber Optic Cable Fence Disturbance Sensor (IntelliFIBER) [26] 
 
(1) IntelliFIBER uses fiber optic intrusion detection for outdoor, 
fence-mounted perimeter security applications. Utilizing signals generated 
by the minute flexing of a fiber optic sensor cable, IntelliFIBER can detect 
an intruder cutting through, climbing on or lifting the fence fabric. 
 
(2) Each IntelliFIBER zone consists of up to 3280 ft of fiber optic 
sensor cable. A single pass of cable is required to protect an eight ft high 
metal fabric fence. For fences up to 12 ft, a double pass of the cable at 
equal vertical distances are required. In most cases, facility perimeters are 
configured in shorter zones to match CCTV assessment capabilities and to 





Figure 17.  Intelli-FIBERT Configuration 
 
• Buried Cable Intrusion Detection System (Perimitrax) [27] 
 
(1) Perimitrax is a covert perimeter intrusion detection system based 
on an invisible electromagnetic field around buried sensor cables. If an 
intruder disturbs the field, an alarm is sounded. It uses a large volumetric 
field to detect moving targets based on their electrical conductivity, size 
and movement.  A person or vehicle crossing through the field is detected 
while small animals and birds are ignored. Common environmental false 
alarm sources like foliage, rain, snow and blowing sand are easily filtered 




Figure 18.  Permitrax System 
 
• Electrostatic Field Disturbance Sensor (IntelliFIELD) [28] 
 
(1) IntelliFIELD is a terrain-following, volumetric sensor that creates 
an electrostatic field between parallel field and sense wires. An intruder is 
detected when the electrostatic field that is created between field and sense 
wires is disturbed. The wires do not need to be touched in order to disturb 
the field. The wires could be mounted on freestanding poles, walls, roofs, 





Figure 19.  Intelli-FIELD System 
 
• Microwave Protection System (IntelliWAVE) [29] 
 
(1) The IntelliWAVE microwave intrusion detection sensor is a 
volumetric, high-performance system that creates a microwave field 
between transmitter and receiver units in order to detect intruders based on 
their size and speed. 
 
(2) It uses a separate transmitter and receiver and is installed inside of 
a physical barrier, such as a fence or wall. Since the detection field is quite 
large, the sensor is difficult to avoid or defeat. Because of their modest 
cost, microwaves are frequently used for short zones at gates in place of a 




Figure 20.  Intelli-WAVE System 
 
Truck Running Gate Sensor Alternatives 
• Visual (as per Truck Runs Fence Scenario) 
 
• CCTV (as per Truck Runs Fence Scenario) 
 
• Speed Camera (RedFlex Lasercam) [30] 
 
(1) Redflex’s Lasercam Speed Camera System combined digital image 
capture with highly accurate laser speed detection. Lasercam™ captures 
two images of an infringing vehicle concurrently; a wide angle lens 
captures an environmental image of the vehicle in its immediate 
surroundings and a telephoto lens captures a close up image of the vehicle 
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and its registration plate. This ensures effective identification of a targeted 




Figure 21.  RedFlex Lasercam System 
 
Truck Bombing Power Substation Sensor Alternatives 
• Visual (as per Truck Runs Fence Scenario) 
 
• CCTV (as per Truck Runs Fence Scenario) 
 
• Speed Detector (as per Truck Runs Gate Scenario) 
 
• RFID Cargo Tag [31] 
 
(1) The Cargo Tag is an all-weather RFID tag with the durability 
required for 24-hour, outdoor exposure in most environmental conditions. 
It delivers accurate and reliable read performance of up to 40 ft, thus 
achieving maximum benefits in RFID cargo and asset tracking 
applications. 
 
(2) The tag is tuned to utilize its aluminum backplate to improve the 
signal. The integrated antenna is designed to deliver superior read range. 
Additionally, since there is no battery to change, this passive tag is 






Figure 22.  RFID Cargo Tag 
 
Truck Sneaking Past Gate Sensor Alternatives 
• Biometric ID System for Truck Drivers [32] 
 
(1) Fingerprint Identification. Fingerprint identification involves 
comparing the pattern of ridges and furrows on the fingertips, as well as 
the minutiae points (ridge characteristics that occur when a ridge splits 
into two, or ends) of a specimen print with a database of prints on file.  
Good fingerprint scanner technology is readily available.  However, it 




Figure 23.  Fingerprint Identification (DHS IDENT System) 
 
(2) Hand Geometry Biometrics. Hand geometry readers work in harsh 
environments, they do not require clean conditions, and form a very small 
dataset. It is not regarded as an intrusive test. This is often the 
authentication method of choice in industrial environments.   
 
(3) As the human hand is not unique, the finger length, thickness, and 
curvature could be used for verification but not for identification.  
However, it is possible to devise a method by combining various 
individual features to attain robust verification. Hence, it can be 
envisioned that fingerprints are used for (infrequent) identification and 





Figure 24. Hand Geometry Biometrics 
 
• Vehicle Explosive Detection System (Rapiscan Systems Neutron Scanner) 
[33] 
 
(1) The Vehicle Explosive Detection System is an automatic, non-
intrusive inspection system that detects explosives and chlorinated forms 
of class-A explosives. The neutron inspection technology is unique in 
providing material specific detection, and is well suited to meet the 
requirements for protection against terrorist vehicle bombs. 
 
(2) The neutrons create gamma-ray signals when they interact with the 
elemental ingredients of the inspected object. The gamma-ray energies are 
unique to the elements in the inspected object. If the gamma-ray signatures 
match those in a threat database, the system automatically triggers an 




Figure 25.  Vehicle Explosive Detection Systems 
 
• Hand-Held Trace Detector (SABRE 4000) [34] 
 
(1) This is capable of detecting threats from explosives, chemical 
warfare agents, toxic industrial chemicals and narcotics.  It can detect and 
identify over 40 of these threat substances in approximately 15 seconds.  It 
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is capable of analyzing either trace particle or vapor samples, allowing the 
operator to apply the ideal sampling technique for the suspicious 
substance. 
 
Figure 26.  Hand-Held Trace Detector 
 
• RFID Reader (Symbol XR400) [35] 
 
(1) The RFID fixed reader is designed to function as part of a 
complete RFID system for accurately tracking the location and status of 
inventory and assets. It has the ability to read, update and transfer RFID 
tag information in real time to the enterprise systems.  
 
Terrorist Cell Importation Sensor Alternatives 
• Heartbeat Detector (Advanced Vehicle Interrogation And Notification 
System) [36] 
 
(1) This system detects the presence of people hidden in vehicles. 
Using data from special sensors, it finds the shock waves generated by the 
beating heart, which coupled to any surface or object with which the body 
is in contact. AVIAN collected the data and analyzes it using advanced 
signal processing algorithms to detect a hidden person in less than 1 
minute.  It is a cost effective method to accurately and quickly search 




Figure 27.  AVIAN Heartbeat Detector 
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• Carbon Dioxide Sensor [37] 
 
(1) This is designed to measure the carbon dioxide concentration in a 
confined environment. In a normal outdoor environment, the level of 
carbon dioxide is approximately 400 ppm. In the event that people or 
living creatures are inside a container, they would exhale carbon dioxide 
and its concentration would increase to a higher level depending on the 
number of living beings and the duration of stay within the container. The 
measurements could be obtained by inserting a sampling probe into the 
container for three minutes without opening the door. 
 
• X-ray Scanner (Rapiscan Systems) [38] 
 
(1) High energy X-ray systems are designed to meet the full range of 
cargo inspection applications.  The linear accelerator X-ray sources can 
penetrate dense cargo. The resulting high quality images enable inspectors 
to detect hidden contraband including weapons, explosives, weapons of 
mass destruction, drugs, and undeclared goods. 
 
(2) Such scanners can be Mobile Systems (truck-mounted, road 
mobile and easily relocatable), or Gantry and Portal Systems (drive-thru 




Figure 28.  X-Ray Scanners 
 
• Gamma-Ray Scanner (Rapiscan Systems) [39] 
 
(1) Gamma-Ray systems have an intrinsically lower radiation field 
when compared to equivalent X-ray systems. This provides a smaller 
operational area and exclusion safety zone. While such systems require 
less maintenance and lower cost of ownership than equivalent X-ray 
systems, the radioactive source (Cobalt-60) requires replacement every 
five years. They are designed to detect hidden contraband including 




(2) Such scanners could be Mobile Systems (provides the greatest 
operational versatility), Gantry Systems (provides complete inspection of 
stationary and unmanned vehicles, cargo and palletized materials) and 





Figure 29.  Gamma Ray Scanners 
 
• RFID Reader (as per the IED smuggled through gate scenario) 
 
Radiological Weapons Sensor Alternatives 
• Vehicle Explosive Detection System (as per the IED smuggled through gate 
scenario) 
 
• Radiation Portal Monitor (SAIC AT-900 Series) [40] 
 
(1) The Radiation Portal Monitor (RPM) is a complete vehicle 
monitoring system used for the rapid detection of unknown hidden 
radioactive sources in moving vehicles. A full color console guides a 





Figure 30.  Radiation Portal Monitors 
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Biological and Chemical Weapons Sensor Alternatives 
• Hand-Held Trace Detector (as per the IED smuggled through gate scenario) 
 
According to Dr. Kosal’s paper, the following sensors are available for biological 
and chemical weapon detection; however, the majority of these sensors are not currently 
feasible for detecting chemical and biological weapons in shipping containers [23]. 
Biological detectors include the following: 
• Pointer Detection  
• Aerosol Particle Sizers (APS)  
• Immunoassays  
• Genetic Detection  
• Mass Spectrometry 
• Surface Acoustical Wave Sensors  
 
• Remote Detection 




(1) Biowatch is a biological detector network constructed by US 
Department of Homeland Security with Environmental Protection Agency 
and the Centers for Disease Control to analyze the contents of the 
atmosphere for biological weapon agents. 
  
Chemical weapon detectors available for detecting different types of chemical 
compounds include [23]:  
 
• Pointer Detection  
• Colorimetric Indicators 
• Electrochemical or chemiresistor detectors 
• Ion Mobility Spectrometry  
• Mass Spectroscopy  with gas chromatography 
• Flame Photometry 
• Photoionization  
• Surface Acoustical Wave Sensors  







• Non-Destructive Evaluation Sensor  
• Isotopic Neutron Spectroscopy 
• Standoff Detector 
• Infrared Spectroscopy 
• Raman Spectroscopy 
 
 
C. MODELING AND ANALYSIS 
1. Modeling Plan 
The TTG began the modeling and analysis phase of the project by examining the 
threat scenarios presented earlier in the paper. After considerable thought, the TTG broke 
the threats into two separate groups for potential modeling. The two groups were 
imported container screening models and perimeter/gate security models.  After further 
investigation, the TTG decided that modeling the perimeter security would prove more 
useful than attempting to develop a container screening model. The TTG came to this 
conclusion because there is considerable work currently being done on container 
screening, both in the U.S. and around the world.  The TTG also concluded that it would 
be more useful to model perimeter security because accurately modeling domestic 
container screening would require the use of classified material, which is beyond the 
scope of this paper.  It is noteworthy to mention that Sandia National Laboratories has 
developed a classified container screening model that potentially could be used for 
classified research.  
Further examination of the potential modeling for perimeter security led the TTG 
to decide to model gate security.  This decision was based on the logic that modeling 
improvements in security to protect critical infrastructure are overly sensitive to the 
particular infrastructure’s vulnerability to blast weapons, and given its vulnerability, one 
can simply use a chart to predict the damage caused by a given amount of explosives at a 
set range.  With this established, a large amount of explosives, perhaps in a container 
carried by a semi truck, would likely have a devastating effect on most targets at ranges 
into the hundreds, if not thousands of feet.  This fact, coupled with the economic value of 
land on port facilities, makes it likely unrealistic to cordon off thousands of square feet of 
prime property, in order to protect critical infrastructure from blast weapons.  The TTG 
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also decided that modeling the alternatives for hardening the port's fences also prove less 
useful than modeling gate security.  It is essential that all of the ports perimeter fences 
first be hardened before additional security measures are added to the gates.  If the gates 
have adequate security, but the fences are not hardened, a terrorist with a vehicle-born 
IED will likely drive through the unhardened fence.  Once the perimeter fences are 
adequately hardened, the terrorist would either be deterred completely, or would be 
forced to attempt gain entry to the port through the ports gates. 
Given that the TTG intended to model gate security, it had to decide between 
modeling a vehicle attempting to gain access covertly (sneak in past the guard), or 
modeling a vehicle attempting to drive through the gate security at the highest speed 
possible.  The TTG decided to model the scenario in which a truck laden with explosives 
attempts to drive through the gate security measures as quickly as possible, in hopes of 
gaining entry to the port terminal before the defensive measures could be effectively 
employed.  Once on the port terminal the explosives laden truck would then proceed to 
critical infrastructure, or a high value target on the terminal, and detonate itself. 
After choosing a suitable scenario to model, the TTG developed its modeling 
plan. The key metric modeled by the TTG was the system effectiveness, which satisfied 
the objective of denying terrorists access to the port. Alternatives modeled included:  
• status-quo (for the Port of Oakland) 
• pop-up barriers 
• spike-strips 
• armed guards (to shoot out the tires of vehicle born IEDs) 
It is note worthy to point out that the TTG decided not to model the effectiveness 
of drop down arms, as this type of a device would create a delay for trucks entering the 
port during normal operations.  In addition to modeling the listed alternatives the TTG 
thought that it would also be useful to model the effects that staggered concrete blocks (to 
force incoming vehicles to reduce their speed) would have on the effectiveness of the 
modeled alternatives.  The three alternatives for the concrete blocks were no blocks, 
blocks before the initial guardhouse, and blocks just before the barrier.  The TTG also 
decided to model the impact that varying the distance of the security zone would have on 
the effectiveness of the alternatives.  The security zone is defined as the distance between 
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the guard house and the defensive measure (pop-up barrier, spike strips, armed guard).  
The purpose of varying the distances as well as the alternatives is to provide generic 
results that are useable for the gate to any port terminal, regardless of physical 
constraints. Appendix A, Table A1 shows a list of complete alternatives, including 
different defensive measures, concrete block positions, and distances, which the TTG 
intended to model.  It is note worthy that replications 31-50 were only going to be 
modeled if it was later desired to add more clarity to results 1-30. 
 
2. Modeling Explanation 
The TTG took its modeling plan and researched several different simulation 
options to determine which software/technique would work best for modeling gate 
security and provide the TTG with the primary MOE for system performance. The TTG 
determined that its best option for modeling gate security would be to use Arena 
simulation software to develop its gate security simulation.  Figure 31 shows a block 




Figure 31.  TTG Gate Security Model 
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The TTG model uses a series of delays and decision nodes to replicate gate 
operations when a vehicle attempts to drive past security without stopping. At the 
beginning of the model an “entity” is created to represent a terrorist truck arriving at the 
port’s gate.  The entity is split into two identical entities to represent two parallel 
processes that occur when the truck drives past the gate.  The first series is the truck’s 
actions, represented by a series of two delays.  The first delay is the time that it takes the 
truck to negotiate any obstacles that my be in the trucks path (concrete blocks), and the 
second delay is the time that it takes the truck to drive through the area between the guard 
house and the barrier (pop-up barrier, spike strips, or armed guard) that does not have 
obstacles in place.  The second series is the defensive actions which are also represented 
by a series of two delays.  The first delay is the time that it takes the guard to realize that 
there was a security breach, and to report the breach (hit the button to deploy the barriers, 
or call the armed guard on a radio), and the second delay is the time that it takes for the 
barrier to properly deploy (or prepare to fire in the case of the armed guard).  It is 
important to note that all delays incorporated into the model are based on triangular 
distributions.  After the identical entities have both proceeded through their respective 
delays, they are batched back into a single entity and then enter a decision node.  The 
decision node is based on the delays that the entities experienced when they were split.  If 
the defensive delays took longer than the truck delays, the attack succeeds, if not the 
defensive barrier had sufficient time to deploy and the entity that represents the truck 
moves on to the next decision node, reliability.   
The reliability decision node takes into account the probability that the defensive 
measures will not always deploy when they receive the order to do so.  In the case of the 
spike strips and pop-up barriers, if they are reliable they will pop-up and lock into 
position; in the case of the armed guard, he will successfully fire his weapon.  If the 
barrier is not reliable, the attack succeeds.  If it is reliable, the entity could proceed to the 
final decision node represented by effectiveness. The effectiveness decision node 
accounts for the fact that even if a barrier is successfully deployed before the truck 
arrives at it, the barrier still may not be successful at stopping the truck before it reaches 
the critical infrastructure that it intends to destroy.  In our model reliability is a 
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percentage that we import into the model.  The percentages that are imported into the 
model are primarily a function of speed, and in the case of the armed guard, it is also a 
function of the distance that the guard has to shoot at the approaching truck (200’+ is 
optimal).  If the barrier is not effective, the attack succeeds; however, if it is effective, the 
attack fails and our system was effective.  The primary MOE from this model is simply 
the number in the attack fails node/the number in the attack fails node plus the number in 
the attack succeeds node.  
One of the most challenging aspects of modeling gate security was finding 
realistic values that could be used as inputs for each of the delay and decision nodes.  A 
list of all of input values can be found in Appendix A, Table A2.  It is important to note 
that all time delays are triangular distributions in seconds, all distances are in feet and all 
reliability and effectiveness is in percent true (95 percent reliability means that the barrier 
is reliable 95 percent of the time).  All time delays for the truck are based on the TTG’s 
calculations using the kinematics equations.  The TTG assumed that all sets of concrete 
blocks would be 100 feet in total length and would force the truck to slow down to a 
maximum of 10 miles per hour in order to transverse the obstacles.  The TTG assumed 
that the initial speed of the truck would be approximately 15 miles per hour at the gate 
when there were not concrete block present (before the gate) and that the truck would 
accelerate at a constant rate of .356 meters per second squared when it is on open road 
(no obstacles).  The truck’s acceleration was calculated based on a 400 horse power tuck 
with a gross total weight of 60,000 pounds.  The calculated value was the multiplied by 
80 percent and 120 percent to produce a triangular distribution that varied by 20 percent 
from the mean.   
The time delays for the guards report time were based on a series of simple 
experiments conducted by the group.  These experiments were used to determine the 
likely time that it would take the guard to hit a button on the wall that would activate the 
pop-up barrier or spike strips, or in the case of an armed guard to pick up his radio and hit 
the transmit button.  The deployment times of the barriers were based off of the 
manufacturer’s specifications, and in the case of the armed guard it was based off of a 
simple experiment performed by the TTG. 
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The TTG decided how velocity would affect the alternative’s effectiveness.  In 
the case of the pop-up barriers, the TTG determined that an increase in velocity would 
reduce the barriers effectiveness.  According to several manufacturers of pop-up barriers, 
the most effective class of pop up barriers is certified for zero penetration by a 15,000 
pound truck at 50 meters per second.  Using the equation for momentum, the TTG 
converted this velocity to 12.5 miles per hour for a 60,000 pound truck.  The 
effectiveness is set at 100 percent for all replications where the trucks terminal velocity is 
less than or equal to 12.5 miles per hour, and the TTG reduced the effectiveness as the 
trucks velocity increased.  The TTG noted that the effectiveness of spike strips would be 
relatively low because even if they punctured the tires of the passing trucks, it is possible 
that the truck would be able to drive on flat tires and reach its target.  The TTG 
determined that the faster the trucks velocity, the more effective the spike strips would 
be, as higher velocities would increase the chance that the terrorist would loose control of 
the truck and crash.  The effectiveness of the armed guard was deemed to be best at 
medium distances because the truck would not be moving at great velocities and the 
guard would allow the guard a large enough time window to properly employ his 
weapon.  As always the addition of an additional human to the loop reduces its 
effectiveness. 
 
3. Analysis of Model Data 
The data for the TTG’s modeling is shown in Appendix B and is arranged into a 
bar graph in Figure 32.  It is important to note that each data point is the average of 120 
simulated days with 289 attempted attacks per day. When multiplied together TTG had a 
total of 34,680 attempted attacks averaged into every data point. In this section of 
writing, TTG created an abbreviation for each of its alternative configurations. For 
example, the abbreviation for a pop-up barrier with no concrete blocks at a distance of 
100 feet from the guard house is PB-CB(N)-100. The first set of letters represents the 
alternative, the second set represents the concrete block configuration (or lack there of), 
and the number at the end represents the distance in feet between the guard house and the 









CB(N) No Concrete Blocks
CB(G) Concrete Blocks Before the Guard House
CB(B) Concrete Blocks Before the Barrier  
 
Table 9.  TTG Model Abbreviations 
 

















































































































































































































































































































































Figure 32.  Simulation Results Based on Distance 
 
The observations as can be seen from Figure 32 are:  
• The Status Quo had an effectiveness of 0% for all distances because the 
Status Quo does not have a means to stop incoming vehicles. 
• The performances of all configurations at the shortest distance of 100ft are 
the worst than that of all other distances for all alternatives. This is likely 
due to the short reaction time to deploy the barriers in order to stop the 
intrusions. 
• At the longer distances of 500ft, 700ft and 900ft, the simulation results are 
relatively similar as the barriers had adequate time to deploy and the 
truck’s speed  at the barrier is the primary factor for the effectiveness of 
each alternative. For the simulations of deploying armed guards, there is 
an added variable of the engagement distances the armed guards have to 
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engage the truck, this was considered in the effectiveness node in the 
model. 
 
It can also be noted from Figure 32 that there are four configurations, which tied 
for the highest effectiveness. They are PB-CB(B)-900, PB-CB(B)-700, PB-CB(B)-500 
and PB-CB(B)-300. The conclusion that can be drawn from this result is that the 
deployment of Pop-up Barrier (PB) along with Concrete Blocks (CB) in front of the 
barrier to slow down the truck, and at a distance of at least 300 feet from the gate 
outperformed all the other configurations. A distance of at least 300 feet from the gate 
allows the pop-up barrier to have sufficient time to deploy and the concrete blocks in 
front of the barrier reduce the truck’s terminal speed.  This causes the truck’s terminal 
speed while approaching the barrier to be identical regardless of distance between the 
guard house and barrier. 
Figure 33 below shows all the simulation results based on the type of barriers 
deployed to stop the intrusion truck. This allowed us to analyze the performance of the 
different types of barriers in comparison to each other. Table 9 shows the abbreviations 
used and their meanings. 
 




















































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 33.  Simulation Results Based on Type of Barriers 
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The observations as can be seen from Figure 33 are: 
• The deployment of pop-up barrier generally outperformed the other types 
of barriers (armed guards and spike-strips) used to stop the intrusion.  
• The deployment of spike-strips is generally more effective than the 
deployment of armed guards. The addition of another human in the loop, 
and the natural hesitation to fire a weapon at a vehicle partially represents 
the poor effectiveness of the armed guard. 
 
a. In Depth Analysis of Effectiveness of Armed Guard 
The simulation results for the effectiveness of the armed guard in various 
configurations are shown in Figure 34. The general trend indicated that performance of 
an armed guard increases with an increase in range. The simulation has shown that an 
armed guard has a maximum effectiveness of only 16 percent at the range of 500 feet. 
Additionally, for ranges less than 300 feet, the various configurations of AG-CB(B) and 
AG-CB(G) performed with an effectiveness close to 0 percent. The armed guard was 
generally ineffective in stopping a moving truck regardless of barrier configuration. The 
performance of various configurations of the armed guard decrease from a high of 16 to 
10 percent when the range is increased from 500 to 900 feet. This decline in effectiveness 
is likely due to the fact that a moving truck is more difficult for an armed guard to engage 
at higher velocities. Overall the simulations showed that an armed guard was generally 






Figure 34.  Effectiveness of Armed Guard Configurations at Various Ranges 
 
Figure 35 shows the effectiveness of the armed guard with and without 
concrete blocks at various position, configurations and ranges. AG-CB(B) has the best 
overall performance at a distance of 500 feet. AG-CB(B) performance was better than 
AG-CB(G). Concrete blocks placed before the barrier slowed down the truck and give 
more time for the armed guard to react but the overall performance of armed guard with 
various configurations increases to a maximum at a distance of 500 feet and then reduces 
as the range continues to increase as a result of the truck’s increasing velocity with 






Figure 35.  Effectiveness of Armed Guards and Concrete Blocks at Various Ranges 
 
For all ranges, the AG-CB(G) and AG-CB(B) configurations appeared to 
be more effective (up to 3 to 4 percent) than the AG-CB(N) configurations since, with the 
concrete blocks positioned at the gate and barrier the slower velocity of the truck would 
permit the armed guard to have more reaction time.  
A particularly noticeable trend was that the effectiveness with concrete 
blocks positioned at the barrier and gate increases sharply between the ranges of 300 and 
500 feet (steep slope). The effectiveness of armed guard decreases when the range 
increased beyond 500 feet. It reduces at a rate of approximately 1.5 percent per 100 feet.  
With the concrete blocks positioned just before the armed guard, the speed of the truck 
was assured to be significantly lower than if the concrete blocks were not present.  The 
performance of the armed guard was largely dependent on time period given for armed 
guard to react and truck velocity, its effectiveness was reduced as ranges increases 
(beyond 500 feet) due to the increase in the truck’s velocity. This made it more difficult 
for armed guard to engage as physiology of human vision and response are factors 
needed to be considered.   
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The results of the relative effectiveness of concrete blocks when used with 
the armed guard are illustrated in Figure 36. The result was similar to Figure 35 as the 
best position of the concrete blocks was at the barrier and was most effective at a distance 
of 500 feet. 
For ranges beyond 500 feet, the concrete blocks positioned at barrier 
provide almost constant three percent better performance in effectiveness than concrete 
block at gate. This performance gain could be attributed to the relative increase in 
reaction time caused when the trucks were forced to slow down by the concrete blocks. 




Figure 36.  Relative Effectiveness of Concrete Blocks with Armed Guards 
 
The results have shown that the armed guard was generally not an 
effective barrier for stopping a moving truck.  The most effective configurations of the 
armed guard were AG-CB(B) at 500 feet. For ranges less than 300 feet, the effectiveness 
of an armed guard is near 0 percent. The outcome has shown that the concrete blocks 




b. In Depth Analysis of Effectiveness of Spike Strips 
The simulation results for the effectiveness of the spike strips in various 
configurations are shown in Figure 37. The results of the simulation show that, spike 
strips have a maximum effectiveness of 47 percent. The general trend indicated that the 
spike strips performed better at greater distances between the guardhouse and the barrier.  
Additionally, at ranges greater than 300 feet, the SS-CB(B) configuration appeared to be 
less effective than the SS-CB(N) and SS-CB(G) configurations.  This is congruent with 
the fact that the damage caused by the spike strip on the truck is generally more severe 
when the truck approaches at a higher velocity, and at these velocities the driver was 
more likely to lose control of his truck when his tires were punctured.  Consequently, the 
spike strip was relatively more effective when the truck approached at higher speeds.  
The best performing configurations were SS-CB(N)-900 and SS-CB(G)-900 with an 
effectiveness between 45 and 47 percent. Table 9 shows the abbreviations used and their 
meanings. 
 





































































































































Figure 37.  Effectiveness of Spike Strip Configurations at Various Ranges 
 
Figure 38 shows the effectiveness of the spike strip with and without 
concrete blocks.  Apart from the 100 feet configuration, the SS-CB(G) configuration 
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performed best, followed by the SS-CB(N) and SS-CB(B) configurations.  In the 100 feet 
configuration, the SS-CB(B) configuration had the best performance as the concrete 
blocks stationed just before the barrier provided sufficient deployment time for the spike 
strip system. Table 9 shows the abbreviations used and their meanings. 
 




















Figure 38.  Effectiveness of Strike Strips and Concrete Blocks 
 
For all ranges, the SS-CB(G) configurations was slightly more effective 
(about 2 percent) than the SS-CB(N) configurations. With the concrete blocks being 
positioned at the gate, the slower velocity of the truck would permit the guards to have 
more reaction time, but the truck would still maintain a relatively high speed at impact. 
A particularly noticeable trend was that the effectiveness with concrete 
blocks positioned at the barrier location remained largely constant at approximately 28 
percent.  With the concrete blocks positioned just before the spike strip, the speed of the 
truck was assured to be significantly lower than if the concrete blocks were not present. 
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Since the performance of the spike strip was largely dependent on the truck’s approach 
velocity, its effectiveness remained mostly constant for the SS-CB(B) configurations 
regardless of range. 
The results of the relative effectiveness of the concrete blocks when used 
with the spike strip are as illustrated in Figure 39. A large increase in performance (about 
15 to 20 percent) was observed only at the 100 feet range. At this close distance, the 
concrete blocks served to provide more time for the successful deployment of the spike 
strip system. Table 9 shows the abbreviations used and their meanings. 
 
Relative Effectiveness of Concrete Blocks























Figure 39.  Relative Effectiveness of Concrete Blocks Using Spike Strips 
 
However, at further ranges, the concrete blocks positioned at the gate 
seemed to provide only marginal increases (about 2 percent) in effectiveness.  This 
performance gain could be attributed by the relative increase in available reaction time by 
the trucks being forced to slow down at the concrete blocks. 
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Furthermore, the concrete blocks appeared to degrade the effectiveness of 
the spike strip when they were positioned just before the spike strip.  This was likely a 
result of the assessment that the spike strips are more effective when the truck 
approached at a higher velocity.  
The results have shown that the spike strips were generally not an 
effective barrier for stopping trucks from reaching their destination within a port 
terminal.  The most effective configurations of the spike strip were SS-CB(G) and they 
were valid for ranges greater than 100 feet.  The outcomes have also shown that the 
concrete blocks generally provided minimal or negative performance gains when 
employed together with the spike strips even though there were some enhancements for 
the 100 feet configurations.   
 
c. In Depth Analysis of Effectiveness of Pop-up Barriers 
The results of the simulation for the effectiveness of the various 
configurations of the pop-up barriers are shown in Figure 40.  In general, configurations 
that included concrete blocks performed better than those without concrete blocks.  The 
results indicated that there might be an optimal range beyond which the effectiveness 
either stayed constant or decrease.  The configurations that showed the best performance 
were the PB-CB(B) that is installed at distances of more than 300 feet from the gate.  
These configurations resulted in a system effectiveness of approximately 95 percent. 
Table 9 shows the abbreviations used and their meanings. 
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Figure 40.  Effectiveness of Different Configurations of Pop-up Barriers 
 
At all ranges, the PB-CB(B) performed better than both the PB-CB(G) and 
PB-CB(N) as shown in Figure 41. Beyond 300 feet, PB-CB(B)’s effectiveness was 
relatively constant; increasing the distance between the gate and the barrier beyond 300 ft 
did not increase the effectiveness of PB-CB(B).  At 100 feet, the effectiveness dropped to 
68 percent, but was still significantly higher than that of PB-CB(N) at 7 percent.  
Additional simulation runs at 200 feet (not showed in the figures) showed that in fact the 
effectiveness of PB-CB(B) had reached 90 percent at 200 feet.  For PB-CB(B), the range 
of 200 feet combined with the concrete blocks in front of the barrier provided sufficient 
time for the barrier to be completely deployed.  This combination was the most effective 
alternative set for all distances. Table 9 shows the abbreviations used and their meanings. 
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Figure 41.  Effectiveness of Pop-up Barriers and Concrete Blocks 
 
PB-CB(G) performed better than PB-CB(N) at range of 100 feet but has 
similar performance beyond 500 feet. At short range, the concrete barrier at the gate 
provided more time for the barrier to deploy, while at longer ranges this difference 
became insignificant. Figure 42 shows the absolute difference in effectiveness between 
configurations with concrete blocks and those without concrete blocks. Table 9 shows the 
abbreviations used and their meanings. 
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Figure 42.  Relative Effectiveness of Concrete Blocks with Pop-up Barriers 
 
The most effective configuration of pop-up barrier is the PB-CB(B).  This 
configuration was most optimal when installed at approximately 300 feet or more from 
the activation point (gate).  The concrete blocks enhanced the performance of the pop-up 
barrier at all ranges and were more significant at shorter distances.  Concrete blocks were 
more effective when placed just in front of the pop-up barrier than at the activation point 
(gate).  
 
d. Data Analysis Conclusions 
In the scenario where terrorist plans a truck laden with explosives and 
attempts to drive through the gate security measures, the TTG’s analysis indicates that the 
most effective implementation against such terrorist attacks is the PB-CB(B)-300+ 
configuration. The current analysis has not taken life-cycle implementation cost into 
consideration. Hence, later in the writing, the TTG will evaluate the cost and benefit by 
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considering the life-cycle implementation cost for a complete assessment on the 
practicality of recommended implementation. 
 
4. Cost Estimation 
The TTG conducted cost estimations of the perimeter defense alternatives to 
enable it to later conduct a cost benefit analysis.  The cost benefit analysis shows the 
stakeholders the amount of anticipated performance that could be achieved for a given 
cost and which alternatives are dominated by others. It identifies the alternatives that both 
cost more and perform less than at least one of the other alternatives, it is never 
economically sound to implement an alternative that is dominated by a different 
alternative.  The TTG cost estimation included not only the alternatives considered in the 
modeling and analysis phase of the project, but it also included a cost estimation on 
hardening a ports perimeter fence.  As presented earlier in the paper, it is illogical to 
implement gate defenses before hardening the perimeter fence, as doing so would simply 
lead the terrorist to crash through the fence and avoid the gate security altogether. The 
TTG did not include cost estimation for hardening the critical infrastructures inside the 
port.  As previously mentioned in this paper, the high economic value of land inside a 
port terminal and the relatively larger destructive radius of a large blast weapon would 
likely make the opportunity cost of hardening the port’s critical infrastructure infeasible.  
 
a. Cost Estimate for Hardening Perimeter Fencing 
The TTG narrowed the alternatives for hardening a port’s perimeter fence 
down to the two most likely choices.  The port would likely build a concrete or brick 
fence or align concrete blocks at the base of the already existing chain link fence.   
For the purpose of this study, all costs are in 2007 U.S. Dollars (USD). 
Based on market survey, the cost for erecting a concrete perimeter fence ranges from 
$100 to $400 per foot, depending on the height and material used. The TTG used the 
average of $250 per foot for its cost estimation. It would costs the port approximately 
$75,000 per 100 yards of perimeter fence to implement this type of a fence. 
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Implementing steel reinforced concrete blocks as a means to harden the 
port’s perimeter fence would cost the port approximately $100 per eight foot concrete 
block [41]. The implementation of a continuous barrier of concrete blocks at the base of 
the preexisting chain link fence it would cost the port approximately $3,750 per 100 
yards of perimeter fence. 
The Port of Oakland has approximately 6,000 yards of perimeter fence, of 
which approximately 50 percent is unhardened.  To harden the remaining 3,000 yards of 
perimeter fence would cost the Port of Oakland approximately $2,250,000 to implement a 
concrete fence, or $112,500 for concrete blocks. Given the large price disparity it is 
expected that most ports would choose to implement steel reinforced concrete blocks in 
order to harden their existing perimeter fencing. 
The following cost estimations were conducted on the alternatives that 
were previously explored during the modeling and analysis phase of this project.  The 
cost estimation for each alternative was later compiled and examined in a cost benefit 
analysis. 
 
b. Cost Estimate for Armed Guard 
Port security was viewed as important for port operators but it was not the 
primary business for any port operator; instead the terminal operator is in business to 
make money. The TTG determined that it was most effective and efficient to outsource 
the port security services to a professional security agency for better resources 
management and for long term sustainability. Outsourcing of security services allowed 
port operators to concentrate on their primary business. Outsourcing of the security 
services does not imply that that the port operator has no obligation to the security of the 
port, but instead that he chose to utilize an outside company with security expertise and 
professional training. 
Based on market survey, the hourly rate for a well trained armed security 
guard services was between $14 to $30, depending on the size of the contract and the 
services that the armed guard was required to perform. Additional cost would be imposed 
if the armed guard was involved in patrol or investigation services, but this cost would 
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not be imposed on TTG’s proposed armed guard alternative, as the guard would be 
stationary.  
For the purpose of this report, the TTG utilized and hourly rate of $17.44 
per armed guard [42]. This is a term contract rate for armed security guard services 
awarded by the state of New Jersey Treasury Purchasing Department for contract number 
59555 between 2004 and 2007. TTG assumed that each port terminal conducted gate 
operations for 40 hours per week and required a single armed guard during normal gate 
operations.  The annual cost to the terminal operator for adding a single armed guard for 
an 8 hour shift would be approximately $36,275.  
 
c. Cost Estimate for Spike Strips 
The material cost of a spike strip traffic controller covering a single 12 ft 
lane is estimated to be $30,000 and the installation cost is expected to be $5,000.  The 
annual operating and maintenance cost for a system is about eight percent of the total 
procurement cost [43].  The expected life span for such a system is about 10 years. 
The TTG determined that each terminal required a minimum of two lanes 
of spike strips, as during maintenance periods, this would allow one lane to operate while 
the spike strip system in the other lane was maintained.  For a system of spike strips to 
cover two lanes, the estimated cost for material and installation is approximately $70,000.  
Additionally, the operating and maintenance cost is approximately $5,600 per year. Table 
10 depicts the cost estimates for employing spike strips. 
 
Item Description Unit Cost Quantity Cost 
A system of spike strip 
covering a 12 ft lane. 
30,000 2 60,000 Spike Strip 
Installation 5,000 2 10,000 
  
Table 10.  Cost Estimation Table for Spike Strips 
 
Assuming that the system had a life span of 10 years and the system was 
not financed, but instead purchased outright, the system had a total average annual 
system cost of $12,600 for two lanes.  If the port terminal instead chose to finance the 
spike strip system over the expected life span of 10 years at an annual interest rate of 
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seven percent with no down payment, the annual payments for the system would be 
$9,966.  If we then consider the operation and support costs for the system, we arrive at a 
total annual system cost of $15,566. 
 
d. Cost Estimate for Pop-Up Barrier 
The material cost of a pop-up vehicle barrier with DOS K-12/L-3 rating 
[44], ranges between $33,000 to $55,000 for a system that covers a single 12 feet lane 
[43].  The installation cost for such a system is an addition of about 90-95 percent of the 
material cost.  The annual operating and maintenance cost for a system is about eight 
percent of the total procurement cost.  The expected life span of such a system is 10-15 
years. 
Assuming that the system has an acquisition and installation price of 
$97,500 per lane, the cost to acquire and install two sets of pop up barriers is 
approximately $195,000.  In addition, the annual operating and maintenance cost for the 
two lanes is approximately $15,600 per year. Table 11 depicts the cost estimates for 
employing pop-up barriers. 
 
Item Description Unit Cost Quantity Cost 
A system of DOS K-12/L-3 
rating covering a 12 ft lane. 
50,000 2 100,000 Pop-up 
Barrier 




Table 11.  Cost Estimation Table for Pop-Up Barriers 
 
Assuming that the system had a life span of 15 years and the system was 
not financed, but instead purchased outright, the system had a total average annual 
system cost of $28,600 for two lanes.  If the port terminal instead chose to finance the 
spike strip system over the expect life span of 15 years at an annual interest rate of seven 
percent with no down payment, the annual payments for the system would be $21,410.  If 
we then consider the operation and support costs for the system, we arrive at a total 
annual system cost of $37,010. 
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In addition to the cost estimation of the three alternatives listed above, 
TTG conducted a cost estimation for the implementation of concrete blocks.  The purpose 
the concrete blocks was to force inbound vehicles to reduce their speed as described in 
the alternatives generation and modeling and analysis portions of this paper.  The 
implementation of concrete blocks is used in conjunction with the other alternatives to 
increase their overall performance and the cost of concrete bocks needed to be considered 
for each alternative where they increased the overall system performance. 
 
e. Cost Estimate for Concrete Blocks 
The usage of concrete blocks has been analyzed to be able to enhance the 
effectiveness of protective measures against the “Truck runs gate scenario”. The 










Proposed concrete Block 
implementation location 
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To effectively use the concrete block to limit the speed of potential threats, 
an implementation of four layers of concrete blocks with 40 feet spacing would be 
sufficient to effectively limit the vehicle speed to 20 miles per hour over an 




Figure 44.  Concrete Block Effective Placement for 20 MPH Speed Limit 
 
The material cost of a basic concrete block is approximately $100 each 
[41]. While installation cost for four blocks was expected to be approximately $500. 
Since its implementation is expected to be permanent, the operating cost is expected to be 
negligible. Maintenance cost for the concrete block over a life span of 10 years is also 
expected to be insignificant. Table 12 depicts the cost estimates for employing concrete 
blocks. 
 
Item Description Unit Cost Quantity Cost 
Concrete Blocks 100 4 400Concrete 
Blocks Installation 500 1 500
  
Table 12.  Cost Estimation Table for Concrete Blocks 
 
The total cost for implementing a set of concrete blocks to reduce the 
speed of incoming traffic was expected to be approximately $900.  The average annual 
cost of implementing concrete block over their expected 10 year life span was $90.  This 
meant that $90 needed to be added to the annual cost of each of the alternatives, if the use 




5. Cost Benefit Analysis 
A cost benefit analysis is an analysis between the modeled alternatives that 
compare the cost and effectiveness.  A complete cost benefit analysis will answer the 
following questions for the stakeholder:  What level of effectiveness can be achieved for 
a given cost? What is the cost of a given level of effectiveness? And which alternatives 
are dominated and should not be considered?  The TTG conducted a cost benefit analysis 
on the alternatives considered during the modeling and analysis phase of this project.  
Appendix D, Table D1 contains a table of the cost and effectiveness of each alternative 
configuration. Figure 45 shows a cost vs. effectiveness graph of the most effective 
combination of all four alternatives. It is important to note that the cost is the average 
annual total system cost and both the spike strips and pop-up barrier costs are the costs if 
the barrier was financed, as stated in the previous section.    
 


























Figure 45.  Cost vs Effectiveness of Alternatives 
 
 The efficient frontier is composed of the set of non dominated alternatives, which 
means that they have the lowest cost for the level of performance that they provide.  
From Figure 45, it is clear that an efficiency frontier exists among the alternatives. The 
efficiency frontier for gate security include: The status quo, spike strips, and pop up 
barriers. The efficiency frontier does not include the implementation of an armed guard 
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because the implementation of spike strips both costs less and performs better than that of 
an armed guard. The implementation of an armed guard is clearly dominated by the 
implementation of spike strips. 
Appendix D, Figures D1 through D4 presents cost versus effectiveness graphs for 
given ranges (700, 500, 300, and 100 feet). This presentation of cost versus effectiveness 
is useful when the port terminal is physically limited by the space that can be placed 
between the guardhouse and the barrier. All three graphs in Appendix D have the same 
general shape, efficiency frontier, and dominance as Figure 45. The important takeaways 
from the cost benefit analysis are that an armed guard should never be implemented in an 
attempt to improve gate security, as the port achieves greater performance at a lower cost 
by instead implementing spike strips, and although the status quo is on the efficiency 
frontier, its is completely ineffective at stopping a truck from gaining access to the port 
terminal. If port management desires to improve its gate security, they should choose to 
implement either spike strips, or pop-up barriers. The spike strips cost less than pop-up 
barriers, but pop-up barriers perform better than spike strips, it is up to the stake holder to 
determine which system is best for their unique needs. 
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III. REGIONAL SEABORNE THREATS GROUP 
A. PROBLEM DEFINITION 
1. Needs Analysis 
Prior to the September 11th 2001, the various security agencies in Singapore 
already operated a well-coordinated and thorough security framework. Following the 
September 11th attack, Singapore had intensified its port security measures. These 
measures were aimed to safeguard sensitive installations such as major oil, chemical 
terminals, cruise, and ferry terminals. 
The Port of Singapore and major waterways were under constant surveillance. 
Key areas within the Port of Singapore such as waters around chemical and off-shore oil 
terminals were declared as restricted areas and small craft entering these areas were to 
seek written approval from the MPA [8].  
The MPA closely monitors the movement of sensitive vessels including liquefied 
petroleum gas (LPG), liquefied natural gas (LNG), chemical tankers, oil tankers and 
passenger ships. The relevant security agencies conduct sea patrols to ensure the various 
vessels were in compliance with port security restrictions. Regional ferries, Indonesian 
Barter Trade Craft and pleasure craft had their routes revised to prevent such craft from 
passing closely to sensitive areas and vessels in port [8]. 
Sea entry checkpoints were strengthened. Security at sea entry checkpoints was 
tightened to prevent entry of undesirable persons and dangerous weapons. Persons 
entering or leaving Singapore by sea, including passengers and crew members going 
ashore were to be subjected to a face-to-face check by ICA (Immigration and 
Checkpoints Authority) at designated landing points. All arriving vessels were to anchor 
at designated immigration anchorages, where the ICA’s officers boards and conduct face-
to-face checks. 
Singapore adopted the ISPS (International Shipping and Port Facility Security) 
since 1st July 2004. Singapore was one of the first countries in the world to fully comply 
with the IMO requirements. There are 1270 Singapore registered ships and 118 port 
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facilities compliant with the ISPS code. Of the 118 port facilities, 25 of them serve ships 
of less than 500 gross tons (GT) and need not comply with the code but chose to do so as 
they felt that the ships that they interfaced with ventured outside the port waters. 
In compliant with the ISPS code, Singapore had executed 3 major maritime 
security exercises at sea involving all the security agencies, operators of sensitive 
installations (Shell and ExxonMobil) and sensitive vessels (LPG carriers) since 2004. 
Random audits were also conducted with security organizations to ensure that security 
procedures are adhered to at port facilities and on ships. 
Three security levels were adopted in accordance with the ISPS Code. The three 
levels are as follows: 
• Security Level 1- normal; the level at which ships and port facilities 
normally operate. It means the level for which minimum appropriate 
protective security measures shall be maintained at all times. 
• Security Level 2- heightened; the level applying for as long as there is a 
heightened risk of a security incident. It means the level for which 
additional protective measures shall be maintained for a period of time as 
a result of a security incident. 
• Security Level 3- exceptional; the level applying for the period of time 
when there is a probable or imminent risk of a security incident. It means 
the level for which further specific protective security measures shall be 
maintained for a limited period of time when a security incident is 
probable or imminent, although it may not be possible to identify the 
specific target. 
The security level would be set by MPA with the aid of the intelligence agencies 
and the Ministry of Transport.  Presently, the Port of Singapore is at Security Level 1.   
MPA also set up a 24-hour Maritime Security Unit to monitor and receive all 
ISPS ships’ submissions of security-related information prior to the entry of the ship into 
port. The information known as Pre-Arrival Notification of Security (PANS) is to be 
submitted at least 24 hours before the ship’s arrival in Singapore. This information 
includes the last ten ports that the ship has called and any special security measures put in 
these ports. 
ISPS ships are to be provided with a ship security alert system (SSAS). The SSAS 
when activated will transmit a ship-to-shore security alert to the administration 
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identifying the ship, its location and indicating that the ship is under threat. All 
Singapore-registered ships will send the security alerts to the MPA regardless of their 
locations. The MPA has a standard operating procedure with the RSN (Republic of 
Singapore Navy) and PCG (Police Coast Guard) to handle ship security alerts. 
For non-compliant ISPS ships, control measures that were put in place are: 
• Denying entry 
• Inspection of the ship 
• Delaying the ship 
• Detention of the ship 
• Restriction of operations 
• Movement within the port 
• Expulsion of the ship from port 
The ISPS code largely focuses on commercial facilities and the larger vessels. 
Therefore, smaller vessels (<500 GT) engaged on international voyages are not 
compelled to comply with the ISPS Code.  However, these small vessels are also 
vulnerable to security threats and could be used as weapons like vessels that require 
compliance with the ISPS Code. The USS COLE attack in Yemen in October 2000 and 
the French Tanker LIMBURG incident in October 2002 are well known. 
The port remains vulnerable to security threats from both arriving non-ISPS 
compliant vessels and vessels from non-ISPS compliant ports. Control measures are put 
into place by MPA to deal with vessels coming from non-ISPS compliant ports. 
Additional measures to the ISPS Code were implemented to safeguard the ships and port 
facilities to further enhance maritime security within port waters. The developed 
measures were: 
• Guidance for establishing security measures when vessels call at non-ISPS 
compliant ports 
• Ship Self-Security Assessment Checklist 
• Harbor Craft Security Code 
• Pleasure Craft Security Code 
• Harbor Craft Transponder System 
Not all the port facilities in the world are ISPS compliant, guidance is provided to 
ISPS compliant ships calling from non-ISPS compliant ports. The ships are to take the 
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directed additional measures while in a non-complaint port. Examples of such measures 
are: 
• Restricting access to the ship 
• Deployment of security guards at gangway 
• Restricting visitors from the ship 
• Securing accommodations 
• Checking for stowaways in the engine room and store rooms 
• Checking packages and baggage brought onto the ship 
The U.S. Coast Guard had recently asked to post the guidance on their website, as 
a means of exchanging experiences and sharing best practices to enhance port security. 
MPA requires the small sea-going vessels of under 500 GT calling at the port to 
complete a SSSA prior to port entry. The checklist is to be kept on board for verification 
by the security agencies or port officials. 
All harbor craft (<500 GT) have to comply with the Harbor Craft Security Code 
(HSCC) and the security log. The HCSC encompasses simple and practical actions taken 
by harbor craft masters to protect the crewmembers and the craft so as to mitigate the 
vulnerability to security incidents on board. The HCSC contains the key security 
measures to ensure the security readiness of the harbor craft while operating in the port 
waters. 
MPA developed a Pleasure Craft Security Code (PCSC) to further enhance 
security in the port waters. The Code is user-friendly and was developed in consultation 
with the pleasure craft community. The PCSC provided security guidance to the pleasure 
craft community and focus on four key areas: 
• Need for preparedness 
• Vigilance when navigating 
• Maintaining an observant posture 
• Being proactive in reporting to the appropriate authorities 
Harbor craft less than 300 gross tons and not engaged on international voyages, 
do not come under the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Regulations and hence are not 
required to carry the Automatic Identification System (AIS) transponders.  Recognizing 
the potential threat, the MPA and the security agencies, developed a vessel tracking 
system known as the Harbor Craft Transponder System (HARTS) as an added defense 
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against potential attacks by small craft. All the 2,800 MPA-licensed powered harbor and 
pleasure craft were fitted with the HARTS transponders. The system has been operational 
since 1 January 2007. 
To prevent unauthorized use, a special coded identity of each transponder ensures 
that the transponder could only operate on the harbor craft on which it was installed. The 
coded identity must match that of the mounting bracket. This security feature ensures the 
transponder will not work if used on another craft. In the event of a security breach, an 
alert would be sent to the control center operator. 
Every transponder is equipped with a panic button. The panic button allows the 
craft owner/master to alert the MPA in the event of distress or a security threat. After 
activating the panic button, an alert message containing the identity, position and time is 
sent to the control center operator. This function is similar to the IMO Ship Security Alert 
System for ocean-going vessels.  
MPA has introduced a new licensing scheme for regional ferry operators. The 
new licensing regime formalizes the need for compliance to safety and security measures. 
This is important since ferry services are a popular mode of transport for traveling 
between regional destinations.  
Since 1 January 2005, companies that operate regional ferry services are required 
to obtain a license in order to provide such services in Singapore. This licensing scheme 
is part of ongoing efforts to safeguard the security of the ferries and passengers. 
For the purposes of protecting the port and vessels from security threats, all 
vessels entering or leaving the port of Singapore may be boarded by a team of police 
officers or authorized representatives of the Port Master. The teams board arrival vessels 
with pilots at the pilot boarding grounds or for departing vessels, the team would board 
with the pilots at anchorages or berths, as far as practicable. 
MPA adopted a multi-agency approach in ensuring maritime security and works 
closely with the Home Teams (Homeland Security) and the RSN. Various task forces, 
committees, and working groups have been established to examine the different aspects 
of maritime security. The smooth implementation of the various security measures in the 
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port includes conducting security exercises, which have been possible only because of 
close-operation between the security agencies and the stakeholders like the port facilities’ 
operators and the ship-owners. 
For the global approach, MPA participates in various regional and international 
forums as well as correspondence groups initiated at these forums to share expertise and 
to exchange information among the member countries. 
 
a. System Decomposition 
For regional port security which is deemed waterside standoff, this model 
represents what the system needs to accomplish to achieve its purpose.  The ability to 
maintain waterside security is dependent upon four areas.  The sub-elements for each area 
are elements that provide the larger component to exist thereby providing the ability for 




Figure 46.  RSTG System Decomposition 
 
b. Stakeholder Analysis 
The primary stakeholders were subdivided into two groups: 
authorities/agency and users. In each of these groups, the concern about force protection 
and port security is a relevant issue.  Each of the groups envisions the issue in somewhat 
of a different aspect; therefore, the need to resolve the issue is important.  When dealing 
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with the regional seaborne aspect of port security, from the pier to the port boundary, the 
threats may be small boats, large ships, swimmers, and autonomous underwater vehicles 
(AUVs). From a regional perspective, the ports of Oakland and Singapore were 
examined. Each of these ports envisions regional aspect of port security in different ways 
yet there were many similarities. 
The Singapore Port Authorities have the following key concerns: 
There is a need to balance the quick flow of trade and commerce against 
the need to enforce and implement the various security measures.  While the fact remains 
the security is paramount to safeguard the interests of the commercial trade, the 
implementation must not be too burdensome to the users of the port.  Also, any 
implemented security measures must not adversely increase the time the ships use 
Singapore as a port-of-call. 
Singapore is only one of the several littoral states along the Straits of 
Malacca (the others being Malaysia and Indonesia), meaning that international 
cooperation is required for any successful response to the prevailing maritime security 
threats.  This is due to the fact that the identified threats are primarily trans-national.  
Action from the Singapore Port Authorities alone will not be sufficient to totally negate 
these threats.  The fact that these threats are not concerned with territorial boundaries 
means that international cooperation is paramount to the success of ensuring maritime 
security in the region.  This co-operation is, however, sometimes affected by political 
relations between the states, which the port authorities cannot control.  While cooperation 
between the states in recent years has improved significantly, more can still be done.   
The Oakland Port Authorities have the following concerns:  
Like that of the Singapore, the need to implement port security measures 
are required post 9/11.  The one operation that cannot be severely affected when a new 
port security measure is implemented is the flow of commerce. This aspect is a common 
thread of high importance.  In the eyes of all parties, time is money to the commercial 
side of the house. From the military’s view, safety and operational readiness are the 
primary issues for ships overseas in foreign ports. What the Oakland Authorities desire is 
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a feasible alternative that will suit the port facility. When the cost of security is increased, 
the expense is paid by the vessel owners, ultimately increasing the price of goods to the 
consumer. 
 With the port of Oakland, the right of freedom of navigation is an issue. 
In the cases of naval installations and oil refineries, there are established security zones 
which more readily provides intent for penetrating personnel/watercraft.  For the Port of 
Oakland, this is not the case; the ability of the port to delineate a security zone around the 
port is infeasible. The number of vessels coming into and out of the port and the required 
manpower to support this initiative is too costly. The number of recreational vessels in 
and around the Port of Oakland varies. The implementation of a security zone would 
cause a political backlash. Initiating this security measure requires legislation and 
enforcement by the DHS agencies. 
 
c. Input-Output Model 
The purpose of the input-output model is to help devise a system 
providing security of the waterside portion of the pier.  This model examines the general 
commercial ports as well as the military ports. The system will examine an active system 
that will provide pier protective measures.  In this model, two aspects are observed and 
contribute to the system which will result in an intended affect as well as by-products of 
the system.   Controllable elements are self explanatory with the exception of the types of 
vessel and port reaction to the threat. Types of vessels refer to the large ships that are on a 
predetermined schedule and are designated to moor to certain piers.  Port reaction to the 
threat is the time of response to address a threat as well as an elevation in threat 
condition.  Uncontrollable elements are those aspects that have a lot of variability and 
whose results are undeterminable. For the uncontrollable input, enemy strike refers to 
who, what, where, when and why. From the interaction with the system, positive and 
negative intended actions as well as by-products are the outputs. These inputs are 
required by the system to function and to address the force protection and port security 
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Figure 47.  RSTG Input-Output Model 
 
d. Functional Analysis 
To effectively mitigate and neutralize the threats posed to port security 
from the local waters, the functional flow of the port security system is envisioned as: 
The sensors for detecting small boats are in continuous operation and 
scanning for appearance and movements of small boats in the local waterways. Upon 
detection, the locations of the small boats are tracked. Profiling is performed 
continuously assessing if the small boats are not following safe routes and/or breaching 
proximity areas to sensitive installations such as oil and chemical installations, and cruise 
and ferry terminals. Like in Singapore, small boats could possible be outfitted with 
HARTS, and the port would be monitoring for alert signals relayed through HARTS, and 
if alerted, will notify the port security forces (such as RSN or PCG) to deny, delay, detain 
or expel the threat. Further efforts will be utilized to classify the small boat, through 
visual identification to assess whether the boat may be carrying WMDs or conventional 
weapons. If the probability of such an occurrence is high, countermeasures are put on 





Figure 48.  RSTG Small Boat Threat Functional Flow Diagram 
 
The sensors for detecting large vessels would be in continuous operation 
and scan for appearance and movements of such in the regional waterways. Upon 
detection, the locations of the vessels are tracked. Profiling is performed to continuously 
assess if the vessels are not following safe routes and/or breaching proximity areas to the 
previously mentioned sensitive installations. The vessels should be outfitted with SASS, 
and the port would be monitoring for alert signals sent via SASS, and if alerted, will 
notify the previously mentioned port security forces. The vessel would be identified 
through AIS and PANS, and anchor at a designated anchorage to be subjected to ship 
self-security verification and face-to-face checks by security and/or immigration officers. 
If the check and profile of ship or crew and passengers indicates a high probability of 
WMD, countermeasures are put on standby, ready to be activated to neutralize the threat 





Figure 49.  RSTG Large Ship Threat Functional Flow Diagram 
 
Likewise, the sensors for detecting divers or swimmers are in continuous 
operation 24x7 and scanning for evidence of divers and swimmers in the local port 
vicinity. Upon detection, the locations of the divers/swimmers are tracked. The port 
security forces would be activated to neutralize the threat. If identification and 
classification of divers or swimmers indicates high probability of WMDs or explosives, 
countermeasures are put on standby, ready to be activated to neutralize the threat as 





Figure 50. RSTG Sea Inserts Threats Functional Flow Diagram 
 
2. Objectives Hierarchy 
In Figure 51, the need is to supply a protective element for force protection and 
port security. With pier waterside standoff, there is a clear and present threat to the 
operability and functionality of the ports to supply force protection to moored vessels. 
When ships are discussed, it pertains to the commercial and military vessels. When ships 
are moored to a container terminal, it is the responsibility of the terminal as well as the 
ship to protect itself. Detecting is the function of finding a threat which is in the action of 
committing a terrorist act. Within detecting, scanning is the ability to analyze the area 
being monitored to look for a type of particular threat criteria that poses a threat to the 
security of the port or moored ships. Classifying is the next sub-function of detect. 
Classify involves assigning a classification to a threat that was detected because it met a 
certain threat profile. Tracking occurs when the system in place monitors the line of 
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motion of the threat. Tracking provides the means to predict the path of the vessel and 
forecast the target in which the terrorist wishes to attack. Once tracking occurs, the 
reactive element of engagement takes place. Engagement is the element which shows 
intent of the threat. There are two aspects of engaging: deny and deter.  Deny is to use 
either lethal or non-lethal means to prevent the penetration of the port and inflict damage 
to the port or ships. Depending on the intent of the threat, the level of force will be used 
would vary. Besides deny, deter is to discourage or restrain the possible threat to the port 
from occurring. By the use of non-lethal force such as loud speakers or high intensity 
lights, the possible threat vessel is alerted of the situation and alters course and moves out 
of the area. This objective hierarchy is needed to provide a high level of force protection 




Figure 51.  RSTG Objectives Hierarchy 
 
In the analysis of the two broad aspects of the project scope (force protection and 
port security), relevant MOPs and MOEs have been identified in Table 13. The list of 
MOEs and MOPS will be classified and associated to its respective objective item from 




MOP: Search Rate (This is the frequency at which target search is 
conducted.)
MOE:
MOP: Average Range of Detection
MOP: Average Target Detection Time
MOP: Proportion of Detection
MOP: Proportion of infiltrations 
MOE:
MOP: Proportion of Correct Classification
MOP: Average Range of Classification
MOP: Average Elapsed Time from Target Detection to Classification
MOP: Average Time from Identification to Classification
MOE:
MOP: Average Time from Detection to Recognition
MOP: Average Range of Recognition
MOP: Average Time from Target Recognition to Identification
MOP: Average Range of Identification
MOP: Proportion of Incorrect Identification
MOE:
MOP: Average Distance between Uncorrelated Tracks
MOP: Average Tracking Error (error between sensor tracked location 
and the target’s actual location)
MOP: Proportion of Tracking Time lost
MOP: False Track Rate
MOE:
MOP: Average Range of Engagement
MOP: Proportion of No-Engagement
MOE:
MOP: Engagement Rate
MOP: Proportion of Encounters where Threats Fired/Attacked First
MOE:
MOP: Proportion of Target Engagements vs Acquisitions
MOE:
MOP: Proportion of Completed/Successful handoff













Effect Employ Lethal 2.3.1.1







Table 13.  Evaluation Metrics for RSTG Objectives 
 
B. DESIGN AND ANALYSIS 
1. Alternatives Generation 
The alternatives were generated based on the respective detection, tracking, and 
engagement requirements.  Based on the list of available platforms that could be used for 
the security of the port as well as its surrounding waters, a suite of sensors, weapons and 
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other forms of detection, tracking and engagement options were proposed.   These serve 
as the building blocks for the proposed systems. 
Table 14 summarizes the platforms, sensors, and engagement options which could 
be used in maintaining security of the surrounding water. 
 
Non-Lethal Lethal
shore passive sensor array AIS Flares CIWS
ship IFF EMP missiles
unmanned vessel (ASV) HARTS high power lights
buoys Surface: RADAR Barriers (fences)
pole Communication human Signs
unmanned a/c (UAV) IR marine mammals water hoses
autonomous underwater vehicle (AUV) Video/Visual IR LRAD
satellite Laser OTH Gas
HUMINT Laser /Dazzlers












Table 14. RSTG Possible Platforms, Sensors, and Engagement Options 
 
For example, the port could use wide-area surveillance radar located on the shore 
to detect potential incoming threats. When a suspicious track has been detected and 
established, a tracking radar from the shore or a UAV equipped with a camera could 
provide the necessary tracking capability. This would enable the security agency to 
monitor its movement before deciding on which course of action to take (lethal or non-
lethal engagements) to repel the perceived threat.   
The following provides a brief summary on each of the individual platforms, 









PLATFORMS    
• Shore.  Enhance existing port facilities and 
technology to increase the ability to detect, track 






• Patrol Craft. Conduct regular patrols in territorial 
waters, providing frontline support to maritime 
security in the realm of detection, deterrence and 





• Autonomous Unmanned Vessel (AUV).  Use of 
advanced technologies to supplement detection of 
threats. Sensors and cameras could be mounted on 
the AUV for detection capabilities to scan the 
terrestrial waterways for threats.  
 
 
• Unmanned Surface Vehicle (USV). Are remotely 
operated vehicles on the water surface or 
subsurface, the USV could be employed to engage 
suspicious intruders instead of direct human 
intervention, especially at distances which may 
compromise the safety of security personnel.  
 
 
• Buoys.  Static floating devices which could be 
mounted with surface and subsurface sensors, 
video surveillance, or communication relay links 





• Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV). A mounted 
payload as IR/TI camera, sensors or weapons 
provides day/night aerial surveillance of terrestrial 
waters up to the horizon for NLOS detection and 
engagement.  
   
 
 
• Satellite. An information gathering satellite could 
be used to track vessel traffic movement towards 
terrestrial waters from their source port. The ability 
to detect irregularities in vessel planned voyage 
allows advance warning to port to take early 




• Poles.  Are platforms where the sensors could be 
mounted? A pole could offer increased height for 






DETECT   
• Passive Sensor Array.  Are arrays of hydrophones 
placed along coastal water, the acoustic sensors 
detect incoming surface vessels or swimmer 
intrusion through propeller beat, cavitation, 
propulsion machinery noises, and hull vibrations. 
These arrays are able to incorporate the ability to 
reject underwater sounds not produced by valid 
targets such as marine life and require long length 
of cable to cover the harbor distance. Daily 
harbor traffic increases the difficulty for the 
array to distinguish between threats and false 
alarms, when both are ‘intruding’ into the 
waters. Passive sensor arrays could be used for 
perimeter-sensing of key installations to detect 
non-authorized vessels in nearby waters.  
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• Communications. Use of on-board vessel 
communications equipment to track whereabouts 
of ships and distance from harbor. 
Communications equipment type may vary from 
vessel to vessel. This is a passive system as the 
ship may not respond to interrogation or when 
operating at different frequencies.  
 
• Video/Visual. Use of video cameras to transmit a 
signal to a specific, limited set of monitors. 
Closed-circuit television (CCTV) could be used 
for perimeter surveillance. CCTV systems may 
operate continuously or only as required to 
monitor a particular event.  
 
 
• Infra-red Sensor. Provides night vision capability 
by near infra-red illumination to detect intruders. 
IR sensors use the intruder’s black-body radiation 
as a function of temperature for detection. The 
higher the object’s temperature, the more infrared 
radiation it emits. Performance is affected by 
humidity, atmospheric interference (rain, snow and 
etc.), ambient light and distance. IR sensors could 
be integrated to enhance the CCTV camera system 
in perimeter surveillance. 
 
• Thermal Imaging (Laser). Thermal imaging 
lasers detect infrared radiation from objects at the 
scene and create an electronic image. Thermal 
imagers are entirely ambient light-level 
independent as they do not rely on reflected 
ambient light. In addition, they are able to 
penetrate obscurants such as smoke, fog and haze. 
Thermal imaging lasers are able to detect people 
and platforms at great distances, perform high 
speed infrared imaging, and multi-spectral infrared 
imaging. 
 
• Human Intelligent (HUMINT). HUMINT 
requires intelligence information gathering and 
analyzing information on possible terrorist 
activities. HUMINT provides advance warning 







• Seismic Sensor.  Seismic sensors provide 
excellent performance in detecting low-noise 
vibration. If these seismic inputs meet the 
pre‑programmed requirements for intruder 
detection, an alarm could be sounded to warn 
operators.  
 
• Magnetic Sensor. A magnetic sensor varies an 
output voltage in response to changes in magnetic 
field intensity. They are used in mine detection 







• Acoustic (Passive/Active) Sensor.  A microphone, 
seismometer, and hydrophone are examples of 
acoustic sensors. A hydrophone is a sound-to-
electricity transducer for use in water or other 
liquids, analogous to an ear for listening to 





• Marine Mammals.  The Biosonar Program has 
constructed the world's first biomimetic (think bio 
mimic) sonar to try to emulate dolphin sonar and 
incorporate search strategies that are specifically 
effective in the noisy near-shore environment. This 
is to emulate a dolphin’s highly sophisticated, 
natural sonar (biosonar) that allows them to detect 













TRACK    
• Automatic Identification System (AIS). AIS is a 
collision avoidance tool, mandated by IMO 
SOLAS V, to improve the situational awareness of 
the bridge crew while facilitating communication 
between vessels. AIS identifies radar contacts by 
Maritime Mobile Service Identity (MMSI) and 
access to accurate positional information for AIS-
equipped vessels. Use for text messaging between 
vessels and/or shore station facilitating 
communication of maneuvering intentions or 
safety alert. 
 
• IFF.  Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) system is 
used as a means of positively identifying friendly 
forces from enemy. This system relies on 
equipment aboard a ship known as a 'transponder'. 
The transponder is a radio receiver and transmitter 
operating on a radar frequency. The target ship's 
transponder replies to signals from an interrogator 
(usually, but not necessarily, a ground station co-
located with a primary radar) by transmitting a 
coded reply signal containing the requested 
information. 
 
• Harbor Craft Transponder System (HARTS). 
Harbor craft less than 300GT and not engaged on 
international voyages, do not come under the 
SOLAS Regulations and hence not required to 
carry the Automatic Identification System (AIS) 
transponders.  Singapore’s Maritime Port 
Authority and the security agencies, developed a 
vessel tracking system known as HARTS as an 
added defense against potential threats of attacks 
by small craft.  
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o RADAR. Radar is an electromagnetic system for 
detecting and locating of reflecting objects such as 
aircraft, ships, spacecraft, vehicles, people, and the 
natural environment. It operates by radiating 
energy into space and detecting the echo signal 
reflected from an object, or target. It can operate in 
darkness, haze, fog, rain, and snow. Its ability to 
measure distance with high accuracy and in all 









• Human. Humans could be deployed at observation 
locations to observe, track and report suspicious 







• Human Intelligent (HUMINT). HUMINT 
requires intelligence information gathering and 
analyzing information on possible terrorist 
activities. HUMINT provides advance warning 
against possible threats and heighten securing 





• Marine Mammals. Marine mammals are trained in 
various roles, which include protecting ports and 
Navy assets from swimmer attacks, locating and 
assisting in the recovery of exercise and training 







• Electro-Optics. The optical system triangulates the 
position of the marker using multiple overlapping 
cameras. It can track multiple targets with its 






ENGAGE: LETHAL    
• Close-in Weapon (CIW). CIW are weapon that are 
mounted either on shore/ship or both for detecting 
and destroying incoming threat vessels at short 




• Missiles. Target tracking rockets are able to 
deliver destructive force (usually in the form of an 
explosive warhead) upon a target. Besides 
explosives, other possible types of destructive 
missile payloads are various forms of chemical or 
biological agents, nuclear warheads, or simple 
kinetic energy (where the missile destroys the 
target by the force of striking it at high speed).  
 
 
ENGAGE: NON-LETHAL   
• Flares.  A type of pyrotechnic that produces a 
brilliant light or intense heat without an explosion. 
It is a non-lethal weapon intended to cause 




• High Powered Lights. A high powered light 
source that produces a brilliant light or beam with 
high visual intensity is a non-lethal weapon 








• Barriers (fences). Water barrier could be used to 
delineate restricted areas while providing both a 





• Signs.  Signs could be deployed in strategic 
locations to warn and deter potential intruders or 
vessels. The signs can be mounted on buoys or 
floating platforms. 
• Water Hoses (Jet). Water Jets, which takes water 
in, accelerates it, and discharges it at high velocity, 
are used to deter potential intruders from land and 
sea. It is effectively used in disseminating riots and 
violent protestors. 
 
• LRAD.  Long range acoustic device (LRAD) is a 
crowd-control and combatant-deterrent sonic 
weapon. The device is used to warn incoming 
vessels approaching without permission. It is 
capable of permanently damaging hearing, and 50 
times the normal human threshold of pain (120 – 
140 dB). The design range extends 300 to 500 
meters. At 300 meters, the warning tone is 105 dB. 
The warning tone is a high-pitched shrill tone 
similar to that of a smoke detector, only louder. 
 
• Laser Dazzlers. Laser dazzlers are a type of a 
directed-energy weapon that employs intense 
visible light. It is a non-lethal weapon intended to 
cause temporary blindness or disorientation 
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• Gas.  Tears gas could be used to disorientate 
intruders and unauthorized entry. Tear gas 
grenades could be deployed to immobilize the 
unauthorized vessel in the vicinity of the port. 
 
• Microwave.  A microwave includes a strong 
millimeter-wave transmitter used for crowd 
control or a threat by directing electromagnetic 
radiation toward the subjects. The waves excite 
water molecules in the skin causing an intensely 
painful burning sensation. 
 
• EMP. This directional weapon is designed to 
disable electronics on a small scale. This would be 
used for disabling a terrorist speedboat or 
preventing the threat from escaping.    
 
The following matrix of alternatives was proposed. 
 Shore 
This alternative involves detection, tracking, and engagement capabilities, which 
reside only in the port itself, with no additional ‘forward capabilities’ in the waters itself.  
This is the current architecture for the Port of Oakland and it is very limited.  With shore 
the Port of Oakland can mainly support detection and some tracking depending on the 
sophistication and money the facility spends to provide security in support of 33 CFR 
Part 103 and 105. 
Ship/Patrol Craft 
This alternative involves detection, tracking and engagement capabilities which 
reside only in the port itself, as well as with ‘forward capabilities’, such as patrol vessels 
from the Coast Guard that can perform interdiction in the surrounding waters.  This is the 
current architecture for the Port of Singapore where they use both Navy and Coast Guard 
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assets to provide a layer defense.  The Port of Oakland as well has this capability but at a 
limited level compared to the Port of Singapore. 
Unmanned Surface Vessel (USV) 
This alternative involves the use of USVs for detection, tracking and engagement.  
Although this is currently not in use by either ports, the Singapore Navy is currently 
exploring the use of USVs for such purposes. 
Buoys 
This alternative involves to the use of buoys to work as a passive or active sensor 
array for early detection.   
A feasibility study was performed on the various platforms.  The process of 
achieving these alternatives is discussed later in the design and analysis phase for the 
RSTG. Table 15 summarizes the alternatives considered for the RSTG. 
 
A: SHORE B.  SHIP/PC C. A/C D. USV E. BUOYS
detect detect detect detect detect
IR IR IR IR passive sensor array




track track track track track
AIS AIS RADAR IR video




Engage Engage Engage Engage Engage
           Lethal            Lethal            Lethal            Lethal            Lethal
CIWS CIWS CIWS CIWS
           Non-Lethal            Non-Lethal            Non-Lethal            Non-Lethal     Non-Lethal
LRAD LRAD Flares Flares signs













Based on the derived alternatives in Table 15, the following broad architectures 
are proposed in Table 16 for the Ports of Oakland and Singapore.  Further the use of 
sensor configuration with the alternatives are then looked at and examined later in the 
modeling portion of the project.   
 
 Port of Oakland Port of Singapore 
Current Architecture Shore+Ship+ 
Manned Aircraft 
Shore + Ship + Manned Aircraft 
Alternative # 1 Shore + Ship + USV + Manned Aircraft 
Alternative # 2 Shore + Ship + USV + Buoys + Manned Aircraft 
 
Table 16.  RSTG Proposed Port Security Architecture 
 
For the Port of Singapore, besides the current shore-based systems, the respective 
security agencies are currently operating the following to ensure the safety of Singapore’s 
territorial waters: 
Singapore Navy 
• Ships – these refer to a fleet of patrol vessels (PVs) used by the RSN. 
• Manned Aircraft – these include the Maritime Patrol Aircraft and 
helicopters. 
• USVs – currently used as sensors for maritime operations.  There are plans 
to extend their use to carry weapons. 
 
Police Coast Guard 
• Ships – these refer to the fleet of patrol craft used by the PCG. 
 
For the Port of Oakland, besides the current shore-based systems for large 
container ships out at sea, within the harbor the respective security measures are solely 
depend upon the port facility itself.  The Sheriff’s Department and the USCG are 
organizations for response when a situation occurs at the Port of Oakland as well as other 
U.S ports. The Posse Comitatus Act prohibits the U.S Navy from acting in a law 
enforcement capacity within the United States.  The level of security for the facilities is 
set by the USCG and measures that are implemented are proprietary information for the 
facility.  The individual port facility only needs to meet and report the minimum 
requirements that the USCG enforces.  Assets currently surveying the waterways at an 






• Boats – these refer to a number of RHIB vessels. 
• Manned Aircraft – these include helicopters. 
 
Sheriff’s Department /Police  
• Ships – these refer to a limited amount of RHIB (SAFE) designed for SAR 
missions and port operations.  If used in the mission area of port security 
the assets are limited. 
 
2. System Design Attributes 
The following figures provide a visual aid of the environment in which the Ports 
of Oakland and Singapore operate.  The operating environments for both ports have been 
discussed earlier and will not be elaborated here.  Both are busy ports and are potential 
high value targets for terrorist attacks.  It is therefore imperative to ensure that sufficient 
measures are effective in ensuring port security. Figure 52 shows the operating 








The Port of Singapore is operated by PSA Singapore Terminals.  Key security 
agencies involved in the protection of the port are as follows: 
Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore  
The MPA is a Government Statutory Board under the Ministry of Transport that 
regulates and licenses port and marine services and facilities.  It also manages vessel 
traffic in the port, ensures navigational safety and port/maritime security, and a clean 
marine environment. 
Republic of Singapore Navy 
The RSN defends Singapore against sea-borne threats and protects its sea lines of 
communications that encompass the Singapore Straits and its access routes. 
Police Coast Guard 
The PCG ensures coastal security and maintains law and order within Singapore 
Territorial Waters (STW). They enforce the law and maintain order in Singapore 
Territorial Waters and prevent and detect crime.  They also conduct Search and Rescue as 
well as assist other maritime agencies such as the MPA and the ICA, which handles 
customs and immigration issues. 
The Port of Oakland is operated and leased to nine privately owned companies.  
Within the United States, the key security agency involved in the protection of the port is 
the Department of Homeland Security.  The primary contributor to the security of the 
waterways for the Port of Oakland as well as other U.S. ports about the nation is the 
USCG.   Within each privately operated port facility there is a Facility Security Officer 
(FSO) who is hired by the company to maintain the security guidelines the USCG place 
upon the port facility.  These FSOs work with the Port Security Officer (PSO) to help 
provide security for the Port of Oakland.  Annually or when required by the USCG, the 
FSO and PSO meet with the USCG which composes the Area Maritime Security 
Committee (AMSC) and discuss security matters. Figure 53 depicts the operating 
environment for the Port of Oakland. 
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Figure 53. Operating Environment for the Port of Oakland 
 
   Within the Port of Oakland, key security agencies involved in the protection of 
the port are as follows: 
  United States Coast Guard (USCG) 
The Eleventh Coast Guard District is located on Coast Guard Island in Alameda, 
California along the east side of San Francisco Bay.  There mission is “As Guardians of 
the Gateway to the Pacific, District 11 serves, protects and defends the American Public, 
maritime transportation system and marine environment, through innovation, operational 
excellence, partnership and teamwork, to ensure a safe, secure and prosperous America.” 
Their mission includes: (1) Responsibility for 3.3 million square miles of coastal and 
offshore waters extending 1000 nautical miles off the coast of California, south to the 
Columbian and Ecuadorian border in South America. (2) The maintenance of the ports, 
waterways, and while providing coastal security. Since the Port of Oakland is designated 
a Tier One port, maritime protection is required for the safety of commerce. The 
Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) corresponds to the Maritime Security 
(MARSEC) levels and restrictions are tightened or relaxed accordingly.   
Local Authorities 
These are composed of local police, sheriff, fire departments that have available 
assets for assistance.  This aspect is small compared to the USCG, but it is an available 
entity.  Jurisdiction is a concern when dealing with multiple law enforcement agencies.   
Facility Security Officer 
The FSO is responsible for maintaining, acquiring, and operating the security 
measures at the facility.  Depending on the port facilities, some companies have invested 
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in surveillance cameras at specific locations.  When these surveillance assets are limited 
only to the FSO and not the security personnel, the benefit of the information is analyzed 
to what the FSO deems important. This disconnect between the FSO and security 
personnel presents an issue that affects the overall status of port security.  Security 
personnel are members of the local unions that provide the last line of defense against 
unauthorized personnel access to the port at the access points. They are typically armed 
with a flash light and a communications device. Since the unions fill the port security 
positions, the possibility of rotating security officers into key security positions exists.  
This creates a security breach in which the security officers may not be trusted with the 
full suite of surveillance capabilities the FSO might have at his disposal.  This results in 
the security guard’s reduced functionality reducing the overall security of the port 
facility.   
Based on stakeholder inputs, four potential threats have previously been identified 
and briefly discussed.  They are: 
• Small boat attack on port 
• Big ship attack at port 
• Sabotage from sea inserts 
• Remotely launched projectiles 
To maintain and ensure security, the port must possess the necessary suite of tools 
which allows the detection and engagement of threats.  An open architecture is required 
to allow further advances to be added to the system.   The requirements to detect and 
engage the identified threats are:  
Small Boat Attack on Port 
Small boats can attain speeds of 30+ knots and their small size often allows them 
to go undetected. As such, it is important to have sensors that have the ability to detect 
small boats with such small radar cross section (RCS) from longer ranges which allows 
sufficient reaction time to counter this threat.  
Big Ship Attack at Port 
Big ships seldom travel as fast as small boats. Their large RCS also allows them 
to be detected and identified from further distances. However, their large size means that 
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a significantly larger number and more lethal factors are required to stop a rogue ship 
approaching the port. 
Sabotage from Sea Inserts 
Sabotage from sea insert is a threat because of its relevance to ports that have 
islands in the vicinity.  This threat results from the infiltration of personnel into the port 
to sabotage its infrastructure or deny the operations of the port.  Detection would be 
difficult due to the covert nature of such operations. 
Remotely Launched Projectiles 
The proliferation of many remotely-launched projectiles (RPG) into the hands of 
terrorists enables these weapons to be used against the port from small boats that are in 
the harbors, straits, or nearby islands. The expected fallout from such attacks would be 
more psychological than physical due to the limited amount of damage that can be 
inflicted by each weapon. Even under such attacks, port operations are not expected to 
completely cease.  Detection would be difficult due to their small signatures, exacerbated 
by these time-critical targets do not allow much reaction time once they have been fired. 
Based on the four identified threats, it was concluded that the scenario of fast 
approaching small boats filled with explosives to either detonate at a ship pier-side within 
the port, or to damage the port itself, seems most likely (e.g. the USS COLE bombing in 
Oct 2000). All of the following sections will focus on this specific threat and its 
variations. 
Therefore a new revised problem statement for the RSTG is to enhance port 
waterside security for the Port of Oakland prior to terrorist attack while carrying on daily 
port operations by detecting, tracking, and employing appropriate courses of action. 
The ability to quickly detect these threats is the primary factor to countering them.  
Tracking and engagement are the next steps once detection has occurred.  Hence, it is 
desired that a minimum engagement range of two km be required.  Taking into account 
the speed of 30+ knots at which a small boat can travel, as well as a reaction time of at 
least five minutes, the minimum detection range of potential targets should be at least 4.5 




Figure 54.  Desired Detection and Engagement Range 
 
However, realistically, it is often impossible to achieve such desired detection and 
engagement ranges.  The high traffic in both ports means that terrorists could potentially 
hide under the cover of larger ships or general ship traffic to avoid detection and enter the 
port vicinity.  Also, spotting the terrorists before they carry out their plans is extremely 
difficult. 
The proposed implementation of the platforms, sensors, and effectors must be 
sufficiently robust to handle the various possible scenarios. 
 
3. Feasibility Screening 
Conversation among the members in the RSTG yielded a screening process that 
provided functional and relevant alternatives against a waterborne attack. Feasibility was 
analyzed by platforms and into the functions of detect, track and engage. This process 
provided the required tools to examine alternatives in sufficient detail to determine if the 
minimum requirements of the stakeholders are met. In the feasibility screening, the 
objective is to eliminate impracticable alternatives. The screening process for the 
platforms, detecting, tracking, and engaging are: 
 Platform/Shore 
This platform type is very feasible and can be installed inside or outside the port 
facility.  It provides a large area to be covered depending on the height of the sensors.  
The ability to expand on the sensor package or provide better technological systems is 
very feasible.  Since the time frame is to have it operational by 2012, the deadline is 
  129
manageable.  There is a chance as more of these shore platforms increase, the sharing of 
information with other port facilities or even the USCG is more feasible providing better 
Maritime Domain Awareness for the San Francisco Bay.   
 Platform/Ship 
This platform type is also very feasible and provides the means to position the 
ship in a location that is ideal for intercepting and engaging a potential threat.  Location 
of the ship is flexible and not fixed to a permanent location like that of a shore platform.  
Having this unit as an organic asset of the port or an inorganic asset of the USCG 
provides a functional aspect of maritime protection.  
 Platform/ASV 
An autonomous surface vessels (ASV) provides the same measures as stated 
above with the ship.  Reduced man power is an advantage over the ship.  If a threat 
becomes apparent to the port facility, the threat of personnel casualties is reduced.  Port 
facilities or the USCG can own and operate the asset and the required sensors from a 
shore location. 
 Platform/Buoys 
With the already installed navigational markers throughout the Port of Oakland, 
adding passive or active sensors on the buoys is a feasible alternative.  These systems can 
covertly increase situational awareness. Port facilities and the USCG can access the 
information regardless of the situation or location. 
Platform/Poles 
This involves placing a sensor on a wood pylon that is anchored to the seafloor.   
This is infeasible since this would entail adding navigation hazards to the already 
congested waterway.  The ranges and types of systems attached to the pole piling would 
be limited.  Also the functionality of having the sensors on a pylon could be equally or 
better served on a shore installation. 
Platform/UAV 
An UAVs is an infeasible option for port security operations. Using the UAV is 
not practical for two reasons. Government regulations by the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) restrict the use of UAVs in federal airspace and it is assumed will 
  130
not be resolved until after 2012.  The launch and recovery of a UAV in the Port of 
Oakland or at a nearby airport would be restricted.     
Platform/AUV 
An AUV is an infeasible option for use by port security as a detection and 
interdiction agent for surface threats. The waterways are not deeper than fifty feet; 
therefore, the water in which the AUV would operate is limited. Visibility would also be 
limited due to the increased amount of sediment and sound.  The AUV response time to a 
threat would be reduced compared to the ASV or UAV. Being able to distinguish threat 
perimeters would also affect the overall efficiency and functionality of the AUV. The 
disadvantage of having an AUV in the water against waterborne threat is the large 
expense with little gain which renders this option infeasible.     
Platform/Satellite 
Satellites, like the UAV, will play a vital role in maintaining the MDA picture in 
the future. Their role will be essential for coastal and open ocean observation. Their field 
of view is the largest compared to any of the platforms discussed. Their time on station is 
a great asset for the MDA picture.  In the realm of port security, the benefit of using a 
satellite for port security operations has its limits. Even with the most sophisticated optics 
and sensors, the ability to distinguish between a hostile vessel and a pleasure craft will be 
difficult. Time sensitive information needed from the satellite by the designated agency 
to take action would be too slow to stop a terrorist in the port.  Another reason is in space, 
the satellites would not be solely used for port security; therefore, the ability to use the 
satellite for port security would be subject to where the priority of port security falls. 
Finally, the time on station the satellite can maintain to accomplish the mission. The 
satellite cannot always remain in a single location and the terrorist threat is not scheduled; 
the ability to use the satellite for port security is reduced to an expensive device with little 
gain. Therefore, the use of a satellite is not feasible for port security.         
Platform/Manned Aircraft   
This platform type is feasible and is able to be positioned in a location that is ideal 
for intercepting and engaging a potential threat.  Location of the manned aircraft is 
flexible and not confined by a permanent location like that of a shore platform.  The field 
of view gives the pilot or observer a broader perspective of port operations.  Having a 
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manned aircraft maintains human awareness to recognize and act on a situation that 
might seem suspicious.  The presence of manned aircraft provides a functional aspect of 
maritime protection and is deemed feasible. 
Detect/Passive Sensor Array    
This device is not feasible for two reasons.  It is a passive array which provides 
only bearing information.  Because it provides solely bearing information, the chance of 
identifying a threat is highly improbable.  The shallow waters around the port and 
throughout the harbor the amount of background noise from container ships to small 
pleasure craft would render this system to be ineffective.   
Detect/RADAR 
The use of RADAR is feasible and provides the means to detect and track 
contacts.  By evaluating the vessel attributes, the intent of the vessel can be concluded.  
By using RADAR, early detection of possible terrorist threats against the port or 
merchant traffic is available.    
Detect/Communications Devices 
Communications involves the use of various types of devices to alert the proper 
authority of a possible threat. Communication devices are feasible tools to help in the 
detection.  They provide a means to coordinate port security activities. 
 Detect/Infrared (IR)      
IR provides a feasible option for detection. IR may be used during night or day.  
The thermal gradient between the water and ships can be easily detected by IR devices. 
IR is not affected by the small RCS of an object, but by the thermal heat produced by the 
object. The ability to recognize small objects remain.  Contacts can be detected by IR in 
high sea states.   
Detect/Video-Visual  
Video and visual means provide a feasible alternative for detection.  Video 
detection is currently used by port facilities to monitor containers in the yards and 
observe personnel traffic.  The use of video or guards provides awareness of any terrorist 
intentions.  The improvement in the range of optical sensors technology is ever 





This technology is still in the development stage and therefore not feasible and 
will not be at the maturity required by 2012. 
Detect/Human Intelligence (HUMINT) 
This is feasible and is currently used.  HUMINT is the use of the other agencies 
besides DHS to gain intelligence that might help prevent a terrorist attack.   
Detect/Seismic 
This technology will not be feasible by 2012. 
Detect/Magnetic 
This sensor is not recommended and thus not feasible for this particular situation.  
With the number of ships and small boats that travel through the waterways, the 
reliability of the magnetic sensor is reduced and not effective.  The use of fiberglass and 
other composites for small boats decreases the magnetic signature of the vessel. This 
decreases the effectiveness of the magnetic sensors placed on the bottom of the 
waterways.   
Detect/Acoustic 
Acoustic technology is either passive or active. With the noisy environment in 
which ports are situated, the benefit of this device is limited.  An improved ability to filter 
background noise could possibly make this device feasible.   
Detect/Marine Mammals  
The use of marine mammals is not a feasible option. It would be hard to establish 
the boundaries set for the animals.  The range in which these animals could enforce 
would be restricted.  With the waterways providing public access to the Port of Oakland, 
the chance of an attack upon a benign contact is possible; therefore, the use of marine 
mammals is not feasible.  
Track/AIS-HARTS 
The use of AIS/HARTS is a feasible alternative for tracking contacts.  All large 
ships operate an AIS system that reports the position, speed and direction of the vessel.  
AIS is a device that is monitored by any agency requiring the information.  HARTS is 
similar to the AIS system but used for small boats.  This system is already in use in 
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Singapore and is a tool that regulates and monitors shipping and boating traffic.  The use 
of these devices in the Port of Oakland or any port in the United States would be helpful 
in surmising the threat a contact might present.  The use of the HARTS for small pleasure 
craft and AIS for larger vessels also provides safety awareness that could be recalled 
when needed.  Overall this device would assist in providing key information to evaluate 
the intent of a contact. 
Track/RADAR 
The use of RADAR is feasible and provides a means of tracking contacts.  By 
evaluating the vessel’s behavior, the intent of the vessel may be concluded.   
Track/Human 
This is the ability of a human observer to track a contact of interest while at a 
watch station.  The range of tracking is limited compared to RADAR or the AIS systems.   
The probability of tracking a contact of interest and reporting to the appropriate agency 
before the contact completes its mission makes this aspect of tracking by a watchmen 
ineffective. Using humans to track contacts of interest is relatively slow and deemed 
infeasible. 
Track/Marine Mammals 
Same as stated in the detection subsection. 
Track/IR  
Same as stated in the detection subsection. 
Track/OTH 
Same as stated in the detection subsection. 
Track/Video 
Same as stated in the detection subsection. 
Engage (Non-Lethal)/Flares 
Pyrotechnics flares are a feasible option for port security.  These flares could be 
used to shoot across the bow of an incoming vessel to alert and warn the vessel that it is 
steering into a restricted area.  The range of flares is limited based on the method of 
release.  They could be used day or night and are visual signs which are difficult to 
ignore. Flares have multiple uses to warn incoming vessels, to request for assistance, and 
to illuminate the night sky for better situational awareness. 
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Engage (Non-Lethal)/High Powered Lights 
The use of high powered lights is feasible. These lights could be directed at a 
contact to disorient the operator. The range of these lights and its potential to prevent 
threat access to the target is limited. 
Engage (Non-Lethal)/Barriers(Fences)    
Barriers are an effective tool to keep a contact out of a controlled area. Using a 
barrier within the port and in a restricted waterway is not feasible. Barriers present a 
political issue with recreational vessels wishing to have access to the public navigable 
waterways. Furthermore, barriers would slow down the arrival and departure of container 
ships. The use of a barrier as a means of port security is not feasible. 
Engage (Non-Lethal)/Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) 
Electromagnetic pulse weapons are still in the development will not be available 
by 2012.   
 
Engage (Non-Lethal)/Microwave  
This directed energy weapon is a technology on the verge of fruition.  The 
military has a working model called the Active Denial System (ADS).  The ADS is a 
large and bulky unit. It uses a microwave beam to heat the skin to an uncomfortable level 
and if the contact does not move outside the beam, burning of the skin is possible.  It is 
assumed that this technology will not be portable before 2012; therefore, the use of a 
microwave beam as a weapon against an inbound vessel in not feasible. 
Engage (Non-Lethal)/Signs 
The least difficult to implement of the alternatives are signs.  They are feasible 
and provide warning to incoming and outgoing vessels transiting the waterways.  The 
signs provide nothing more than a warning.  Their range is limited to a person’s eye sight.  
They assume that a person knows how to read English and their intentions are pure.  If 
the signs are in particular locations and if there is someone standing watch on a particular 
port facility they provide a imaginary zone which could provide the intent of a contact. 





Engage (Non-Lethal)/Water Hoses   
When referring to water hoses as a means of port security, it is in reference to the 
use of 2.5 inch hoses. Water hoses provide an ineffective tool for fast moving vessels.  
The range of the water spray is limited to the amount of water pressure (150 psi) that is 
available.  Water hoses are good tools for repelling boarders or for riots and not as a non-
lethal measure for port security.  The only function that water hoses have when dealing 
with the port facility is to put out a fire, wash a vessel or supply fresh water to a vessel  
and should not be considered as an option for port security. 
Engage (Non-Lethal)/Long Range Acoustic Device (LRAD) 
LRAD is a sonic weapon that can permanently damage a persons hearing as the 
contact moves within close proximity. This directional beam of sonic energy will initially 
warn the target, but if the contact continues to move closer, the pain threshold goes 
beyond the tolerable levels and will harm the aggressor. This alternative is feasible. 
Engage (Non-Lethal)/Laser-Dazzlers 
The use of a Laser-dazzler is feasible.  Laser-dazzlers, directed at contacts, warns 
and disorients the operator. The level of prevention is limited because the threat could 
effectively continue on its mission.  Laser-dazzlers provide the means to provide what the 
intent of the vessel is and thereby giving the authorities the right to interrogate the vessel 
and increase force protection measures. 
Engage (Non-Lethal)/Gas 
The use of gas is not a feasible alternative.  To use gas as a non-lethal measure, 
many variables need to be accounted for in the application.  Against a small fast vessel, 
the usefulness of gas is questionable. The range is ineffective and the chance of success is 
minute.   
Engage (Lethal)/Close in Weapons System (CIWS) 
CIWS is the use of small to medium caliber ammunition for the purpose of 
disabling a vessel or inflict fatal injury to personnel aboard the vessel. Assets that might 
have CIWS may be aircraft, patrol boats, or armed personnel. One drawback to the CIWS 
is the potential to inflict collateral damage. Overall, this was deemed a feasible means to 




The use of missiles is not feasible. Missiles permit a small margin of error within 
a port or in a waterway. There is a chance that the missile might not strike its intended 
target. There is also the chance that the missile might not have enough time to arm itself 
due to the short distances it travels. Lastly, the chance of collateral damage to the 
surrounding area is also very high when using missiles. 
 
C. MODELING AND ANALYSIS 
1. Proposed Detection and Tracking Systems for Modeling 
The proposed design was based on the RSTG’s evaluation of the main threat from 
the sea: small boats attacks. The principle consideration in the design of the sensors 
integration scheme follows: 
The RSTG assumed the port authority required five minutes of reaction time from 
the detection of a contact of interest (COI) to the launch of countermeasures in the form 
of lethal/non-lethal weapons or a patrol ship to investigate the contact. This requirement 
results in the need to detect all ships and vessels movements within five nautical miles of 
the port, initially assuming that a high speed boat closed at a speed of 60 knots. 
Furthermore, there is a need to monitor and track all vessels activities once they enter the 
five nautical mile radius. 
The concept of detection and tracking is based on the following: 
• The first line of detection is radar detection which shall be able to detect 
small ships or vessels with a radar cross section (RCS) of at least one 
square meter within the five nautical mile range from the port. Upon 
detection of the targets, the command center shall track, using tracking 
algorithm or tracker system, the vessel’s movement on its Command and 
Control (C2) system. Any abnormal vessel movements or routes shall 
trigger the necessary signal or alarm to the authorities for further 
investigation and action. 
• The second line of detection is the close-in detection. This is achieved thru 
the placing of Electro-Optical (EO) and acoustic sensors at the port to 
monitor ship activity. 
• In addition, the RSTG proposed the insertion of networked sensors to 
enhance the detection of vessels carrying WMD to the port. 
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a. Sensor Design Considerations 
The types of environment, terrain, target size, distance to track, resolution 
and operation have to be considered in order to design a suitable sensor suite for the 
detection and tracking function.  Figure 55 shows the effective boundary where the 






5 nmiles Boundaries & Low Depth areas
 
 
Figure 55.  Port of Oakland Detection Boundaries 
 
The sensor has to be able to detect within a five nautical mile coverage 
area. The next consideration is the size of the target in terms of RCS enabling detection 
within that distance. The travelling speed of the target(s) would also affect the sensor 
selection due to the sensor’s scan rate. Changes in environment, for example rain, snow, 
mist and humidity, will affect the sensor’s performance and its detection capability. The 
continuous operating requirement and harsh operational environment presents another 
challenge in terms of sensors selection.  
From the different requirements highlighted, RSTG decided that a sensor 
suite customised for the Port of Oakland would best serve the intended function. The 
sensor suite would be a combination of different types of sensors composed of radar, 
electro-optical sensors (thermal imager and infra-red) and acoustic sensors chosen for 
their specific function. When these sensors are integrated they would form the sensor 
suite for Port Of Oakland. 
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b. Sensor Suite Concept of Operations 
Table 17 shows the layered concept of operations for the different sensor 
types selected for Port of Oakland. The radar would be employed for long range detection 
but offers a lower resolution. The electro-optical sensors, such as the thermal imager and 
infra-red sensors, would be installed for close range identification and offering a higher 
level of resolution. The acoustic sensors placed near key installations offers a relatively 
rapid detection against close-in threats.  
 
Sensor Type Operations 
Radars • All-weather above water surveillance 
• Long range detection (within 5 nm) 
• Unified Recognized Surface Situation Picture 




• All-weather above water surveillance 
• Upon detection cueing from radars, provide 
detailed identification of threats at range < 1.5nmi 
 
Acoustics  • Medium-range medium-frequency active sonar  
o Cover key installations against surface ships, 
submarines, small boats, swimmers, divers, 
AUV 
• Short-range high-frequency active sonar 
o Barrier to cover the inner harbor and coastal 
areas for perimeter detection < 0.5 nm 
 
  
Table 17.  Sensor Suite Concept of Operations 
 
A common operation picture displaying a unified recognized surface 
situation could be presented to the operators by sensor fusion from the different platforms 
with the ship’s Automatic Identification System (AIS) and interrogation friend-foe (IFF) 
systems. A system of systems operation can be further achieved by integrating the sensor 
suite with the port deterrence system for a coherent sensor-shooter operation. 
 
c. Sensor Consideration: Radar 
The purpose of radar is to detect all the commercial vessels and small 
boats within a five nautical mile radius of the Port of Oakland. It is especially useful to 
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detect fast approaching vessels which could be any of the small boats within the vicinity 
of Port of Oakland. A small boat could have a RCS as small as one square meter.  When 
this vessel is traveling at a speed of 30 knots, this translates into a reaction time of about 
one minute per kilometer before reaching its destination at a port. Therefore, the radar 
must have the sensitivity to detect the small RCS at least five miles removed from the 
port range to maximize reaction time. 
The radar site for sensor installation is to be on the highest ground 
practicable to improve the detection angle and range to the target.  The radar antenna is to 
be of a wide structure with narrow beam width to detect the small RCS of vessels and to 
provide adequate noise rejection from atmospheric and maritime clutter.  The radar 
propagated signal waveform has to be at high frequency with frequency diversity to 
facilitate changing environmental conditions. The radar wave should be of circular 
polarization to improve performance while raining.  Other desirable specifications are 
detailed in Table 18. 
 
Specifications Functions 
Non-coherent Pulse Modulation 
 
• Non-coherent pulses de-correlate sea 
clutter 
• Ship echoes stand out stronger 
• Target velocity derived from range gate 
integration 
 
Frequency Modulated Continuous Wave 
(FMCW) 
 
• Useful when target has high velocity 
relative to environment 
• Good range resolution measurement 
 
Coherent Pulse Doppler 
 
• Uses phase or frequency of transmitted 
and received signals 
• Allows extraction of both range and 
velocity from doppler 
• Discriminate moving targets from 
weather and other types of background 
clutter 




Table 18.  Radar Specifications 
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Four off-the-shelf radar types were evaluated. Table 19 compares the 
various radar specifications for detecting a target size of one square meter. 
 
No. Radar Type Country Frequency Range Cost Assessments 
1 Scanter Non-
coherent 
Denmark X-band 2.4km $1mil • Cheap 
• Good performance for ship 
detection 
• Dual frequency version: 
19% improvement in 
detection range 
• Detect small rubber boat at 
2.4 km 







Israel X-band 5km $1.5mil • Good range resolution 
• Detailed range resolution 
not critical 
• Azimuth beamwidth: 1.5° 
• Widest among X-band 
radars 
 
3 Suricate France X-band 8km $2.5mil • Very narrow beamwidth 
(0.6°) 
• Accurate detection 
• Cue EO/IR sensors with 
accurate azimuth 
• Good overall detection 
capability 
 
4 Giraffe CD Sweden C-band 10km $3.5mil • Less attenuation than X-
band 
• Expensive 
• Poorer detection of low-
level targets as compared to 
other X-band radars 
• Wide azimuth beamwidth 
(2°) 
• Good detection capability 
for airborne platforms 
 
  
Table 19.  Radar Specifications 
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For the Port of Oakland application, it is desirable to employ radars 
operating in the X-band frequency thus providing a low lobe angle for good low-level 
detection of vessels and small boats. Selecting a fully coherent system provides better 
signal processing in terms of integration. Therefore, two of the Suricate system radars 
were selected to provide the desired detection coverage and range. 
The current existing radar system and coverage area is shown in Figure 
56. It can be seen that the area of detection is not as wide compared to the proposed 
coverage. In order to achieve the desired detection area of five nautical miles, two 
additional radar sites shown in Figure 57 are proposed for the Suricate system radars 
installation. After the installation, the two radars will complement the existing radar by 























Figure 57.  Additional Radar Site 
 
Upon detection of threats, the EO sensor systems can be focused for 
detailed investigation.  
  
d. Sensor Considerations: EO (IR/Thermal Imager) 
The purpose of the EO sensors is to focus on detected fast attack crafts and 
tracking of smaller crafts or even swimmers heading towards the port for detailed 
investigation. The sensors would interface with the radar system by providing close-in 
target tracking and the lethal/non-lethal deterrence systems via sensor fusion for an 
integrated system-of-systems operation.  This offers coherency in terms of operations and 
minimizes the decision making cycle and maximizes the response action.  Similarly, for a 
small craft travelling at 30 knots, the reaction time is increased one minute per ½ nautical 
mile.  Hence, an EO sensor that provides a detection range of three nautical miles 
provides a response time of six minutes.  
The EO sensors offer detection and recognition capability continuously 
(day/night) and under all-weather conditions when integrated with the radar systems. 
Table 33 compares five different types of EO and infra-red (IR) sensors specifications 
detecting a target size of one square meter. 
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No. EO/IR Type Make Wavelength Range Cost Assessments 
1 Brite Star FLIR 3 - 5 µm - $100k • Thermal Imager 
• Laser Rangefinder / 
Illuminator 
• Designed for aircraft and 
shipborne platforms 
• More expensive than Sea Star 
Safire III 
2 Sea Star 
SAFIRE III  
FLIR 3 - 5 µm - $100k • Shipborne Airborne Forward 
Looking IR Equipment 
• Thermal Imager, Image 
Intensifier, Laser Rangefinder 
/ Illuminator, Spotter Scope 
• Mounted below aircraft  or on 
patrol vessels 




FLIR 7.5 - 13 µm 3km $82k • Installed at key installation 
areas for added coverage 
• Pan/Tilt capability 




FLIR 7.5 - 13 µm 2.6km $36k • Fixed look direction 
• Good for perimeter 
surveillance 
  
Table 20.  Electro-Optics/Infrared Specifications 
 
For the Port of Oakland sensor deployment, the radar would provide the 
initial detection of targets while the EO/IR sensors, upon obtaining the cueing 
information from radars, would focus on the desired target for detailed investigation. The 
EO/IR sensors have to be integrated with radar as their performance degrades rapidly in 
high humidity environments because their signal suffers high attenuation.  These sensors 
also have limited fields of view which could be enhanced by software mosaics to enlarge 
the tracking areas or targets of interest.  However, this may result in latency in terms of 
refreshing real-time situation data due to the additional computer processing.    
Figure 58 shows the deployment plan of the EO sensors. The selected 
sensors are deployed at locations to maximize coverage of interest areas and distance 
while minimizing the number of sensors to reduce costs.    
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Propose sensors coverage II
ThermoVision Sentry II (1.5miles radius) 
Propose sensors coverage I
 
 
Figure 58.  Electro-Optics Sensors Deployment Plan 
 
 Two ThermoVision Sentry II sensor systems are deemed to be necessary 
to provide coverage for tracking in the three kilometer radius of the port for detailed 
investigation capability near key installations areas.  Five ThermoVision Sentinels are 
proposed for perimeter surveillance along the port coast against insertion threats from the 
sea into Port of Oakland.  The Sea Star Sapphire III sensor system is proposed to be 
mounted on patrol aircraft and vessels for enhancement thus achieving day/night tracking 
and detail investigation capability. 
 
e. Sensor Consideration: Acoustic Sensors 
The purpose of the acoustic sensors is to detect fast attack craft near key 
areas at the Port of Oakland. The acoustics sonar offers high sensitivity detection 
capability against small craft surface threats such as powerboats and power-jets and has 
the added advantage of detecting subsurface threats such as divers, submarines, remotely 
operated vessels (ROV) and autonomous underwater vehicles (AUV).  The acoustic sonar 
is very expensive. They are only proposed to be installed near key areas at Port of 
Oakland. 
Five different types of acoustics sensor were evaluated. Table 21 
compares the five different types of acoustics sensor specifications for detecting a target. 
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No. Acoustics Sensors Frequency Cost Assessments 
1 Passive Hydrophone 
Receiver Array 
10Hz – 5kHz $2.5mil • Silent 
• Much greater range than active 
sonar 
• Allows identification of target 
• Performance affected by 
ambient noise 
• Insufficient for detection of 







(λ = 0.3m) 
 
$2mil • Useful in providing exact 
position of an object 
• Difficult to identify the target 
• Any vessel around emitting 
sonar will detect its emission  
• Other platforms can detect 
active sonar at a greater range 
than detection range of sonar 
(2-way attenuation & 
absorption) 
3 Active High-Freq 
Tactical Sonar 
    50kHz 
(λ = 0.03m) 
$1.5mil • Good resolution 
• Short detection range 
4 Vertical Array 
Passive Receivers 
1Hz – 20kHz $500k • Silent 
• Much greater range than active 
sonar 
• Allows identification of target 
• Performance affected by 
ambient noise 
• Insufficient for detection of 
underwater vehicles in littoral 
environment 
  
Table 21.  Acoustic Sensor Specifications 
 
Figure 59 shows the proposed acoustic sensors deployment near key 
installations at Port of Oakland. A total of five active omni-directional acoustic sensors 
and four active tactical high frequency acoustic sensors are required to adequately fulfill 
these functions. The active omni-directional acoustic sensors are needed for medium 
range surveillance and confirming suspected contacts that may be threats. The active 
tactical high frequency acoustic sensors are deployed to address the threat of small craft 
or swimmers around key assets by providing a sensor barrier covering the inner harbor 
and coastal areas for perimeter detection less than ½ nautical mile.   
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Figure 59.  Acoustic Sensor Deployment Plan 
 
The acoustic sensors would be deployed at strategic locations overlooking 
possible threat attack routes. The detection scheme could also be further complemented 
by positioning the acoustic sensors at transit passageways and channel routes so that any 
incoming/outgoing vessels may be easily detected. However, this deployment plan can be 
highly expensive as there are numerous passageways and channels.   
The information from the radars and sensors shall be forwarded to an 
integrated Command and Control system at the command center.  This C2 system shall 
provide the data fusion of the various sensor information to form the common operational 
picture (COP), which shall be available for all port authorities and interested 
shareholders. With the COP, it shall enhance the interoperability of the various agencies 
for all operations. 
 
f. Coastal Patrol Routes 
As stated previously, it is desired to monitor all maritime activity within 
the five nautical mile boundary of the Port of Oakland.  This would allow for adequate 
reaction time and coordination in the event of any intrusion of unwanted craft and 
personnel to the port.  The boundary includes water of low depth, big vessel shipping 
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channels, beaches and marinas in the immediate vicinity.  These regions have activities 
happening during various times.  Figure 60 shows the locations of the vessels routes and 
marinas that are located in the region. The RSTG has identified a number of marinas 
within the vicinity where that can be used as launch platforms for potential terrorist 
activity.  These activities could hinder the port operations; thus, it is prudent to provide a 




Figure 60.  Locations of the Vessel Routes and Marina 
 
In addition to the situation of radars and EO sensors to detect and track 
shipping activities, the presence of patrol craft in the surrounding waters is prudent to 
security and safety of the port and ships. Their known presence could provide a strong 
deterrence to any potential unwelcome activity.  
The RSTG proposed the four patrol routes for security forces.  These 
routes were devised to provide the routine, close-in surveillance to the activities on the 
Red lines – 
Outbound merchant vessel 
Yellow Line- Inbound 
merchant vessel 
Green circles – 
Marinas where possible 
launched platform for terrorist
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coast and ships in the vicinity.  The objective of the close-in surveillance is to 
complement the sensors in detection, especially in the areas of blind spot and small 
targets intruders. 
The patrol craft shall be equipped with Sea Star Safire III EO/IR sensors. 
These shall provide the operators in the craft the capability to operate in day and night, 
regardless of visibility and weather conditions. 
Two routes, route 1 and route 2, were proposed for the surveillance of the 
coasts and marinas. These routes were designed in clockwise and counter-clockwise 
directions. The considerations were to reduce the predictability of the patrol routes and to 
increase the periodic presence of the patrol craft. These routes would be constantly 
patrolled with craft launched at regular intervals. Thus at one time, there would be a 





Figure 61.  Patrol Routes 1 and 2 (Coastal Patrol) 
Key
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In addition to the surveillance on the coastal area, the team proposed two 
inner routes in the sea area for the surveillance of the activities on the shipping routes and 
anchorage areas. Route 3 and 4 are proposed for patrols in the northern and southern 
waters of the port. Figure 62 shows the propose routes for the anchorage area. These 
patrol routes shall provide the surveillance on the activities on the anchorage areas. It 




Figure 62.  Patrol Routes 3 and 4 (Anchorage Patrol) 
 
The proposed patrol routes created the presence of the security forces in 
the port vicinity. Through regular contacts with the craft and vessels in the vicinity, the 
security forces can also complement intelligence gathering, through Human Intelligence 
(HUMINT), on the collection of abnormal activities and signs of irregular shipment or 





g. Possible Routes of Advancement for Small Boat Attacks 
Figure 60 showed the location of marinas within the port vicinity where 
small boast attacks could be launched. In order to evaluate the sensor’s detection and 
tracking capability or hide any early signs of abnormalities of its routes, the intrusive 
boats were directed to follow the usual vessel routes to move in to the targeted area 
depicted in Figure 63. Upon closing upon the targeted area, the boats would rapidly 
detour and move in to strike the port facility. 
From the launch platforms to the strike area, the teams devised six 
possible boat routes which were deemed to have good concealment within the sea routes 
for vessels and crafts.  The initial movement of the contacts of interest was designed to 
appear to be following the routine shipping routes. These movements are shown in 








Figure 64.  Threat Routes: Possible Advancement Routes from Far Bank Marinas 
 
A simulation program was developed by the RSTG. It aimed to model the 
projected radar and sensors deployment, security/patrol vessels surveillance routes and 
the possible threat advancement routes.  The programs modeled the proposed solution 
based on the sensor’s specifications on its range, area of coverage, the screening forces 
on patrol, and the intrusion activities described above. The objectives were to measure 
the effectiveness of the proposed solutions in their detection capability and the optimal 
sitting of the sensors for a full sea coverage and detection of small boat activities in the 
vicinity of the port.  
 
2. Modeling Plan 
Faced with the constant increase in complexity of both the components of the 
system and their multifaceted interrelationships, the RSTG needed a tool to simplify the 
interactions and provide a visual interface.  Modeling is the one tool that helps make the 
complex situation for the RSTG understandable.  For the RSTG, the focus is on the 
prevent/protect element of force protection and port security.  The different alternatives 
that have been generated for RSTG were prioritized on the probability of specific threats, 
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identification of key elements of concern for the Port of Oakland, and the resources 
whose technological capabilities and viability provide security for the port.  One way to 
illustrate the effectiveness of an alternative, or if time and resources permit different 
alternatives, is to model the problem space and implement the alternatives and execute 
simulation runs to analyze the results that are collected. 
A simulation and modeling tool was selected to execute the design and 
implementation in the simulation of the alternatives. Simkit, a Discrete Simulation 
Engine from NPS Modeling, Virtual Environment and Simulation (MOVES) curriculum 
was selected to carry out the modeling task.  Simkit has been used in several Port related 
analysis projects in the past with positive results.  The event-driven paradigm has been 
popular in MOVES and its modularity is certainly helpful to allow a simulation 
application to be developed for the RSTG.  Agent-based simulation could have been 
chosen to carry out the development of the simulation for the RSTG; however, most 
agent-based simulation systems work on the basis of a discrete time paradigm.  Unlike 
the event-driven paradigm, discrete time paradigm advances in unit time steps in carrying 
out each simulation run.  This characteristic has certainly raised some constraints and 
ambiguity in employing agent-based simulation for the RSTG.  One basic constraint 
would be the need to spend the required number of time units for each simulation run.  
Collect statistical results based on multiple runs would have been an arduous, if not 
impossible task. Another ambiguity in using agent-based approach would be the selection 
of the correct time unit as basis for discrete time advancement.  The question of adequacy 
of a basic time unit has to be defined with respect to the resolution of details that the 
simulation run is able to capture versus the extent at which physical time would be 
needed to complete a single scenario run.  
In using the discrete event paradigm upon which Simkit is based, the constraints 
and ambiguity faced with the discrete time paradigm do not surface. This is primarily due 
to the fact that the advancement of the simulation is purely on the existence of events that 
exist in time. Simulation run proceed in accordance to the orderly occurrence of events. 
Carrying out multiple runs to collect statistical results would be much more viable.  There 
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is no need to address the adequacy of the resolution of a unit time interval. Resolution 
hinges on the complexity of models entirely.   
However, there are some agent-based simulation systems that have been around 
earlier than Simkit. As such, there is a convenient Graphical User Interface (GUI) to 
facilitate modeling that is currently not available in Simkit. Simulation models developed 
using Simkit have to start from scratch. Nevertheless, there are several libraries of 
behaviors that have been helpful. 
The analysis of the status quo, identification of the key areas within the port, and 
the operational approach of the alternatives are key elements that drive the requirements 
specifications for the modeling and simulation approach.   
With respect to the sections that described the alternatives in detail, a flow chart 
illustrates the flow of an alternative. In this flow chart, for the RSTG, a series of major 
blocks has been identified. These major blocks for sensory system represent a significant 
step in the operational procedure that has been formulated in the alternative generation. 
The major steps are: 
• Target Detection  
• Threat Classification  
• Threat Recognition 
• Threat Identification 
• Engagement 
• Intent Monitoring 
Figure 65 represents the flow chart for the RSTG model, which identifies the 




























































Figure 65.  RSTG Model - Small Boat Procedure Flow Chart 
 
The analysis of the alternative has also facilitated the allocation of these major 
steps linking them into a logical flow.  This logical flow depicts how the alternative will 
be executed in the implementation of the simulation models. The running of the 
simulation will execute according to the flow analyzed in this flow chart for the 
alternative. 
 
3. Modeling Explanation 
In designing the simulation models, the behaviors for both the threats and sensors 
had to be created. Different components had to be designed. Each component that was 
designed had its roles and responsibilities identified with respect to one or more major 
blocks in the flow chart. The relationship and the communication between components 
had also been designed to realize the logical flow of procedure that is depicted in the flow 
chart. In this way, executing the simulation run realizes the execution of the flow chart 
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logical flow for the scenario that has been created for the alternatives of the RSTG 




Figure 66.  RSTG Discrete Event Components 
 
The components have been designed with the relevant roles and responsibilities 
that they represent and thus model concrete entities’ behavior. There are relationships 
that link these components together. These communication links implement the 
relationship between various independent components. These communication links 
essentially establish the interface to address the independence, extensibility and 
expansibility of each component in the simulation design. 
In the design of the software components, there has been consideration for ease of 
future expansion and extension on the behavior that is currently implemented.  Each 
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component has been identified with a set of roles and responsibilities.  The interface and 
communication linkages with other related components have been appropriately 
designed.  The current implementation for each component is in fact independent.  In the 
future, when there is a need to change the implementation of one component with a 
higher precision or fidelity, it could be easily expanded by adding more events without 
affecting other components.  Similarly, when new components need to be created to 
augment the behavior of existing component, they could easily be linked to existing 
components without disrupting the other existing components already in place.   
The key for ease of carrying out future work using the existing components 
designed for RSTG would be to fully understand the rationale in the design of each 
component, its assigned role and responsibility and its existing behavioral fidelity. 
The following are some of the simulation components that have been identified.  
The sensors are the resources that help provide the security of the port while the threats 
are the behaviors that depict the infiltration of threats to attack the port.  The following 
simulation components are required: 
• SensorMover – entity holder that contains the properties of craft, radar and 
other sensor resource. 
• SensorMoverManager – a manager category of object that is responsible 
in the maneuver of the entity that it is entrusted with. 
• Mediator – a category of objects that undertakes the responsibility to 
facilitate the sensor in the detection of objects of interest 
• Classifier – a component that is responsible for carrying out the necessary 
intelligence of classification of objects 
• Identifier – a component that is responsible for carrying out the necessary 
computation of identification 
• RouteDeter – a component that has the role to make decision on making 
change in the route that the entity will proceed with 
• Arrival – a component that is responsible for depicting the existence of 
threats in the scenario 
• CreateThreat – a component whose role is to identify the different types 
and location where threats will be created in the scenario 
Figure 67 shows the user interface for the scenario controller. The user would 
deselect the visual simulation to box to generate statistics. The number of simulation 
replications and the number of terrorists can be specified. The array of available sensors 
can be toggled by selecting and deselecting the appropriate boxes. The positions, routes, 
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Figure 67.  Scenario Controller of Port Security Local Waterside Model 
 
Figure 68 is a screen capture of the RSTG model using Simkit and applied with a 
“Google Earth” overlay of a section of the San Francisco Bay which contains the Port of 





Figure 68.  Visual Simulation of Port Security Local Waterside Model 
 
In the application that the RSTG has developed, there are typically seven color 
schemes used for all entities.   
• Blue -  depicts the patrol crafts, helicopters, USVs, radar sensors, electro-
optic sensors, acoustic sensors, and all entities within the simulation that 
are considered resources belonging to the agency that is responsible for 
protecting the port. 
• Red – depicts the threats that exist as it would in reality.  Contacts that 
have the intent to infiltrate into the key installation areas through water 
passage compose the red forces. 
• Green – depicts the various pleasure crafts that transit along the waterways 
of the Port of Oakland.  They neither have the ill intent of infiltration nor 
to attack the port.  They are privately owned vessels that ply through the 
waterway.    
• Magenta – depicts all initial contacts, whether threats or pleasure craft or 
container ships, as unknown.  After detection, classification, recognition 
and final identification, they will eventually update to Red or Green. 
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• Yellow – depicts a contact within scanner range whose intentions are still 
unknown. 
• Pink – depicts a successful classification of the contact (while in scanner 
range). 
• Orange – depicts a successful identification of the contact (while in 
scanner range). 
The RSTG ran the model more than thirty times for each of the alternatives.   This 
provided an appropriate sample size for a normal distribution for data analysis and 
provided enough information on which to base the results and arrive at some type of 
conclusion. 
In the scenario, threats have been modeled with behaviors that attempt to land at 
key installation areas in the Port of Oakland.  The simulation logic is implemented with 
counter metric values for each of the threat entities created in each simulation run to 
capture the status of each threat’s attempt to reach the key installation areas.  
Consolidating these metric values through the “manager objects” in the simulation 
computes the number of infiltrations which is an example of one of the MOE to be 
measured. Each of the sensor entities for example: patrol craft, radar sensor, and aircraft 
have behavior implementation that attempts to interact with the threat entities.  There are 
different kinds of service period for each of the sensor entities. This information is 
obtained from the analysis of the problem space by the RGTS group. In each simulation 
run, each sensor entity would interact differently with the threat entities and thus each 
sensor entity’s effectiveness in detecting and eventually deterring the threats are reflected 
in the difference in the status metric values.  In addition, the values of these status metric 
values are very much affected by the assigned capabilities for the Sensor Entities within 
the scenario. The utilization of each sensor entity and its ability to detect is computed 
during each simulation run. At the end of each simulation run, the 
“manager objects” computes the average utilization, rate of successful detection, rate of 
classification of targets, and the average time to target detection through the values of the 
metric values of each sensor entity.  From the data that was collected, particular MOE’s 
were analyzed identified prior to the model and simulation aspect.  With the data 
correlated to the particular MOE, statistical information was gathered and linked to the 
particular alternative. Comparison of the alternatives was solely based on cost because 
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this issue is the major aspect which all the stakeholders have in common and if time 
permits further analysis can be conjectured.   
The desire of the model is to assist in the MDA of the San Francisco Bay which 
will assist in the protection of the Port of Oakland. The current system is inadequate to 
deal with the potential of a waterborne terrorist threat against the Port of Oakland. What 
the RSTG is hoping to achieve is improved coverage of the area where a potential threat 
will be addressed in an appropriate manner. That the system will give multiple 
individuals access to the system and provide awareness to all stakeholders.  This 
awareness aspect will then be operational three hundred and sixty-five days a year, seven 
days a week and twenty-four hours a day. With this system in place, the cost and benefit 
will be marginal to the overall effects of a terrorist attack to the Port of Oakland. 
Around the Port of Oakland, there are several potential locations that have been 
identified as vulnerable points where terrorists/threats could potentially launch to attack 
the vulnerable areas of the port.  These areas have been circled in Figure 69.  Figure 69 
also depicts the routes commonly used by vessels to and from the Pacific Ocean.  Figure 










Figure 70.  Key Areas of the Port of Oakland 
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Figures 71 to 76 illustrate six different routes that terrorist/threat entities will be 
taking off to infiltrate the key areas in the Simulation.  Each of these routes originates 
from different marinas situated in the area of the Port of Oakland. 
 
Figure 71.  Route 1 of Threats 
 
Figure 72.  Route 2 of Threats 
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Figure 73.  Route 3 of Threats 
 




Figure 75.  Route 5 of Threats 
 
  




Table 22 lists the sensor specifications encoded in the simulation model: 
Patrol Craft
Max Speed 10.0 knots
Max Range 1.0 km
Helo
Max Speed 150.0 knots
Max Range 2.0 km
Scattering non-coherent Radar
Max Speed 0.0 knots
Max Range 2.4 km
ACSR
(Advanced Coast Surveillance Radar )
Max Speed 0.0 knots
Max Range 5.0 km
Suricate Radar
Max Speed 0.0 knots
Max Range 8.0 km
Girraffe CD Radar
Max Speed 0.0 knots
Max Range 10.0 km
ThermoVision Sentry II
Max Speed 0.0 knots
Max Range 3.0 km
ThermoVision Sentinel
Max Speed 0.0 knots
Max Range 2.6 km
FOV 10.0 degree
Directions { 250, 70, 250, 
110, 80 }
Active OminiDirectional Sonar
Max Range 0.15 miles
Max Speed 0.0 knots
High Frequency Tactical Sonar
Max Range 0.5 miles
Max Speed 0.0 knots
USV
Speed 10 knots
Range 1 km  
 
Table 22.  Sensor Specifications Encoded in Port Local Waterside Simulation 
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Figures 77 and 78 list the encoding of the four routes of the patrol crafts, two 
routes of the USV and the route of the helicopter. Cyclical route 1 of the patrol craft 
consists of CG1->CG2->CG3->CG4->CG5->CG6->CG7->CG8->CG9->CG10->CG11-
>CG12->CG13->CG14->CG15->CG16->CG17->CG18->CG19->CG20->CG4->CG3-
>CG2->CG1. Cyclical route 2 of the patrol craft is the reverse of cyclical route 1. 
Cyclical route 3 of the patrol craft consists of CGR3_1->CGR3_2->CGR3_3->CGR3_4-
>CGR3_5->CGR3_6->CGR3_1. Cyclical route 4 of the patrol craft consists of CGR4_1-
>CGR4_2->CGR4_3->CGR4_4->CGR4_5->CGR4_6->CGR4_7->CGR4_8->CGR4_1. 
Cyclical route 1 of the USV consists of USV1->USV2->USV3->USV4->USV5->USV6-
>USV7->USV8->USV9->USV10->USV11->USV12->USV13->USV14->USV15-
>USV16->USV17->USV18->USV19->USV3->USV2->USV1. Cyclical route 2 of the 










Figure 78.  Encoding of Routes of USV and Helicopter 
 
Figures 79, 80, and 81 show the encoding of the positions of the sensors. R1, R2, 
and R3 represent the positions of the three radars. TSentry1 and TSentry2 represent the 
position of the ThermoVision Sentry II sensors. TSent1, TSent2, TSent3, TSent4 and 
TSent5 represent the position of the five ThermoVision Sentinel sensors. HFTS1, 
HFTS2, HFTS3, HFTS4 represent the position of the four High Frequency Tactical 













Figure 81.  Encoding of Positions and Coverage of the Acoustic Sensors 
 
4. Simulation Setup 
Simulation was performed using the model that was developed by the RSTG by 
using Simkit.  Figure 82 shows the options available for running the simulation.  The 
simulation runs were performed by: 
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• Executing 30 simulation runs for each specific configuration to obtain a 
large sample size. 
• Varying the types of sensors available for use by the Port of Oakland.  
These varied from the current suite of sensors available at the Port, as well 
as those additional alternatives proposed by the team. 
• Varying the number of terrorist small boats attempting to reach the Port of 
Oakland during each simulation run.  These numbers varied from 1 to 12, 




Figure 82.  Scenario Controller for Simulation Engine 
 
a. Key Simulation Parameters 
Seven possible entry routes for the terrorists were incorporated in the 
simulation (Six from the various marinas situated in the region near the port, one from the 
main shipping lane used by ships when they enter the San Francisco Bay).  The 
simulation engine was designed such that each terrorist small boat would randomly select 
one of these entry routes. 
For the transit time along the terrorist routes, the transit typically took 
between 17 to 30 minutes (depending on their starting locations) to arrive to the 
destination (which is the key area marked out in the Port of Oakland as shown in Figure 
83).  The logic behind these routes are that they will normally follow the designated small 
craft routes, to avoid suspicion, until they are near the port area.  The terrorists would 





Figure 83.  Designated Terrorist Target Area 
 
To enhance the coordination of the attackers, multiple attacker scenarios 
were simulated such that they all arrived at the scene at once, rather than sequentially to 
better evaluate the capability of the sensor network to detect and identify multiple threats.  
Their transit speed was established at 30 knots. 
Successful interrogation of a terrorist’s small boat was achieved by having 
each sensor follow a detect-classify-recognize-identify algorithm. The classification, 
recognition and identification times are each set as three minutes in simulation time.  For 
example, the small boat must be within the coverage of the given sensor for that 
minimum period before classification/recognition/identification could be achieved by that 
particular sensor.  If the small boat leaves the sensor coverage before the loop is 
completed, the boat is not successfully interrogated. 
The factor of 1:60 is used for conversion between real time and simulation 





b. Limitations of the Current Simulation Engine 
The assumption was made that when a terrorist’s small boat was detected 
by one of the sensors platforms, it was assumed to be deterred.  While this is not 
necessarily true in any real life situation, this crucial assumption was made to scope the 
problem to avoid having to deal with the many complexities that arise after detection has 
occurred (e.g. what to do next, whether to continue tracking or to decide which 
engagement option to execute).  This cannot be easily modeled and requires a human-in-
the-loop to decide the next best course of action.  
The sensors could only perform single processes for the 
detection/classification/recognition/identification procedures due to the complexity of 
encoding this algorithm for multiple targets.  The limited time available for the team to 
build the simulation model from scratch was a major limitation. 
The inability of Simkit to model objects moving in three dimensions 
meant that the implementation of the sonar platforms in this simulation may not 
correspond to the real world environment.  While Diskit, which is an extension of Simkit, 
allows for 3-D Point (versus Simkit’s implementation of Point2D), the team was not 
confident that the implementation in Diskit would result in a stable simulation engine.  
Hence, the team reverted to using Simkit, with the associated limitations of Point2D. 
 
c. Simulation Runs 
For the simulation runs, different sensor configurations were performed to 
test the sensor capabilities.  These configurations ranged from the RSTG’s understanding 
of the current sensor configuration at the Port of Oakland, to the final configuration that 
the team proposed.  Intermediate configurations were also simulated to gather results to 
more fully understand the capabilities afforded by the addition or subtraction of any 
particular set of sensors: 
The sensors used are described briefly: 
• 1 x Helo The helicopter used by the Coast Guard for use in their 
Search-And-Rescue (SAR) missions.  Detection using this platform is 
incidental, as it is not primarily deployed as a sensor.  Anytime the 
helicopter was used, only one helicopter was on patrol. 
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• 4 x Patrol Craft  The patrol craft are currently in use by the Coast 
Guard.  It is assumed that a maximum of four of these craft were 
patrolling the coastal waters around the port at one time.  It was 
assumed that these patrol craft are fitted with the Sea-Star III for 
improved sensing capability. 
 
• 1 x Radar Configuration   This radar is currently in use by the 
USCG in their daily operations for vessel trafficking service (VTS) not 
primarily used for port security, it is located at the radar tower located 
on Yerba Buena Island situated west of the port.  It was assumed that 
this radar has the ability to detect and identify targets with one square 
meter radar RCS. 
 
• 2 x Radar Configuration  In addition to the existing radar, 
another radar was added to provide wide area sensing and target 
tracking.  The additional radar needed not necessarily be able to detect 
targets with a one square meter RCS. 
 
• 3 x Radar Configuration  In addition to the existing radar, two 
additional radars were being implemented for wide area sensing and 
target tracking.  These additional radars needed not necessarily be able 
to detect targets with the one square meter RCS. 
 
• 2 x Unmanned Surface Vehicles  The PROTECTOR Class 
USVs were proposed to complement the manned patrols.  They may 
be used for routine patrolling as well as any interdiction operations. 
 
• 2 x Thermo Vision SentryII The Thermo Vision Sentry II aided 
in providing continuous wide area high resolution thermal imaging.   
 
• 5 x Thermo Vision Sentinel The Thermo Vision Sentinel aided in 
providing continuous focused-view high resolution thermal imaging 
for perimeter-sensing for the port. 
 
• 2 x Networked Sensor The Networked Sensors were a vertical 
array of passive receivers that were deployed in shallow water and 
supported by surface buoys. 
 
• 5 x Active Omni Directional Sonar The Active Omni Directional 
Sonar was primarily used for the detection of subsurface threats.  
While the perceived main threat in this case was from small boat 
attacks, the possibility of a subsurface threat remained.  Furthermore, 
sonar could also detect the perturbations caused by fast approaching 
small craft.  Hence, the sonar was included. 
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• 4 x High Frequency Tactical Sonar Similar to the Active Omni 
Directional Sonars, the High Frequency Tactical Sonar were also used 
for the detection of potential subsurface threats. 
The sensor configurations (column headings) and type of sensor platforms 










5. Results and Key Findings 
a. Current Configuration 
Based on interviews and conversations with the Port of Oakland and the 
USCG, the current sensor configuration for the Port of Oakland was assumed to be the 
following: 
• 1 Helo 
• 4 Patrol Crafts 
• 1 Radar (situated on Yerba Buena Island) 
This was the assumed current configuration for the Port of Oakland; it was 
the baseline configuration for which the other configurations will be compared against in 
terms of how the added sensors and platforms would increase the detection capability.   
Table 24 and Figure 84 summarized the detection and infiltration rates of 








Figure 84.  Infiltration and Detection Rate for (A) Configuration 
 
With regards to Table 25, the detection rate is defined as the number of 
contacts that were successfully interrogated by completing the 
classification/recognition/identification chain. 








b. Current and USV (B) 
The simulation runs with this sensor configuration sought to verify the 
increased capability afforded by the addition of Unmanned Surface Vessels.  The 
configuration was modeled by including the following: 
• 1 Helo 
• 4 Patrol Crafts 
• 1 Radar 
• 2 USVs 
Table 26 and Figure 85 summarized the detection and infiltration rates of 
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Figure 85.  Infiltration and Detection Rate for (B) Configuration 
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Table 27.  Sensor Detection Rate for (B) Configuration 
 
c. Current and USV and 1 Additional Radar (C) 
The simulation runs with this sensor configuration sought to verify the 
increased capability afforded by the addition of a wide-area sensing radar with tracking 
capability.  The modeled configuration was as follows: 
• 1 Helo 
• 4 Patrol Crafts 
• 2 Radars 
• 2 USVs 
Table 28 and Figure 86 summarized the detection and infiltration rates of 
the simulation runs with varying the numbers of terrorist small boats. 
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Figure 86.  Infiltration and Detection Rate for (C) Configuration 
 




Table 29.  Sensor Detection Rate for (C) Configuration 
 
d. Current and USV and 2 Additional Radar (D) 
The simulation runs with this sensor configuration sought to verify the 
increased capability afforded by the addition of two wide-area sensing radars with 
tracking capability.  The modeled configuration was: 
• 1 Helo 
• 4 Patrol Crafts 
• 3 Radars 
• 2 USVs 
Table 30 and Figure 87 summarized the detection and infiltration rates of 
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Figure 87.  Infiltration and Detection Rate for (D) Configuration 
 




Table 31.  Sensor Detection Rate for D Configuration 
 
e. Current and USV and 2 Additional Radar and Thermo Vision 
Sentry II (E) 
The simulation runs with this sensor configuration sought to verify the 
increased capability afforded by the addition of two wide-area sensing radars with 
tracking capability.  The modeled configuration was: 
• 1 Helo 
• 4 Patrol Crafts 
• 3 Radars 
• 2 USVs 
• 2 Thermo Vision Sentry II 
Table 32 and Figure 88 summarized the detection and infiltration rates of 




Table 32.  Infiltration and Detection Rate for (E) Configuration 
 
 
Figure 88.  Infiltration and Detection Rate for (E) Configuration 
 





Table 33.  Sensor Detection Rate for E Configuration 
 
f. Current and USV and 2 Additional Radar and Thermo Vision 
Sentry II and Thermo Vision Sentinel (F) 
The simulation runs with this sensor configuration sought to verify the 
increased capability afforded by the addition of two wide-area sensing radars with 
tracking capability.  The modeled configuration was: 
• 1 Helo 
• 4 Patrol Crafts 
• 3 Radars 
• 2 USVs 
• 2 Thermo Vision Sentry II 
• 5 Thermo Vision Sentinel 
Table 34 and Figure 89 summarized the detection and infiltration rates of 
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Figure 89.  Infiltration and Detection Rate for (F) Configuration 
 





Table 35.  Sensor Detection Rate for F Configuration 
 
g. Current and USV and 2 Additional Radar and Thermo Vision 
Sentry II and Thermo Vision Sentinel and Networked Sensors 
and Sonar (F) 
The simulation runs on this sensor configuration sought to verify the 
increased capability afforded by the addition of Networked Sensors supported by buoys, 
as well as sonar.  The modeled configuration was: 
• 1 Helo 
• 4 Patrol Crafts 
• 3 Radars 
• 2 USVs 
• 2 Thermo Vision Sentry II 
• 5 Thermo Vision Sentinel 
• 2 Networked Sensors 
• 5 Active Omni Directional Sonar 
• 4 High Frequency Tactical Sonar 
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Table 36 and Figure 90 summarized the detection and infiltration rates of 
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Figure 90.  Infiltration and Detection Rate for (G) Configuration 
 





Table 37.  Sensor Detection Rate for G Configuration 
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h. Key Findings 
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Figure 91.  Terrorist Detection Rate for Various Sensor Configurations 
 
While the detection rates decreased as the number of terrorist small boats 
increased, it is noticed that the rate of reduction is smaller with a multi-layered system.  
This is primarily due to the RSTG’s assessment that the optimal sensor solution should be 
a multi-layered sensor plan.  This is vital in ensuring that the various sensor platforms 
form an effective network to detect against incoming threats. 
While the detection rate seems to decrease with the increasing number of 
terrorist small boats, RSTG realized that this could be due to the limitations of the 
simulation engine that was used.  More specifically, each sensor platform could only 
detect a single target at any one time. The lengthy classification/recognition/identification 
process for any target usually resulted in the other targets being able to ‘escape’ detection 
from the same sensor.  This further reinforces the necessity for the Port of Oakland to 
adopt a multi-layered sensor architecture for effective target interrogation. 
While real operational sensors could perform multiple threat detection and 
tracking, the many uncertainties present in reality can result in the sensor suite not being 
used to its full potential. This may not enable for appropriate counter terrorist operations 
to be performed within the limited time before the terrorist is able to reach his objective. 
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The performance of the various sensor platforms are summarized as 
follows: 
• Radars - Radars form the first line of detection. This is due to their 
wide-area sensing capabilities, and their respective detection times 
confirm that they are the first to detect incoming targets. 
 
• EO/IR Sensors - The suite of Thermo Vision sensors that provided 
EO/IR sensing capabilities were also useful in detecting the incoming 
threats that managed to ‘evade’ radar detection 
 
• Helo - Helicopters, primarily used for SAR operations, are not very 
useful in detecting targets in this simulation.  However, in real life, 
their ability to move from location to location at high speeds among 
the shipping vessels gives them a distinct advantage should the need 
arise for the USCG to get from place to place quickly. 
 
• Patrol Craft -While the detection rates of the patrol craft may appear to 
be small compared to other sensor platforms like the radars, their 
importance in reality cannot be overstated.  While the detection of 
terrorists would be incidental (i.e. being at the right place at the right 
time), their very presence in the waters surrounding the port serves to 
deter any potential attackers, and this deterrence is a viable form of 
defense.   
 
• USVs - USVs are similar to patrol craft in that their ‘detection’ of 
terrorists would also be incidental.  However, like patrol craft, their 
very presence in the waters serve to deter any potential attackers.  
Furthermore, the ability to use these unmanned vessels for interdiction 
in hazardous scenarios could often save the lives of the security 
personnel who would otherwise have to confront any hostile elements. 
 
• Networked Sensor - Networked Sensors, using buoys, did not seem to 
be particularly useful in the simulation, as demonstrated by their low 
detection rates.  Their small coverage areas meant that they will be 
triggered only if there is disturbance right in the immediate vicinity of 
the mounted sensor.  Furthermore, although not simulated, it is 
expected that the power requirements of these Networked Sensors 
would be difficult to support.   
 
• Sonar - Sonar did not seem particularly useful in the simulation 
demonstrated by their low detection rates.  This is largely due to the 
fact that the primary perceived threat was from surface attacks by 
small boats, and hence the simulation was modeled that way. Sonar 
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could possibly be useful in the detection of subsurface threats, and 
ought to be considered for those threats. 
 
5. Cost Estimation 
The RSTG gathered cost estimation data for the alternatives that provided the 
waterborne defense against the small boat threat to the Port of Oakland.   This data was 
used to conduct a cost benefit analysis of the alternatives.  The cost benefit analysis 
illustrates the amount of anticipated performance that could be achieved for a given cost 
and which alternative provides the most effectiveness for the associate cost.  More simply 
stated, the objective is to show a graphical representation of the “bang for the buck” 
amongst the alternatives.  The RSTG cost estimation did not examine the application of 
these alternatives inside the individual terminals of to the Port of Oakland.  This option 
was deemed too costly and infeasible.  What the RSTG examined was the application of 
the alternatives to the assets that are already in place in regards to the mission of port 
security.  These assets mainly belong to the USCG, which is tasked with the job of port 
security and directly involved in the protection of the Port of Oakland.    
 All costs are in 2007 U.S. Dollars (USD) and were acquired from 
corresponding with sales associates and operators of the various systems and required 
equipment. Life cycle cost estimates included procurement cost and operational and 
support aspects of the required equipment. This provided a reasonable value for the total 
cost of each of the alternatives which mainly focused on the acquisition and ownership of 
the equipment. The term sunk cost is the money already paid for a particular asset for 
MDA. Due to the time frame of the PSS12 project, research and development cost; 
disposal cost; as well as any upgrades were not calculated and figured into the cost 
estimation. 
Cost estimation is based on historical data. Based on that basic principle the 
operational and support costs that is not provided by vendors or operators was based on 
the rule of thumb that 30 to 70 percent of the procurement cost is the typical annual 
operation and support costs.  Again, the following are purely estimates obtained through 
calculations and conversations and should not be considered the actual procurement and 
O&S costs. 
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Special note must be addressed upon the cost of the USVs selected. This applies 
to all configurations except for the current configuration. With this particular type of 
USV, a large portion of the total cost is contributed to procurement and O&S of two 
USVs. The cost encompasses a boat, trailer, gun mount (7.62 mm, mini-Typhoon), 
Toplight (EO/IR) system, spare kit, control station (two person), on site training and 
warranty.  Different USV platforms are out on the market and cost not nearly as much but 
because of the Protector’s proven performance out in the fleet and diverse mission roles it 
was assumed the best candidate for the mission of port security. Table 38 depicts the cost 




Table 38.  Summary of Cost per Configuration 
 
Current Configuration (A) 
With the current configuration a large portion of the total cost has already been 
paid for from previous fiscal year budgets. This is common referred to as sunk cost. For 
example, if USCG already has four SAFE Boats in operation, there is not a need to 
repurchase the boats. What remains is the operational and support (O&S) costs for 
maintaining and support the missions of the particular assets. Table 39 represents the 




Table 39.  Total Cost for Alternative A 
 
Current + USV (B) 
With this configuration, the addition of an USV was used in the cost estimation.  
The Protector is used and was the only USV examined because of its diverse mission 
profile and its legitimate functional role in port security. The high procurement cost 
comes from the many different amenities that come along with the baseline version of the 
Protector. In regards to the model, RSTG used two USVs and therefore USV 
procurement was added to the total cost. Table 40 represents the procurement costs, 




Table 40.  Total Cost for Alternative B 
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Current + USV + One Additional Radar (C) 
With this configuration, an additional X-Band Radar was procured and used in 
conjunction with the items in configuration B. O&S costs for the Suricate X- Band radar 
was determined by analogy to the existing X-Band radar. Using the O&S percentage of 
the existing X-Band radar and applying it to the procurement cost of the Suricate radar, 
the O&S cost of the Suricate X-Band radar was determined as indicated in Table 41. 
 
Table 41.  Total Cost for Alternative C 
 
Current + USV + Two Additional Radars (D) 
The same procedure described previously was with this alternative. In this 
configuration, an additional Suricate radar was used. Table 42 summarizes the total cost 




Table 42.  Total Cost for Alternative D 
 
Current + USV + Two Additional Radar + Thermo Vision Sentry II (E) 
 




Table 43.  Total Cost for Alternative E 
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Current  + USV + Two Additional Radars + Thermo Vision Sentry II + Thermo Vision 
Sentinel (F) 
Table 44 summarizes the total cost for alternative F. 
 
 
Table 44.  Total Cost for Alternative F 
 
Current + USV + Two Additional Radars + Thermo Vision Sentry II + Thermo Vision 
Sentinel +Networked Sensors + Sonar (G) 




Table 45.  Total Cost for Alternative G 
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6. Cost Benefit Analysis 
 As the number of sensors that are incorporated into the different sensor 
configurations increases, so does the cost of the configurations.  Graphing the detection 
percentage compared to the cost is depicted in Figures 92 and 93.  Each line segment is a 
particular number of terrorist threats and each point on each line segment represents the 
alternatives A-G respectively.   
 For example, if the desire of the stakeholder is to prevent three terrorist 
small boat attacks from reaching the Port of Oakland, he would need to determine the line 
with the appropriate characteristics from either of the graphs below.  From the three 
terrorist line (yellow line in Figure 92), he would profile trace the path to the determined 
detection percentage the stakeholder desires.  If the desired detection percentage is within 
the bounds of the three terrorist’s line, he would proceed to the closest point along the 
line to determine the appropriate sensor package.  The point to the far left on the point is 
A, the second point in same line is alternative B, etc.  At that point, a desired cost of the 
configuration can be obtained.  
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Figure 93.  Cost vs Detection for Alternatives A-G with Even Number Terrorists 
 
What the RSTG discovered was that for each number of terrorist threats, the most 
optimal configuration ranged. As with the optimal sensor configuration, the aspect of cost 
and detection percentages are huge driving considerations as well and can ultimately 
sway the stakeholder’s consideration. Depending on the needs of the stakeholder which 
desire a particular sensor configuration, the final say rests in the hands of the stakeholder 
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IV. SOURCE SEABORNE THREATS GROUP 
A. PROBLEM DEFINITION 
1. Needs Analysis 
a. System Decomposition 
The system decomposition is a step during the needs analysis process that 
is used to identify what the current system addresses which enables the generation of 
possible solutions. Figure 94 presents the system decomposition for the SSTG. The 
system is decomposed into the components, functions, states and structure. They are 
intended to provide a framework to analyze the current system, elements, subsystems and 










-Deny container holding undesired cargoes from loading onto container ship
-Deny terrorist would-be crews onboard container ship
-Detect and disrupt UAV attacks on container ship in-transit











Figure 94.  SSTG System Decomposition 
 
The components section is divided into structural, operational, and flow 
requirements needed for port security from the source port and in-transit aspect.  The port 
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and its infrastructure, sensors, weapons and communication networks form the 
framework of the system. Personnel, trucks, and ships, are the integral components of the 
operational construct of the system in providing port security. The C4I (command, 
control, communications, computers, and intelligence) and the cargo are the elements that 
flow through the system.  
The systems’ functions are selected to address threats at the source port 
and transiting ships. At the source port, the system should deny containers enclosing 
undesired cargo from loading onto container ships. It should deny potential terrorists 
from boarding the ship as crew or passengers. The objective of these two functions is to 
curtail terrorist preparation activities at the source port.  The system should also detect 
and disrupt UAVs attacking the transiting container ships. 
These states describe different modes in which the system must operate.  
The ship may be located inside the port, in congested and restrictive waterways, or in 
open water during transoceanic transit.   
The structure describes the command and control of the system and the 
interaction among personnel to assure the availability of security measures. The crew of 
the ship must coordinate with the port facilities, maritime authorities, security agencies, 
and law enforcement agents from the source port, transshipment ports, and the receiving 
port to ensure security from the source to the destination. This must be a coordinated 
effort including the governments of the littoral states whose waters the ship traverses. 
 
b. Stakeholder Analysis 
All stakeholders belong to at least one of four categories: clients, users, 
analysts, and others.   The clients are the personnel, businesses, or agencies that make the 
decisions to allocate resources for the purchase, maintenance, and operation of the 
system.  The users are the businesses and their personnel who are employed to operate 
the system.  The analysts are businesses, agencies, and governments that have a vested 
interest in the analysis of the operation, success or failure of the system, and future 
viability.  The others category relates to individual, business, agencies, and governments 
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that have an indirect vested interest in the success or failure of the system.  Figure 95 




Figure 95.  SSTG Stakeholders 
 
The stakeholders list was determined through an evaluative process 
resulting in site visits, phone interviews, e-mails, and video teleconferences with 
prospective clients, users, and analysts. Clients included foreign and domestic 
governments and port owners who determined that preventing undesired goods from 
entering the port area by land and sea was critical in providing port security for the source 
and destination ports. Identification of undesired cargo transiting unchecked to the 
destination port and being traced to the source port could have serious political 
ramifications for the originating port and the government in which the originating port is 
located. The source port would suffer enormous economic repercussions if WMDs were 
allowed passage to foreign territory. More specifically, all security agencies and practices 
at that port would be questioned and current trading practices would change.   
A critical area the users identified in source port security is the lack of 
awareness and accountability in the hiring and background checks of personnel that 
operate and work on ships that frequent the ports. Additionally, a large portion of 
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shipping is done via transshipment in which the containers and crew are rarely screened 
as they are unloaded and reloaded from ship to ship. Although there are locking 
mechanisms on the containers, there are currently no additional measures in place to 
ensure that these containers are not tampered with in the process.   
There is also the need to assess the economic impact on the operation of 
the source port from initial system layout and the economic burden of reduced throughput 
of containers and ships. 
 
c. Input-Output Model 
The input-output Model identifies the critical input parameters required 
for the system to operate and the desired and undesired outputs of the system.  
The input-output model is displayed in Figure 96. The inputs and outputs 
are identified by examining the four primary functions the system needs to accomplish in 
order to address the needs at the source port and shipping in-transit. The four primary 
functions are: 
• Deny container holding undesired cargo from loading onto container ship 
• Deny terrorist crews access to the container ship 
• Detect and disrupt UAV attacks on the transiting container ship 




Figure 96.  SSTG Input-Output Model 
 
In Figure 96, under the controllable inputs, various types of sensors and 
the associated performance parameters, such as the transmission signal and the 
architecture of the sensor system, would affect the overall system performance. Other 
controllable factors that could also affect the system performance are the selection of the 
appropriate threat level and its associated measures, the number of scanning stations, the 
technology used for the scanning, the area of operations, and the amounted of personnel 
needed to maintain the required operational effectiveness. 
Uncontrollable inputs are those who cannot be totally manipulated by the 
stakeholder. The amount of relevant intelligence collected directly influences the mission 
success of the system. The type of targets and their associated operational profiles and 
specifications also affect the system’s mission success. Environmental conditions, such as 
the temperature and sea state, also influence the system output. 
Each of the four primary functions aims to achieve a desirable output from 
the system. At the source port, before the container ship leaves for the destination port, 
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only the legitimate crews should be authorized onboard the vessel. Prior to the loading of 
containers onto the ship, any container that is indeed carrying undesired cargo must be 
quarantined and inspected. During the transit, any hostile UAV attempting to deploy 
WMD onto the ship’s hull, containers, or deck should be detected, tracked, and disrupted. 
In the vicinity of the destination port, where natural and manmade chokepoints are 
present at the port of entry, the ideal state is to maintain an unobstructed traffic flow in 
the essential water route. 
There are additional by-products that are undesirable that the system 
requires minimizing the impact. By-products of a system include: 
• Collateral Damage 
• Extra loading and processing time 
• Real estate needs to manage queue size 
• Miss detection 
• False alarm 
• Shipping and cost overhead 
 
d. Functional Analysis 
Figure 97 is the functional flow diagram to deny containers holding 
undesired cargo from loading onto container ships.  The sub-functions are to screen the 
container’s manifest, conduct either a non-intrusive or intrusive inspection, or both. For 
countries considered to have hazardous cargo, either quarantine or load the flagged 
containers depending on what is found by investigation to determine if the cargo is 
legitimate. 
The CBP requires the shipper to complete manifests and bills of lading 
information. This information is to be submitted to the CBP 24 hours in advance of the 
cargo being loaded onto the container ship at foreign ports [14]. These manifests are then 
screened to identify containers that contain potentially dangerous cargo. Screening 
attempts to identify possible anomalies that suggest the actual contents do not match the 
description of the manifest. Containers that do not pass the manifest screening are 
segregated for higher level inspections. The subsequent inspection is composed of non-
intrusive and intrusive methods. Non-intrusive scanning is performed using external 
sensing devices or human senses to scan the container for suspicious sensory signatures 
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without opening the container and examining every single item inside. This type of 
scanning also includes weighing the container to confirm the weight of stated cargo is 
within an acceptable confidence level for the goods stated in the manifest. The objective 
of the scanning is to detect weight anomalies as well as traces of chemical, biological, 
radiological, and explosive substances emitted from the containers.  A useful by-product 
of this function is the detection of contraband items. Intrusive inspection requires 
removing the items from the container for thorough inspection. A failed non-intrusive 




Figure 97.  Deny Loading of Undesired Cargo Functional Flow Diagram 
 
Containers that have passed the preliminary manifest screening or follow-
up inspection would proceed to be loaded onto the container ship, or placed in a storage 
area while waiting the arrival of the container ship. Containers carrying items that fit the 
description of the undesired cargo would be quarantined and inspected. The focus of this 
study is to detect containers carrying undesired cargo prior to the loading onto container 
ships.  
Figure 98 is the functional flow diagram to deny terrorist access to the 
container ship. The system shall gather intelligence data from the network of databases to 
collate and identify container ships, captains, and sailors that have access to the port 
facilities and the ship. The identification process may determine that an individual or 
group of people could pose a security threat to the port or ship.  A ship that has been 
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identified as having one crew member who could be a security threat to the port would be 
denied port entry. 
The ship’s entry could be denied by securing the port or most likely 
interdicting the ship in open waters by the appropriate agency.  If the ship has already 
berthed at the dock or has managed to gain access to the port, all of the ship’s crew would 
be denied access to the port facility. The appropriate agencies would be notified to 
investigate and detain the suspected individuals.   The final stage of the functional flow is 
to neutralize the threat.  Once the ship’s crew members have been denied entry to the port 
facilities, the threat has to be neutralized.  The neutralization process would include the 
notification of appropriate local, state, and national government agencies to detain and 




Figure 98.  Ship's Crew Infiltration Functional Flow 
 
The functional flow diagram to detect and disrupt UAV attacks on a 





Figure 99.  Detect and Disrupt UAV Attack on Transiting Ship Functional Flow 
 
A ship employing this system would need to maintain awareness by 
scanning the surrounding area.  Air surveillance radars would be used to create an image 
of the area surrounding the ship, enhancing situational awareness.  All contacts would be 
tracked.  Based on the contacts behavior (such as speed, altitude, and direction), the target 
would be identified as either hostile or neutral.  An identified hostile contact could be 
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neutralized by non-lethal means. An example of neutralization is the use of audio 
warnings to delay the attack, which provides the container ship time to seek further 
assistance from other entities. This process is constantly iterative, occurring the entire 
time that the vessel conducting the search while transiting in high risk regions.  The high 
seas regions were not considered as there is low probability of occurrence due to the 
required range which is currently unachievable by the terrorists.  
Figure 100 is the functional flow diagram to secure navigation-restricted 
water routes to the ports. The sub-functions are as follows: 
• Collect PANS in advance of vessel approach to chokepoint and strategic 
waterway 
• Scan for dangerous cargo at source ports 
• Monitor vessel traffic near and within strategic waterway and chokepoint 
• Obtain hostile ship information from intelligence 
• Analyze & identify targets & threats 
• Monitor probable threats 
• Escort probable threats 
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Figure 100.  Secure Chokepoint Loading to Port Functional Flow 
 
Prior to the vessel’s arrival at the strategic waterway, initiatives to ensure 
its security include scanning for dangerous cargo and submission of PANS documents. 
At the strategic waterway and chokepoint, the system should monitor vessel traffic 
transiting into and within the vicinity. Through scanning and tracking surface vessels, the 
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system searches for suspicious activity that warrants additional investigation. High traffic 
density around the vicinity of high-value targets poses challenges to the system in 
identifying suspicious activity. Intelligence would be a vital input element in the threat 
and targeting analysis. Intelligence enables the system to perform threat analysis and 
generate a potential threats list. Resources would be recommended for deployment to 
protect high-value assets.  
The output of the threat and targeting analysis delivers the likelihood of 
each vessel posing a threat to the waterway and other vessels. The maritime security 
authority handles threats according to their risk factors. If the threat probability is deemed 
low, the vessel would be cleared to proceed through the strategic waterway. If the threat 
probability is deemed moderate, the threat would be monitored closely and provided with 
an escort if necessary. For cases when the threat is very likely, the maritime security 
authority and other local agencies might deny the vessel transit through the chokepoint. 
The focus of this study is to detect and prevent threatening vessels from inflicting damage 
near or within a strategic waterway. 
 
2. Objectives Hierarchy 
The objective hierarchy provides the means to evaluate the concerns of the system 
and the lower tier of the evaluation measures are adequately measure to attain the system 
objective. The MOEs and MOPs are the quantitative measures used to evaluate the 
different alternatives generated for the system design. During the modeling and analysis 
phase, the MOEs and MOPs serve as a guide to design the models in order to analyze the 
various alternatives. Figure 101 depicts the objectives for “deny container holding 
undesired cargo from loading onto container ship,” while Table 46 describes the 








MOP: Probability of Detecting Anomalies
MOP: Probability of Type I Error
MOP: Probability of Type II Error
MOE:
MOP: Average Time to Process Manifest
MOP: Average Number of Manifests Processed per Day
MOE:
MOP: Probability of Detecting Undesired Cargo
MOP: Probability of Type I Error
MOP: Probability of Type II Error
MOE:
MOP: Average Scan Time Per Container
MOP: Number of Containers Scanned Per Day/Hour
MOE:
MOP: Probability of Verifying Undesired Cargo
MOP: Probability of Type I Error
MOP: Probability of Type II Error
MOE:
MOP: Average Inspection Time per Container
MOP: Number of Containers Inspected Per Day/Hour
Intrusive Inspection - 1.3
Intrusive Inspection - 1.3
Screen Container Manifest – 1.1
Screen Container Manifest – 1.1
Non-Intrusive Scanning - 1.2
Non-Intrusive Scanning - 1.2
Accuracy of Inspection
Timeliness of Inspection
Accuracy of Manifest Screening






Table 46.  MOE/MOP for Deny Container Holding Undesired Cargo from Loading 
 
Figure 102 depicts the objectives for “detect and disrupt UAV attack on a 
container ship in-transit,” while Table 47 describes the associated MOEs and MOPs for 
the function. In the UAV attack scenario, there will be little time after an air vehicle is 
detected to consult other intelligence agencies or to summon local area enforcement for 
assistance.  The SSTG is focusing on the pre-attack aspect and leaving the response 















MOP: Probability of Detecting UAV
MOP: Probability of Type I Error
MOP: Probability of Type II Error
MOE:
MOP: Speed of UAV
MOP: Direction of UAV




MOP: Probability of Maintaining Track
MOP: Probability of Lost Track
MOE:
MOP: Maximum Number of Contacts Tracked
MOE:
MOP: Probability of Correct Identification
MOP: Probability of Type I Error
MOP: Probability of Type II Error
MOE:
MOP: Percent of Threats Neutralized
MOP: Minimum Effective Range
MOE:
MOP: Average Time Required to Deploy
Suitability Neutralize - 2.5
Identification Accuracy Identify - 2.4
Neutralization Effectiveness Neutralize - 2.5
Timeliness Track - 2.3
Detect - 2.2
Track Quality Track - 2.3
Multiple Contact Capabilities Track - 2.3
Frequency Scan - 2.1
Detection Quality Detect - 2.2
MOEs/MOPs




Table 47.  MOE/MOP for Detect and Disrupt UAV Attack on Transiting Container 
Ship 
 
Figure 103 depicts the objectives for “deny terrorist access onboard container 









MOP: Probability of Correct Identification
MOP: Average Time to Identify a Threat
MOP: Probability of Type I Error
MOP: Probability of Type II Error
MOE:
MOP: Average Time to Notify Appropriate Agencies
MOP: Probability of Type I Error for Denial
MOP: Probability of Type II Error for Denial
MOP: Average Response Time to Locate and Detain 
Identified Crew Members
MOP: Average Time Required to Process Identification of 
Suspect Crew Members
MOE:
MOP: Average Time of Port Operations Disruptions due 
to Threat Neutralization
MOP: Percentage of Equipment Downtime during 
Neutralization
MOP: Manpower Required to Neutralize Typical Threat
MOEs/MOPs
Intelligence Data Handling Capability Identify - 3.1
Timeliness Deny - 3.2
Effectiveness Neutralize - 3.3
 
 
Table 48.  MOE/MOP for Deny Terrorist Access Onboard Container Ship 
 
Figure 104 depicts the objectives for “secure chokepoint leading to the domestic 










MOP: Proportion of Acquisitions vs Detections








MOP: Resolution of Measurements (e.g. speed, direction)
MOP: Probability of Detection
MOP: Probability of Type I Error







MOP: Probability of Maintaining Track
MOP: Probability of Losing Track
MOP: False Track Rate
MOE:
MOP: Maximum Number of Tracks at Once
MOE:
MOP: Time that Intelligence is Obtained and Measured 
with respect to Hostile Ship Leaving Port
MOP: Time that Intelligence is Obtained and Measured 
with respect to Hostile Ship Entering Port
MOE:
MOP: Probability of Intelligence Showing a Real Threat
MOE:
MOP: Credibility Rating of Source
MOE:
MOP: Number of Sources with Coinciding Information
MOE:
MOP: Time in Advance that PANS is received
MOE:
MOP: Relevance of Questions
MOP: Depth of Questions
MOE:
MOP: Trustworthiness of Informer
MOP: Availability of Source Port Counter-Checking 
PANS with Ships Document
MOE:
MOP: Minimum Amount of Information Needed to Run 
Analysis
MOP: Uncertainty in Analysis Results
MOP: Ability of Analysis to Incorporate and Infer from 
Up-to-Date Real World Incidents
MOE:
MOP: Probability of Correctly Identifying Threats
MOP: Proportion of Valid Predictions of the Situation
MOP: Proportion of Correct Forecasts
MOP: Proportion of Estimates Containing Complete 
Predictions
MOP: Spread of Analysis Results (how many ships are 
probable?)
MOE:
MOP: Firepower to Deter Potential Wrongdoers
MOP: Firepower to Neutralize Wrongdoers
MOE:
MOP: Average Time from Decision to Issuing Requests or 
Reports
MOP: Response Time of Escort
MOE:
MOP: Average Time to Disseminate Orders
Speed of Operations Release Target Ship - 4.8
Suppression Ability Escort Target Ship - 4.7
Speed of Operations Escort Target Ship - 4.7
Quality of Analysis Analyze Threats - 4.6
Performance of Analysis Analyze Threats - 4.6
Detail of PANS Document Collect PANS - 4.5
Authentification of Informer Collect PANS - 4.5
Coincidence Intelligence - 4.4
Timeliness Collect PANS - 4.5
Accuracy of Source Intelligence - 4.4
Credibility of Source Intelligence - 4.4
Multiple Contact Capabilities Track - 4.3
Timeliness Intelligence - 4.4
Track Quality Track - 4.3
Information Availability Detect - 4.2
Timeliness Track - 4.3
Detection Quality Detect - 4.2
Coverage Scan - 4.1
Frequency Scan - 4.1
MOEs/MOPs
Target Search Scan - 4.1
Target Acquisition Scan - 4.1
 
 
Table 49.  MOE/MOP for Secure Chokepoint Leading to Domestic Port 
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B. DESIGN AND ANALYSIS 
1. Alternatives Generation 
The Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA), signed into law by President 
George Bush in November 2002, has some far reaching implications for the development 
of robust designs that allows for accurate and efficient scanning of undesired cargo.  
Cargo inbound to the U.S. from foreign source ports on container ships may be denied 
entry into U.S. territorial waters by the DHS if the source ports are found to be 
consistently lacking in adequate security and screening of cargo [46]. The source port 
group is not limiting a source port to be identified as a port that only has inbound cargo to 
the United States, but rather any port that exports containerized cargo to another country.  
The implications of the MTSA on the world’s view of port security measures could have 
ripple effects to other countries that may also deny inbound cargo from suspect ports that 
do not provide adequate cargo screening.   
The SSTG developed alternatives based on the premise that a source port would 
be receiving container cargo from land routes (trucks carrying containerized cargo) and 
through transshipment (containerized cargo that is off-loaded from one ship to another 
ship in the port). During the initial alternative generation, all methods were considered 
regardless of cost or impact on port operations. A morphological chart and feasibility 
screening were used to narrow the generated alternatives to a realistic number that was 
bound by the constraints of available technology by 2012, stakeholder inputs, and 
minimal impact on port operations, in particular container throughput. 
 
a. Considerations for Alternatives 
Installation of Scanner 
The installation of scanning equipment was considered for subsequent 
modeling and analyzing the overall system effectiveness.  The mobile system is generally 
installed in a van or truck that can freely travel within the port to scan containers and 
shipping trucks.  The mobile unit brings the scanning equipment to the targeted 
containers for non-intrusive scanning. The mobile system is equipped with digital 
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imagers that automatically highlight any suspicious cargo and can be utilized to scan the 
entire container or certain areas.   
Scanning systems located on the crane already exist as weight scales.  The 
scales are effective in determining if the container matches the cargo weight stated in the 
cargo manifest.  The incorporation of X-ray and neutron imagers onto the crane loaders is 
being developed and will be available by 2012.  Each container would be scanned and 
imaged while being lifted by the crane loader. The combining of lifting and scanning 
concurrently enables the port operator to execute 100 percent volume scan of all 
containers.  Currently, information is not available on the performance of the crane 
loading scanners and if such technology requires extra time to lift each container due to 
the scanning requirement. Although Port of Oakland has conducted the trial using crane 
loading scanners, the results have not been released. 
Fixed entry point scanning is already implemented in Singapore and other 
ports.  Every container truck must pass through a scanning system at the entry point of 
the port, making 100 percent volume scanning for all containers possible. Utilizing the 
newest X-ray and gamma ray imagers, the trucks can be scanned as they traverse through 
the entry in approximately eight seconds. However, transshipment containers arriving 
from the waterside will have to be scanned using the mobile system or the crane loading 
scanner. 
Intrusive Inspection 
Intrusive inspection seeks to verify suspicions of container cargo 
following an initial stage of screening. The initial stage of screening includes manifest 
screening and non-intrusive inspection of the container among other procedures that 
could lead port authorities to doubt the integrity of the container cargo. 
When a container is flagged for intrusive inspection, its origin or its 
contents are suspected and the key objective of intrusive inspection is to accurately 
identify and locate any suspected cargo within the container. If the call to inspect the 
container is a false alarm, then the process of intrusive inspection has to be precise and 
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prompt. Both requirements are important to ensure that suspected cargo is cleared or 
confirmed at a rate that causes minimum disruption to port operations. 
The key elements of intrusive inspection are human inspectors, assisted 
with trained animals, portable radiation detectors and potentially remotely-controlled 
robot inspectors. 
Given the sheer volume of cargo within a container and the potential 
danger involved, human inspectors are not expected to do a carpet search of all cargo or 
physically handle the suspected cargo. The value of human inspectors lies within their 
ability to integrate their understanding of the entire situation (manifest screening, non-
intrusive scan results, anomalies in the real word) to better direct search efforts and 
harness the appropriate technology to conclude the search accurately and promptly. 
During a container search, trained animals are guided to search within the container and 
deploy portable radiation detectors and identifiers in the more probable regions.  
Animals can be also trained to aid port security on different dimensions. 
Trained sea lions and dolphins are able to locate underwater divers. Trained dogs can be 
employed to detect drugs, bombs and now DVDs. Their olfactory ability is sensitive 
enough to detect trace amounts of many compounds, which makes them very effective in 
screening objects, in particular to detect drugs, humans and explosives. Dogs require 
close proximity to the cargo being searched and can take a considerable amount of time 
to screen a container. In addition, dogs require constant training to remain proficient and 
alert to detect a particular search item. 
Today's security challenges are complicated. Commercial businesses ship 
radioactive material with valid commercial purposes. Terrorists may ship radioactive 
material in their bid to build WMDs. The human inspector requires equipment such as a 
portable radiation inspectors to instantly reveal the precise nature of radioactive contents. 
The portable radiation inspector needs to be sensitive and accurate in identifying the type 
of radiation present in the suspected container. Its job is complicated by the natural 
cosmic radiation all around us, unintentional radiation from manmade materials (e.g. 
ceramic tiles) and the intentional shielding of any radioactive material that is being 
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smuggled. The portable radiation inspector needs to inform the inspector of the precise 
radioactive contents in order to conclude the search. The portable radiation inspector is 
required to maintain a low false alarm rate and to minimize disruptions to port operations 
and public confidence. Various national laboratories in the U.S. have been focusing on 
radiation detectors. They include Sandia National Laboratories, Radiation Detection 
Center at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and Oak Ridge National Laboratory. 
The previously-mentioned national laboratories have been focusing on 
radiation detection portals and portable radiation devices. Given the dangerous nature of 
cargo inspection to the human inspector and trained animals, it is not unreasonable to 
forecast the use of robotics to take over this job. However, tremendous technical 
challenges in radiation detection and in robotic automation have to be overcome before 
such robot inspectors are technically and commercially viable to incorporate into cargo 
search. 
Manifest Screening 
The manifest screening aspect of the container security process describes 
the use of information about the containers and cargo that does not originate from the 
scanning process.  The system uses the information to determine the container’s threat 
level and to organize the scan and search operations. Without manifest screening, port 
operators would not have any advanced notice about the type of cargo arriving at the port. 
The selection of container for scanning would be random at the source port. All 
intelligence regarding the containerized goods would be collected from non-intrusive and 
intrusive searches conducted in the source port. 
ATS (Status Quo) 
Currently, the CBP in coalition with the USCG have two enforced rules 
for cargo reporting that are destined for U.S. ports.   
On 2 December 2002, the 24 hour cargo manifest rule was enforced.  This 
rule requires carriers to submit a declaration to CBP 24 hours prior to cargo loading in a 
foreign port.  The CBP enters this data into the Automated Targeting System (ATS) that 
is linked to various commercial and law enforcement agencies. The ATS uses the 
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information to search for pattern anomalies and cargo of interest.  The ATS system was 
created after 9/11 from a similar system that CBP was in use.  The Automated Manifest 
System (AMS) stored information about the participants in the shipping industry and 
their shipping patterns.  ATS provides a more thorough search, and generates a numerical 
score for each container.  Higher scores equate to higher risks.  This law was in full 
enforcement by 2 May 2003. Fines were being issued to the shipper who had filed 
incorrect information and “Do Not Load” messages were being sent to port operators for 
the containers that were not properly documented. 
The USCG also requires all commercial vessels, foreign or domestic, 
entering a U.S. port from a foreign port to give a 96 hour advance notice of arrival.  A 
cargo manifest must be electronically submitted to the National Vessel Movement Center 
(NVMC) for screening.  The NVMC is linked to other agencies and databases to detect 
suspicious cargo and to alert the USCG before the ship’s arrival in port.  
ATS+ 
In the ATS (status quo), only the shippers are required to submit manifests 
to CBP.  The shippers usually get the necessary data from the exporter to complete the 
manifest and there is no requirement for the exporter to submit the manifest.  The level of 
inspection conducted by the shipping company prior to loading the container will depend 
on several factors. Usually, shipping companies will accept reports from trusted exporters 
as truth and transfer the reports to CBP.  This process presents a gap for the exporter to 
exploit permitting an opportunity to smuggle undesired cargo into the United States. A 
ship operated by a rogue crew could easily forge the manifest by adding the number of 
containers shipped from a particular exporter and their own containers packed with 
explosives and radiological material without causing suspicion.   
However, if manifests are required separately from the exporter, shipper 
and importer, a more complete image can be generated on the item being shipped. 
Discrepancies would be easily flagged when the three submissions are collated for 
consistency. A terrorist cell would have to infiltrate or create their own exporting, 
shipping, and importing company, and coordinate the manifest filings for each in order to 
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smuggle undesired cargo.  In ATS (status quo), either the shipper or the exporter would 
have to be infiltrated in order to transport undesired cargo to a U.S. port. 
Data Sharing 
Data sharing among the authorities and agencies would enhance the 
awareness of the global containers shipment.  There are two forms of data sharing 
described as separate alternatives below.  Additionally, data sharing also includes sharing 
intelligence gathered via intelligence agencies and as manifests and information collected 
via the non-intrusive scanning and intrusive searching.  The goal of the data sharing is to 
streamline the intelligence gathered together with the scanning and search results into one 
cohesive report that is readily accessible by the correct authorities at the right time.  This 
method would allow for further inspection of scan results while the ship is in-transit if the 
need arises.  The USCG could decide if the ship should be stopped and searched at sea or 
allow the ship to enter the destination port. Without data sharing, the results of the non-
intrusive scan would remain with the source port. 
 
b. Status Quo Alternative 
The Status Quo alternative describes the container security being practiced 
at the U.S. domestic ports. Containerized cargo arriving at the port facility via trucks 
would be screened for undesired materials. Transshipment containers, which constitute 
the major portion of the port’s shipping container volume, are excluded from the 
screening process due to sheer lack of resources and additional overhead cost. 
The ATS developed by the CBP is adopted to analyze shipping manifests 
(bill of laden and information) and customs documents to profile containers on risk of 
carrying undesired cargoes into the United States. Based on certain rules set, high-risk 
containers would be flagged as potential threats and of these potential threats, some are 
randomly selected for non-intrusive scanning before loading at the source port or at the 
port of entry in United States. Currently the ATS flags approximately six percent of all 
containers as potential threats [47]. 
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At the source port, every container delivered by land vehicles is scanned at 
the point of entry into the port. The container will also be weighed to spot any anomalies 
by the experience operators. Radiation detectors will also be deployed to detect 
radioactive signatures.  
Containers are also randomly selected for intrusive inspection. Intrusive 
inspection of containers is performed by human beings. Human inspectors would use 
portable radiation detectors to verify radiological materials. They will also be assisted by 
trained dogs to sniff for explosives. 
 
c. Zero Percent Inspection Alternative 
The zero percent volume screening alternative does not perform container 
scanning and inspection. It is proposed on the basis that current random screenings are 
not effective at meeting the performance of detecting unwanted cargo. In March 2006, 
the Government Accountability Office reported that there is no control to provide 
reasonable assurance that ATS is effective at targeting containers with the highest risk of 
smuggled weapons of mass destruction [48]. As such, this alternative does not perform 
any screening, scanning and inspection of containers.  
 
d. 100 Percent Volume Screening Alternative 
The 100 percent volume screening alternative is formulated upon the 
ambitious goal to scan each and every container that passes through the source port. This 
alternative applies the scanning approach to both incoming and transshipment containers. 
This is a huge increase in scanning requirements over the status quo of six percent of all 
containers identified by ATS for inspection. 
In order to handle the huge volume of containers passing through each 
source port, this alternative incorporates a non-intrusive scan of each container at its 
essential waypoints in the port, namely at its point of entry into the port and while being 
lifted by the quay crane and yard crane. By incorporating scanning efforts in the essential 
waypoints, additional overhead to the current processing time could be minimized. The 
technologies used in this alternative are passive devices, such as weighing scales, 
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radiation detectors, and X-ray scanners. The (crane) operator experience and training 
proficiency would be a critical factor of the overall system performance. Figure 105 




Figure 105: Handheld and Fixed Structure Radiation Detectors [49] 
 
In current port operations, cranes fail to reach their specified productivity 
due to yard delays. For instance, the operator interference and proficiency in crane 
loading and machinery delays could introduce additional container processing time. 
Current state-of-the-art cranes, such as the Tandem 40s, are specified to load or unload a 
container in ideally 39 seconds which includes 30 seconds of crane mechanical 
movements and confirmation of pickup and deposit positions [50]. Yard delays prolong 
the turnaround time to 60 seconds. This provides a window of opportunity of duration of 
approximately 30 seconds to scan each container on the crane. Crane scanning 
technologies would have to meet this time requirement to minimize the economic cost of 
this alternative. 
Containers that fail the scanning either at the point of entry or lifted by the 
crane are further screened using intrusive methods that is more thorough. Technologies 
used at this stage include human inspectors, trained animals and portable radiation 
detectors. 
Given the comprehensive scanning efforts that have been invested into 
verifying each container, the source port will protect the integrity of the scanned 
container with smart tags that stores the cargo information and is hardened with tamper-
proof lock. That information will be shared with destination ports authority to alleviate 
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their scanning requirements and for anomaly-checking in the event that the container has 
been tampered with. 
Given that this alternative scans every container, there is no need to use 
ATS for targeting. 
 
e. Improved Loading Inspection Alternative 
The improved loading search alternative was based on improving the 
physical inspections that occur during the loading of containers. This method examines 
the concept that physical searches improve the detection of undesired goods more 
effectively than the use of intelligence. As part of the improved loading search 
alternative, ATS would remain as is by providing no information prior to container 
loading.  Additionally, no data sharing mechanisms would be in place to exchange data 
regarding each container to the respective destination ports.   
Non-intrusive screenings would occur during the loading process by 
positioning the sensors on crane spreaders.  X-ray scanners, radiation detectors, and 
neutron scanners would provide scanned images of the containerized goods. Additionally, 
scales and operator experience would aid in detecting anomalies or unevenly distributed 
containers.  Since the scanners would be on every crane, 100 percent of the containers 
loaded from trucks and containers loaded from another ship would be inspected.   
Containers not passing the non-intrusive screening would immediately be 
removed from the loading area for an intrusive inspection. Humans, animals, and portable 
radiation detectors would be used to search for contraband.  As no intelligence is being 
used to determine if a container needs an intrusive search, the decision would be based on 
the results from the non-intrusive search. 
 
f. Minimum Port Operations Disruption Alternative 
In contrast to the previous alternative, the minimum port operations 
disruption alternative relies on maximizing intelligence gathering in order to keep ship 
loading on schedule, preventing ships from being delayed while containerized goods are 
visually searched by humans.   
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An act is currently being supported in Congress that proposes the 
importer, exporter and the shipping company to submit cargo manifests to the CBP 
screening headquarters twenty-four hours before the containers are to be loaded at the 
source port. This system, known as ATS+, would provide a huge advantage over ATS 
(status quo) which only requires the shipping company to provide a manifest twenty-four 
hours prior to reaching its destination port. This information provides a much more 
complete picture of the shipping domain. Computers would rapidly distinguish containers 
with varying or vague manifests. 
At the port, containers are scanned by the sensors mounted on the crane 
spreaders during transfer. The correlation of X-ray images, radiation signatures and 
gamma-ray energy levels would be used to calculate the probability of undesired cargo 
being present in the container. Operator experience would play a vital role in comparing 
items listed in the manifests with actual container weight, providing an additional layer of 
detecting container anomalies.  
Those containers flagged as high risk through intelligence screening and 
fail the non-intrusive inspection would be transported to a temporary holding site located 
a safe distance from the port’s critical infrastructure. The exporters are contacted to 
remove the containers sitting in the holding cell.  The container can be resubmitted for 
shipment after the documentation and cargo issues are resolved. This plan provides a 
heavy economic impact for improper cargo and manifests submissions. It would provide 
a strong economic incentive for the exporter, importer and shipper to ensure that 
manifests are correctly documented and only legitimate cargo is packed inside the 
container.   
Finally, the smart tags would be attached to provide container integrity 
throughout the shipment. Any tampering incident would trigger an instant notification to 
the subscribers of the container security network. Data from the screening process is also 
uploaded into the destination port so that the port authorities can further screen the 




g. High Performance Alternative 
The high performance method uses the maximum capability of every 
aspect of the container screening process.  This plan is probably the most expensive to 
implement, but provides a very interesting modeling alternative for comparison with the 
other alternatives. “Does the cost of the high performance alternative prove itself through 
much greater detection rates?  Will the additional advanced screenings add cost to the 
operations without increasing the operating performance?” are questions that need to be 
answered. 
The ATS+ provides thorough manifest processing to generate a list of 
containers of interest.  ATS+ mandates that the exporter, the importer, and the shipper all 
provide manifests to the screening agency twenty-four hours prior to container loading.  
A mobile system as well as a sensor suite on the crane spreaders provides non-intrusive 
scanning capability.  Each suite will include x-ray and gamma ray scanners accompanied 
by radiation detectors and neutron scanners. Scales and operator experience aids in 
anomaly detection.  As 100 percent of the containers are non-intrusively inspected by this 
method, those requiring further inspection as a result of identification by the ATS+ or 
failing the non-intrusive scanning are removed and inspected by remotely-operated 
robots.  Each robot would be operated by one human. The robot would prevent 
unnecessary risk for humans or animals entering the container to conduct inspections.  
Additionally, the robot is equipped with computers to process images and odiferous 
computation. The data collected by the robot will be searched within the library of threat 
signatures. 
Smart tags would also be used to protect the containerized cargoes.  
Lastly, data from the screening is uploaded into the destination port to provide the 
officials in the destination port with a complete container history prior to arrival. 
 
h. 100 Percent Intrusive Inspection Alternative 
The 100 percent intrusive inspection concentrates the effort to inspect 
every container. There would be no manifest screening and non-intrusive scanning.  A 
team of customs officials would open every container upon its arrival to the port (via land 
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or transshipment), and visually inspect the container cargo.  The teams would carry 
portable radiation detectors and use dogs to detect explosives and chemicals.  After the 
team verifies the cargo is legitimate, the container would be sealed and loaded onto the 
container ship.  There would be no data sharing and use of smart tags.  
 
2. System Design Attributes 
Source ports are located in areas of a country that usually have direct deep water 
access to the shipping lanes of the world.  In addition, areas around source ports tend to 
be congested by the infrastructure and related industries that burgeon in the local vicinity 
of a source port.  The location and scarcity of available space constrains the design space 
to one in which careful consideration must be given prior to the recommendation of 
alternatives that would further limit the port space or restrict future operations or limit the 
ports container throughput. Alternatives that have a combination of acceptable 
performance while minimizing the impact on port operations, cost, space, and resource 
allocation will have an advantage over other better performing alternatives.  The 
development of alternatives that require large footprints for housing scanning equipment 
or that require large or many support facilities will not be supported by the majority of 
the stakeholders due to the limited design space.   The design space is not only limited by 
the physical constraints and boundaries of the port itself, the city and country in which it 
resides, but also by local, federal, and international laws that govern legitimate free trade 
between cooperating countries.  For example, the Container Security Initiative 2006-2011 
Strategic Plan, published by CBP contains many initiatives and future policies that will 
be levied against source ports that will have to comply with those constraints [51].  The 
addition of local, state, federal, and international laws in the design space for alternative 
generation is essential in ensuring that the alternatives generated will be acceptable for 
current and future implementation. 
 
3. Feasibility Screening 
The purpose of feasibility screening is to evaluate alternatives that clearly do not 
meet the system requirements.  There are eight criteria used for the feasibility screening. 
Foremost, the system must be able to detect chemical, biological and radiological 
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weapons. Every non-intrusive screening station should be manned by at most two 
personnel and each scanning should not take more than one minute. From the health 
perspective, the radiation exposure for the operator should be less than 10 mrem 
annually. Each screening station should not take up more than 100 square meters. The 
technology has be available and system to be ready to be fielded by 2012. 
The first alternative to be removed is the zero percent screening.  Although this 
will have little economic impact and will not delay the cargo, the system will not be able 
to detect chemical, biological, radiological and explosive material before the container is 
loaded onto the container ship. The zero percent screening alternative fails to meet this 
main requirement and it is removed from consideration. 
The second alternative to be removed from consideration is the 100 percent 
intrusive inspection. The sheer manpower needed to physically inspect each and every 
container is enormous and not cost effective. The delays caused by the intrusive 
inspection per container would be up to eight hours and it is not economical to implement 
the procedure [52]. The physical and economic constraints render the 100 percent 
intrusive inspection to be ineffective.  
The high performance alternative utilizes several screening technologies. System 
requirements cannot be met if fewer than two personnel are employed for non-intrusive 
screening.  SSTG concluded that the manpower required for dog handlers, drivers for the 
mobile screening vans and other additional manpower support to run the system was 
greater than two.  
The alternatives that passed the feasibility screening are Improved Loading 
Search, Minimal Port Operations Search, and 100 percent volume screening. These 
alternatives all passed the basic requirements, except for the status quo, which failed the 
requirement to detect chemical weapons non-intrusively. SSTG decided to keep status 
quo for modeling and simulation in order to have a baseline reference to view if the 
alternatives improve the overall performance. Table 50 shows the overall results of the 




Table 50.  Deny Loading of Undesired Cargo Feasibility Screening 
 
C. MODELING AND ANALYSIS 
1. Modeling Plan 
The SSTG used EXTEND version 6.0 to model the workflow of the containers 
arriving at the port, the screening and inspection stations and ending at the loading bay. 
One model was created to represent the workflow while the alternatives were modeled by 
varying the different factors. A total of 17 factors were identified for the analysis. The 
different combinations of these 17 factors describe different sensor suite configurations 
that were analyzed for overall inspection performance and effectiveness. 
The scale of the 17 factors of interest would require no less than 217 runs to 
investigate the effects of various combinations. The sheer magnitude of our experiment 
requires intelligent design of experiments in order to maximize potential information and 
data analysis with the minimal number of experiments. Cioppa describes a way to 
generate smart design of experiments using the Nearly Orthogonal Latin Hypercube 
(NOLH) algorithm [53]. A NOLH design spreadsheet created by Sanchez combined 
several works to create a user-friendly Microsoft Excel worksheet that allowed 
convenient input of factors to get the optimal design of experiments [54]. The team also 
explores an Extended NOLH algorithm by Ang to investigate the better experiment 
design for simulation runs [55]. With the NOLH algorithms, the original 217 runs can be 
reduced to 129 or 65 runs if the NOLH or ENOLH algorithm was to be used respectively. 
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The model is built to answer two MOEs of accuracy of container screening and 
timeliness. These MOEs are quantified by MOPs.  
The following MOPs are measured to evaluate the accuracy MOE. 
• MOP: Probability of detecting undesired cargo 
• MOP: Probability of Miss Detection  
• MOP: Probability of False Alarm 
The following MOPs are measured to evaluate the timeliness MOE. 
• MOP: Average handling time per container 
• MOP: Container throughput 
The objective of the analysis was to determine the different mixes of alternatives 
in each inspection station and their effects on the MOP. The Type I and Type II errors 
were carefully considered and depicted in Table 51. 
 
Actual  Container Condition Null Hypothesis: 
Container is Dirty Dirty Clean 














Table 51.  SSTG Type I and II Errors Defined 
 
2. Modeling Explanation 
The scenario of interest was a flood of dirty containers that are planted by 
terrorists to be shipped on three US-bound ships. The simulation modeled port inspection 
operations to foil the terrorists’ objectives in this scenario within a 12-hour period. The 
performance metrics of the study were built upon the statistics of the various inspection 
processes and in particular, the success of the terrorists’ objectives. The entire port 
inspection model was summarized by its five key components. 
• Container Generation 
• Fixed point of entry 
• Holding yard (non-intrusive) inspection 
• Intrusive Inspection 
• Crane (non-intrusive) Inspection 
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The simulation model to examine the five key components listed above is 




Figure 106.  SSTG Simulation Model 
 
a. General Flow of Containers through Port Inspections 
Incoming containers into the source port were handled differently 
according to their mode of arrival: sea and land.  
The bulk of containers in the model were transshipment containers, which 
arrive via the sea and were temporarily stored in our source port (acting as intermediary 
for these transshipment containers) holding yard for 3-5 days before transferred onto 
another ship bound for its final destination [56]. There are mobile inspection machines 
patrolling the holding yard to inspect transshipment containers while they were in transit. 
Other incoming containers arrived via land either by truck or rail. These 
land containers were scheduled in a just-in-time fashion so that they arrived at the source 
port on the day of loading and were routed immediately to the loading bay after clearing 
inspections at the point of entry. 
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If a source port was equipped with ATS risk profiling, the manifests of all 
incoming containers would have undergone risk profiling prior to the physical arrival of 
the containers. Those containers that were profiled as high-risk were picked out for 
intrusive inspection before loading onto the departing ship. A second level of random 
selection for intrusive inspection was also in place to randomly check containers 
regardless of their risk profile and origin.  
Cleared containers were routed to the quay for loading when they undergo 
the last level of inspections while being loaded by the quay-side cranes.   
All dubious or dirty containers that failed at the various levels of 
inspection were sent to the intrusive inspection teams for thorough examination. Dirty 
containers when found by the intrusive inspection teams were detained for further 
handling by the relevant authorities. 
 
b. General Assumptions for All Inspection Modules 
Throughout the entire model, containers were categorized as “clean” and 
“dirty” in the model. A dirty container was one that was planted by the terrorist and 
contains undesired cargo. The nature of the undesired cargo was randomly selected as 
nuclear, biological or chemical. On the other hand, a clean container was one that is 
legitimately being shipped for commerce purposes and does not hold any undesired 
cargo. 
For all inspection modules, there was more than one sensor. The model 
requires passes from all sensors for a container to be cleared as “clean”. Thus if any 
sensor fails the container, the container would be suspected of being “dirty”. 
For all inspection modules, each container underwent all sensors. 
Inspection did not stop at the earliest point of clearance failure. For example, the fixed 
point of entry may be equipped with scales, trained animals, radiation detectors and 
gamma scanners in this particular order of inspection. If the animals signal dubious 
content, the container was sent to the radiation detector and gamma scanner respectively 
before sent to the intrusive inspection team. Proceeding with the full set of inspections 
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will enable quicker and better informed diagnostics at the intrusive inspection team, as 
well as minimize disruption of the processing flow. 
The point of entry, holding yard and quay-side crane inspection were 
single-queue-multiple-servers model. The intrusive inspection is a priority-queue-
multiple-servers model. 
 
c. Process Flow for Container Generation 
There were two container generators, one for each mode of arrival: truck 
and sea. The truck container generator assumed a constant arrival rate for container at 
source port. The transshipment container generator creates a fixed amount of 
transshipment containers (equivalent to transshipment volume shipped per day) and this 
transshipment container population remains constant for the rest of the 12-hour 
simulation. The model does not model the influx of transshipment containers as 
transshipment containers are expected to spend days within the simulated source port and 
hence arriving transshipment containers within the simulated 12-hour time frame are not 
due for re-shipping anytime soon. Thus they are not included for simulation. 
Dirty containers containing explosive contents are planted among the 
legitimate containers. These containers are designated to contain either unwanted cargo 
that is radioactive, biological or chemical in nature. 
Upon leaving the container generation module, each container was routed 
to a different path according to its arrival mode: transshipment container that arrived via 
sea was routed to the holding yard and land containers that arrived via truck or rail were 
routed to the point of entry gates. 
 
d. Process Flow for Fixed Point of Entry 
The model simulated a port with multiple entry points, with only a certain 
percentage of entry points fitted with all sensors. The land containers were randomly 
selected to enter the sensor gates and non-sensor gates. Each of these sensors were 
characterized by inspection time, probability of detection and false alarm rate. 
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Land containers that enter via non-sensor gates were cleared for this stage 
of inspections. Land containers that enter via sensor gates went through one or more of 
these non-intrusive sensors. Containers that do not pass this stage of inspection were sent 
for intrusive inspection. 
 
e. Process Flow for Yard (Non-Intrusive) Inspection 
The model simulated one central holding area with several mobile 
inspection machines that roamed the holding yard and scanned the containers while they 
were in transit. The mobile inspection machine was characterized by its service time, 
inspection time, probability of detection and false alarm rate.  
Containers that were in the holding area for a time shorter than the mobile 
inspection machines’ service time did not get inspected and were cleared for this stage of 
inspections. Containers that did not pass this stage of inspection were sent for intrusive 
inspection. 
 
f. Process Flow for Crane (Non-Intrusive) Inspection 
The model simulated multiple quay cranes loading containers onto each 
ship. Each of the quay cranes was equipped with either one or both of the radiation 
detector and gamma scanner. These scanners inspect the container while it was being 
transferred from the quay to the ship. For some containers, this was the only stage of 
inspection as they may have skipped inspections at the point of entry or holding yard. 
Containers that failed either sensor were handled differently based on their 
history of inspections in the port. The following handling rule-set was partially derived 
from understanding of port operations at Port of Oakland [57].  
• Suspected containers that have not undergone any previous inspections are 
immediately lowered back on the quay and taken away for intrusive 
inspection with high priority so that it can be processed on time for 
loading.  
• Suspected containers that have previously triggered a similar sensor but 
was previously cleared would be treated as cleared on the quay sensor. An 
example would be a container of ceramic tiles with some natural radiation 
triggers the radiation detection at the point of entry and was cleared. When 
  232
it triggers the radiation detector on the loading crane, it would be treated 
as cleared and loaded.  
• Suspected containers that trigger the crane sensor for the first time would 
be treated as failed on the quay sensor and immediately lowered back on 
the quay and taken away for intrusive inspection with high priority for 
loading. An example would be the same container in the previous 
paragraph triggering the gamma sensor on the crane but not triggering 
gamma sensor at the holding yard or point of entry. 
  
g. Process Flow for ATS and Random Inspection 
The ATS and random selection processes singled out containers for 
intrusive inspection on a systematic and random manner respectively.  
The model simulated two efficiency levels of ATS: namely default ATS 
and ATS plus. The difference between both ATS levels would be their ability to single 
out high risk containers for inspection. In the model, dirty containers were flagged as 
high-risk with a higher probability than clean containers. For the default efficiency level 
of ATS, 6 percent of all containers were marked high risk and 12 percent of dirty 
containers were marked high risk. For the higher efficiency level of ATS plus, 6 percent 
of all containers were marked high risk and 18 percent of dirty containers were marked 
high risk. 
The model simulated a random percentage between 0 to 10 percent of all 
containers being selected for intrusive inspection. 
The above processes sent a regular stream of containers to the intrusive 
inspection team. 
 
h. Process Flow for Intrusive Inspection 
The intrusive inspection team received high-risk containers from ATS 
risk-profiling, random containers selected and containers that had been failed by the 
crane sensors. 
Intrusive inspection teams consisted of human operators who were aided 
by the following sensors: trained animals, radiation detectors, gamma scanners, 
biological detectors and chemical detectors. Intrusive inspection was characterized by 
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service time, inspection time, and probability of detection. A pass status for this stage of 
inspection would allow a container to be loaded onto the ship despite further triggering of 
the crane sensors. A failed status for this stage will cause the container to be detained.  
The model can detain a clean container without finding dirty contents 
within a stipulated inspection time. This is with consideration that the intrusive inspection 
has to be highly efficient and constrained within 30 minutes to handle the large flow of 
containers. Thus clean containers that repeatedly trigger off the sensors wrongly are 
deemed to be suspicious and inappropriately pre-declared. Thus they are detained and the 
associated economic cost to be borne by the shipper. 
The number of inspection teams is set at 15 in the model. This is based on 
pre-known statistics that ATS selects 6 percent of all containers for intrusive section and 
random selection of containers is set at 0 to 10 percent. This huge volume of containers 
selected for intrusive inspection warrants the adequate supply of inspection teams to 
ensure smooth port operations. 15 teams is a reasonable figure computed from the 
container traffic and 30 minutes average inspection time per container. When more 
containers are sent for intrusive inspection due to false alarm of sensors, we expected 
these teams to be further loaded. 
 
3. Model Inputs 
a. Container Traffic 
The port statistics of container volume in the model is modeled after 
statistics of the PSA Singapore Terminals, the word’s largest transshipment hub. PSA 
Singapore handled 22.3 million TEUs of (transshipment) containers in 2005 and this 
transshipment volume made up 95 percent of Singapore’s total throughput of 23.2 million 
TEUs. A 2002 Spring Singapore publication describes a typical day at PSA (Year 2000) 
would see 60 ships berthing and un-berthing with 47,000 containers moved and 8,000 
trucks passing through its gates [58]. The PSA Annual Report 2005 describes the “scale 
of PSA in Singapore. 41 berths, 131 quay cranes, and four seamlessly integrated world-
class container terminals in one location link shippers to an excellent network of 600 
ports in 123 countries via 200 shipping lines [59]” 
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The following statistics (deduced average PSA container traffic) are 
obtained from the above information by simple averaging. 
• 15000 TEUs of transshipment containers per day per terminal  
• 800 TEUs of incoming (truck) containers per day per terminal 
• Berth/unberth 15 ships using 33 cranes along its ten berths 
From the information gathered, the model will simulate an “example 
terminal” approximately a-third the scale of a PSA terminal and for a 12-hour time frame. 
As we are obtaining statistics from the world’s busiest port, as well as biggest 
transshipment hub, the container traffic will be further moderated by a 25 percent 
reduction for realism. The container traffic of the simulated terminal will be as follows: 
• 1875 TEUs of transshipment containers within 12 hours 
• 100 TEUs of incoming (truck) containers within 12 hours 
• Berth/unberth 5 ships using 11 cranes 
 
b. Sensor Performance 
Sensors are modeled by their probabilities of detection and false alarm. 
While efforts have been made to research on the required probabilities, there have been 
few results. Hence the model will assume that future technology will catch up and 
adequate sensors will be fielded by 2012 with the following desired probabilities of 
detection and false alarm. Table 52 through 55 describes the sensor performance inputs 

















Possibility 1 1 1 1 0 0 
PFA 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0 0 
PDetect against 
radioactive material 0 0 0.9 0.5 0 0 
PDetect against 
biological material 0 0 0 0.5 0 0 
PDetect against 
chemical material 0 0.5 0 0.5 0 0 
PDetect against 
explosive material 0 0.8 0 0.8 0 0 
 


















Possibility 0 0 1 1 0 0 
PFA 0 0 0.01 0.01 0 0 
PDetect against 
radioactive material 0 0 0.9 0.5 0 0 
PDetect against 
biological material 0 0 0 0.5 0 0 
PDetect against 
chemical material 0 0 0 0.5 0 0 
PDetect against 
explosive material 0 0 0 0.8 0 0 
 


















Possibility 0 1 1 1 1 1 
PFA 0 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
PDetect against 
radioactive material 0 0 
0.9 
[60] 0.5 0 0 
PDetect against 
biological material 0 0 0 0.5 0.7 0 
PDetect against 
chemical material 0 0.5 0 0.5 0 0.7 
PDetect against 
explosive material 0 0.8 0 0.8 0 0 
 
















Possibility 1 0 1 1 0 0 
PFA 0.01 0 0.01 0.01 0 0 
PDetect against 
radioactive material 0 0 0.9 0.5 0 0 
PDetect against 
biological material 0 0 0 0.5 0 0 
PDetect against 
chemical material 0 0 0 0.5 0 0 
PDetect against 
explosive material 0 0 0 0.8 0 0 
 
Table 55.  Sensor Performance Inputs for Crane 
 
4. Model Results and Analysis 
This section of the report contains the data analysis of the raw output data that 
was generated from the SSTG Extend model.  The first section will detail the type of data 
that was generated from the Extend model, define key terminology associated with the 
model and explain how the Measures of Performance were calculated from the generated 
data.  A logistic linear regression model was fit to the data to help to interpret the 
meaning of the model output and to help predict future values of how varying a randomly 
  237
selected percentage of containers to be inspected could affect the probability of detection. 
The logistic regression model was only fit to the probability of detection MOP and 
therefore another technique was used to interpret the results of the other MOPs and to 
also reinforce the results of the logistic regression model with respect to the probability of 
detection MOP.   
Partitioning analysis was used as an intuitive analytical tool to interpret the results 
of the output data for the remaining MOPs.  An easy to ready flow chart instantly showed 
the results of taking out or leaving in sensors on the impact of the MOP under study. 
 
a. Optimal Sensor Mix 
The optimal sensor mix was a combination of gamma scanners on the 
crane spreaders and holding area combined with all available sensors at the inspection 
station including the gamma scanner, radiation detector, chemical, biological detectors, 
and animals trained in detection.  The radiation detector in the holding area was also 
considered significant. 
SSTG Extend Model Logistic Regression Data Analysis 
The SSTG Extend model has been discussed in great detail in both the 
construction of the model and the individual model components.  The actual raw data 
output that was generated from that model is included in the SSTG Data Analysis 
Appendix.  The type of output generated allows the user to analyze the overall impact on 
average container throughput per hour as well as the overall detection capability of the 
system.  The raw data was used to calculate our Measures of Performance as well as to 
capture predictor and response variables for linear regression.  The sensors that were used 
for the detection of the dirty containers were located at four different locations and were 
modeled accordingly in Extend.    
When the Extend model was run, it produced performance data for each 
station.  An example of what type of data that was generated is included below. Table 56 
shows the general format of the Extend model output for each station for collecting the 





Table 56.  Station Format for Determining MOP Related to Accuracy 
 
• Clean Container Arrived – Count of the number of clean containers 
that arrived at applicable station. 
• Dirty Container Arrived – Count of the number of dirty containers that 
arrived at the applicable station. 
• Clean Container Start Inspection – Count of the number of clean 
containers that began the inspection process at the applicable station. 
• Dirty Container Start Inspection – Count of the number of dirty 
containers that began the inspection process at the applicable station. 
• Clean Container Passed- Count of the number of clean containers that 
passed the inspection and have completed the entire inspection process 
at the applicable station. 
• Dirty Container Passed- Count of the number of dirty containers that 
made it through the inspection process without detection (Missed 
Detection). 
• Clean Container Failed- Count of the number of clean containers that 
failed the inspection at the applicable station and were either sent to 
the Intrusive inspection station or detained if already at the intrusive 
inspection station. 
• Dirty Container Failed – Count of the number of dirty containers that 
failed the inspection at the applicable station and were either sent to 
the Intrusive inspection station or detained if already at the intrusive 
inspection station. 
Table 57 shows the general format of the Extend model output for each 




Table 57.  Station Format for Determining MOP Related to Timeliness 
 
• Container Arrived- Count of the number of containers that arrived at 
applicable station 
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• Container Serviced- Count of the number of containers that were 
serviced at the applicable station. 
• Utilization- Amount of time that the service station was occupied with 
customers during the simulation run time interval.  For example, the 
inspection center was occupied with customers for a total of 8 hours 
out of the 12 hours of simulated run time, resulting in an utilization 
rate of .67. 
• Average Queue length – Average number of containers waiting in line 
to be serviced. 
• Average Queue time- Average amount of time the containers spent in 
the Queue (measured in seconds).  
• Average Total Time- Average amount of time a container spent at the 
service station.  This time includes Queue time and service time. 
 
Measures of Performance Related to Accuracy 
The probability of detecting undesired cargo was calculated by summing 
the total number of dirty containers that had been detained and dividing that number by 
the total number of containers that had been processed by the system.  The Extend model 
default was to generate 12 dirty containers, however not all of those containers were 
necessarily processed by the system before the 12 hour run time has expired.  Some 
containers could be in the queue or were still being serviced at any 1 of the 4 stations 
when the simulation had ended.  The Probability of detection was calculated from the raw 
data by the following formula: 
 
_ _
_ _ _ _
dirty containers held
dirty containers held dirty containers loaded+  
 
The probability of a missed detection was calculated by counting all of the 
dirty containers that passed through all of the inspection stations and was loaded onto the 
ship divided by the total number of dirty containers that had been processed by the 
system. The probability of a missed detection was calculated from the model raw data 
output by the following formula: 
 
_ _
_ _ _ _
dirty containers loaded
dirt containers loaded dirty containers held+  
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The probability of a false alarm was calculated by counting the total 
number of clean containers that were being detained divided by the total number of clean 
containers that had been processed by the system.  The probability of false alarm was 
calculated from the model raw data output by the following formula: 
 
_ _
_ _ _ _
clean containers held
clean containers loaded clean containers held+  
 
Measures of Performance Related to Timeliness 
The average handling time per container was calculated by multiplying the 
total number of containers that arrived at each handling station, where sensors were 
located, by the total average time spent at each station.  This produced the total amount of 
processing time per station.  The processing time for each station was summed and then 
divided by the total number of containers that was processed by all of the inspection 
stations.  This gave the average processing or handling time per container. 
     
        Total service time at Entry = (# of Containers serviced at Entry)*(Entry average time)    (1) 
        Total service time at Yard = (# of Containers serviced at Yard)*(Handling average time)    (2) 
        Total service time at Customs = (# of Containers serviced at Customs)*(Customs average time) (3) 
        Total service time at Crane = (# of Containers serviced at Crane)*(Crane average time)    (4) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
_#_ _Total containers processed
+ + +  
 
Container throughput was be measured by the total number of containers 
processed per hour.  The formula used from the model raw data output was: 
 
3600*( _ _ _ _ )
_ _ ( )
Clean Containers loaded Dirty Containers Held
Total Model Runtime Seconds
+  
 
SSTG Raw Data Linear Regression 
The Extend Model raw data was outputted into Microsoft Excel 
spreadsheet and then expanded into a new data set to include the MOP for linear 
regression analysis in S-Plus version 7 and Minitab version 14.  The data set compilation 
was automated through the use of a MatLab program. The complete data set was 
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imported into S-Plus and a logistic linear regression model with the logit link function 
was used to fit a model to the generated data. 
The analyzed response variable was the probability of detection of a 
container loaded with undesired cargo, as detailed in the earlier sections of the report, by 
a terrorist organization.  The terrorists flooded the port with 12 dirty containers with the 
goal to have 3 of the 12 dirty containers loaded onto a ship bound for the United States.  
The probability of detection was calculated using the formula as detailed above, but the 
logistic regression model with a logit link function from the binomial family works best 
when the response variable is a success or failure (0 or 1).  In order to provide the correct 
0 or 1 response variable for the statistical software package, the data set had to be 
expanded to include a field for detected or not detected.  The Extended Nearly 
Orthogonal Latin Hypercube (ENOLH) Matrix as outlined in earlier sections of the report 
generated 65 different configurations in order to provide efficient space filling and 
reducing the possibility of multicollinearity.  Each configuration was run through the 
model 10 times to generate 10 observations for each configuration.  This resulted in 650 
total observations.  However, in order to capture which containers were detected and 
which containers were not detected, each configuration had to be expanded by the total 
number of dirty containers processed.  The total number of containers detained was 
already a generated numerical output and that numeric output was used to randomly 
assign an equivalent number of containers with a 1 indicating that they had been detected.  
This procedure was performed on the Extend output data by a MatLab routine. The data 
set response variable is now coded properly for the logistic regression model. 
The regressors or predictor variables for this model were all of the 
different sensors that were used to determine whether or not a container was dirty or 
clean.  The following is a list of predictor variables: 
• eScales(es)-  Scales that were used for weighing containers at the port 
of entry that were brought into the port by trucks. This regressor is a 
categorical variable with values of 0 and 1.  A value of “0” indicates 
that the sensor is “off” and not in the system.  A value of “1” indicates 
that the sensor is “on” and is part of the system. 
• eAnimals(ea)- Trained animals at the port of entry to detect particular 
chemical compounds.  This regressor is a categorical variable with 
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values of 0 and 1.  A value of “0” indicates that the sensor is “off” and 
not in the system.  A value of “1” indicates that the sensor is “on” and 
is part of the system. 
• eRad(er)- Radiation detector at the port of entry to detect radiation 
levels above a preset threshold level at the port of entry.  This 
regressor is a categorical variable with values of 0 and 1.  A value of 
“0” indicates that the sensor is “off” and not in the system.  A value of 
“1” indicates that the sensor is “on” and is part of the system. 
• eGamma(eg)- X-Ray, Gamma ,or Neutron scanner used to scan 
container contents at the port of entry (Fixed Scanner).  This regressor 
is a categorical variable with values of 0 and 1.  A value of “0” 
indicates that the sensor is “off” and not in the system.  A value of “1” 
indicates that the sensor is “on” and is part of the system. 
• hRad(hr)- Radiation detector used at the holding area to detect 
radiation levels above a threshold level in the holding area.  This 
regressor is a categorical variable with values of 0 and 1.  A value of 
“0” indicates that the sensor is “off” and not in the system.  A value of 
“1” indicates that the sensor is “on” and is part of the system. 
• hGamma(hg)- X-Ray, Gamma, or Neutron scanner used to scan 
container contents in the holding area (Mobile Scanner).  This 
regressor is a categorical variable with values of 0 and 1.  A value of 
“0” indicates that the sensor is “off” and not in the system.  A value of 
“1” indicates that the sensor is “on” and is part of the system. 
• iAnimals(ia)- Trained animals used to detect particular chemical 
compounds at the intrusive inspection area.  This regressor is a 
categorical variable with values of 0 and 1.  A value of “0” indicates 
that the sensor is “off” and not in the system.  A value of “1” indicates 
that the sensor is “on” and is part of the system. 
• iRad(ir)- Radiation detector used to detect radiation levels above a 
threshold level at the intrusive inspection station. (Portable device)  
This regressor is a categorical variable with values of 0 and 1.  A value 
of “0” indicates that the sensor is “off” and not in the system.  A value 
of “1” indicates that the sensor is “on” and is part of the system. 
• iBio(ib)- Biological agent detector used to detect suspect biological 
agents in containers at the intrusive inspection station (Mobile).   This 
regressor is a categorical variable with values of 0 and 1.  A value of 
“0” indicates that the sensor is “off” and not in the system.  A value of 
“1” indicates that the sensor is “on” and is part of the system. 
• iChem(ic)- Chemical compound detector used to detect certain 
chemical compounds in containers at the intrusive inspection station 
(Mobile)  This regressor is a categorical variable with values of 0 and 
1.  A value of “0” indicates that the sensor is “off” and not in the 
system.  A value of “1” indicates that the sensor is “on” and is part of 
the system. 
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• cScales-(cs) Weight scales attached to the crane spreaders where 
transshipment cargo is loaded onto waiting ships.  This regressor is a 
categorical variable with values of 0 and 1.  A value of “0” indicates 
that the sensor is “off” and not in the system.  A value of “1” indicates 
that the sensor is “on” and is part of the system. 
• cRad(cr)- Radiation detector used to detect container radiation levels 
above a preset threshold level on the crane spreader.  This regressor is 
a categorical variable with values of 0 and 1.  A value of “0” indicates 
that the sensor is “off” and not in the system.  A value of “1” indicates 
that the sensor is “on” and is part of the system. 
• cGamma(cg)- X-Ray, Gamma, and/or Neutron Scanner used to detect 
suspicious objects in containers located on the crane spreader.  This 
regressor is a categorical variable with values of 0 and 1.  A value of 
“0” indicates that the sensor is “off” and not in the system.  A value of 
“1” indicates that the sensor is “on” and is part of the system. 
• ATS(ats)- Automated Tracking System used to identify suspicious 
containers through legal documentation and manifest. Values of 0 
indicate that ATS is not used.  A value of “1” indicates that the basic 
ATS is used and in the system.  A value of “2” indicates that the 
enhanced ATS system is used and in the system. 
• eScanPrc(esp)- Entry scan percentage.  The entry scan percentage is 
based upon that percentage of containers that are arriving by trucks 
that will be subjected to the sensors at the port of entry.  The reason 
behind varying the percentage of scanned trucks is to allow the 
modeler to model a port that is in various states of construction where 
there are multiple entry gates or entry lanes where all gates or lanes do 
not have scanning sensors.  For example, a port with 2 entry gates or 2 
lanes at one gate may have 1 gate where all trucks are subjected to 
scanning, but the other gate does not have the equipment installed.   
The scanning percentage for this configuration would be .5 or 50%. 
• iRdmSel(irs)- Random Selection.  The percentage of containers that 
are randomly selected for intrusive inspection can be set to any user 
selected percentage from 0-10% to determine the effect that random 
selection has on the Measures of Performance. 
The general format for the Logistic Linear Regression model was as 
follows: 
~ ( 1, )i i iY Binomial n π=  
 
  where _ _ ( )i iprobability of success E Yπ = =   
 
The general form of the logistic model was:  
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x xπ β β βπ = + + +−     
 
The expected value of the response variable was:   
 
( )i iE Y π=       
 
The variance of the response variable was:   
 
( ) (1 )i i iVar Y π π= −    
 
Fitting our parameters into the general model without 2 way interactions 
would lead to the following model: 
0ln( )1
i
es es ea ea er er eg eg hr hr hg hg ia ia
i
ir ir ib ib ic ic cs cs cr cr cg cg ats ats esp esp irs irs
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β β β β β β β β β
= + + + + + + + +−
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The above model was run in S-Plus and the summary results of the model 
in the form of a deviance table and summary statistical data is included in the SSTG 
Appendix for Model Data Analysis.  A likelihood ratio test was performed to test the 
above model with the saturated model and the result of that test was a p-value that was 
equal to zero.  This implies that at least one of the regressor variables in the logistic 
regression model is important because it has a non-zero regression coefficient. Table 58 




Table 58.  Results of Goodness of Fit Test 
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Table 59 presents the Type III Sum of Squares for the 17 factors. The p-
values are indicating that the scales at the point of entry and on the crane are not 
significant in determining whether or not a container will be detected or not detected.  In 
addition, the animals at the point of entry are not significant whereas the animals at the 
inspection station are a factor. This could be due to the fact that in our model the majority 
of the containers went through the transshipment hub and therefore many more containers 




Table 59.  Type III Sum of Squares for the 17 Factors 
 
There were 12 dirty containers generated by the model and only two were 
selected to come into the port through the port by way of truck and the other 10 were 
brought into the port by way of transshipment.  The radiation detector at the port of entry 
and on the crane spreader also had large p-values indicating that they were not significant 
in detecting or not detecting the dirty containers.  This was likely due to the fact that the 
detectors probability of detecting one certain type of radiation combined with the fact that 
only four out of the 12 dirty containers were loaded with radioactive material, and out of 
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the 12 containers only two were loaded to come into the port through the port of entry, 
resulting in a low level of significance in identifying dirty containers.  The radiation 
detector at the inspection team had a low p-value implying that it was significant in 
detecting or not detecting the dirty containers.  The fact that any container that was 
flagged by any of the inspection stations or randomly selected will be sent to the intrusive 
inspection team, making it much more likely that all of the sensors at the inspection 
station to encounter a dirty container.  This was the reason that all of the sensors at the 
inspection station had a high level of significance.    
In order to predict how the random selection percentage affects the 
probability of detection, the linear regression model can be used.   The randomly selected 
percentages can be set as a variable from 0 to 100 percent and determine a probability of 
detection based upon the configuration of sensors that are selected. 
The Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) algorithm was used to determine 
the significant regressors for inclusion in the logistic regression model.  The summary of 
S-Plus output is included in Table 60. This algorithm is a well known procedure that is 
more mathematically rigorous and methodical at eliminating regressors than simple 
backwards elimination or inspection of the p-values. The model returned by step AIC is: 
 
glm(formula = Detected ~ eGamma + hRad + hGamma + iAnimals + iRad + 






Degrees of Freedom: 7787 Total; 7774 Residual 
Residual Deviance: 7513.159  
 
 
Table 60.  Coefficients and Results of the stepAIC Function 
 
Mallow’s Cp was calculated for the full model with ATS, eScanPrc, and 
iRdmPrc to determine which was the best subset that would include these particular 
regressors to predict which percentage of random scanning selection, ATS level, and 
intrusive inspection random selection that would return the highest Probability of 
detection.  The subsets with their Mallow’s Cp are shown in Figure 107.  It is interesting 
to note that the different methods all pointed to models with the same regressors with the 
exception that Mallow’s Cp did not determine the cScales to be important whereas the 
stepAIC did.  This could be due to the fact of the extra restriction that was placed on the 
Mallow’s Cp generation of including ATS, eScanPrc, and iRdmPrc.  The inclusion of 
these regressors could have minimized the significance of the cScales regressor. 
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                                          E         i 
                                         e A         A         c 
                                         S n   e   h n   I     S   c 
                                         c I   G   G I   G   I c   G 
                                         a m e a h a m I a I C a c a 
                                         l a R m R m a R m B h l R m 
                       Mallows           e l a m a m l a m I e e a m 
Vars  R-Sq  R-Sq(adj)      C-p        S  s s d a d a s d a o m s d a 
   1   10.8      10.8   1799.8  0.44885                            X 
   1   7.4        7.4   2163.9  0.45730                  X 
   2  17.7       17.6   1065.5  0.43128                  X         X 
   2  15.2       15.1   1334.8  0.43780            X               X 
   3  22.2       22.2    579.8  0.41924            X     X         X 
   3  22.0       22.0    599.9  0.41974              X   X         X 
   4  26.4       26.4    130.5  0.40778            X X   X         X 
   4  22.9       22.8    512.8  0.41753            X   X X         X 
   5  27.1       27.0     60.8  0.40595            X X X X         X 
   5  26.8       26.7     92.0  0.40676            X X   X X       X 
   6  27.5       27.4     23.5  0.40496            X X X X X       X 
   6  27.2       27.1     53.6  0.40574          X X X X X         X 
   7  27.6       27.5     15.6  0.40473          X X X X X X       X 
   7  27.5       27.4     19.8  0.40484        X   X X X X X       X 
   8  27.6       27.5     11.3  0.40459        X X X X X X X       X 
   8  27.6       27.5     14.7  0.40468          X X X X X X X     X 
   9  27.6       27.5     10.5  0.40454        X X X X X X X X     X 
   9  27.6       27.5     12.2  0.40459      X X X X X X X X       X 
  10  27.7       27.5     11.4  0.40454      X X X X X X X X X     X 
  10  27.6       27.5     11.8  0.40455  X     X X X X X X X X     X 
  11  27.7       27.5     12.8  0.40455  X   X X X X X X X X X     X 
  11  27.7       27.5     12.9  0.40455      X X X X X X X X X X   X 
  12  27.7       27.5     14.3  0.40456  X   X X X X X X X X X X   X 
  12  27.7       27.5     14.5  0.40457  X   X X X X X X X X X   X X 
  13  27.7       27.5     16.0  0.40458  X   X X X X X X X X X X X X 
  13  27.7       27.5     16.3  0.40459  X X X X X X X X X X X X   X 
  14  27.7       27.5     18.0  0.40461  X X X X X X X X X X X X X X  
Figure 107.  Mallow's Cp 
 
The subset model with the lowest Mallow’s Cp includes: eGamma, 
hRad,hGamma, iAnimals, iRad, iGamma, iBio, iChem, cGamma, iRdmPrc, ATS, 




eg eg hr hr hg hg ia ia ir ir
i
ib ib ic ic ig ig cg cg ats ats esp esp irs irs
x x x x x
x x x x x x x
π β β β β β βπ
β β β β β β β
= + + + + + +−
+ + + + + +
 
  
The output data in Figure 108 shows that the model is a good fit and that 
all of the regressors that are left in the model are significant in determining whether or 
not a container is detected or not detected with the exception of iRdmPrc.  The random 
percentage of containers selected for intrusive inspection is a regressor that the SSTG 
chose to leave in the model to be able to predict how the Probability of detecting a dirty 
container would change based upon the percentage of containers that were randomly 
selected for inspection. 
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Binary Logistic Regression: Detected versus eGamma, hRad, ...  
 




Variable  Value  Count 
Detected  1       5105  (Event) 
          0       2682 
          Total   7787 
 
 
Logistic Regression Table 
                                                   Odds     95% CI 
Predictor         Coef    SE Coef       Z      P  Ratio  Lower  Upper 
Constant      -2.97964   0.132867  -22.43  0.000 
eGamma        0.215092  0.0629802    3.42  0.001   1.24   1.10   1.40 
hRad          0.280516  0.0604222    4.64  0.000   1.32   1.18   1.49 
hGamma         1.23749  0.0606417   20.41  0.000   3.45   3.06   3.88 
iAnimals       1.28834  0.0619840   20.79  0.000   3.63   3.21   4.10 
iRad          0.466768  0.0574378    8.13  0.000   1.59   1.43   1.78 
iGamma         1.58231  0.0616637   25.66  0.000   4.87   4.31   5.49 
iBio          0.399751  0.0587772    6.80  0.000   1.49   1.33   1.67 
iChem         0.308614  0.0597397    5.17  0.000   1.36   1.21   1.53 
cGamma         1.92586  0.0653787   29.46  0.000   6.86   6.04   7.80 
ATS         -0.0910465  0.0408770   -2.23  0.026   0.91   0.84   0.99 
eScanPrc      0.200392  0.0909223    2.20  0.028   1.22   1.02   1.46 
iRdmSelPrc  -0.0583792    1.00131   -0.06  0.954   0.94   0.13   6.71 
 
Log-Likelihood = -3757.835 




Method                 Chi-Square  DF      P 
Pearson                   752.201  52  0.000 
Deviance                  740.532  52  0.000 
Hosmer-Lemeshow           133.578   8  0.000 
Brown: 
General Alternative         7.035   2  0.030 
Symmetric Alternative       5.117   1  0.024 
 
Measures of Association: 
(Between the Response Variable and Predicted Probabilities) 
 
Pairs         Number  Percent  Summary Measures 
Concordant  11134071     81.3  Somers' D              0.64 
Discordant   2348773     17.2  Goodman-Kruskal Gamma  0.65 
Ties          208766      1.5  Kendall's Tau-a        0.29 
Total       13691610    100.0  
Figure 108.  Minitab Results of New Model 
 
The generated interval plot with a 95 percent Confidence Interval (Figure 
109) shows that the active scanning machines like the X-Ray, Neutron, and Gamma 
Scanners can contribute significantly to the overall probability of detection.  Notice from 
the chart that when an active scanner was present in the system the probability of 
detection was significantly higher than when the scanner was not in the system.  The only 
exception from this result was the active scanner located at the port of entry where the 
containers were scanned as they arrive by truck.  This was in large part due to the 
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construction of our model where the model was patterned after a port that had 95 percent 
of its shipping volume arriving by transshipment, meaning that the majority of the cargo 
never passed through the port of entry scanner.  Out of the 12 dirty containers that arrived 
that could contribute to the overall probability of detection, only two of the containers 
were admitted to the port through trucks, thereby limiting the overall effect that the entry 




Figure 109.  Interval Plots for Gamma Detectors 
 
A comparison of the inspection station sensors interval plots (Figure 110) 
shows that the chemical sensor did not contribute much to the probability of detection 
compared to the other sensors located at the station.  This could be due to a variety of 
factors, including the fact that the chemical detector is specifically designed to only 
detect the presence of certain chemicals and if there are chemicals loaded on the 
container for which the chemical detector is not designed to detect then the chemical 




Figure 110.  Interval Plot of Inspection Station Sensors 
 
The following interval plot (Figure 111) compares ATS and the entry 
scanning percentage as a function of probability of detection.  It is interesting to note that 
for ATS level 1 the probability of detection decreases at a port entry scanning 
percentages of 50 and 100 percent.  Both ATS and entry scanning percentage were 
determined to be non significant in determining the probability of detection in the 




Figure 111.  Interval Plot of eScanPrc and ATS 
 
b. Partitioning Analysis 
In this section, partition trees were used to interpret the simulation results 
of different sensor configurations. Partitioning is a data-mining technique especially 
suited to handle large problems and good for exploring relationships without requiring a 
good prior model. The findings of partitioning are presented as partition trees, which are 
intuitive to interpret and understand.  
For our model, four partition trees were generated to investigate how the 
experiment settings of sensor configuration affect the MOP of Probability of Detection 
(Pd), False Alarm Rate (FAR) and Productivity. Each partition tree comprises a series of 
splits that are formed by exploring all possible partitions of the data to find the most 
significant factor that will impact the MOP most at each node of the tree. Hence, each 
tree enables a quick and statistically powerful diagnosis of the operation boundaries that 
are most and least favorable to optimizing the MOP under study. 
In the following discussion, the partition trees will be interpreted to 
optimize the MOP of interest; hence they could be traversed from left to right or vice 
  253
versa with no fixed direction. The rule of thumb is to interpret the best sensor mix. The 
direction of description will be included in the figure caption so that the reader can follow 
the discussion. 
As the analysis progressed, trade-offs between system objectives would 
surface and call for user inputs to influence the splitting of the partition tree. The 
branching of partition trees can be automatic or by choice. Automatic branching is done 
by the program and it selects the most significant factor to split branches. Choice 
branching is done by the analyst to fit real world choices, not unlike our choice to retain 
the counter-option of deploying the gamma detector that will increase FAR.  In this 
section, the analysis will be mostly automatic to find the most significant factors. In 
reality, the same partition tree model could be repartitioned using an existing sensor 
configuration if there are certain features that must be in the system. Such a partition 
would provide different bounds on the average MOP and would aid the systems engineer 
in predicting the performance bounds of the configuration under study. 
  Partition for Probability of Protection 
Probability of detection would probably be the most heavily weighted 
MOP for a stakeholder from the security department. Thus the above partition tree is of 
utmost interest to find the sensor mix for ensuring high Pd. It should be noted that the 
partitioning results only optimize one MOP at a time without consideration for tradeoffs 
with other MOPs.  The proposed sensor mix for maximum Pd may or may not conflict 
with alternative sensor mix to optimize other MOP of interest. Figure 112 shows the 










































































































































Figure 112.  Partition Tree for Probability of Detection (Max Pd, rightmost) 
 
From the topmost of the partition tree, the average Pd for all sensor 
configurations was 66 percent. At the first split, the most significant factor to influence 
the average Pd was the presence of a gamma detector mounted on cranes (cGamma). This 
result was intuitive as the gamma detector scans all cargo while loading them onto the 
vessel. The difference in deploying a crane gamma detector was an average Pd of 50 
percent (without) versus 81 percent (with).  
The next best sensor to supplement a crane sensor was another gamma 
detector at the intrusive inspection team (iGamma), which increased average Pd to 93 
percent. Beyond that, stationing animals with the intrusive inspection team (iAnimals) 
could swing the Pd to 90 percent (without) versus 95 percent with animals.  However, the 
standard deviation of the experimental results did not suggest statistical significance in Pd 
due to the use of trained animals and therefore it will not be recommended. Conversely, if 
there was no detector at the intrusive inspection team, the average Pd decreased to 69 
percent and could be significantly boosted to 86 percent by deploying trained animals at 
the intrusive inspection team. 
All is not lost without deploying a crane gamma detector. Deploying 
gamma detectors on mobile scanning units in the holding area (hGamma) could still 
maintain an average Pd of 68 percent, which is boosted to 85 percent when supplemented 
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with gamma detectors at the intrusive inspection teams, or boosted to 90 percent when we 
ensure that more than 75 percent of all incoming land containers were scanned at the 
fixed point of entry (eScanPrc). 
Given that a huge volume of the container traffic was transshipment 
containers, SSTG expected to find that not deploying gamma detectors in both the crane 
spreader and holding area would result in an average Pd of 31 percent. 
The Pd partition tree showed that deploying gamma detectors is vital in 
ensuring high Pd. The best locations in descending order were on the crane (81 percent), 
holding area and intrusive inspection team. Trained animals helped optimize the Pd given 
their versatility in detecting various materials. With gamma detectors, average Pds of 
above 90 percent could be achieved. If gamma sensors were not deployed within the 
sensor configuration, average Pd could be as low as 31 percent. 
  Partition for False Alarm Rate 
The model counted clean, legitimate containers wrongly detained as false 
alarms. In reality, it is common practice for the port to pass on the cost of inspections 
and/or detainment to the customers (shipper) who would certainly be extremely 
unpleased. As such, false alarm of the entire port inspection process was a vital statistic 
that translated to lost productivity, lost goodwill and reputation of the port. Ideally, FAR 
should be minimized and as such the partition tree would be traversed left to right. Figure 










































































































Figure 113.  Partition Tree for False Alarm Rate (Min FAR, leftmost) 
 
From the topmost of the partition tree, the average FAR for all sensor 
configurations was 2.23 percent. At the first split, the most significant factor to influence 
the average FAR was the presence of a gamma detector with the intrusive inspection 
team (iGamma). The difference in deploying this gamma detector was an average FAR of 
0.92 percent (without) versus 3.50 percent (with).  In addition, not having biological or 
chemical detectors at the intrusive inspection teams would help stabilize the average FAR 
to 0.22 percent. 
As we saw in the Pd partition tree, deploying the gamma detector with the 
intrusive inspection team helped achieve a high Pd. Hence we may be inclined to tolerate 
the associated FAR without compromising Pd. Given that the gamma detector was 
deployed at the intrusive inspection team, the next best way was to not introduce ATS 
profiling in the sensor system as it would tag more containers for inspection. The 
resultant FAR would be an average of 2.77 percent (without ATS) versus 3.86 percent 
(with ATS). 
The FAR partition tree showed that deploying the gamma detector with 
the intrusive inspection team was the main culprit for hiking up the FAR to an average of 
3.50 percent. In our early Pd partition analysis, the gamma detector at various locations 
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had been singled out as significant for ensuring a high Pd.  If Pd is valued as more critical 
than FAR, the FAR associated with the gamma detector has to be tolerated so as not to 
compromise Pd. Given the deployment of the gamma detector, the average FAR can be 
capped to 2.77 percent by not introducing additional container inspection volume from 
ATS risk profiling.  
  Partition for Productivity 
Inspections decrease productivity and hence, the analysis was expected to 
yield recommendations to not install various sensors. Such findings will be weighed 
against earlier findings of Pd and FAR optimization and recommended accordingly. 










































































































































Figure 114.  Partition Tree for Productivity (Max Productivity, rightmost) 
 
The simulation was conducted given ample inspection resources, so as not 
to halt productivity. Hence, SSTG saw only a slight spread of productivity figures of 
approximately 8 percent about the average. The overall average productivity was 159 
containers (loaded) per hour. 
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The most significant factor that affects productivity was the percentage of 
total container traffic randomly selected for inspection (iRdmSelPrc). The difference in 
productivity due to the random selection percentage was 156 containers per hour (more 
than 8 percent) versus 161 containers per hour (less than 8 percent). 
The best productivity of 163 containers per hour was achieved if the 
random selection was kept below 8 percent and the gamma detector was not deployed at 
the intrusive inspection team. However, the latter was part of the optimal sensor mix and 
hence had to be worked around. 
Working around the deployment of the gamma detector, SSTG chose not 
to deploy weighing scales on cranes, as they decrease productivity to 157 containers per 
hour and has not been shown to be a significant factor in optimizing Pd.  Such a 
configuration achieved an average productivity of 161 containers per hour. 
The least favorable configuration comprises random selection above 8 
percent, ATS profiling and deploying weighing scales on crane spreaders. Such a 
configuration brings productivity down to 151 containers per hour. 
Both random selection for inspection and ATS risk-profiling proved to be 
the most significant counter-productivity factors. On the other hand, to optimize 
productivity, the random selection percentage should be capped below 8 percent. The 
gamma detector with the intrusive inspection team had resurfaced as a counter-
productivity factor but it would not be scrapped as it would compromise Pd.  Even with 
the gamma detector in the system, productivity could still be kept relatively high by not 
having crane scales in the same system.  Additional partitioning suggested further 
reducing the random selection percentage to 5 percent but the difference is not significant 
for us to recommend that. 
  Partition for Inspection Time per Container 
As with the productivity analysis, the “average time per container” 
analysis was expected to yield recommendations to not install various sensors. Such 
findings would be weighed against earlier findings of Pd and FAR optimization and 
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recommended accordingly. Figure 115 shows the partition tree for the average inspection 


























































































































































Figure 115.  Partition Tree for Inspection Time per Container (Min Time, leftmost) 
 
The average inspection time per container was 37.7 minutes, with a 
standard deviation of 7 minutes. This MOP was most significantly affected by the 
presence of ATS risk-profiling, which affects all containers.  The difference in average 
inspection time was 33.3 minutes (without ATS) and 39.8 minutes (with ATS). If there 
was no ATS risk profiling and no gamma detector in the holding area, the average 
inspection time per container was further reduced to 29.6 minutes. 
The SSTG reserves the need to deploy the gamma detector and thus would 
have to face an average inspection time of 36.1 minutes. If the gamma detector was 
deployed, the crane scales detector should not be deployed as it would further increase 
inspection time. 
The least favorable configuration comprised ATS risk profiling and 
random selection percentage. This finding coincided with the productivity analysis 
finding. Both processes combined raised the average inspection time per container to 43.3 
minutes. 
The best configuration to optimize average inspection time per container 
(with consideration for Pd) was to remove ATS risk profiling, deploy the gamma 
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detectors in the holding area and not to deploy crane weighing scales. Such a 
configuration would bring the average inspection time per container approximately 32.6 
minutes. 
Both random selection for inspection and ATS risk-profiling proved to be 
the most significant factors and should be avoided if we want to minimize average 
inspection time per container. Otherwise the resultant average inspection time per 
container could be as high as 44.9 percent. 
  Partitioning Analysis Conclusions 
The individual partition analysis on the MOPs had enabled appreciation of 
the significant factors driving each MOP.  The final conclusion was based on trade-offs 
between these factors and the (qualitative) weight of the MOPs.  The probability of 
detection remains the ultimate objective and thus the optimum sensor configuration must 
deploy gamma detectors in one or more of these locations (descending preference) on the 
crane, on mobile inspection teams in the holding area and/or at the intrusive inspection 
teams.  Trained animals complement the inspection efforts too.  Overall such a 
combination could achieve average probability of detection of above 90 percent. 
However, the use of gamma detectors would compromise the other MOP 
of FAR, productivity and average inspection time per container. Nonetheless Pd was 
valued more importantly and hence subsequent recommendations would work around the 
fact that gamma detectors would be deployed. 
Additional recommendations include: removing ATS risk profiling, 
limiting random selection to less than 8 percent of total container volume and not 
deploying crane scales. These factors will help achieve average FAR of 2.77 percent, 
average productivity of 161 containers per hour and average inspection time per container 
of 32.6 minutes 
 
c. Data Analysis Conclusions 
The analysis of the model raw output data has helped the SSTG to 
determine which of the sensors are significant in changing the values of our response 
variable or MOPs.  Through linear regression and partition analysis, the SSTG have 
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learned that for the specific port modeled; with a high transshipment volume; to have a 
high probability of detection, gamma scanners at the inspection station and also at the 
crane spreaders was needed.  Both the linear regression analysis and the partition analysis 
provided consistent answers to the factors that were important in the probability of 
detection.  The single most important piece of equipment that provided the largest 
increase in probability of detection was due to the gamma scanners and it is essential to 
place them in locations where the largest portion of the containers will be scanned by the 
equipment.  In addition, a well equipped, efficient, inspection team cadre that can keep up 
with the sheer volume of containers that need to be inspected due to false alarms and 
random selection is essential in providing the highest probability of detection.  
Minimizing false alarms by reducing the number of randomly selected containers and 
also by reducing the ATS level to 0 ensured that the number of containers that have to go 
to the inspection station for an intrusive search would be minimal.  The linear regression 
model showed that the random selection percentage and the ATS level were insignificant 
in the detection or non-detection of dirty containers, and therefore there is only a slight 
penalty in probability of detection.  This seems counter intuitive and highlights an area of 
concern about the model assumptions.  In order for the model to process all of the dirty 
containers in the 12 hour simulated run time, the number of inspection teams and the 
efficiency with which those teams processed containers were increased.  This helped to 
ensure that enough of the dirty containers had been processed through the system to get 
credible probability of detection.  In reality, there would be a higher penalty in 
probability of detection and lost productivity with inspection teams that took longer to 
process containers compounded with fewer teams.  When the model was first run with 
five inspection teams that could process the containers in a one hour timeframe, the 
number of processed dirty containers were very few due to the very long queues at the 
inspection stations.  This would have created a much larger penalty for productivity and 
container throughput would have also declined.  The important result is that even for 
highly accurate sensors with low false alarm rates the number of containers that need to 
be inspected can be overburdening on the port facility.  This problem is compounded by 
additional sensors. 
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5. Cost Estimation 
In developing the cost analysis, the system life cycle cost was considered and that 
includes the research and development phase, the production and implementation phase, 
the operation and support phase, and the disposal phase.  As all of the products 
considered in the SSTG alternatives generation are already developed by private 
companies, the research and development cost is not included in the estimation. 
Additionally, the disposal cost for the system is also excluded from the estimation. As 
such, the individual cost for the production, implementation, operation, and support for 
each system element and component of the various alternatives were aggregated to derive 
the total system cost for each alternative. 
The system is expected to be fully implemented and inclusive of operation for 20 
years. Each system component and element will have its unique life cycle cost and 
maintenance schedule. After 20 years, the system is expected to be upgraded or replaced 
with more advanced technologies and future daily operational cost is likely to be lower. 
Each system component and element unit cost were estimated and then multiplied 
by the actual units of the component and element to derive the sub-system cost. Each 
reference cost is normalized to US 2007 dollars. Future inflation is not considered in the 
system life cycle cost. 
 
a. Manifest Screening 
The Government so far had spent 34 million dollars over six years on 
developing the Automated Targeting System (ATS).  The additional maintenance and 
operational cost was estimated to be 6.7 million per year.  Most of the maintenance and 
operation cost involves paying the large number of operators necessary to handle the 
volume of manifests each day.   
The cost to improve the current ATS to ATS+ was estimated to be at 10.5 
million 2001 dollars per year. Table 61 shows the breakdown for developing ATS+. 
Normalized to 2007 dollars, the cost is estimated to be 12.2 million dollars. Majority of 
the cost components were due to the production support and maintenance changes with 
little over half the cost per year.  The estimated costs were developed before the ATS was 
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fully developed.  While the current estimate is likely to differ, the group continues to use 
the older estimates due to lack of references. It was assumed that there was no cost 
associated to the source port for not implementing manifest screening. 
 
 
Table 61.  Cost of Improving the ATS System in 2001 Dollars 
 
b. Scanning Location 
Each of these units employs X-ray and Gamma ray scanners as well as 
radiation detectors.  For this reason, SSTG included the cost of these scanners in the cost 
of each screening location.   
The ROM (Rough Order of Magnitude) cost of the mobile scanning 
system is not available in the public domain. As such, SSTG estimated the cost by 
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decomposing the system into various component and search for the retail price of each 
components, parts and elements. A large truck for housing the equipment and transport 
the equipment to scan the container is estimated to cost between 60 thousand to 150 
thousand dollars. The primarily cost driver for the truck is the size and horsepower. 150 
thousand dollars will be used as the estimate cost due to the fact that the truck will have 
to be customized to house the x-ray and gamma ray scanners.  In addition, the annual 
maintenance costs, gas cost and operator cost were separately estimated.  The average 
trucker salary is 50,000 dollars.  The average maintenance costs for the truck is 3,000 
dollars.  Gas usage is harder to estimate because the truck will only move around the 
confines of the port and with the availability of additional mobile scanning systems, each 
truck is expected to travel less mileage. The estimation is simplified by assuming one 
mobile system will be used for the entire port.  Referencing the map of Port of Oakland, 
the end to end distance is approximately 4 miles across.  Figuring that the truck will make 
1 round trip an hour, the truck will roughly travel 32 miles a day.  In a year, the truck is 
expected to travel 11,200 miles.  The national average diesel cost per gallon is 2.792 
dollars.  The average truck gets roughly 10 miles per gallon when fully loaded and that 
translate for the truck annual gas cost to approximately 3,200 dollars.   
According to the Financial Times, each X-ray machines for inspecting 
cargo containers cost 2.2 million dollars.  The radiation detector cost roughly 337,000 
dollars a piece according to the U.S. General Accounting Office. The operator paycheck, 
regular maintenance and electricity cost summed up to 183,000 dollars a year for the 
operational and support.  The total life cycle cost for the mobile scanning system is 5.96 





Table 62.  Cost Estimation for Mobile Scanning System 
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The X-ray Fixed Entry Systems cost 3.7 million dollars in 1996 according 
to the United States General Accounting Office.  Adjusting for inflation to 2007 dollars, a 
fixed X-ray system would be 4.74 million dollars.  The United States General Accounting 
Office estimated that the maintenance, operator and electric costs would run up to 2.1 
million dollars a year.  Multiplying by 20 years gives a whopping 42 million dollars over 
the lifespan of the fixed scanner system, putting the total cost at 46.7 million dollars.  




Table 63.  Cost Estimation for Fixed Scanning System 
 
According to the Port of Auckland’s website, crane spreaders cost roughly 
6.5 million U.S. dollars.  The cost varies on size, type and manufacturer.  Including the 
sensor package at an approximately one million dollars, the total acquisition is estimated 
at 7.5 million dollars.  Due to high strain and impact vibration caused by the act of 
loading and unloading the containers, replacement parts and maintenance costs are 
estimated at 600,000 dollars.  The operator paycheck and the electricity usage add 
another 60,000 dollars to the operational cost annually.  Each crane spreader scanning 
system life cycle cost is approximately 20.7 million dollars. Table 64 shows the cost 




Table 64.  Cost Estimation for Crane Spreader Scanning System 
 
c. Non-Intrusive Container Screening 
Like guide dogs, drug and bomb sniffing dogs require lots of training and 
care costs.  A guide dog team (dog and handler) costs $40,000 to train, and a detection 
dog can expected to be comparable [61].  The average work span for these dogs ranges 
from six to eight years [62]. The cost for dogs and training, as well as for the annual care, 
maintenance and handling are provided in the table below. The 20 year total cost 
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provides for three replacement dogs and their training, as the dogs retire to safe and 




Table 65.  Cost Estimation for Trained Animals 
 
Truck scales are easily available and have become very durable through 
continued technology advances.  A truck scale including equipment, foundation, freight, 
installation, and startup has an estimated cost of between $60,000 and $70,000 [63]. It is 
expected to last 15-20 years, in high traffic, with proper maintenance.  This maintenance 
included semi-annual inspections for the first five years and quarterly inspections every 




Table 66.  Cost Estimation for Scales 
 
d. Intrusive Container Screening 
Portable radiation detectors are available commercially for as little as $400 
a piece [64]; however, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory estimates the cost to be 
closer to $2000 each [65]. With two detectors required for each person, to ensure they 
always have one available in good working order for each shift, these still are relatively 
inexpensive to implement.  Additionally, almost no maintenance is required although 
their small size will make them prone to loss as well as dropping and cracking. Table 67 




Table 67.  Cost Estimation for Portable Radiation Detector 
 
A human inspection team for intrusive inspections of suspicious 
containers is provided for by U.S. Customs and not incurred on the ports or shipping 
companies. However, a cost will incur by the U.S. Government. The inspection teams 
usually are manned by five personnel. Each personnel are expected to receive equipment, 
training and other supplies to carry out their tasks.  The estimated cost for equipment is 
100 thousand dollars for hand held radiation detectors, chemical scanners and biological 
screeners. Training is roughly another two thousand dollars for scenario mock up 
equipment, instructor and trainee pay. The expected maintenance cost for the equipment 
is 250 dollars per year and the salary of each member is on average 50 thousand dollars.  
Multiplying for a life-cycle of 20 years and adding the different parts of the system, the 
total lifespan cost comes to be about 5.6 million dollars. Table 68 shows the cost 




Table 68.  Cost Estimation for Customs Inspector 
 
Remotely Operated Robots are used everyday in the military and by the 
police force as bomb disposal units.  These robots would be easily reconfigured with a 
sensor package to do inspections of cargo containers for undesired cargo.  According to 
one of the leading manufacturer’s website, Security Pro USA, the cost for a robot system 
is 26 thousand dollars.  The cost for an x-ray onboard is an additional 3 thousand dollars.  
The cost for a complete weapons of mass destruction sensor package (biological, 
radiological and chemical) is 24 thousand dollars.    Maintenance and operating cost 
figures would be around 100 thousand dollars per year considering parts and labor costs 
for maintenance and paying two operators, one to operate the robot and one to operate the 
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sensor packages.  The total cost comes to a little over two million dollars for the lifespan. 




Table 69.  Cost Estimation for remotely Operated Inspection Robots 
 
e. Smart Tags 
RFID (Radio-Frequency Identification) technology is becoming more and 
more prevalent today as major corporations and military departments have started to use 
this method to track goods and streamline the supply chain [66]. Active tags can cost as 
little as three dollars apiece and those which are active and also contain GPS and wireless 
communication capabilities can cost as little as five hundred dollars apiece. Software 
upgrades and infrastructure systems will cost an additional 200,000 to millions of dollars. 
These systems will be costly to implement, but could, in the long run, save shipping 
companies money because they will greatly reduce lost shipments and stolen goods. The 
exact cost of widespread implementation is uncertain, as these have only been installed 
on containers in small quantities. As these smart tags will not affect the models created 
because their capabilities are not relied on for protection until the container is out of the 
source port and in-transit, the smart tag costs will not affect the cost benefit analysis. 
 
f. Alternative Cost Analysis 
The cost of each alternative SSTG presented can be found by summing all 
of the component costs for each alternative once they have been multiplied by the number 





Table 70.  Number of Systems Used in Each Inspection Station 
 
One sees that ten servers were modeled at the point of entry inspection 
location. However, ten servers would realistically not be installed in all of the 
alternatives. The status quo alternative only inspects 5 percent of the cargo volume.  
When 5 percent inspection is done by ten servers, as modeled, the utilization rate for each 
is very low.  The utilization values are shown in Table 71. 
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Table 71.  Utilization of Servers at Inspection Stations for Each Alternative 
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Therefore, for the alternatives cost analysis, the minimum units required to 
complete each inspection was figured by multiplying the utilization rate by the number of 
servers modeled to determine how many would be implemented.  For example, in the 
status quo alternative, one fixed entry system is all that would be needed to handle the 5 
percent cargo inspection required.  With these normalized values, Table 72 shows the 




Table 72.  Cost Estimation for Six Alternatives 
 
6. Cost Benefit Analysis 
To determine the utility for the cost benefit analysis, the results from the model 
were grouped into a table. The utility functions were designed to translate the raw score 
for each MOP into utility score. The total utility score for each alternatives were then 
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computed based on the weight assigned to each MOP. As the stakeholders were not 
available to participate in a survey to state the preferences of each MOPs, SSTG was 
unable to use Analytical Hierarchical Process to determine the weight of each MOP. As 
such, each MOP is assigned the same weight and multiplied with each utility score to 
derive the total utility score. The weighted utility score for each alternative is shown in 




Table 73.  Rank of Alternatives Based on Utility 
 
Figure 116 shows the graph of the utility scores versus the system life cycle cost 
for the six alternatives. From the cost benefit analysis, two alternatives can be eliminated 
by inspection.  The 100 percent Volume inspection alternative and the Improved Loading 
Search alternative both have higher costs and lower performance compared to the High 
Performance alternative and can be eliminated.  The 100 percent Intrusive inspection 
alternative was also eliminated because of the time added per container passing through 
the model was enormous and economically infeasible for shippers and distributors.  The 
remaining alternatives worth of consideration were Minimum Port Operation and High 
Performance.  While High Performance scored the highest, decision maker will have to 
decide the need to spend additional US$20.5 millions to raise the score from 60.64 to 
90.57 
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Cost vs Utility Score of Alternatives
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Figure 116.  Cost vs Utility Score of Alternatives 
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V. INTERNAL PERSONNEL THREATS GROUP 
A. PROBLEM DEFINITION 
1. Needs Analysis 
a. System Decomposition 
The system decomposition enabled the group to identify a hierarchical 
structure and the major functions and components of a port internal security system. The 
three levels of the hierarchical structure were super, lateral, and subsystems. The super 
systems relative to the port internal security system were national intelligence agencies, 
state/ federal legislation and the International Maritime Organization. Lateral systems 
included local police, CBP, USCG and security agencies. Subsystems included biometric 
readers, sensors (like CCTV), security teams, command centers, communication 
networks and portable database computers.   
The system includes structural, operating, and flow components. The 
structural components consist of force (including patrol and inspection assets), ISR, 
Command and Control (C2) Centers (including analysis/response teams), 
Communications Systems, and decision support. Operating components included sensor 
networks, Inspection Teams, C2 Centers, Intelligence Centers, and communications 
networks.  
The following are the four categories in enhancing port security 
undertaken by various agencies in the Port of Singapore with regard to internal personnel.  
• Port Compound Security – compartmentalize the port into zone to 
moderate and monitor cargo and personnel movement.  
• Enhanced Port Border Security – undertake measures to protect the 
perimeter of port compound. 
• Cargo Clearance – measures undertaken to pre-verified shipment details 
and conduct security spot check to detect any illegitimate cargos.  
• Personal Clearance – measures undertaken to ensure the legitimacy of 
workers and crew. 
PSA has the sole responsibility of ensuring the security of the port; 
safeguarding everything in the port premises except immigration and customs issues. 
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However, security issues that threaten national interest will have close cooperation with 
the government agencies (e.g. SPF and ICA).  
PSA has implemented intelligent security monitoring system on its 
compound to monitor and detect suspicious activities (e.g. suspicious baggage/items, 
intrusions to restricted zone, tampering of cargos/containers). Measures also include 
alarms on restricted access equipment. 
Extensive security measures are undertaken to pre-verify shipment and 
conduct of effective cargo checking. Singapore, being one of the busiest ports in world, 
poses a great challenge in ensuring the legitimacy of goods. Most importantly, it enables 
law enforcement the chance to detect materials (or even weapons) that threaten the 
interest of the nation. Deployed technology equipment such as x-ray scanners, IED 
scanners, and sniffers further assist the detection capability of law enforcement. 
There are two levels of concern in personnel clearance: facility workers 
and ship’s crew. The access control of workers in the compound has to be enforced to 
prevent any disruptive acts. Internal staff has to execute background checks to ascertain 
the necessary credibility and trust related to the accessibility of information that may be 
sensitive and may cause severe consequences with the security of the port. 
Authenticity in access control for workers is also enabled through the 
employment of biometrics. However, such an implementation has tremendous impact to 
the count in the measurement of efficiency. Therefore, such measures are employed 
where the threat condition has elevated.  
As for the crews, checks and procedures that are similar to immigration 
enforcement are conducted (e.g. authenticity and validity of passport holders). 
 
b. Stakeholder Analysis 
The scope this study involves multiple stakeholders that involve many 
international agencies, the U.S. Navy, and local port operators with the main purpose of 
identifying the critical assumptions and constraints of the problem statement. 
Globalization has created a growth of port related activities that require close cooperation 
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of ports around the world. Therefore, as part of the integral studies, stakeholders from the 
Ports of Singapore will also be analyzed.  
Basically the team has identified a group of stakeholders and divided the 
stakeholders into different level based on their hierarchy of roles and responsibilities in 




Figure 117.  IPTG Stakeholders 
 
The two primary stakeholders that have contributed greatly to shaping our 
perspective and understanding all the associated issues with port security are:  The Port 
Authority of Oakland, and the Port of Singapore.   
On 19 January 2007 the Security director for the Port of Oakland extended 
an invitation for the PSS12 to directly interview with all the key organizations that 
contribute to the security operation at the port. In attendance were the Port of Oakland, 
USCG, and the two terminal operators. The Port of Oakland Authority represented the 
city of Oakland who owns the port and its infrastructure. The terminals are then leased by 
the city to the terminal operators. There are 11 terminals in the Port of Oakland, leased to 
nine different operators servicing over 50 shipping companies. The Port of Oakland is 
predominantly designated as a container port. The primary focus of the terminal operators 
are the daily tasks of loading and unloading containers on and off ships in the most cost 
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efficient manner. The three stakeholders that were present at the meeting came with 
different perspectives, different priorities and conflicting requirements.   
As for port security, the Port of Oakland plays the role of a landlord 
focused on maintaining a balance between following the security guidelines set by the 
DHS through the USCG, while ensuring the leasers of the terminals are satisfied with the 
operating environment. The USCG is the security enforcer who places security 
guidelines, requirements, and fines upon the port authority and the terminal operators. 
The port terminal operators were the IPTG’s most relevant stakeholders due to their 
extensive exposure to the inner working of the ports.  They are also the primary means 
for identifying potential security risks.   
With this background, there were a few keys take-away from the meeting. 
In general, all stakeholders agree that the port security has not received adequate attention 
at the Port of Oakland, and there is definitely room for improvement. All three 
stakeholders listed various on-going projects that could offer near-term solutions (i.e. 
Vessel Identification System (VIS), biometric ID cards for the workers, WMD containers 
scanners). However, as the meeting progressed, there are two statements that seem to 
perpetuate: 1) there is very limited funds available from any of the three stakeholders.  
The USCG funding is distributed by the Department of Homeland Security. The terminal 
operators are effectively working as freelance contractors to the shipping lines, and due to 
the competitiveness of the shipping business, the margin is small and there are not readily 
available funds established for security purposes. 2) Commerce is the life blood of the 
port and cannot be disrupted. 
An interview was conducted with officers from the PSA and Maritime 
Port Authority. It was mentioned that personnel accessibility and cargo is of concern to 
the security of the port. The newly implemented biometrics access control system is one 
method to help correct the access control procedure to the port premises. Although 
current access card control systems are good, surveillance systems must be sensitive 
enough to detect any illegitimate activities on the ground.  
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Personnel assigned as staff to the facility would be pre-screened to the 
necessary clearance level as part of the background check. Policies and procedures would 
be implemented to safeguard and prevent information deemed useful towards the 
vulnerability of the system, allowing illegal activity to take place. One constraint is that 
the full-fledged implementation security measures will be detrimental to port efficiency 
when security threat heightens. 
 
c. Input-Output Model 
The input-output model is helpful to scope and bound the problem.  When 
developing the model, the inputs that are necessary and the outputs that are produced by 
the system are analyzed. Inputs may be controllable or uncontrollable. Controllable 
inputs may be further divided into physical, human, informational and economic inputs, 
while uncontrollable inputs may be further divided into environmental characteristics and 
existing conditions.  These inputs in the system result in intended outputs and by-



































Figure 118.  IPTG Input-Output Model 
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The physical inputs to the system include the physical size of the port, the 
number of entry and exit points, and the number of restricted areas within the port 
premises. This is important as there is a need to regulate the flow of personnel in and out 
of the port, as well as personnel moving within the port. The human inputs include 
employee training and the background information of the employee. Proper training 
would ensure the employee is aware of the security implication, their responsibilities, and 
accountability. The results from the employee background check would translate to the 
level of security clearance that would be granted. The informational input includes data 
classification and correspondingly data criticality. It is prudent that the various types of 
data within the organization be properly identified and classified, enabling data 
safeguards to be placed to ensure data integrity and availability. Finally, the economic 
inputs include the amount of money needed to implement the system. 
Environmental inputs include the flow of human movement, which is 
difficult to control, especially during peak hours. Some existing conditions that are inputs 
to the system are the employee general perception to security measures, as well as their 
awareness of the security implication of their work.  This has impact of the output of the 
system as a lack of security awareness or a negative perception to security would cause 
an employee to circumvent the system that is put in place.   
The most important outputs that are intended are deterrence to intrusion, 
minimal unauthorized access, minimal informational leakage, as well as a knowledgeable 
workforce.  Deterrence is one of the goals of the system, when put in place, may cause 
any potential security intruders to reconsider before acting.  If deterrence fails, it is 
important that any unauthorized access within the port be kept to a minimum, whether 
intended or unintended, so as to keep the port operation uninterrupted and safe.  
Moreover, data outflow must be controlled and restricted to minimize any unauthorized 
information leakages that would jeopardize the safety and security of the port operation.  
Information such as shipment schedule and cargo types should be properly guarded as 
these are high value targets for informational operations.  It is also the intent of the 
system to educate the employees to achieve a knowledgeable workforce that is aware of 
the implication of security.  
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Some outputs are not intended and are by-products of the system. The by-
products include employee dissatisfaction, restriction in personnel movement, and 
reduction in productivity. By implementing physical and informational access control, 
reduction in the rate of personnel movement and productivity would result. This may 
have a negative impact of the job satisfaction of the employee. 
 
d. Functional Analysis 
The functional hierarchy helps identify the most important functions of the 
system and decompose these functions into sub-functions. The primary concern of 
internal threats in the port is when an insider assists outsider(s) to execute terrorist acts 
within the port, or activities that support terrorist acts at other locations. The solution will 
have to address three fundamental functions of deter, access and response as depicted in 
Figure 119. 
 
Prevent Insider from Committing or Supporting



















































Figure 119.  IPTG Functional Hierarchy 
 
The first function that has to be addressed is how to deter personnel from 
collaborating with terrorists.  To further explore this idea, the term deter can be thought 
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as a function that provide disincentive for anyone who acts to the detriment of the port. 
Subsequently, the deter function can be decomposed into three sub functions: setting 
barriers, monitoring, and engaging.  The idea of having a physical fence or barrier might 
seem trivial, but it does provide a visual deterrence to a potential intruder.  At a 
minimum, it would retard the breach of security and set a boundary for area layer 
defense.  More effectively, it would require the intruders to formulate a work-around plan 
to breach security, and possibly be directed where the port defense is strongest.  Once a 
barrier is established, monitoring would be required to ensure that the integrity of the 
barrier is maintained.  Monitoring would also act as a first set of sensor that triggers an 
alarm system. (An alarm system with loud noise distributed over a wide area can be an 
effective deterrence method that prevents intruders from executing their activities once 
they realize that their intentions are no longer secret.) If a breach of security is detected, 
the sub-function of engage is to provide visual, audio, or other alarms as a last resort to 
deter the intruders from carrying out their intention. 
Once the barrier is established to deter intruders, the next function that the 
system must address is how to provide access to both the information and the physical 
area of the port authority to those who have the legitimate need for such. The question of 
access can be divided into two sub areas: data and personnel. For data access, the primary 
concern is with the security sensitive data (and possibly, economic sensitive data). To 
further explore data access, a process needs to be established to categorize the sensitivity 
of the data. In addition, the data need to be validated to assess its integrity, and to 
facilitate establishing an access control method whereby the data is matched to those 
personnel who has a valid needs and their needs have been authenticated. However, as a 
way to minimize disruption to the port operation, a streamlined procedure is needed to 
prevent possible bottlenecks in either personnel authentication or data validation process. 
To ensure the safe keeping of the data, a robust storage with redundancy is also required, 
and a method of retrieving the data for the personnel also needs to be addressed. The 
main questions are: Can the data be accessed electronically and remotely? How many 
sites can the data be accessed through? The function of providing access for port 
authority personnel can be decomposed to: screening, identifying, tracking, and isolating.  
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In-coming workers should be screened for early determination of security risk.  In 
addition, each worker should be provided with a unique ID that is tamper proof.  
Geographically, the port is generally a vast area. Providing access to personnel would 
also necessitate the need to track each worker to validate or authenticate their placement 
during their normal operating routine, and to ensure each worker is accounted for in an 
emergency situation.  Lastly, once the access control procedure is established, a training 
method to educate the workers must be addressed to ensure everyone knows their 
security roles and responsibilities, and to keep security focus prominent to all involved. 
Any security measure, regardless of their intended purpose, will 
experience lapses. Through extensive planning by intruders or unintended lapses by the 
system due to an unforeseen event, there are instances when the system will have to 
adjust to these events to maintain their effectiveness. The critical function at this point in 
time is response. More precisely, how does the system respond to a low probability but 
potentially catastrophic event, or to high probability but inconsequential events due to 
human or system errors? To further assist in understanding the function of response, it 
can further be divided into detecting, communicating, mobilizing, and engaging.  When 
the security is breached, the system should have a method of detecting when and where it 
occurred. The information then needs to be shared and communicated with all involved.  
If and when a threat is validated and determined to have cataclysmic consequences, 
internal and external resources will have to be mobilized to neutralize the threat.  At a 
minimum, even when a threat is determined to be attributed to human error, the internal 
resources should be mobilized to either validate that it is inconsequential and/or to reset 
the detection sensors.  In the event that the threat is authentic, the security has been 
breached, and resources have been mobilized, an established set of rules of engagement 
are required to assist both internal and external security assets to determine each asset’s 
roles and responsibilities in responding to each threat.  For example, the rules of 
engagement would determine whether the internal security asset can detain or neutralize a 
threat prior to the external security asset’s arrival. 
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2. Objectives Hierarchy 
The objectives hierarchy is similar to the functional hierarchy, except this 
includes evaluation measures or metrics used to measure how well different alternatives 
meet the objectives. In addition, it also includes system attributes that are not functions 
but are nevertheless important decision criteria. The hierarchy begins with an effective 
need divided into the major functions, sub-functions, and metrics. Recalling the IPTG 
results from the needs analysis, our effective need is to prevent insiders from committing 
or supporting terrorist acts inside the port facilities. The three major functions and one 
objective of our system are to minimize impact to current operations, provide deterrence, 
control access to information and physical locations, and respond if necessary.   
The primary function of the terminal port is to facilitate the movement of cargo to 
support both national and global commerce. The transportation of containerized cargo is 
a low margin, labor intensive industry with very minimal overhead. With the current 
global threat of terrorism, the port terminal operators and authorities are well aware of the 
security risks they might encounter.  However, as explicitly stated by our stakeholders, 
security measures must not impede the commerce. Given this high order objective, the 
IPTG perceived it is important to our stakeholders that our solutions will have a minimal 
impact on the overall port operation. One perceived method to ensure that the IPTG 
doesn’t lose sight of this critical requirement of the system is to directly place it in the 
objective hierarchy.   
Unlike the other objectives which are linked to the system functions, this 
particular objective is essence represented attributes of the systems.  As an example, non-
performing characteristics can be factors such as ease of use, maintainability, or 
reliability.  These factors were more designed to determine how well the system adapt to 
the environment that it is designed for.  Attributes were also referred to as the ‘ilities’ of 
the system. These non-functional characteristics of the system provided important 
information to the stakeholders in deciding which alternatives to select.  To help clarify 
the overall objective of minimize operation impact and to facilitate defining the 
meaningful metrics for this objective, the IPTG further decomposed into sub-objectives: 
operational delays due to implemented security procedures, the cost of the security 
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procedures, the operational complexity of security procedures, and the downtime of the 
security system.  The impact of these sub-categories was to bring about a feasible 
solution, while minimizing the impact to the port’s bottom line. Some metrics that we 
identified were the mean travel time of personnel, the average time to process a container, 
training time necessary, and system reliability. The alternatives that sufficiently address 
these metrics will be best for the IPTG system.  
The next objective is to deter.  Under the deter section, the three sub-objectives 
are to minimize the perceived accessibility, and to maximize the perceived detectability 
and the perceived intervention capability. The impacts of these sub-categories is to be 
maximized in order for all personnel to perceive that access cannot be achieved without 
detection and intervention will come before their plan can succeed.  The metrics that 
were identified are number of attempted breeches and measurement of perceived security 
(which may be accomplished through surveys or expert opinion).  
Another objective is to control access. Controlling access has been further sub-
divided into data and personnel categories. The objectives of data access control are to 
prevent information leakage, unauthorized access to information, contraband and/or 
dangerous substances from entering under fraudulent documentation, and to minimize the 
scope of information access to personnel.  The personnel access control has objectives of 
preventing unauthorized physical access, minimizing the scope of access to personnel, 
and preventing inadvertent release of critical information.  These categories of access 
control are to be maximized on a need to know or access basis in order to minimize the 
impact any single individual can have on operations.  Metrics have been identified such 
as the number of unauthorized accesses, number of personnel who have access to data or 
locations, misidentification rate, and the number of successful attacks. 
The final objective is to respond.  The sub-objectives are to minimize damage 
after an incident and to minimize the time from incident to full operational recovery.  
Some metrics are time to recovery, amount of unrecoverable information, quantity of 
information leaked, time to detect, time to communicate, and time required to intervene. 
The objectives hierarchies are listed in Figures 120 through 123. The associated metrics 



















Figure 123.  IPTG Objectives Hierarchy for Response 
 
Metrics Objective Item
Mean Sojourn Times (Personnel)
Processing Time per Container
Cost of System
Time to Train
Mean Time Between Failures of System
Mean Time to Repair System
Number of Employees Leaving Company per Month/Year
Number of Complaints per Month/Year
Number of Attempted Breaches
Measurement of Perceived Security (Surveys, Opinions)
Number of Unauthorized Access
Number of Personnel who have Access to Data/Locations
Misidentification Rate
Number of Successful Attacks
Time to Achieve Normal Day to Day Operations
Amount of Unrecoverable Data
Quantity of Information Leaked
Time to Detect an Irregular Event
Time from Detection to Communicating to Proper Personnel
Time to Intervention






Table 74.  IPTG Evaluation Metrics 
 
B. DESIGN AND ANALYSIS 
1. Alternatives Generation 
To support the formulation of the solution, the IPTG spent considerable effort 
gathering information initially from within the group, relying on the knowledge of the 
port operations based on interviews with the Port of Oakland Security Team and the PSA. 
Subsequently, extensive efforts were also devoted to online research, review of existing 
documents, and team discussion to familiarize ourselves with the security issues the port 
  286
authorities have to address.  The IPTG segregated the specific issues that relate with the 
internal security of the ports concentrating on the port employees or infrastructure.  In 
addition to the regular discussions held among the IPTG members to derive to the 
optimal solution, engagement with the stakeholders (Port of Oakland and PSA) attempted 
to validate selected methods to ensure that the approach to the problem was correct.  In 
this regard, positive feedback was received from the two primary stakeholders.  From the 
engagement of the stakeholders, the IPTG concluded there were differences in priorities 
and approaches to the same problem between the stakeholders.  Their differences will be 
discussed further as their current security plans are analyzed in the search for solutions.   
The approach to finding the solution begins with constructing a functional 
hierarchy of the problem.  From the functional hierarchy, it was determined that to be 
successful, the solution must address how to perform each one of these vital functions 
effectively.  The overall solution requires that each function must be independently 
addressed.  The tool used to assist in this process is Zwicky’s Morphological Chart. 
The morphological chart is shown in Table 75 with each function listed in the 
column headings. Beneath these headings are the design alternatives or the means to 
carry out the listed function. For example, the function deter was listed in the first column 
as a heading.  In the context of internal security, the objective of this function is to 
prevent or discourage outsiders from gaining unauthorized access to the port critical 
infrastructure and/or its critical data by discouraging port employees from acting on 




Table 75.  IPTG Morphological Chart 
 
Deter 
There are three primary methods of deterring personnel from attempting 
malicious activity: punishment, denying access, and monitoring. Deterrence by 
punishment is a strategy which utilizes the possibility of apprehension of the attacker and 
punishment to the full extent of the law. The attacker is deterred if he chooses not to 
attempt his malicious activity because the perceived punishment is excessive. Deterrence 
by denying access aims to deny attackers opportunities to act. The attacker is deterred 
upon recognition that he does not have a good opportunity for attack and concludes that 
his probability of success is low. Deterrence by monitoring utilizes sensors or people to 
monitor the assets being protected. The attacker is deterred by the knowledge that he is 
being adequately monitored in an attempt to attack the asset. 
The minimum requirement for deterrence requires all three of the previously 
mentioned forms. The following were selected as they serve their function with cost 
effectiveness. Deterrence by punishment could be carried out with warning signs. Signs 
posted at regular intervals along the perimeter fence, warning attackers that the port and 
terminal is being monitored at all times and unauthorized access would result in 
prosecution to the fullest extent of the law. The presence of armed guards reinforces these 
signs that would warn the attackers. Deterrence by denying access can be accomplished 
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by using perimeter fencing. This provides the minimum form of physical barrier to 
prevent and delay unauthorized access to the port area. Fencing also serves to channel the 
flow of personnel and vehicle to an access control point for effective screening. The 
minimum level of fencing is the wire-mesh crowned with barbed wire. Deterrence by 
monitoring may be accomplished via security patrols. A highly visible security patrol is 
an effective form of deterrence and is both versatile and capable of engagement. A well 
trained security patrol would be on alert for people acting suspiciously as well as search 
for objects that are out of place in relation to their surroundings.  
Physical security can be further enhanced by legislation, dual layered perimeter 
fences, automatic vehicles barriers, security training, and an intruder detection system. 
Increasing the penalty for unauthorized access to the port area could be examined if the 
current penalty is unable to attain the desired level of deterrence. Allowing armed guards 
in the port should be examined as another forceful form of deterrence. Having a dual 
layer of perimeter fencing would not only effectively delay the attacker, but also provide 
a clear area between the inner and outer fence for any sensor system to be optimized for 
detection and monitoring. Lighting could be provided throughout the fencing to help 
prevent night intrusion. To prevent drivers from ramming their vehicle through the access 
point, an automatic vehicle barrier could be implemented. Typically, the response time 
for the security guard to activate the barrier would be small and hence concrete blocks to 
slow down vehicle speed could be utilize to allow these automatic vehicle barrier to be 
effective deployed. The best form of monitoring is the vigilant awareness of the people 
working in the port. Through training, there would be increased vigilance by the workers, 
enabling them to report any suspicious activities or people to the security agents. Through 
regular training, the workers could feel safer working within the port and understand that 
they are an integral part to the security plan. To supplement security patrol, an intruder 
detection system could be employed. These systems can sense any cut in the fence, 
tunneling under the fence, or attempt to scale the fence. Installation of these systems 
reduces the workload of the security patrol and is another form of deterrence.  
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Data Access Control 
To effectively protect against information threats, security measures placed in 
order to protect the accessibility and integrity of data are of prime importance.  Such 
measures span across a broad spectrum of domain knowledge, including areas such as 
physical security, network security, cryptography, access control, and business continuity 
planning.  While each of these areas achieve some specific sets of goals, it is important 
that careful considerations be given when implementing these measures to achieve a 
robust layered approach to effectively handle the various informational threats.   
In order to achieve basic data access control, it is necessary to implement a set of 
measures that will form the essential baseline to protect the critical data from 
unauthorized access. One of the basic requirements in dealing with informational threats 
is to ensure that the premises where data are stored or accessed are secure.  This can be 
achieved via implementation of basic physical security measures, which typically include 
measures to deter, delay, detect and response to physical threats.  To effectively 
implement such measure, a centralized approach in the data resource management is 
preferred, and one such approach is the consolidation of data resources to the data center, 
in which tight physical security measures can be implemented and enforced.  A typical 
data center is well protected by layered defenses such as security personnel, barriers and 
locks.  This would deter and delay any potential adversary.  Intrusion monitoring and 
detection are achieved via motion detectors and CCTV.  A data center could have a set of 
emergency response processes and escalation channels should any compromise in 
security is detected.  With such centralized approach to physical security, the chances of 
data compromise are greatly reduced compared to a distributed approach. While the data 
centers are being physically secured, it should be noted that adversaries can still access 
the data via the network.  To address such threats, network security measures need to be 
put in place.  Such measures include the use of firewalls to inspect and block unwanted 
network traffic, the implementation of demilitarized zones (DMZ) to buffer against 
attacks on critical information assets. At a minimum, storage encryption at the personal 
computers should be implemented to protect the confidentiality of the data used by the 
employees. Such measure ensures that any adversary would not be able to access 
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sensitive information easily even if they manage to gain access to the files. With all these 
measures in place, it should not be forgotten that robust access control mechanism could 
be in place to prevent unauthorized access of the data. The basic mechanism should 
include individual authentication and authorization via the use of user IDs and passwords.  
Auditing of user access should also be enforced to ensure traceability and accountability. 
A basic set of requirement to ensure business continuity is to have at least a formal set of 
backup and recovery procedures for the critical data. The backup data should be stored 
offsite. These measures ensure that there is at least a working set of data should the 
integrity of primary source of data be compromised.  
The baseline data access control will form the basic safeguarding mechanism.  To 
achieve a more robust data access control, it is necessary that more measures be put in 
place to re-enforce the baseline mechanism. Apart from the basic set of physical security 
measures, a guard post and monitoring post could be set up at the entry point to the data 
centers. Procedures to control the inflow and outflow of data to the data center by 
checking all storage media carried by the personnel entering or leaving the data center 
must be strictly enforced to prevent any unauthorized access or leakages of information.  
Vendors performing installation and configuration of servers within the data center 
should also be escorted at all time. The data center should be situated in a hardened 
facility to ensure that it is protected against physical sabotage by any potential adversary. 
Besides implementing the DMZ and firewalls, network-based and host-based intrusion 
detection and prevention systems could be implemented to detect and react to any attacks.  
Such systems would be monitored continuously by information security professionals in 
order to ensure fast and appropriate response. From examination of the large premises of 
a maritime port, the bits and bytes during wire transmission may also be vulnerable to 
sniffing and attack. The use of cryptography such as secure socket layer (SSL) and public 
key infrastructure (PKI) would be able to address such threats. Storage encryptions 
should also be implemented at the servers to protect the confidentiality of critical data in 
the data center. The use of two-factor authentication such as biometric or smart card for 
data access should be enforced to achieve a more robust access control mechanism.  Such 
mechanisms could be linked with physical access control so that only authorized 
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personnel are able to access the critical data resources within the data center. Finally, 
business continuity planning ensures that critical data are backed up periodically and an 
alternative site will be available to restore the backup data should the primary site fails 
for some reason. A set of policy and procedures are to be established and periodically 
exercised to test the procedures to be executed to ensure the data can be restored in the 
event of attack resulting in loss or corruption of data.  
Respond 
The Port of Oakland is taken as the baseline for our considerations in port 
security, and thus its response capabilities form the minimum level required. Threat may 
be detected in the administrative area (offices), operational area (storage, 
loading/unloading, berths) and perimeter of each terminal. The threat may be in the form 
of an intruder, authorized visitor (including trucker) or terminal employee. The 
jurisdiction of the terminal is limited to visual monitoring and verbal warning to the 
threats. There is a heavy reliance on the local authorities for any actions required to 
neutralize the threat. The local authorities would most likely be activated from their 
nearest station and travel in cars and trucks. At the perimeter, the threat would be denied 
entry and monitored by terminal’s security personnel. Local police would be called via 
telephone to apprehend the threat. In the administrative area, the office personnel may 
call his superior for appropriate actions. Security personnel may be required to escort the 
threat to the perimeter and hand over to local police. For uncooperative cases, the local 
police may be called to make arrests. There could be a need to evacuate the building in a 
situation in which the threat carries explosives or firearms. In the operational area, the 
watchman will inform (via handheld radios) the security personnel while monitoring the 
threat. The watchman could attempt to deny the threat from assessing the critical 
facilities. In the meantime, the local police are called to make the arrest. Again, for threat 
carrying explosives or firearms, there will be a need to evacuate the terminal personnel in 
the immediate vicinity. 
The maximum response alternative explores the possibility of placing the 
emphasis on response capabilities, while meeting the minimum requirements in access 
control and deterrence. By response capabilities, we mean the abilities of the proposed 
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system to neutralize the threat before it can cause any damages to the port facilities or 
other landmarks through the port. Since the internal threat is primarily human-based, the 
response will be focused on how to neutralize the human threat most efficiently and 
effectively. 
Upon detection and identification of threat, the response function would be 
triggered to neutralize the threat appropriately with minimum lag time. Handheld radios 
would facilitate communications among the security personnel during the response 
action. Alarm and public address systems would work in tandem to alert the terminal 
personnel to appropriately assist in the response either by keeping away or actively 
pursuing or cutting off the threat. In the near future, it is possible to broadcast the live 
picture and location of the threat’s movement on TV screens at strategic locations or 
sorely to the security personnel, so that it is easier to isolate the threat. 
Physically, the terminal may be rigged to raise walls to segregate the terminal into 
sections to minimize the abilities of the threat to escape or reach the critical facilities.  
The walls would also minimize collateral damage to adjacent facilities.  For example, 
such walls should be implemented in the container area to prevent the threat from hiding.  
External agencies would be called and the best response can be achieved if these agencies 
are stationed in the port vicinity.   
Alternative One (Status Quo) 
Due to extensive knowledge of its operations and its current security capabilities, 
the Port of Oakland is used as a baseline alternative. The advantages of using the Port of 
Oakland as the measuring yardstick are because they are familiar with the issues that 
have to be addressed; they know the challenges that have to be overcome, and the 
effectives of some of the solutions that are currently being implemented. Since the 
solutions are formulated for implementation five years out, the solutions are expected to 
be only slightly better than the current technology offerings.  
For deterrence of unauthorized access into the port terminals, the Port of Oakland 
uses a multi-layered method. As one approaches the port terminal from the road, there are 
multiple visual and physical signs of deterrence: posted warning signs threatening 
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prosecution for unauthorized access, warning signs indicating that the fence is electrified, 
fences along the terminal perimeter, serpentine barbed wire on top of the fences, and 
CCTV along the perimeter. As a psychological deterrence, the access in and out of the 
terminal is zigzagged in an effort to confuse casual intruders presenting a tactical 
advantage. The zigzagged road pattern allows the guards the opportunity to monitor those 
approaching the terminal.  
For data access control, the electronics data network servers and supporting 
equipment are located in three rooms on the ground floor of the terminal administrative 
building.  The rooms are outfitted with electronic card readers, and access to the rooms is 
tightly controlled.  The network itself is access restricted, with user login and password 
required for entrance.  Personnel access is authorized based on their job functions. The 
network is highly compartmentalized and aligned to each personnel job tasks. For 
example, planners have access to data about incoming ship containers with their 
manifests, then electronic applications are designed specifically to allow them to 
formulate the most optimal stacking arrangement.  
As for personnel access to the terminal, there is only one personnel entry point to 
the terminal. At the entry point, there are two electronically activated turnstiles; the 
turnstiles are activated by the Transportation Workers Identification Credentials (TWIC) 
card.  There are CCTV monitors mounted over the turnstiles with full redundancy, two 
monitors are pointed at the entrance of the turnstiles, two at the exit.  Located past the 
turnstiles is a guard post.  Personnel have to bypass the guard post to gain entrance to the 
terminal.  The guard provides the final verification of incoming personnel. The guard can 
also de-activate the turnstiles to allow visitors or employees without a TWIC card to 
come through the turnstiles. However, as a security procedure, the guard must verify and 
validate all visitors. All visitors require escorts.   
For responding to security breaches, personnel can mobilize within the terminal 
by 15-person van, pickup trucks, and golf carts. For equipment, pickup trucks and 
forklifts are available within the terminal to be used to move concrete barriers, and or 
temporary fences. If all the deterrence methods fail to prevent intruders from gaining 
access to the port, and if security is compromised, as a final measure, the CBP agents 
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assigned to the port terminal carry firearms and are federally authorized to use them as 
necessary.  
Alternative 2 (The Port of Singapore) 
Deterrence is the primary measures that the port of Singapore undertook in the 
port security plan. A strong deterrence factor cuts the desire to attempt malicious activity.  
Visually displaying security personnel and instructions or equipment are ways to enhance 
the deterrence factor. It will be effective to have security personnel patrolling everywhere 
with watchful eyes to safeguard the security of the port. In addition to the human fatigue 
problem, tremendous labors cost makes it unwise to impose such deployment.  Optimized 
numbers of security personnel are deployed around the port to patrol the grounds.  
Together, large signboards displaying the “Trespassers will be prosecuted” and 
“Area under surveillance” warned the implications of any wrongful actions with the 
sublime message of “everyone is watching and we are ready to catch you.” These 
signboards are prominently placed and spread across the surrounding fence line of the 
port premises. Fence lines are built around the surrounding compound to cordon off the 
premises from public access is one physical measure undertaken. Limited access points 
with security screening helps to sanitize the port premises. Since the port is a large area, it 
is not possible to have security patrol within every inch of the port areas.  
The use of technology is an important component in aiding the security capability. 
CCTV with smart video analyzing software is the latest device to aid in securing the 
compound. Currently, the Port of Singapore is well-equipped with such an intelligent 
surveillance CCTV system that monitors each sector of the compound and looks out into 
sea and land channels to thwart any undesirable actions. Again, the display of such 
sophisticated camera all around the compound and fence will inform and warn any 
further deliberation of opportunistic threats. Some of the undesirable actions that can be 
detected are trespassers, irregular flow of traffic (people, vehicular, container) directions, 
irregular behaviors (loitering, break-in etc).  
Other complimentary technology along the fence could be the installation of 
tripwires in secluded areas. Typically, audio alerts are placed together to summon all the 
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necessary attention for action to be taken. Publicizing the capability of certain security 
implementation is also another form of psychological combat to weave off any 
undesirable attempts and increasing difficultly for any sabotage plans. Therefore, the Port 
of Singapore does display robust security capability which shows strength in the 
safeguarding of the port.   
As for access control of data, shipping information is critical information 
safeguarded by the port of Singapore. Only authorized personnel have access to the 
docking and scheduled information. The information is compartmentalized to declassify 
it to the necessary stakeholders such as transportation companies, handlers and shipping 
lines. Only necessary information is distributed to the grounds at short notice to prevent 
any planned sabotage.  Information regarding the placement of scheduled duties for crane 
operators, ground handlers and even checkpoints officers are also highly guarded. All 
data access requires are access cards to verify the authenticity of the information 
retriever. Network security and encryption are also imposed on the data information. 
Since the Port of Singapore handles one-fifth of the world’s total transshipment 
throughput, a complete port operation backup and data disaster recovery has been 
implemented to ensure business continuity.    
Personnel access control is performed via identification by the issuance of photo 
access cards. Different levels of access control are implemented and controlled by the 
access cards. Guards are stationed at key access points. Other places, such as 
administrative offices, require two factors of authentication such as the swiping of access 
cards and keying in of passwords. All the access information are logged and screened for 
any irregularity such as late night or early morning access to administrative zones or 
storage areas. Vital equipment, such as cranes, need special authorization to access.  All 
personnel must display their access pass prominently in all zones as security guards or 
employees are vigilant for any unauthorized access. Biometrics identification at all access 
points are set to authenticate personnel. The implementation would lengthen the time 
taken to screen the personnel which is significant in the port where the large working 
population exists, and efficiency is a key factor. Currently the biometric screening is only 
activated when a certain threat level is issued by the HSAS. To safeguard port security 
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against insider sabotage, background checks are conducted on all contractors and staff 
permitting issuance of only relevant authorizations. All contractors (including handlers, 
drivers, and caterers) have to submit personnel information for clearance prior to entry. 
No entry will be given if prior notice is not served. Security guards at the guard post will 
authenticate and verify the information with the contractor’s employer.  Personnel such 
as ship’s crew members are classified as immigrants and proceed under the discretion of 
the ICA. 
In the case of a security breach, the response forces augment the port security 
personnel with the Singapore Police Force (SPF), Singapore Civil Defence (SCDF), PCG 
and RSN. In the premises of the port, the PSA’s security force would be the first 
responders. To initiate security response, multiple points of activation that range from 
personnel or the triggering of an alert by surveillance system are available. There is a 
recall management system that electronically mobilizes security force to the scene via 
their localized intercommunication system and even their mobile phone if they are 
outside the port area. Being the first responders, the security force of PSA would be 
mobilized to the scene. Assessment would be done to decide if any further activation of 
relevant authority and expertise is required. Once the threat is validated, methods and 
equipment used to neutralize the threat are evaluated. Guards armed with batons are 
taught engagement techniques. If the threats are armed, SPF would be involved in the 
engagement with firearms. If there is a chemical, biological, radiological or explosives 
threat, the SCDF will be activated as they are trained and specially equipped to handle 
such threat.   
Alternative 3 (Maximizing Response) 
This alternative explores the possibility of placing the emphasis on response 
capability, while meeting the minimum requirements in access control and deterrence. 
Response capability is the ability of the proposed system to neutralize the threat before it 
can cause any damage to the port facilities or other landmarks within the port.  Since the 
internal threat is primarily human-based, the response will be focused on how to 
neutralize the human threat most efficiently and effectively. Threat may be detected in 
the administrative area (offices), operational area (storage, loading/unloading, berths) and 
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perimeter of each terminal. The threat may be in the form of an intruder, authorized 
visitor (including trucker) or terminal employee. To achieve maximum response 
capability, it is necessary to monitor and neutralize on the threat swiftly and 
comprehensively during the response phase. The concept of operation requires the 
terminal to actively restrain the human threat while external agencies are activated. The 
terminal should be equipped to neutralize the threat to a limited extent, if necessary prior 
to the arrival of external agencies. This can be achieved by communication, mobilization, 
and neutralization. 
Upon detection and identification of a threat, a response function would be 
triggered to neutralize the threat within a minimum amount of time. Handheld radios 
would facilitate communications among the security personnel during the response 
action.  Alarm and public address systems would work in tandem to alert the terminal 
personnel to appropriately assist in the response either by deterring or actively pursuing 
and neutralizing the threat. Through the network of CCTVs installed throughout the 
terminal, the movement and action of the human threat can be monitored. In the near 
future, it is possible to broadcast a live picture showing the threat’s movement on 
monitors at strategic locations or broadcast to the security personnel via Personal Digital 
Assistants (PDAs), enabling the identification and isolation of the threat. Ideally, there 
would be more than one security command & control centers on the terminal (and even 
off-site) to provide redundancy.  In addition, one of the centers could be designated to 
track the current human threat, while the remaining centers can continue to search for 
other threats.  This will ensure that distraction tactics would not be successful. 
Internal security personnel would be stationed at strategic locations throughout 
the terminal, rather than at a centralized location. They would be equipped with bicycles 
to facilitate their movements and to carry their equipment, reducing their response time. 
In addition, training a portion of the terminal personnel should be considered to assist the 
established security forces. A sufficient number of trained pseudo-security personnel 
(similar to the watchmen in Port of Oakland) well dispersed throughout the terminal 
during normal operations would ensure a rapid response on human threats. External 
agencies would be called and the best response would be achieved if these agencies are 
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stationed in the port vicinity. Otherwise, the external agencies should patrol the port 
vicinity with sufficient frequency to provide first response prior to the main force. In 
addition, there would be some robust yet swift means of verifying the identities of the 
external agencies prior to entry. This could be as simple as an e-mail from the external 
agencies providing information on the key personnel that are dispatched. The e-mail 
would be accessible by the security personnel at the gate instantaneously. As a backup, 
direct numbers of external agencies should be listed at the guardhouse. This is to prevent 
the intentional tripping of the security system in the terminal to facilitate the entry of 
falsified personnel from external agencies.   
The security personnel within the terminal would be armed with non-lethal as 
well as lethal means to neutralize the human threat. The non-lethal means may include 
rubber bullets, tear gas and nets.  Pseudo-security personnel would assist to neutralize the 
human threat, and are not expected to physically restrain the threat. However, they may 
be equipped with tazers for self-protection. Physically, the terminal may be segregated 
into zones to facilitate ease of neutralization. The means of segregation are fences, walls, 
and gates. Upon alert, the gates could be closed automatically to limit the human threat to 
certain zones. The pseudo-security personnel may assist to prevent the human threat from 
scaling the fences. Guard dogs could prove effective at chasing human threats due to their 
speed, ability to sniff out their locations and psychological effect on the human threat.  
Hence, it is recommended to have guard dogs in the response plan. 
 
C. MODELING AND ANALYSIS 
1. Modeling Plan 
In modeling the internal personnel, we have introduced various models to model 
and simulate the design; in deterrence capability, data control and response.  
For deterrence capability we will use a mathematical model based on Mr. Robert 
Anthony’s analysis of the deterrence against the 9/11 terrorists was used [67]. For control 
access capability, the IPTG used a combination of models to analyze both the access 
control capability of information and personnel. For personnel, a probability based model 
was generated to analyze the ability of the access control alternatives to thwart internal 
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personnel smuggling in explosives, and the impact of the access control plan on the 
process flow of the port terminal operation.  
For data control, leveraging prior academics analytical works whereby a 
combination of a stochastic model to simulate the randomness of network intrusion 
occurrence [68] in conjunction with the Markov decision process to analyze the security 
of the IT infrastructure system was used [69].  Lastly, an agent-based model (i.e. MANA) 
was used to analyze the response capability with the focus on assessing the 
communication channel effectiveness of the coordination between port security officers 
and the local and federal agencies. 
Each model was designed to simulate a particular function of the IPTG’s system 
design. The link among all the models assessed two performance characteristics: the 
probability of catching internal personnel in the act of sabotage and the qualitative 
assessment of the probability of deterrence. The parameters and the outputs of the models 




Input Parameters MOEs Obtained 
Deter Excel 1.  Probability of apprehension 
2.  Severity of consequences for 
offenders 




Extend 1.  Probability of detection for 
various detection measures 
2.  Delay time associated with each 
detection measures  
1.  Probability of 
detection 
2.  Mean delay time 
3.  Cost of system 
Data Access Excel 1.  Probability of detection at 
various points of data access 
1.  Probability of 
detection 
2.  Cost of system 
Response MANA 1.  Quality of communications 
2.  Existence of internal fence 
1.  Probability of 
interdiction 
2.  Cost of system 
 
Table 76.  IPTG Model Input Parameters and Associated MOEs 
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2. Modeling Explanation 
a. Deterrence Model 
The basis of the deterrence model was the logical assessment that the 
terrorists who are engaged in a high-risk venture must constantly exercise caution.  Even 
suicide terrorists, who generally hope to conduct significant attacks, would most likely 
not carelessly or recklessly squander their lives on an attack that had little chance of 
success.  From Mr. Anthony’s 9-11 report, to accomplish the 9-11 attacks, the terrorists 
had to successfully perform nine sequential tasks from organize, plan, recruit, train, 
getting passport, learn to fly, board the planes, and to crash the planes while avoiding 
military aircraft interception.  At every step the terrorists had to asses their success rate 
and decide whether or not to proceed.  On the same token, every step also presents an 
opportunity for interception or detection of the terrorist plot to prevent it from continuing.  
The deterrence model examined this terrorist execution process qualitatively and 
quantitatively, explored the missed opportunities for deterrence, and assessed whether the 
behavior of the 9-11 terrorists suggested, even if momentarily, indicators of deterrence in 
their final decision to proceed. 
The model was formulated and calibrated with data from the Drug 
Enforcement Administration (DEA) narcotics interdiction operation in South America.  
The general deterrence relationship was described by the mathematical model shown 
below, 






 - the probability of thwarting crime
 - actual probability of being apprended
1  - the probability of not being apprehended
















 - the willingness to do the crimeIW P
 
For simplicity, it was assumed that the perceived of apprehension, PI*, was 
the same as the actual probability of apprehension, PI.  This assumption could be checked 
or modified as needed for specific situations. To calibrate the willingness factor, 
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empirical data collected from drug interdiction was used to extrapolate into factors for 
our own deterrence model.  From the interdiction data, it was found that the willingness 
function is an inverse power function that relates three general characteristics of the 
psychology of deterrence: 
For the low probabilities of apprehension, there was a minimum threshold 
below which perpetrators ignore the risks, but beyond which many were deterred. 
The initial threshold for deterrence was determined by the perpetrators’ 
perceptions of the consequences of getting caught, and those consequences were set by 
interdictors’ rules of engagement. 
There was also a residual fraction of perpetrators who were never deterred 
by the given consequence, and it equals the deterrence threshold probability. 












− ±⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
=
 
The exponential factor of -1.03 +/- 0.2 reflected the calibration factor of 
the consequence on psychological deterrence. The value of -0.83 (-1.03 + 0.2) indicated a 
low consequence of getting caught, i.e. material loss or an equivalent misdemeanor 
punishments, whereas the value of -1.23 (-1.03 – 0.2) indicates a high consequence of 
getting caught, i.e. loss of life or life imprisonment.   
To apply the mathematical model to assess the deterrence capabilities of 
various alternatives, the output of the model was dependent on three variables: 
interdiction probability, consequences and punishment of getting caught, and the 
threshold of deterrence. The interdiction probability was highly dependent on the 
personnel access control model.  The security placement and screening would play a 
pivotal role if internal personnel could be caught doing something detrimental to the port 
terminals. The probability of interdiction would be subjectively assessed based on 
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qualitative evaluation of the various personnel access control measures. The 
consequences factor would be assessed based on site specific data by applicable laws 
governed the ports, which was calibrated to reflect the MARSEC level. For example, if 
someone is caught by the CBP during MARSEC level III would be more harshly 
punished as opposed to someone caught by the port authority security officer during 
MARSEC level I. Lastly, the threshold of deterrence was a qualitative assessment of the 
baseline security infrastructure currently implemented by the port security. 
 
b. Physical Access Control Model 
The Physical Access Control Model was used to determine the probability 
of successful attempt by an internal threat whose objective was to bring explosives to a 
target of interest within the terminal without being detected. The additional delay induced 
in the flow of movements for other terminal workers due to various alternatives was also 
recorded. 
The model was separated into two parts:  gate access and unauthorized 
movement within the terminal.  In the gate access portion, the model simulated the arrival 
of 70 terminal workers including the internal threat who was carrying explosives.  All the 
workers had to enter the terminal through the turnstiles. This was modeled for the 
morning rush when everyone was arriving for work.  The flowchart in Figure 124 depicts 








Figure 124.  Gate Access Flowchart 
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All workers including the internal threat was required to enter the terminal 
through the turnstiles where they were subjected to various measures such as walk-
through metal detectors and bag scanners. 
In the unauthorized movement part, the model simulated the movement of 
the internal threat from the admin building towards the target of interest.  Along the way, 
the threat would encounter varying number of personnel who would question his 









Figure 125.  Unauthorized Movement Flowchart 
 
The internal threat would left its place of work in the Admin Building and 
walked towards the target of interest with the explosives.  The threat attempted to avoid 
various detection measures such as watchmen and security personnel. 
The underlying assumptions were as follows: 
• The internal threat would bring in the required explosives only on 
the day he intended to execute his plan. 
• The exact nature of the explosives was not modeled, but it was 
assumed to be detectable with certain probability. 
• Since the probability of detection for various measures could not 
be convincingly determined from open sources, the team attempted 
to give a reasonable figures to the various parameters associated 
with each detection measures. 
The distribution of arrival time for the 70 workers was assumed to have 
the form as shown in Figure 126.  The internal threat was assumed to consistently arrive 
around 0745 hrs at the gate, with the majority of workers to avoid being conspicuous.   
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Figure 126.  Distribution of Arrival at Gate 
 
Assuming the first worker arrived at 0700 hours, and the last worker at 
0810 hours.  The majority of the workers were expected to arrive between 0740 hours 
and 0810 hours.   
The key parameters for the model were the time taken for various 
activities and the probabilities of detection using the various means.  These are 




Table 77.  IPTG Model Activity Parameters 
  305
The model was simulated for 1,000 runs with each alternative.  The 
outputs from the modeling were as follows: 
• Probability of detecting the explosives carried by the internal 
threat. 
• Additional delay induced due to the various detection measures 
implemented. 
The MOE provided was the probability that the internal threat managed to 
bring explosives from outside the terminal and activated at his target of interest without 
being detected.  This is calculated from the model output as follows: 
 
Probability of success 
(by internal threat) =   1   – 
Probability of detection 
(by the terminal) 
 
The Physical Access Control Model was a queuing model using ExtendTM 
v6.0.2.  The parameters were hard-coded into the model prior to each run, and the outputs 
were read off and recorded.  Each alternative was simulated with 1,000 runs. 
 
c. Data Access Control Model 
The approach for modeling data access control was divided into two parts.  
The first part of the model was developed using a network representation of the system 
structure together with Markov models of intruder progress and strategies.  This model 
provided an explicit mechanism to estimate the probability of successful breaches of 
information infrastructure security as well as to evaluate potential improvements.  The 
second part of the model was based on a probabilistic decision tree that modeled the 
various components that were part of the infrastructure security. These two models 
combined to provide a more comprehensive view of the system robustness.    
In the first part of the data access model, a Markov decision process was 
constructed to model the intruder’s strategy at the system level, without carrying along all 
the details of each state of the process. 
At the system level, a network of barriers and movements for an insider 
trying to obtain sensitive information were represented using a set of nodes and arc, as 





Figure 127.  System Level Network 
 
In Figure 127, the nodes represent barriers that an intruder must penetrate, 
and arcs represent movements between barriers that an intruder can make within the 
system.  If an attempted penetration at a particular entry node is successful, they can 
traverse edges from the successfully breached node to other nodes in the network that are 
connected to the one breached, which entails a risk of detection. 
As an insider, the intruder must first gain access to the data through his 
own office, or he may attempt to directly go to the data center facility.  After physical 
access has been gained, he may attempt to gain access to the network through a client PC 
terminal, or directly go to the server if he is within the data center.  Network access 
entails negotiating the network security controls such as firewall and network intrusion 
detection systems, while direct server access requires the intruder to compromise the 
server security controls such as lock in the rack.  Once access has been gained, the 
intruder would need to gain access to the data by breaking the access control of the data.  
Once the data has been obtained, he would attempt to exit the facility without being 
detected. 
A set of input data on the probability of success and probability of 
detection for the various nodes and arcs give rise to the solution for the intruder strategy 
as summarized in Figure 128. To the left of each node is the probability of a successful 
attack’, given that the intruder is arriving at that barrier.  To the right of each node is the 
probability of success, given that the intruder had successfully negotiated that barrier.   
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Figure 128.  Summary of Intruder Strategy and Probability of Success 
 
Figure 128 established the base-case for the system.  With the base-case, a 
series analysis can be performed by varying the various inputs to the network to examine 
the impact of potential changes to improve security.  For example, attempts could be 
made to reduce the probability of a successful attack on highly sensitive servers by 
housing them in separately secured rooms with an additional CCTV system.  The impact 
of such additional security features on the overall probability of success could be 
investigated.   
In the modeling of the various alternatives, parameters of the various 
nodes and arcs have been varied to investigate the various differing levels of security 
applied to the port environment. 
The objective of the second part of the data access model was to facilitate 
the understanding of the key components in the design alternatives for Personnel Access 
Control.  Particularly, in the analysis of data information access by personnel, the key 
components were physical security, training, encryption, backup system plan, 
authorization mechanism and network security. 
The model sought to use probabilistic theory to statistically model a 
relationship between the design of the key components and their aggregated effect 
towards an effective implementation of the design.  A simple way to look at the model 
was to use Game Theory (from the perspective of the threat): a mathematical and 
economical analysis to decide the decision path. From the implementer point of view, it 
was a layered defense in information assurance.  Basically, the analysis started with the 
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nature of traffic in the design i.e. an insider threat with a probability of success associate 
with each key component in placed by the design. Each key component was represented 
by a node that characterizes the probability of successful entry by the traffic (insider 
personnel).  For example in the diagram below, an insider has a 0.2 probability of 
accessing a data center access compared to a (1-0.2) = 0.8 probability of logging thru an 
office network and hack through the system to retrieve the desire data. Figure 129 depicts 




Figure 129.  Probabilistic Data Access Model 
 
The decision on the design alternatives were based on the state (intrusion 
with signal or no signal) derived from results using Bayes rule as illustrated in Figure 
130. However, it should be noted that at this stage the model did not try to accurate 
pinpoint the probability of success an intruder based on the probability of success (or 
capture) by each key component (defense layer).  On the other perspective, the results 





Figure 130.   Bayes Rule 
 
Lastly, the model used random distribution to simulate the randomization 
attempts by an insider intruder via the threat path to determine the average probability of 
success in the design model. 
Markov Model - Minimum Design Scenario for the Port of Oakland 
In modeling the insider threat, a set of input data on probability of success 
and probability of detection of the various nodes and arcs was needed to determine the 
overall probability of success. Table 78 shows the node data used for the analysis and 
Table 79 shows the probabilities of detection used for the arcs in Figure 129.  The values 
are hypothetical, with the aim of illustrating the relative importance and relation to each 
other values within the network.  In practice, these input values would likely be a mixture 
of estimates based on specific elements of the targeted system. 
 
Node Prob of Success Prob of Detection 
Office Access 0.90 0.10 
Data Center Access 0.70 0.30 
Network Access thru PC 0.60 0.40 
Network Security Controls 0.60 0.40 
Server Security Controls 0.60 0.40 
Data Access 0.80 0.20 
Undetected Exit 0.90 0.10 
 
Table 78.  Data for Network Nodes (Minimum Scenario) 
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Arc Prob of Detection 
Office Access - NW Access thru PC 0.10 
Data Center Access - NW Access thru PC 0.30 
Data Center Access - Server Security 0.30 
NW Access thru PC - NW Security 0.20 
NW Security - Data Access 0.20 
Server Security - Data Access 0.00 
Data Access - Undetected Exit 0.40 
 
Table 79.  Probabilities of Detection for Possible Move (Minimum Scenario) 
 
With this set of data, it is shown that the probability of success for 
intrusion through normal access is 0.08 compared to a probability of success of 0.13 for 
intrusion through gaining access to data center.  Hence, an intruder with insider 
information would choose to intrude through the data center, and this scenario would give 
an upper bound to the probability of success with the input data considered.  
To explore the effect of varying the various controls of the nodes, a “what-
if” analysis could be conducted, i.e. what if more server security controls are put in place.  
The next part of the report attempts to descript the scenario with maximum data access 
control to illustrate the point. Figure 131 depicts the probably of success for the minimum 
scenario. 
 
































Figure 131.  Probability of Success for Minimum Scenario 
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Markov Model - Maximum Design Scenario for the Port of Singapore 
In the maximum design scenario, it is assumed that mechanisms have been 
placed to reduce the probability of success of all the nodes as well as to increase the 
probability of transversing the nodes.  Table 80 shows the node data used for the analysis 
and Table 81 shows the probabilities of detection used for the arcs. 
 
Node Prob of Success Prob of Detection 
Office Access 0.90 0.10 
Data Center Access 0.60 0.40 
Network Access thru PC 0.50 0.50 
Network Security Controls 0.50 0.50 
Server Security Controls 0.50 0.50 
Data Access 0.70 0.30 
Undetected Exit 0.80 0.20 
 
Table 80.  Data for Network Nodes (Maximum Scenario) 
 
Arc Prob of Detection 
Office Access - NW Access thru PC 0.15 
Data Center Access - NW Access thru PC 0.35 
Data Center Access - Server Security 0.35 
NW Access thru PC - NW Security 0.25 
NW Security - Data Access 0.25 
Server Security - Data Access 0.00 
Data Mining - Undetected Exit 0.45 
 
Table 81.  Probabilities of Detection for Possible Moves (Maximum Scenario) 
 
The resultant probabilities of success are shown in Figure 132.  It can be 
seen that by tightening all the controls of the nodes and arcs, the probabilities of success 
can be significantly reduced to 0.03 for office access and 0.06 for data center access.   
 
  312
































Figure 132.  Probability of Success for Maximum Scenario 
 
Markov Model – Other Design Scenarios 
The Markov decision process allows the modeling of any other design 
scenario by performing a “what-if” analysis on the various nodes and arcs.  The effect of 
varying the control mechanism within a node or arc on the overall probability of success 
of intruding into the system can then be studied.  For example, it may be desirable to 
tighten the server physical security mechanism by requiring all works done on the server 
to be escorted by a system administrator.  This would serve to reduce the probability of 
success at the server security node, thereby decreasing the overall rate of success of 
intruding through data center access.  A numeric example is not given here, as there are 
numerous possibilities that one can explore given the user specific set of operating 
environment.   
Probabilistic Model – Minimum Design Scenario for the Port of Oakland 
The parameters considered are as follows: 
• Physical security of servers 
• Network security 
• Access authentication & authorization (One FA authentication) 
• Backup data 





Access Personnel P(office) 0.8
    
P(Data 
Center) 0.2
        
Physical Access P(Phy) 0.7
        
IS Components P(FA) 0.4
    P(FireW) 0.7
    P(IDS) 0.6
 
Table 82.  Input Parameter for Minimum Scenario 
 
With the above parameters, the results are generated using the 
probabilistic data access model. In the minimum design scenario, the parameter value 
was extracted from internet research (www.secunia.com) on overall effectiveness of each 
typical components of security infrastructure based on market survey. Key assumption 
made here was the holistic effectiveness of an basic authentication system with One 
Factor Authentication of 0.4 value.  The results of the simulation are as shown in Table 
83. 
 
Data Center Access     
P(intrusion/no signal)   0.00432 
P(intrusion/signal)   0.00648 
    
Office Access     
P(intrusion/no signal)   0.32 
P(intrusion/signal)   0.48 
Results        
Avg P(Success) 1FA(0.4) 0.216877 
   
 
Table 83.  Results for Minimum Scenario Simulation 
 
The results have shown that: 
• The layers of implementation of physical security, factor 
authentication and network security control greatly reduced the 
probability of intrusion. (Comparing data centre access and office 
access). 
• The insider threat through office access is a good chance (32 
percent) of intruding and going undetected. On the hand, 48 
percent will be detected. 
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Probabilistic Model - Maximum Design Scenario for the Port of Singapore 
The parameters considered are as follows: 
• Physical security of servers (Biometric) 
• Network security 
• Cryptography (SSL & PKI) 
• Access authentication & authorization (2 FA authentication) 
• Backup data 
The input parameters for the maximum design scenario are specified in 
Table 84. 
Access Personnel P(office) 0.9
    P(Data Center) 0.2
        
Physical Access P(Phy) 0.7
        
IS Components P(FA) 0.6
    P(FireW) 0.7
    P(IDS) 0.8
 
Table 84.  Input Parameters for Maximum Design Scenario 
 
In this scenario, the design template increases the physical security access, 
network security and intrusion detection security components. This results in having a 
higher probability of detection in both the Access control and Information Security 
components sections.  The results of the simulation are shown in Table 85. 
 
Data Center Access     
P(intrusion/no signal)   0.00072 
P(intrusion/signal)   0.00288 
    
Office Access     
P(intrusion/no signal)   0.18 
P(intrusion/signal)   0.72 
Results        
Avg P(Success) 1FA(0.6) 0.111649 
 
Table 85.  Results of Maximum Scenario Simulation 
 
The maximum design scenario tightens the overall implementation 
effectively. The results have shown that the detection capability have almost doubled, 
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which means that this aspect of the concept of layer defense has a high effectiveness.  In 
simulating a multiple randomization of intruder, the average success for an insider threat 
is approximately 11 percent. 
 
d. Response Model 
The Response Model was an agent-based, Map Aware Non-uniform 
Automata (MANA) version 3.2.1.  The parameters were hard-coded into the model prior 
to each run, and the outputs were stored in excel.  Each alternative was simulated with 
100 runs. The response model was used to determine the probability of that an internal 
threat who successfully penetrated the access control measures could reach the desired 
target.  The Response Model will reflect the ability of the personnel stationed within the 
Port Terminal to prevent the perpetrator from reaching the target once the access control 
plan produces a signal.  Due to the force-on-force nature of the response plan, MANA 
was the software chosen to best model the response capabilities.  
The response model is dependent on the infrastructure and trigger points 
of the Access Control phase.  Therefore there are multiple scenarios that must be created 
in MANA in order to fully analyze the alternatives.  There will be eight independent 
scenarios ran in MANA:  1) Baseline, 2) Improved Communications, 3) Mid-terminal 
fence with perpetrator starting at main entrance gate, 4) Mid-terminal fence with 
perpetrator starting at main entrance gate with improved Communications, 5) Mid-
terminal fence with perpetrator starting at main entrance gates and mid-terminal gates 
triggered shut, 6) Mid-terminal fence with perpetrator starting at main entrance gates and 
mid-terminal gates triggered shut with improved communications, 7) Mid-Terminal fence 
with perpetrator starting at mid-terminal gate, and 8) Mid-Terminal fence with 
perpetrator starting at mid-terminal gate with improved communications. 
The underlying assumptions were as follows: 
• The internal threat would proceed directly from point of successful 
access control breach to the critical target. 
• Due to the relatively short amount of time required to traverse the 
terminal, outside personnel would not arrive in time to prevent the 
perpetrator from reaching target.  Therefore, they are not included 
in the model. 
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The terminal map was taken directly from the highest resolution image 
available on Google Earth. This was map was then simplified using color schemes 
allowed by MANA for denoting terrain. Table 86 denotes how terrain was modeled: 
 
Real Port Items MANA Color Represented in MANA as: 
Pavement/ Concrete Yellow Roads 
Containers, Equipment, Terminal 
boundaries, Building walls 
Grey Walls 
Building interiors, and area 
underneath cranes 
Light Green Light Brush 
Interior Fence Dark Green Dense Bush 
 
Table 86.  Response Terrain Model Description 
 
The key parameters for the model are the attributes used to model 
communication.  Also, there were other attributes that are significant enough to note.  
The attributes and how they were modeled are listed in Table 87. 
 
Real Attributes Modeled in MANA as: 
Baseline Communication All agents appear on matrix. 
Inorganic SA Range set to 50 m 
Improved Communication  All agents appear on matrix. 
Inorganic SA Range set to 1000 m 
Federal Agents- Weapon: Gun Range to Shooter: 200 m  Hit Rate: 0.3 
Range to Shooter: 10 m   Hit Rate: 0.8 
Range to Shooter: 1 m    Hit Rate: 1.0 
Note: Interpolation enabled 
Note: Can’t fire through walls or hills selected 
Guards, Watchmen, Perpetrator- 
Weapon: Unarmed (fists) 
Range to Shooter: 1 m    Hit Rate: 1.0 
Perpetrator’s path to target Waypoints used 
 
Table 87.  MANA Model Attributes 
 
The model was simulated for 100 runs with each alternative.  The outputs 
from the modeling were the probability of successfully interdicting the perpetrator before 
target reached. 
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The MOE provided was the probability that the internal threat managed to 
bring explosives from outside the terminal and activated at his target of interest without 
being successfully interdicted.  This is calculated from the model through MANA’s Excel 
output. 
 
3. Modeling Results and Analysis 
There were two threat scenarios that the IPTG analyzed: an employee smuggling 
in explosives to cause physical damage to the ports and an employee extracting vital port 
operation or security data to be used against the port.   
Four complimentary models were generated to aid in validating solutions to each 
scenario.  For the first scenario, where personnel attempt to smuggle and/or detonate an 
explosive in the port, an EXTEND model was created.  This model was used to simulate 
a port employee in the process of entering the port terminal just before the 
commencement of regular working hours.  Various alternatives were analyzed to 
determine the effectiveness of each in catching an employee in an attempt to smuggle 
explosives.  Using the Port of Oakland as the status quo, turnstiles requiring ID badges 
for access and guards monitoring the process were simulated.  The same model was used 
to simulate other alternatives improving the probability of capturing the employee in the 
act of smuggling.  The two additional physical access control options analyzed were: the 
inclusion of metal detectors in conjunction with random search procedures similar to the 
process TSA use with air transportation and having guards specifically trained in 
identifying suspicious activities.  Different alternatives with various mixes of the two 
options previously mentioned were analyzed.  The composite layout with all the options 
implemented is illustrated in Figure 133.  For nomenclature, we referred to the alternative 




Figure 133.  Physical Access Control EXTEND Model 
 
Given the conditions described previously, the expected results of the EXTEND 
model were that the personnel would be detected at the terminal entrance point.  
However, to analyze the port terminal’s layered defense, an agent based model was 
created using MANA to simulate the response plan in the event that the perpetrator 
managed to get the explosive through the entrance point, but not before the guard 
activates the port terminal’s alarm.  The perpetrator would attempt to continue the 
mission by running for the designated critical target such as a crane on offloading 
radioactive medical supplies from a ship docked at the pier.  In this analysis, the 
alternatives that were analyzed were the effectiveness of the port security internal 
communication system among the guards, watchmen, and the CBP as they consolidated 
their efforts in stopping the personnel from reaching his objective.  In addition, the 
effectiveness of installing a fence between the container storage area and the loading/off-
loading cargo area, which will limit and restrict access within the terminal operational 
area, was analyzed.  The fence had three access openings to allow for people and cargo to 
move from the operational to the storage area illustrated in Figure 134.  At each opening 
of the fence, there was a guard positioned to check ID and verify access clearances.  An 
optional alternative was to explore the effectiveness of having the fence gates opened or 
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closed during alarm the conditions.  For modeling the closed condition, if detection 
occurred at the terminal entrance, then the gates to the mid-terminal fence would be 
activated to close.  The intent was to stop or retard the rogue personnel from reaching his 




Figure 134.  MANA Model with Internal Fence 
 





Figure 135.  MANA Model Denoting Communication Links 
 
For the data access control model, an EXCEL spreadsheet was used to model the 
process the rogue employee must use to gain access to critical unauthorized data.  The 
focus for the EXCEL model was to assess the effectiveness of the physical security of the 
computer servers containing the data, and assess the effectiveness of deploying a two-





Figure 136.  EXCEL model of Data Access Control System 
 
The results of the EXTEND physical access model is tabulated in the Table 88.   
 
 
Table 88.  EXTEND Model Results 
 
The results that were obtained from the MANA model of the response tended to 




Table 89.  MANA Raw Data Matrix 
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Every improvement feature and combination of such features yielded significant 
gains over the baseline scenario.  The presence of the mid-terminal fence with an open 
gate policy provided the largest single factor improvement of 97 percent over the baseline 
status quo.  The combination of improved communications, mid-terminal fence, and a 
triggered-shut gate policy yielded the highest probability of successful response with a 
172 percent improvement over the baseline.   
It is important to note, however, that the probabilities listed above are dependent 
on a detection signal being produced by some aspect of the access control plan.  
Accordingly, the probabilities are only for responding to the threat once the threat is 
identified.  Additionally, because of this, the mid-terminal gate starting point data can not 
be compared to the rest of the response plan results and were modeled only to combine 
with physical access data for a more complete analysis.   
There was one apparent anomaly in the MANA response model.  The scenario 
consisting of a fence with the gate triggered shut paired with poor communications 
actually produced a probability of successful interdiction lower than if the gate were kept 
open.  This does not seem to make logical sense as the closed gate should make it 
sufficiently difficult for the perpetrator to pass which enables the responders to 
successfully interdict.  However, it was not possible to correctly model the fence in 
MANA.  This was primarily due to the fact that the value of terrain hindrance had to be 
spread over a thickness much greater than the thickness of a fence to achieve the same 
level of impenetrability as a fence.  This affected the results as the responders had to 
travel through the fence to get to the perpetrator from both sides and through some 
meaningful thickness.  Also, if the perpetrator were to cut his way through the fence, the 
responders would be able to use the same hole.  In MANA, it was not possible to model 
this.  There could be no easier path through the fence for the responders.  Essentially the 
responders would then have to cut through the fence again.  This same anomaly was not 
apparent with the good communications model as the responders were able to reach the 
perpetrator with great numbers and in shorter amounts of time, reducing this effect.   
A final conclusion as to the effectiveness of any single improvement or 
combination of improvements cannot be based on the MANA results alone because of the 
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inherent dependence relationship with the physical access control plan.  Accordingly, a 
more useful and thorough analysis is presented as part of the whole model analysis. 
Due to the very high probability of successful interdiction that the baseline data 
access model produced, it is more useful to discuss the results obtained via the physical 
access and response models.  Additionally, separating the data access allows for useful 
analysis and conclusions to be drawn from scenarios that do not require data access, 
which may be considered more probable.  The baseline which models the current 
facilities and procedures at the Port of Oakland produced only a twelve percent chance of 
successfully detecting and interdicting a perpetrator attempting to enter and traverse the 
terminal.  By implementing the same items listed in the complete model conclusions 
without the data access control model being considered, the successful detection and 
interdiction percentage increased from twelve percent to just over sixty-five percent (a 
441 percent improvement).  These results are somewhat masked when analyzed in the 




Table 90.  Combined Physical Access & Response Model Results 
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Consequently, the resulting interdiction probability of capturing the perpetrator in 
the act of committing terrorism fed the mathematical deterrence model which gave 
theoretical values for psychological deterrence.  The resulting probabilities of deterrence 




Table 91.  Psychological Deterrence of Implementing Access Control Measure 
 
Our overall model, which combined the data access control model, physical 
access control model, and response model, produced results consistent with expectations.  
That is, each item that was expected to improve the security of the terminal actually did.  
Thus the conclusion was that the terminal should implement 1) two factor authentication 
for computer network access 2) improved communications for all guards, watchmen, and 
customs agents, 3) build a mid-terminal fence with gates that can be remotely shut, 4) 
provide additional training to guards/ watchmen, and 5) install metal detectors and bag 
scanners.  By implementing the above items a thirteen percent increase was realized in 
successful interdiction rates over the baseline. 
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 The probability of detection of the combined security features are listed in Table 
92 below.  Note the underlying assumption is that the perpetrators need to access critical 
network data prior to execution, and the results have shown that network data intrusion 




Table 92.  Combined Total Probability Detection 
 
The findings summarized that both the physical access control and response 
section generated a very low probability of capturing the intruder compared to the data 
access control section.  Based on the results of the EXTEND model, it is recommended 
that to enhance the deterrence and physical control factors, metal detection gates and 
trained guards should be emphasized.  As for the response section, the simulated MANA 
models suggested that an improved communication system will increase the guards’ 
watchmen’s collaborative efforts and resulted in greater effectiveness in responding to a 
security breach.  The analysis resulting from the statistical model of data access control 
depicted the criticality of controlling information access to thwart (or reduce the 
probability of a successful attempt by an intruder) while maintaining adequate 
information assurance.  The combination of the three models illustrated the concept and 
effectiveness of a defense-in-depth approach to port security for internal personnel access 
control –complimenting the three stages of the protection design; deterrence, physical and 
data access and lastly the response, will greatly enhance the effectiveness of the 
protection solution. 
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The modeling showed that the effects of implementing Two Factor Authentication 
(2FA) increased the security of data access by an additional 10 percent. A Two Factor 
Authentication system typically is composed of a smart card or token in combination 
with the traditional login-password system. Security analysts from the industry found that 
the traditional login-password system is weak and prone to dictionary attacks or even 
clever guess attacks. Therefore, with the implementation of 2FA systems, it is made more 
difficult with close possession of the smart card or token. 
The other key point is the importance of good physical access control in 
information systems. It is the first and most important defense layer of the defense-in-
depth concept. Modeling has also shown the deterrence probability with the 
implementation of this concept. Each layer introduced will reduced the probability of a 
successful penetration into the information system. Hence, it is recommended that the 
2FA system should be implemented together with the concept of layers defense. 
 
4. Cost Estimation 
For cost analysis, an assumption was made that the security system would be 
installed and have an operating life cycle for 10 years, after which the depreciated value 
of the system will be fully depleted.  All costs are depicted in CY 2007 U.S. Dollars.   
For the data access control implementation of two factor authentication, a 
keyboard with ID badge reader would be required at the cost of $100 per keyboard.  
Using Hanjin terminal of Oakland as a basis of our estimate with 20 administrative 
personnel, the resulting total purchasing cost is $2000.  In addition, modification to the 
port existing networks servers would also be required to allow for screening personnel, 
along with establishing network firewalls.  For simplicity, IPTG assumed that the 
terminal operators would contract out the tasks of upkeep and support of the networks 
security system at the cost which was estimated to be a full time job for one Information 
Technology (IT) personnel.  Consequently, the average hourly standard loaded wage rate 
for contracted IT personnel is $37 per hour, the annual operating cost for maintaining a 
network security will be approximately $74,000.   
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The component cost for implementing the physical security access control 
measures are broken down as follows: 
Untrained Guard with Random Handheld Metal Detector Search  
The cost of hand-held metal detector is $1000 and the guard at the turnstile 
requires one hand held metal detector. There are no O&S costing related to this metal 
detector as it assume to have one year warranty and the highest cost associated with this 
option would be to buy one detector a year after the warranty period.  
The total cost for this option would be $1000 x 10 year = $10K. 
Trained Guard 
There are seven existing guards in the terminal and their hourly wage is 
approximately $50.  For a security training package of one week, it would cost $50 x 8 
hr/ day x 5 days x 7 guards = $14 K in man-hour. Hiring one trainer for one week would 
cost $6K. 
The total cost for this option would be ($14K + $6K ) x 10 year = $200K 
Maximum Access  
The metal detector gate and the bag scanner would cost $150K with an O&S cost 
of $15K per year. It is assumed that after 5 year, the metal detector gate and the bag 
scanner would be replaced.  
The total cost for this option would be $150K +$150K + ($15K x 10 year) = 
$450K. 
Fence with gate and guard 
The cost of procuring and installing a fence was assumed to be $100 per yard and 
700 yard would be required, hence $70K would be required for fencing. There will be 
three access control points with automatic gate that cost $10K each with an O&S cost of 
$3K a year.  The total cost of the gates would be (3 x $10K) + ($3K x 10 year) = $60K.  
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It is assumed that three additional guards would be required to man the three 
gates. The cost of guard is $100K per year. Over ten year, they would cost $300 x 10 year 
= $3000K. 
The total cost of this option would be $70K + $60K + $3000K = $3130K. 
Installing the fence along with the guards to implement the physical access 
control would also benefit the response plan.  However, to fully deploy our response plan 
would also require upgrading the existing walkie-talkie with its range and capability 
limitations to a hot microphone system similar to those used by the personnel security 
professionals and SWAT teams, which priced to $3000 per unit.  The total number of 
units required was estimated to be 24 which also include spares and replacement costs for 
a 10 year operating cycle.  Therefore, the total cost for implementing communication 
improvement will be $72K. 
 
5. Cost Benefits Analysis 
The cost analysis can be traced to the threats scenarios of either data access or 
physical access.  The cost of implementing the data access is linear to its benefit, the 
benefits of spending $742K in network security results in a 12.7 percent improvement in 
probability of detection.   
However, for physical access control and the linked response plan, there are 
multiple factors to examine. Given the costs required to implement various security 
alternatives that we analyzed, the cost benefit analysis was done to determine the cost 
efficiency of various alternatives that was modeled previously.  The results are plotted in 
Figure 137.  The shape of the graph highlights the correlation of increased performance 
(Probability of interdiction) with increasing cost. On the lower left corner, it shows the 
cost and the performance of the current existing system - $0 cost with performance ~ 
0.121. On the other spectrum, it reflects the theoretical maximum probability of 
interdiction of ~ 0.65 at the cost of nearly $3.8 million over a ten year period.  In terms of 
cost benefit, this represents a performance gain of 441 percent for a cost of $4 million.  
However, if cost is an independent variable that needs to be minimized, then the most 
insightful point on the graph is the mid-point dip, with the corresponding performance of 
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0.356 and at a cost of $732K.  Similarly, this result illustrates the performance gain of 
194 percent for an increase of $732K, a more cost efficient solution compared to the 
theoretical maximum performance solution.       
 
 
Figure 137.  Cost Comparison of All Alternatives Analyzed 
 
In addition to the economic cost of the alternatives, other intangible costs of 
implementing the proposed solutions are also analyzed. Specifically, the primary question 
of minimizing operational impact was examined via the EXTEND model. Using queuing 
theory analysis, delay time and queue length were analyzed and the results are presented 
in Figure 138. The EXTEND model examined two arrival times that would be submitted 
to the access control process; in the morning when the workers arrived for the day, and 
when the workers are returning from lunch. It was determined that the morning rush hour 
was more critical due to the high density of workers arriving in a short period of time.  
Nevertheless, the model showed that even for the most stringent security implementation 
of scanning and random searches would only add at most approximately two minutes to 
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the required time for employee check in, as compared to the 15 seconds that is currently 
























VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. TERRESTRIAL THREATS GROUP 
1. Conclusions and Recommendations 
After the completion of this study, the TTG reached several conclusions. The 
TTG first noted that perimeter security requirements differ significantly among ports. The 
likelihood of an attack is a function of geography, potential economic impact, and 
potential political ramifications. Stakeholders need to determine if their port facilities 
require improvements in their perimeter and gate security to ensure adequate protection.   
The TTG concluded that it is useless for a port to harden its gates without first 
hardening its perimeter fencing. This conclusion is consistent with United States Coast 
Guard’s recommendations as outlined in the June 2005 Port Security Assessment Best 
Practices Bulletin [41]. Based on the TTG’s cost estimations, the TTG recommends that 
the port should attach steel reinforced concrete blocks to the base of its preexisting chain 
link fencing to harden its fences. Implementing concrete blocks would likely have the 
same effectiveness of implementing a concrete or brick fence but at one twentieth the 
cost. 
After hardening the fencing, the TTG recommends implementing a gate security 
barrier to stop unauthorized vehicles from entering the terminal. Based on the results of 
the TTG’s modeling, simulation, and cost benefit analysis, the TTG recommends that the 
terminal implement either spike strips or pop-up barriers but not an armed guard. The 
implementation of spikes strips costs approximately one-half the cost of implementing 
pop-up barriers, but provides only one-half the performance. An armed guard should not 
be implemented because its costs are greater and performance is less than that of spike 
strips. For optimal performance, the TTG recommends that the port terminal implement 
pop-up barriers with a set of staggered concrete blocks just before the barrier with a 
distance of 300 feet or more between the guard house and the pop-up barriers. 
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2. Areas of Future Study 
The TTG recommends that further study be conducted in the areas of gate 
security and container screening. Further study would be useful in determining 
effectiveness and impact on commerce as a result of increased screening at the gate for 
inbound trucks. This study would help stakeholders determine if they should implement 
additional measures at the truck screening gate. The TTG also recommends that further 
work be conducted to determine effectiveness and impact on commerce that would result 
from implementing various types of additional screening from imported containers. Work 
is currently being done in this area at a classified level by Sandia National Laboratories. 
 
B. REGIONAL SEABORNE THREATS GROUP 
1. Conclusions and Recommendations 
The RSTG discovered that a layered defense is required in the San Francisco Bay 
to provide security for the Port of Oakland. The present system is inadequate to support 
port security in a post 9/11 environment. The RSTG recommends:  
• Current Configuration 
• USV 
• Two X-Band Radar Stations 
• Two Thermal Vision Sentry II 
The solution that maximizes effectiveness, while minimizing cost is: 
• Current Configuration 
• USV 
• Two X-Band Radar Stations 
The effective solution that minimized cost was not chosen because the utility of 
Thermal Vision Sentry II EO sensors was deemed valuable. The removal or replacement 
of USVs is a means to reduce cost; however, the RSTG believes that the role of the USV 
is important and should remain to provide a technological advantage against the threat.  
Overall, the cost of detecting a terrorist threat is a small fraction of the total cost 
associated with psychological and reconstruction costs, which could result from a 
successful terrorist attack. The decision is the stakeholder’s who have the option of 
appropriating more money or opting for a less expensive system configuration.   
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In addition to a layered defense of sensors, a data fusion center in which the 
sensor inputs are received and disseminated to the appropriate authorities is needed. In 
the case of the Port of Oakland, this data fusion center could be located on Yerba Buena 
Island where there already exists a VTS facility. Another option is Coast Guard Island 
where the COP may be relayed to the FSO/PSO at the Port of Oakland’s premises. This 
would provide an increased situational awareness which is the key to port security.   
Current commercial market systems designed for detecting, tracking, maintaining, 
and engaging potential terrorist threats can accommodate the sensor and data fusion 
requirements. Examples of these are: Northrop Grumman’s “Hawkeye,” Raytheon’s 
“Project Athena,” and L3’s “HarborGuard.” Attached in Appendix J is a test and 
evaluation test plan that PSS12 constructed for the HarborGuard system.   
The ability to have an open architecture sensor infrastructure is also an extremely 
important aspect to consider. The implementation of USV, X-band radar, and EO sensor 
capabilities increases awareness of a terrorist threat and provides a better chance of 
prevention. 
 
2. Areas of Future Study 
There still remain unresolved questions that can be examined for future studies.  
The time constraint prevented the RSTG from addressing all regional threats issues 
related to port security. The RSTG determined other threats in needs analysis, which 
were not analyzed. Engagement was another aspect which RSTG did not determine. This 
aspect would consider the distance at which the threat is discovered and the range needed 
for engagement. With respect to sensors, the RSTG did not look into a single sensor 
capable of monitoring multiple small crafts. Overall, the RSTG addressed only a portion 
of the many facets in dealing with port security against local waterborne threats, opening 
many areas for future consideration.  
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C. SOURCE SEABORNE THREATS GROUP 
1. Conclusions and Recommendations 
The continued joint development of policies to police port security at source ports 
by world leaders is crucial in the ability to provide safe passage of commerce in the 
global market. The incorporation of new smart containers, protocol, sensor, and container 
handling technology into port facilities is an ongoing process that will demand an 
enormous amount of world resources to implement effectively.   
Accurate active scanning equipment to quickly analyze the contents of a container 
and to determine a threat level associated with that container is an area of study that will 
demand continual rapid development to increase the security of our ports, ships, and 
commerce. Fixed and portable scanning equipment that has a high accuracy and low false 
alarm rated will be required. Reliable, accurate, and cost effective sensors to monitor 
containers in transit will reduce the amount of time and resources needed to re-inspect 
containers that have already been inspected at source ports.  
The ability of a port that handles high volumes of containers, through the 
transshipment process, railway, or vehicles, is limited by time, money, and technological 
constraints to provide a 100 percent safe guarantee that all containers passing through its 
ports are free of undesired cargoes. The work by the SSTG revealed that a higher 
probability of detection will come at a cost of higher false alarm rates and therefore will 
pose a penalty to the productivity of the port measured in its ability to handle containers.  
The most technologically advanced sensors with a high probability of detection and a low 
false rate will still generate a significant number of false alarms every day in a port that 
handles millions of containers per year.  The amount of time and money that is required 
to handle all of these false alarms and to also inspect the randomly targeted containers is 
a large drain on the port resources.  The SSTG Extend model flexibility allows different 
type of ports and sensor configurations to be represented. The port that the SSTG 
modeled was a port with high container volume with 95 percent of that volume being 
generated through transshipment. The alternative that provided the best solution for our 
MOPs independent of weighting levels for each MOP was the high performance solution.  
Therefore, the SSTG recommendation for a port with high transshipment volume is to at 
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a minimum pursue the best crane spreader sensor technology, so that all of the containers 
can be loaded onto outgoing ships while having the contents scanned simultaneously for 
undesired cargoes.  In addition, the number of inspection teams located at each port needs 
to be sufficient in size to handle the large volume of containers that will need to be 
inspected due to false alarms and randomly targeted inspection. The type of sensors, 
training, and efficient use of port facilities will be instrumental in minimizing the amount 
of time to inspect and handle containers that need to be inspected is critical in minimizing 
the disruptions to port operations and commerce. The inspection teams cannot be 
overlooked as our model demonstrated that the ability to inspect containers effectively 
and efficiently is a chokepoint in productivity. 
 
2. Areas of Future Study 
The SSTG developed several scenarios in earlier sections of this report that were 
not explored due to the time constraint involved with the generation of this report. The 
rapid development of new and existing technologies provides a breeding ground for the 
terrorists to explore new avenues of targeting their enemies. Unmanned aerial vehicles 
are an example of new technology that has become increasingly available to a wider 
sector of the world market. Private businesses can mass produce the technology and make 
it affordable and accessible to main stream terrorists. A feasibility study or analysis of a 
terrorist attack by an UAV, either by plane or helicopter, on a cargo ship in transit needs 
to be undertaken. In addition, new methods, procedures, and technology studies need to 
be considered to enhance ATS ability to identify containers that are possible threats. 
The vulnerability of the transshipment process is an area of port security that has 
not been fully studied or addressed. The port of Singapore is the world’s busiest port 
handling in excess of 23 million TEUs annually and over 90 percent of the containers 
handled are through the transshipment process. Areas of further study would include how 
a port can effectively handle containers coming from a non-secure port with minimal 
facilities, procedures, and equipment to identify undesired cargo into a known secure port 
that delivers cargo all over the world. 
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The co-location of commercial shipping hubs with military installations in 
densely populated areas pose a considerable threat to the economic and defense 
capabilities of cities and civilian populations located in those areas.  The port of Norfolk, 
which is the 3rd busiest seaport on the east coast of the United States, is representative of 
such a location.  The world’s largest navy base is co-located with a busy seaport and local 
shipyards in a densely populated area.  The sinking of a large cargo ship over the 
Hampton Roads Bridge Tunnel during Christmas time when there are four Nimitz class 
carriers in port with two other carriers in Newport News Shipyard would be disastrous.  
The economic impact coupled with the inability to move the countries most valuable 
Navy assets out of port could be an area of study that needs to be addressed.  
The SSTG developed and used an Extend model to draw conclusions on the 
probability of detection of containers with undesired cargo.  The model could be greatly 
enhanced by studies in how to effectively model real world sensors and the interaction 
between multiple sensors.  The addition of a highly realistic sensor bank could increase 
the credibility of the studies already completed. In addition, the study in how port 
facilities are built to yield enormous gains in productivity and efficiency if the facility 
was designed with a focus on workflow processes, security and safety needs, and setup 
that could reduce the amount of time that inspection teams would need to inspect suspect 
containers, and to maximize the number of containers that could be handled per day with 
minimal resources. 
 
D. INTERNAL PERSONNEL THREATS GROUP 
1. Conclusions and Recommendations 
The analysis showed that there was a performance benefit to every security option 
that was analyzed. Given the probability of interdiction of 12 percent for physical access, 
and 81 percent for catching a rogue employee accessing unauthorized data, both the 
threats and the consequences of these events are high enough to warrant implementing all 
the security measures that were analyzed. Specifically, the Max Alternative for physical 
control access with an upgraded communication system for the security personnel and the 
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two factor authentication for network security are modeled to increase the likelihood of 
catching internal employees in the act by more than a factor of four. 
 
2. Areas of Future Study 
The analysis of deterrence, access control, and response mechanisms to insider 
threats provides the port operator a means to control and contain the potential damages 
that could be caused by an insider threatening the security of the port.  However, it is also 
important that preventive mechanisms be put in place to allow the port operator to 
actively monitor any suspicious activities and act on them before they become threats.  
Such preventive mechanism could be of the form of pattern analysis for identification of 
abnormal behaviors. Research has been done on data mining techniques for misuse 
detection and anomaly detection, which aim at constructing models to differentiate 
intrusive and other abnormal behavior from normal behaviors. Techniques current being 
explored includes statistical modeling, temporal sequence learning, neural network, and 
genetic algorithms. However, key challenges exist in the form of large data sizes, high 
dimensionality, the temporal and skewed nature of data, and the requirement for 
extensive data processing. Existing projects include the MINDS project done by Army 
High Performance Computing Research Center in University of Minnesota, which 
attempts to build an anomaly detection system using association pattern analysis. Future 
work could be done to look into such research which will provide insight into potential 
areas of focus for implementation of a proactive pattern analysis system to compliment 
the access, control and response systems. 
 
E. PORT SECURITY STRATEGY BEYOND 2012 
The original tasking of the PSS12, from the Wayne E Meyer Institute of Systems 
Engineering, was to improve port security measures for U.S. ports and Force Protection 
options for U.S. forces in U.S. and foreign ports.  After conducting preliminary research 
and receiving input from the various stakeholders, PSS12 concluded the best option to 
protect U.S. forces and commercial vessels while in-port was to secure the port facilities.  
To secure the port facilities, PSS12 examined the potential avenues from which a threat 
may originate and modeled options to defeat the threat.   
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By conducting this study in the previous manner, it was evident that Port Security 
is a disjointed problem.  PSS12 limited the alternatives by specifying that the alternatives 
must be able to be implemented by 2012.  When dividing into the four sub-groups to 
address the different aspects from which a threat may originate, PSS12 established 
geographical and jurisdictional boundaries between the sub-groups to avoid duplication 
of efforts.  The result of the total effort was four distinct systems that addressed threats 
from the four examined avenues.   
An additional portion of the initial tasking of PSS12 was to design a system of 
systems that addressed the issue of port security.  Due to the disjointed problem of port 
security, there was not a single system that addressed all the avenues from which threats 
may come.  Threats to a port facility originate from various locations, display different 
characteristics that enable detection, and operate in different environments (i.e. land or 
sea).   
The relatively short timeframe given to examine the problem of port security did 
not enable PSS12 to adequately address the issue of integration of these systems.  PSS12 
presented different system alternatives to address the diverse threats.  One challenge to 
the integration of such systems requires the stakeholder to choose which systems are 
desired based on his specific need.  The different alternatives presented within each sub-
group have different hardware and software requirements, maintenance schedules, and 
operation and training requirements.  Acquiring a stakeholder decision was beyond the 
scope of this project. 
However, an initial discussion among the members of PSS12 yielded that one 
option that addresses the problem of integration of the systems is the establishment of a 
command center.  The purpose of such would be to create a central location, staffed with 
trained personnel, to which the information from the various sensors is relayed.  The 
information would originate from the sensors of the different systems the stakeholder 
decided to implement.   
With the establishment of a command center, the issue of data fusion arises.  The 
different agencies, whose efforts collectively provide port security, have different 
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jurisdictions, organizational structures, and funding.  With these agencies, a serious 
coordination problem becomes evident.  The information received from the agencies 
must be rapidly received, displayed, interpreted and responded to in order for the system 
to be effective.  From conducting this study, PSS12 recognized that the fusion of data is a 
critical issue that needs to be addressed.  Data fusion was beyond the scope of this 
project; however, is an area where future study is required. 
A second function of the command center would be to coordinate the appropriate 
response to any incident. This conceptual command center would require hardware and 
software to process information in order to provide a common operational picture for the 
operators required to make quick and appropriate decision.  Communications links would 
be vital as well because some of the alternative presented require human detection and 
response.  Along with the information processing requirement, the communications 
requirements for the selected alternatives differ with the alternatives that are chosen for 
implementation.  The types of systems the stakeholder implements will directly 
determine the robustness of this conceptual command center. 
The command center is one possible alternative for addressing the problem of 
integration of the systems.  PSS12 was not able to fully examine the systems integration 
issue in order to adequately address the problems of threat detection and intervention.  
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APPENDIX A: TTG MODELS 
 
Model Alternatives (Defensive Measures, Distances, Concrete Block Positions) 
Trial Barrier Type Security Zone Distance (ft) Blocks/position Trial Barrier Type Security Zone Distance (ft) Blocks/position
1 Status Quo 900 No Blocks 31 Status Quo 700 No Blocks
2 Pop-Up Barrier 900 No Blocks 32 Pop-Up Barrier 700 No Blocks
3 Spike Strips 900 No Blocks 33 Spike Strips 700 No Blocks
4 Armed Guard 900 No Blocks 34 Armed Guard 700 No Blocks
5 Pop-Up Barrier 900 Gate 35 Pop-Up Barrier 700 Gate
6 Spike Strips 900 Gate 36 Spike Strips 700 Gate
7 Armed Guard 900 Gate 37 Armed Guard 700 Gate
8 Pop-Up Barrier 900 Barrier 38 Pop-Up Barrier 700 Barrier
9 Spike Strips 900 Barrier 39 Spike Strips 700 Barrier
10 Armed Guard 900 Barrier 40 Armed Guard 700 Barrier
11 Status Quo 500 No Blocks 41 Status Quo 300 No Blocks
12 Pop-Up Barrier 500 No Blocks 42 Pop-Up Barrier 300 No Blocks
13 Spike Strips 500 No Blocks 43 Spike Strips 300 No Blocks
14 Armed Guard 500 No Blocks 44 Armed Guard 300 No Blocks
15 Pop-Up Barrier 500 Gate 45 Pop-Up Barrier 300 Gate
16 Spike Strips 500 Gate 46 Spike Strips 300 Gate
17 Armed Guard 500 Gate 47 Armed Guard 300 Gate
18 Pop-Up Barrier 500 Barrier 48 Pop-Up Barrier 300 Barrier
19 Spike Strips 500 Barrier 49 Spike Strips 300 Barrier
20 Armed Guard 500 Barrier 50 Armed Guard 300 Barrier
21 Status Quo 100 No Blocks
22 Pop-Up Barrier 100 No Blocks
23 Spike Strips 100 No Blocks
24 Armed Guard 100 No Blocks
25 Pop-Up Barrier 100 Gate
26 Spike Strips 100 Gate
27 Armed Guard 100 Gate
28 Pop-Up Barrier 100 Barrier
29 Spike Strips 100 Barrier
30 Armed Guard 100 Barrier  
Table A1:  TTG Model Alternatives 
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Model Inputs (Delays, Reliability, Effectiveness) 
Trial Replication Description Obstacle Delay sec zone delay report delay barrier delay reliability (%) effectiveness (%)
1 Status Quo-900'-No Blocks 0 19.6, 24.4, 29.3 0 0 95 0
2 Pop-Up Barrier-900'-No Blocks 0 19.6, 24.4, 29.3 1, 3, 6 1, 2, 5 95 90
3 Spike Strips-900'-No Blocks 0 19.6, 24.4, 29.3 1, 3, 6 1, 1.5, 2 95 48
4 Armed Guard-900'-No Blocks 0 19.6, 24.4, 29.3 2,3,5 5, 15, 30 75 10
5 Pop-Up Barrier-900'-Blocks@Gate 0 22.7, 28.4, 34.1 1, 3, 6 1, 2, 5 95 91
6 Spike Strips-900'-Blocks@Gate 0 22.7, 28.4, 34.1 1, 3, 6 1, 1.5, 2 95 50
7 Armed Guard-900'-Blocks@Gate 0 22.7, 28.4, 34.1 2,3,5 5, 15, 30 75 12
8 Pop-Up Barrier-900'-Blocks@Barrier 5.5,6.8,8.2 18, 22.4, 27 1, 3, 6 1, 2, 5 95 100
9 Spike Strips-900'-Blocks@Barrier 5.5,6.8,8.2 18, 22.4, 27 1, 3, 6 1, 1.5, 2 95 30
10 Armed Guard-900'-Blocks@Barrier 5.5,6.8,8.2 18, 22.4, 27 2,3,5 5, 15, 30 75 14
11 Status Quo-500'-No Blocks 0 12.6, 15.8, 18.9 0 0 95 0
12 Pop-Up Barrier-500'-No Blocks 0 12.6, 15.8, 18.9 1, 3, 6 1, 2, 5 95 94
13 Spike Strips-500'-No Blocks 0 12.6, 15.8, 18.9 1, 3, 6 1, 1.5, 2 95 40
14 Armed Guard-500'-No Blocks 0 12.6, 15.8, 18.9 2,3,5 5, 15, 30 75 38
15 Pop-Up Barrier-500'-Blocks@Gate 0 15.3, 19.1, 22.9 1, 3, 6 1, 2, 5 95 95
16 Spike Strips-500'-Blocks@Gate 0 15.3, 19.1, 22.9 1, 3, 6 1, 1.5, 2 95 42
17 Armed Guard-500'-Blocks@Gate 0 15.3, 19.1, 22.9 2,3,5 5, 15, 30 75 40
18 Pop-Up Barrier-500'-Blocks@Barrier 5.5,6.8,8.2 10.6, 13.3, 15.9 1, 3, 6 1, 2, 5 95 100
19 Spike Strips-500'-Blocks@Barrier 5.5,6.8,8.2 10.6, 13.3, 15.9 1, 3, 6 1, 1.5, 2 95 30
20 Armed Guard-500'-Blocks@Barrier 5.5,6.8,8.2 10.6, 13.3, 15.9 2,3,5 5, 15, 30 75 42
21 Status Quo-100'-No Blocks 0 3.2, 4, 4.9 0 0 95 0
22 Pop-Up Barrier-100'-No Blocks 0 3.2, 4, 4.9 1, 3, 6 1, 2, 5 95 97
23 Spike Strips-100'-No Blocks 0 3.2, 4, 4.9 1, 3, 6 1, 1.5, 2 95 32
24 Armed Guard-100'-No Blocks 0 3.2, 4, 4.9 2,3,5 5, 15, 30 75 10
25 Pop-Up Barrier-100'-Blocks@Gate 0 4.4 5.5, 6.6 1, 3, 6 1, 2, 5 95 98
26 Spike Strips-100'-Blocks@Gate 0 4.4 5.5, 6.6 1, 3, 6 1, 1.5, 2 95 33
27 Armed Guard-100'-Blocks@Gate 0 4.4 5.5, 6.6 2,3,5 5, 15, 30 75 12
28 Pop-Up Barrier-100'-Blocks@Barrier 5.5,6.8,8.2 0 1, 3, 6 1, 2, 5 95 100
29 Spike Strips-100'-Blocks@Barrier 5.5,6.8,8.2 0 1, 3, 6 1, 1.5, 2 95 30
30 Armed Guard-100'-Blocks@Barrier 5.5,6.8,8.2 0 2,3,5 5, 15, 30 75 12
31 Status Quo-700'-No Blocks 0 16.3, 20.4, 24.4 0 0 95 0
32 Pop-Up Barrier-700'-No Blocks 0 16.3, 20.4, 24.4 1, 3, 6 1, 2, 5 95 92
33 Spike Strips-700'-No Blocks 0 16.3, 20.4, 24.4 1, 3, 6 1, 1.5, 2 95 44
34 Armed Guard-700'-No Blocks 0 16.3, 20.4, 24.4 2,3,5 5, 15, 30 75 22
35 Pop-Up Barrier-700'-Blocks@Gate 0 19.2, 24, 28.8 1, 3, 6 1, 2, 5 95 93
36 Spike Strips-700'-Blocks@Gate 0 19.2, 24, 28.8 1, 3, 6 1, 1.5, 2 95 46
37 Armed Guard-700'-Blocks@Gate 0 19.2, 24, 28.8 2,3,5 5, 15, 30 75 20
38 Pop-Up Barrier-700'-Blocks@Barrier 5.5,6.8,8.2 14.5, 18.1, 21.8 1, 3, 6 1, 2, 5 95 100
39 Spike Strips-700"-Blocks@Barrier 5.5,6.8,8.2 14.5, 18.1, 21.8 1, 3, 6 1, 1.5, 2 95 30
40 Armed Guard-700'-Blocks@Barrier 5.5,6.8,8.2 14.5, 18.1, 21.8 2,3,5 5, 15, 30 75 22
41 Status Quo-300'-No Blocks 0 8.4, 10.5, 12.6 0 0 95 0
42 Pop-Up Barrier-300'-No Blocks 0 8.4, 10.5, 12.6 1, 3, 6 1, 2, 5 95 95
43 Spike Strips-300'-No Blocks 0 8.4, 10.5, 12.6 1, 3, 6 1, 1.5, 2 95 36
44 Armed Guard-300'-No Blocks 0 8.4, 10.5, 12.6 2,3,5 5, 15, 30 75 22
45 Pop-Up Barrier-300'-Blocks@Gate 0 10.6, 13.2, 15.9 1, 3, 6 1, 2, 5 95 96
46 Spike Strips-300'-Blocks@Gate 0 10.6, 13.2, 15.9 1, 3, 6 1, 1.5, 2 95 38
47 Armed Guard-300'-Blocks@Gate 0 10.6, 13.2, 15.9 2,3,5 5, 15, 30 75 20
48 Pop-Up Barrier-300'-Blocks@Barrier 5.5,6.8,8.2 6, 7.5, 9 1, 3, 6 1, 2, 5 95 100
49 Spike Strips-300'-Blocks@Barrier 5.5,6.8,8.2 6, 7.5, 9 1, 3, 6 1, 1.5, 2 95 30
50 Armed Guard-300'-Blocks@Barrier 5.5,6.8,8.2 6, 7.5, 9 2,3,5 5, 15, 30 75 22  
Table A2:  TTG Model Inputs 
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APPENDIX B: TTG MODELING RESULTS 
Data  by Distance Data  By Barrier Configuration Data  By Effectiveness
Configuration Effectiveness Configuration Effectiveness Configuration Effectiveness
SQ-100 0 SQ-100 0 PB-CB(B)-900 0.950374856
PB-CB(N)-100 0.06816609 SQ-300 0 PB-CB(B)-700 0.950374856
SS-CB(N)-100 0.075951557 SQ-500 0 PB-CB(B)-500 0.950374856
AG-CB(N)-100 0 SQ-700 0 PB-CB(B)-300 0.950374856
PB-CB(G)-100 0.348673587 SQ-900 0 PB-CB(G)-500 0.931430219
SS-CB(G)-100 0.224077278 PB-CB(G)-300 0.911418685
AG-CB(G)-100 0 AG-CB(B)-100 0 PB-CB(N)-300 0.898442907
PB-CB(B)-100 0.682497116 AG-CB(B)-300 0.024798155 PB-CB(N)-500 0.89310842
SS-CB(B)-100 0.269232987 AG-CB(B)-500 0.16349481 PB-CB(G)-700 0.882958478
AG-CB(B)-100 0 AG-CB(B)-700 0.133419839 PB-CB(N)-700 0.873933103
AG-CB(B)-900 0.100346021 PB-CB(G)-900 0.864446367
SQ-300 0 AG-CB(G)-100 0 PB-CB(N)-900 0.855305652
PB-CB(N)-300 0.898442907 AG-CB(G)-300 0.015599769 PB-CB(B)-100 0.682497116
SS-CB(N)-300 0.34106113 AG-CB(G)-500 0.13638985 SS-CB(G)-900 0.474480969
AG-CB(N)-300 0.003690888 AG-CB(G)-700 0.113465975 SS-CB(N)-900 0.455161476
PB-CB(G)-300 0.911418685 AG-CB(G)-900 0.083102653 SS-CB(G)-700 0.436908881
SS-CB(G)-300 0.360178777 AG-CB(N)-100 0 SS-CB(N)-700 0.416998633
AG-CB(G)-300 0.015599769 AG-CB(N)-300 0.003690888 SS-CB(G)-500 0.407814302
PB-CB(B)-300 0.950374856 AG-CB(N)-500 0.063754325 SS-CB(N)-500 0.379527105
SS-CB(B)-300 0.285207612 AG-CB(N)-700 0.088696655 SS-CB(G)-300 0.360178777
AG-CB(B)-300 0.024798155 AG-CB(N)-900 0.058044983 PB-CB(G)-100 0.348673587
SS-CB(N)-300 0.34106113
SQ-500 0 SS-CB(B)-100 0.269232987 SS-CB(B)-700 0.285207612
PB-CB(N)-500 0.89310842 SS-CB(B)-300 0.285207612 SS-CB(B)-300 0.285207612
SS-CB(N)-500 0.379527105 SS-CB(B)-500 0.285207612 SS-CB(B)-500 0.285207612
AG-CB(N)-500 0.063754325 SS-CB(B)-700 0.285207612 SS-CB(B)-900 0.2838812
PB-CB(G)-500 0.931430219 SS-CB(B)-900 0.2838812 SS-CB(B)-100 0.269232987
SS-CB(G)-500 0.407814302 SS-CB(G)-100 0.224077278 SS-CB(G)-100 0.224077278
AG-CB(G)-500 0.13638985 SS-CB(G)-300 0.360178777 AG-CB(B)-500 0.16349481
PB-CB(B)-500 0.950374856 SS-CB(G)-500 0.407814302 AG-CB(G)-500 0.13638985
SS-CB(B)-500 0.285207612 SS-CB(G)-700 0.436908881 AG-CB(B)-700 0.133419839
AG-CB(B)-500 0.16349481 SS-CB(G)-900 0.474480969 AG-CB(G)-700 0.113465975
SS-CB(N)-100 0.075951557 AG-CB(B)-900 0.100346021
SQ-700 0 SS-CB(N)-300 0.34106113 AG-CB(N)-700 0.088696655
PB-CB(N)-700 0.873933103 SS-CB(N)-500 0.379527105 AG-CB(G)-900 0.083102653
SS-CB(N)-700 0.416998633 SS-CB(N)-700 0.416998633 SS-CB(N)-100 0.075951557
AG-CB(N)-700 0.088696655 SS-CB(N)-900 0.455161476 PB-CB(N)-100 0.06816609
PB-CB(G)-700 0.882958478 AG-CB(N)-500 0.063754325
SS-CB(G)-700 0.436908881 PB-CB(B)-100 0.682497116 AG-CB(N)-900 0.058044983
AG-CB(G)-700 0.113465975 PB-CB(B)-300 0.950374856 AG-CB(B)-300 0.024798155
PB-CB(B)-700 0.950374856 PB-CB(B)-500 0.950374856 AG-CB(G)-300 0.015599769
SS-CB(B)-700 0.285207612 PB-CB(B)-700 0.950374856 AG-CB(N)-300 0.003690888
AG-CB(B)-700 0.133419839 PB-CB(B)-900 0.950374856 AG-CB(N)-100 0
PB-CB(G)-100 0.348673587 AG-CB(G)-100 0
SQ-900 0 PB-CB(G)-300 0.911418685 AG-CB(B)-100 0
PB-CB(N)-900 0.855305652 PB-CB(G)-500 0.931430219 SQ-900 0
SS-CB(N)-900 0.455161476 PB-CB(G)-700 0.882958478 SQ-700 0
AG-CB(N)-900 0.058044983 PB-CB(G)-900 0.864446367 SQ-500 0
PB-CB(G)-900 0.864446367 PB-CB(N)-100 0.06816609 SQ-300 0
SS-CB(G)-900 0.474480969 PB-CB(N)-300 0.898442907 SQ-100 0
AG-CB(G)-900 0.083102653 PB-CB(N)-500 0.89310842
PB-CB(B)-900 0.950374856 PB-CB(N)-700 0.873933103
SS-CB(B)-900 0.2838812 PB-CB(N)-900 0.855305652
AG-CB(B)-900 0.100346021  
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APPENDIX C: TTG LIFE CYCLE COST DSC2000 BARRIER 
In its attempt to design a system of systems to protect foreign and domestic ports, 
PSS12 was tasked to construct reliability and lifecycle cost analysis of one selected 
alternatives.  The alternative that was chosen was the DSC 2000, which is a pop-up 
barrier system that prevents unauthorized vehicles from infiltrating a port facility by 
running the gate.  The DSC 2000 is sold by the Delta Scientific Corporation and is the 
currently used at the Ninth Street gate at the Naval Postgraduate School.  The proximity 
of this system provided ample opportunity to correspond with the system operators and 
designers to provide the information required for such study. 
For the purpose of this study, all costs are stated in fiscal year 2007 United States 
Dollars (USD).  From a various phone conversations and emails with Mr. Gregg Hamm, 
who is the High Security Systems Technician for Delta Scientific Corporation, the cost of 
procuring the DSC 2000 pop-up barrier system depends on how many pop-up 
mechanisms are desired.  This number directly corresponds to the width of the travel lane 
that the security personnel wish to impede.  Mr. Hamm stated that a travel lane of width 
of twelve feet, three pop-up barriers are recommended.  He further stated that 
procurement of such a system involves the purchasing of the parts and installation of the 
system.  The purchase of the three pop-up barrier system costs approximately 40 – 45 
thousand dollars.  Mr. Hamm added that a good rule of thumb for installment cost for 
these systems is 90-95 percent of the purchase cost bring the total cost for the 
procurement of this system to approximately 80 – 85 thousand dollars.         
The two major components of the DSC 2000 are the pop-up barriers and the 
hydraulic power unit.  The pop up barriers are installed in the vehicle lanes of travel.  
Their purpose is to impede the vehicle from penetrating into the facility by blocking the 
travel lane upon activation by the security personnel.  These barriers are constructed of 
heavy metal obstructions that are hydraulically lifted from the roadway to impede vehicle 
passage.  An extended version of the pop-up barrier is shown in Figure C1. 
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Figure C1.  Extended Pop-Up Barrier 
 
In Figure C1, the hydraulic cylinder receives fluid from the system to raise and 
lower the barrier.  The components of this system are not very complex.   
The maintenance required for this portion of the system requires greasing the 
hinges, tightening the bolts as necessary, and maintaining the nitrogen pre-charge of the 
actuator.  These actions are required monthly except for the checking of the nitrogen pre-
charge.  The checking of the nitrogen pre-charge is directed to be conducted at least every 
six months according to the Delta Scientific Maintenance Manual for the DSC 2000.   
For the purpose of this study, the procurement costs of common tools required for 
maintenance such as wrenches, screwdrivers and hammers will not be figured into the 
operating and support costs.  The maintenance for the pop-up barrier portion of the DSC 
2000 is relatively inexpensive.  A simplified version of the pop-up barriers is shown in 









Figure C2.  Simplified Diagram of the Barrier System 
 
This pop-up barrier subsystem is not very complex.  The only specialized tool 
required for maintenance is required for checking and maintaining the nitrogen pre-
charge on the barrier hydraulic actuators.  The Delta Scientific Maintenance Manual 
recommends purchasing the Delta Charging Kit # 2469-31 for use in this task.  The 
charging kit has a one time cost of $217.30.  Nitrogen is only required in these actuators 
if it is evident that a leak is present which leads to bigger issues.  The hinges and bolts 
require greasing and tightening at least once every month.  From the conduction a market 
survey, a 40 cubic foot nitrogen cylinder costs approximately $100.00.  Once used, these 
nitrogen gas cylinders may be recharged at a gas supplier that can range from $20 to $40.  
The grease required to lubricate the system costs from $4 to $6 per pound cartridge.  
Overall, the maintenance of the pop-up barrier system is minimal with most of the cost 
being the initial procurement of the tools necessary to recharge the cylinder.  The initial 
procurement of these tools sums to $317.30 with the recurring yearly cost being primarily 
for the lubricant and nitrogen.  Assuming that one nitrogen bottle is used per year and on 
pound on grease is used each month per pop-up barrier of a three lane system, the annual 
scheduled maintenance cost for the parts of the system is $210.00.  
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The more complex portion of the barrier system is the Hydraulic Power Unit 
(HPU).  The purpose of the HPU is to maintain the primed pressure on several of the 
systems actuators to enable the system to be deployed in according to the one-half second 
advertisement.  A simplified block diagram of the components of the HPU is shown in 




Figure C3.  Simplified block Diagram of HPU 
 
The concept of operation for this system in the normal mode is an electric motor 
drives a hydraulic gear pump.  The motor and hydraulic gear pump is connected in 
parallel with the hand pump.  The hand pump provides a method to manually charge the 
system with hydraulic pressure in case of a motor failure.  These pumps pressurize 
several accumulators which maintain the pressure charge required for the rapid actuation 
of the barriers.  After the accumulators are the directional valves which determines the 
direction of the hydraulic fluid flow to the pop-up barrier actuators.  The pop-up barriers 
are hydraulically powered up and down and the directional valves are the mechanisms 
that control the direction of actuation. 
The monthly scheduled maintenance directed by the Delta Scientific Manuals for 
the HPU is not extensive.  The monthly scheduled maintenance for the HPU includes 
changing the hydraulic fluid filter and topping off the hydraulic fluid contained in the 
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reservoir (if any of these are necessary).  The manual recommends changing the 
hydraulic fluid filter every third month.  Mr. Hamm said these oil filters costs 
approximately $60.00 each.  Changing these oil filters every three months requires four 
oil filters per year bringing the total yearly cost for the oil filters to $240.00.   
The yearly scheduled maintenance directed by the manual directs a full flush and 
refill of the hydraulic fluid contained in the HPU.  The capacity of the HPU reservoir is 
20 gallons for the typical three lane system.  The Delaware State Contract procurement 
Office obtains the required Shell Tellus 46 Hydraulic Fluid for 6.50 per gallon.  To fully 
flush and fill the system would cost an annual amount of $130.00.  The scheduled 
maintenance parts cost for the HPU would be $370.00 annually.  For the entire system, 
the cost for the parts would be $580.00.    
Delta Scientific (Delta) estimates the DSC 2000 system can perform its 
functionality between 15 to 20 years when regular preventive maintenance is conducted 
according to the recommendations in the manual.  Assuming time T is an exponential 
random variable, the reliability of the system after one year would be between 93.4 and 
95.1 percent. There is a generous assumption that most component failures do not affect 
the performance of the system’s stated functionality are not considered as system failures 
while the system is addressed as one big complex component.  In the examination of the 
system design documents and maintenance guidelines, the critical components affecting 
the full operational functionality of the barriers system were identified and shown in 
Table C1.  A common system problem highlighted by Delta is the Hydraulic Pump Unit 
(HPU). The HPU Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) estimate given by Delta is 
between 10 to 15 years. The HPU is driven either via electrical or manual methods. With 
the parallel connectivity driving the HPU, the overall reliability of the HPU is 98.5 
percent as shown in Table C2. 
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Critical Components MTBF Ri 
Motor 10 0.904837 
Motor Switch 15 0.935507 
Hydraulic Pump & Reservoir 5 0.818731 
Hand pump 20 0.951229 
Hose & Fitting 8 0.882497 
Accumulator 12 0.920044 
Directional Valve 15 0.935507 
Hydraulic Cylinder 12 0.920044 
Barrier 50 0.980199 
 
Table C1.  Reliability of Critical Components of the Barriers System for One Year 
 
Hydraulic Pump Unit Ri 
Electric Hydraulic Pump 0.693041 
Hand Pump 0.951229 
Overall Reliability of 
Hydraulic Pump Unit 
0.985029 
 
Table C2.  Reliability of the Hydraulic Pump Subsystem for One Year 
 
Most of the components MTBF are not available and the estimates for them are 
based on analogy.  Personal experience on similar parts working in various systems such 
as automobile and helicopter systems were use to give the “best estimate” with large 
assumptions.  The remaining data from Delta is the fitting and hose that requires to be 
replaced every seven to eight years. This is due to abrasion by the contaminants in the 
hydraulic fluid and causing wear and tear over prolonged usage.  The MTBF and the 
reliabilities for the components are shown in Table C1.  
The HPU, hose and fitting, accumulator, directional valve, hydraulic cylinder and 
the barrier are treated as connected in a series. The product of the individual reliabilities 
works out to be 67.5 percent for the overall system reliability.  While there is a big 
contrast between Delta’s estimate and calculated reliabilities, assumptions used were 
generous and field data are not available to enable higher accuracy in the estimation. 
Delta Scientific’s spare parts list for the DSC 2000 is included on the following 
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APPENDIX D: TTG COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
Configuration Effectiveness Annual Cost (USD) Configuration Effectiveness Annual Cost (USD)
SQ-100 0 0 PB-CB(B)-900 0.950374856 37100
SQ-300 0 0 PB-CB(B)-700 0.950374856 37100
SQ-500 0 0 PB-CB(B)-500 0.950374856 37100
SQ-700 0 0 PB-CB(B)-300 0.950374856 37100
SQ-900 0 0 PB-CB(G)-500 0.931430219 37100
SS-CB(N)-100 0.075951557 15566 PB-CB(G)-300 0.911418685 37100
SS-CB(N)-300 0.34106113 15566 PB-CB(N)-300 0.898442907 37010
SS-CB(N)-500 0.379527105 15566 PB-CB(N)-500 0.89310842 37010
SS-CB(N)-700 0.416998633 15566 PB-CB(G)-700 0.882958478 37100
SS-CB(N)-900 0.455161476 15566 PB-CB(N)-700 0.873933103 37010
SS-CB(G)-100 0.224077278 15656 PB-CB(G)-900 0.864446367 37100
SS-CB(B)-100 0.269232987 15656 PB-CB(N)-900 0.855305652 37010
SS-CB(B)-900 0.2838812 15656 PB-CB(B)-100 0.682497116 37100
SS-CB(B)-500 0.285207612 15656 SS-CB(G)-900 0.474480969 15656
SS-CB(B)-300 0.285207612 15656 SS-CB(N)-900 0.455161476 15566
SS-CB(B)-700 0.285207612 15656 SS-CB(G)-700 0.436908881 15656
PB-CB(G)-100 0.348673587 15656 SS-CB(N)-700 0.416998633 15566
SS-CB(G)-300 0.360178777 15656 SS-CB(G)-500 0.407814302 15656
SS-CB(G)-500 0.407814302 15656 SS-CB(N)-500 0.379527105 15566
SS-CB(G)-700 0.436908881 15656 SS-CB(G)-300 0.360178777 15656
SS-CB(G)-900 0.474480969 15656 PB-CB(G)-100 0.348673587 15656
AG-CB(N)-100 0 36275 SS-CB(N)-300 0.34106113 15566
AG-CB(N)-300 0.003690888 36275 SS-CB(B)-700 0.285207612 15656
AG-CB(N)-900 0.058044983 36275 SS-CB(B)-300 0.285207612 15656
AG-CB(N)-500 0.063754325 36275 SS-CB(B)-500 0.285207612 15656
AG-CB(N)-700 0.088696655 36275 SS-CB(B)-900 0.2838812 15656
AG-CB(B)-100 0 36365 SS-CB(B)-100 0.269232987 15656
AG-CB(G)-100 0 36365 SS-CB(G)-100 0.224077278 15656
AG-CB(G)-300 0.015599769 36365 AG-CB(B)-500 0.16349481 36365
AG-CB(B)-300 0.024798155 36365 AG-CB(G)-500 0.13638985 36365
AG-CB(G)-900 0.083102653 36365 AG-CB(B)-700 0.133419839 36365
AG-CB(B)-900 0.100346021 36365 AG-CB(G)-700 0.113465975 36365
AG-CB(G)-700 0.113465975 36365 AG-CB(B)-900 0.100346021 36365
AG-CB(B)-700 0.133419839 36365 AG-CB(N)-700 0.088696655 36275
AG-CB(G)-500 0.13638985 36365 AG-CB(G)-900 0.083102653 36365
AG-CB(B)-500 0.16349481 36365 SS-CB(N)-100 0.075951557 15566
PB-CB(N)-100 0.06816609 37010 PB-CB(N)-100 0.06816609 37010
PB-CB(N)-900 0.855305652 37010 AG-CB(N)-500 0.063754325 36275
PB-CB(N)-700 0.873933103 37010 AG-CB(N)-900 0.058044983 36275
PB-CB(N)-500 0.89310842 37010 AG-CB(B)-300 0.024798155 36365
PB-CB(N)-300 0.898442907 37010 AG-CB(G)-300 0.015599769 36365
PB-CB(B)-100 0.682497116 37100 AG-CB(N)-300 0.003690888 36275
PB-CB(G)-900 0.864446367 37100 AG-CB(N)-100 0 36275
PB-CB(G)-700 0.882958478 37100 AG-CB(G)-100 0 36365
PB-CB(G)-300 0.911418685 37100 AG-CB(B)-100 0 36365
PB-CB(G)-500 0.931430219 37100 SQ-900 0 0
PB-CB(B)-300 0.950374856 37100 SQ-700 0 0
PB-CB(B)-500 0.950374856 37100 SQ-500 0 0
PB-CB(B)-700 0.950374856 37100 SQ-300 0 0
PB-CB(B)-900 0.950374856 37100 SQ-100 0 0  





















s Pop-Up Barrier, Blocks at
Barrier
Spike Strips, Blocks before
Guardhouse




Figure D1.  Cost vs Effectiveness of Alternatives at 700 Feet Range 
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Figure D2.  Cost vs Effectiveness of Alternatives at 500 Feet Range 
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Figure D3.  Cost vs Effectiveness of Alternatives at 300 Feet Range 
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APPENDIX E: SSTG MODELS 
Design of Sensors 
Each sensor was modeled for its probability of detection (PDetect), false alarm rate 
and time to scan the object of interest. 
The sensor’s probability of detection was dependent on the type of materials 
being investigated. For instance, the chemical detector (used by the intrusive inspection 
team) is only effective at detecting chemical-contents of unwanted cargo and ineffective 
against any other types of material.  












1 Scales     PFA TScan 
2 Animals   PDetect PDetect PFA TScan 
3 Radiation Detector 
(Passive) 
PDetect    PFA TScan 
4 Gamma Scanner 
(Active) 
PDetect PDetect PDetect PDetect PFA TScan 
5 Biological detector  PDetect   PFA TScan 
6 Chemical detector   PDetect  PFA TScan 
 
 
Table E1:  Performance of Sensors against Different Materials 
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Design of Sensor Suite 
There are four areas where the sensors could be dispatched:  
• At the point of entry into the source port (for incoming containers via 
land) 
• Holding area where transshipment containers are stored 
• On cranes where containers are loaded onto ships 
• Intrusive inspection teams where containers are opened and searched. 
 
The following table illustrates the possible configurations of sensors that are 
being modeled in this simulation. Over the multiple runs of the simulation, the following 
sensor configurations will be further varied by enabling or disabling these sensors at 
various inspection locations. The simulation of these different sensor configurations 
would allow for analysis of the difference in system performance due to each 
configuration. 
Location of Sensor 
 Sensor Fixed 
Entry 







1 Scales X   X 

















  X  
 
 
Table E2:  Use of Sensors at Various Inspection Locations 
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Summary of Sensor and Sensor Suite Design 
 Fixed Sensor Parameters Levels 
1 Probability of detection for each sensor, for each category of 
unwanted cargo 
Location, sensor, material 
specific 
2 Probability of false alarm for each sensor Location, sensor specific 
3 Time to scan container for each sensor Location, sensor specific 
 
Table E3:  Fixed Sensor Parameters 
 Variable Sensor Suite Parameters Levels 
1 Availability of ATS None, ATS, ATSplus 
2 Percentage of non-transhipment containers that goes through 
point of entry scanning 
4 levels:  25%, 50%, 
75%, 100% 
3 Percentage of containers that is randomly selection for intrusive 
scanning 
0-30% 
4 Point of Entry – Availability of Scales On/Off 
5 Point of Entry – Availability of Trained Animals On/Off 
6 Point of Entry – Availability of Radiation Detectors On/Off 
7 Point of Entry – Availability of Gamma Scanners On/Off 
8 Holding  Area Inspection – Availability of Radiation Detectors On/Off 
9 Holding  Area Inspection – Availability of Gamma Scanners On/Off 
10 Intrusive Inspection – Availability of Trained Animals On/Off 
11 Intrusive Inspection – Availability of Radiation Detectors On/Off 
12 Intrusive Inspection – Availability of Gamma Scanners On/Off 
13 Intrusive Inspection – Availability of Biological Detectors On/Off 
14 Intrusive Inspection – Availability of Chemical Detectors On/Off 
15 Crane Inspection – Availability of Scales On/Off 
16 Crane Inspection – Availability of Radiation Detectors On/Off 
17 Crane Inspection – Availability of Gamma scanners On/Off 
 
Table E4:  Variable Sensor Suite Parameters 
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Smart Design of Experiments using NOLH Algorithms 
Both the Nearly-Orthogonal-Latin-Hypercube (NOLH) algorithm and its 
Extended NOLH version were considered for generating the sensor suite experiment 
points. The output experiment matrices from both algorithms were compared for 
correlation which should ideally be minimized to the ideal zero value. The ENOLH 
experiment matrix created an experiment matrix with higher average correlation but 
lesser critical correlation violations. Hence the ENOLH experiment is selected for use in 
this mode. The following two tables present the correlation between experiment factors 
using NOLH and ENOLH. 
 
NOLH eScales eAnimals eRad eGamma hRad hGamma iAnimals iRad iGamma iBio iChem cScales cRad cGamma ATS eScanPrc iRdmSelPrc 
eScales 1.000                 
eAnimals 0.008 1.000                
eRad 0.008 0.008 1.000               
eGamma 0.008 0.008 0.008 1.000              
hRad 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 1.000             
hGamma 0.070 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 1.000            
iAnimals 0.070 0.070 0.008 -0.054 0.008 -0.054 1.000           
iRad 0.039 -0.023 0.101 -0.085 0.101 -0.023 0.039 1.000          
iGamma -0.023 -0.023 0.039 0.039 0.039 -0.023 -0.023 0.008 1.000         
iBio 0.008 0.008 -0.054 -0.054 0.008 0.008 0.008 -0.023 0.039 1.000        
iChem -0.054 0.008 0.008 0.070 0.070 0.008 -0.054 -0.085 0.039 0.132 1.000       
cScales 0.101 0.039 0.039 -0.023 -0.023 -0.023 0.101 -0.054 -0.054 0.225 0.039 1.000      
cRad -0.023 0.039 0.039 -0.023 -0.023 0.039 0.039 0.194 -0.054 0.039 -0.023 0.070 1.000     
cGamma -0.054 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.070 -0.054 0.008 -0.023 0.039 -0.116 0.008 -0.023 -0.023 1.000    
ATS -0.055 -0.077 0.120 -0.055 -0.098 -0.055 0.098 0.033 0.055 -0.033 -0.273 0.055 -0.011 -0.055 1.000   
eScanPrc 0.084 0.116 0.052 0.020 -0.076 -0.044 0.020 0.004 0.068 -0.044 0.020 0.004 0.004 -0.108 -0.006 1.000  
iRdmSelPrc 0.004 0.003 -0.054 0.010 -0.020 -0.008 -0.001 -0.054 0.006 -0.106 -0.013 -0.024 -0.022 -0.010 0.045 -0.054 1.000 
  
Table E5:  Correlation of Experimental Factors using NOLH 
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ENOLH65 eScales eAnimals eRad eGamma hRad hGamma iAnimals iRad iGamma iBio iChem cScales cRad cGamma ATS eScanPrc iRdmSelPrc
eScales 1                 
eAnimals 0.015 1.000                
eRad 0.015 0.015 1.000               
eGamma 0.015 0.015 0.015 1.000              
hRad 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 1.000             
hGamma 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 1.000            
iAnimals 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 1.000           
iRad -0.015 -0.015 -0.015 -0.015 -0.015 -0.015 -0.015 1.000          
iGamma -0.015 -0.015 -0.015 -0.015 -0.015 -0.015 -0.015 0.015 1.000         
iBio -0.015 -0.015 -0.015 -0.015 -0.015 -0.015 -0.015 0.015 0.015 1.000        
iChem -0.015 -0.015 -0.015 -0.015 -0.015 -0.015 -0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 1.000       
cScales -0.015 -0.015 -0.015 -0.015 -0.015 -0.015 -0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 1.000      
cRad -0.015 -0.015 -0.015 -0.015 -0.015 -0.015 -0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 1.000     
cGamma -0.015 -0.015 -0.015 -0.015 -0.015 -0.015 -0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 1.000    
ATS 0.094 -0.019 -0.057 -0.398 -0.095 0.094 -0.019 0.019 0.019 -0.019 0.057 0.057 -0.056 -0.208 1.000   
eScanPrc 0.180 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.169 0.180 -0.006 -0.017 0.006 -0.017 -0.017 0.006 -0.017 0.006 -0.050 1.000  
iRdmSelPrc -0.008 0.002 -0.008 0.002 0.013 0.002 -0.105 0.051 0.019 0.051 -0.024 0.008 -0.024 0.019 0.003 0.007 1.000 
 
 
Table E6:  Correlation of Experimental Factors using ENOLH 
 
 eScales eAnimals eRad eGamma hRad hGamma iAnimals iRad iGamma iBio iChem cScales cRad cGamma ATS eScanPrc iRdmSelPrc 
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 0.05 
2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 2 1 0.06 
3 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 2 1 0.07 
4 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 1 0.04 
5 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0.06 
6 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0.05 
7 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0.05 
8 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0.06 
9 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 2 0.25 0.03 
10 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 2 0.25 0.08 
11 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 2 0.25 0.08 
12 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 0.25 0.03 
13 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0.25 0.07 
14 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0.25 0.04 
15 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0.25 0.04 
16 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0.25 0.07 
17 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0.5 0.02 
18 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0.5 0.09 
19 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0.5 0.09 
20 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0.5 0.02 
21 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 0.5 0.08 
22 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 2 0.5 0.03 
23 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 2 0.5 0.02 
24 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 2 0.5 0.08 
25 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0.01 
26 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0.10 
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 eScales eAnimals eRad eGamma hRad hGamma iAnimals iRad iGamma iBio iChem cScales cRad cGamma ATS eScanPrc iRdmSelPrc 
27 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0.10 
28 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0.01 
29 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0.10 
30 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0.02 
31 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.01 
32 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.10 
33 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.75 0.06 
34 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.06 
35 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.05 
36 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0.25 0.04 
37 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0.25 0.07 
38 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 2 0.25 0.05 
39 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 2 0.25 0.06 
40 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 2 0.25 0.06 
41 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 2 0.25 0.05 
42 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0.08 
43 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0.04 
44 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0.03 
45 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0.08 
46 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 2 1 0.04 
47 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 2 1 0.07 
48 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 2 1 0.07 
49 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 2 1 0.04 
50 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0.75 0.09 
51 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0.75 0.02 
52 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 2 0.75 0.02 
53 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 2 0.75 0.09 
54 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0.75 0.03 
55 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0.75 0.08 
56 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0.75 0.09 
57 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0.03 
58 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0.25 0.10 
59 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0.25 0.01 
60 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0.25 0.01 
61 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0.25 0.10 
62 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0.25 0.02 
63 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0.25 0.09 
64 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0.25 0.10 
65 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.25 0.01 
 
Table E7:  Values for Experimental Design of Sensor Suites using ENOLH 
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APPENDIX F: SSTG METRICS 
The following list the Measures of Effectiveness (MOE), Measures of 
Performance (MOP) to be evaluated and the Data Requirement (DR) to be collected from 
the simulations. 
 
1. MOE:  Accuracy of Inspections 
 
For each inspection location, the following MOPs are evaluated. 
 
1) MOP: Probability of detecting undesired cargo 
 
1.1.1. DR: Number of clean containers that arrived at inspection location 
1.1.2. DR: Number of dirty containers that arrived at inspection location 
1.1.3. DR: Number of clean containers that started inspection  
1.1.4. DR: Number of dirty containers that started inspection  
1.1.5. DR: Number of clean containers that completed inspection and passed 
1.1.6. DR: Number of dirty containers that completed inspection and failed 
 
2) MOP: Probability of False Alarm 
 
1.2.1. DR: Number of clean containers that arrived at inspection location 
1.2.2. DR: Number of clean containers that started inspection 
1.2.3. DR: Number of clean containers that completed inspection and failed 
 
3) MOP: Probability of Miss Detection 
 
1.3.1. DR: Number of dirty containers that arrived at inspection location 
1.3.2. DR: Number of dirty containers that started inspection 
1.3.3. DR: Number of dirty containers that completed inspection and passed 
 
2. MOE:  Timeliness of Inspections 
 
For each inspection location, the following MOPs are evaluated. 
 
1) MOP: Average Handling time per container 
 
2.1.1. DR: Total time duration  
2.1.2. DR: Average queue length of inspection server 
2.1.3. DR: Number of containers in queue 
2.1.4. DR: Average time in queue 
2.1.5. DR: Time arrive at inspection station 
2.1.6. DR: Time leave inspection station 
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2.1.7. DR: Average time in inspection server 
2.1.8. DR: Time start inspection 
2.1.9. DR: Time end inspection 
 
2) MOP: Container throughput 
 
2.3.1. DR: Total time duration  
2.3.2. DR: Number of containers arriving at inspection location  







Table F1:  Simulation ‘General’ Output Parameters 
 
Table F2:  Simulation ‘Per Server at Inspection Location’ Output Parameters 
 





Table F4:  Simulation ‘Per Inspection Location’ Output Parameters 
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APPENDIX G: SSTG INPUT PARAMETERS 
Fixed Simulation Parameters 
The table and the following page lists the input simulation parameters that will be 
fixed for all simulation runs.  The fixed simulation parameters can be broadly categorized 
into the following groups:  
• General 
• Container Generation 
• Ship Scheduling 
• ATS 
• Fixed point of entry 
• Holding area (non-intrusive) inspection 
• Crane (non-intrusive) Inspection 
• Intrusive Inspection 




Table G1:  Fixed Simulation Parameters in Extend Data Array 
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Table G2:  Fixed Sensor Simulation Parameters for Location: Point of Entry 
 
Table G3:  Fixed Sensor Simulation Parameters for Location: Holding Area (Non-
Intrusive Inspection)  
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Table G4:  Fixed Sensor Simulation Parameters for Location: Intrusive Inspection 
Teams 
  









The following table shows the organization of parameters for the combination of 
sensors at each of the locations: fixed entry point, non-intrusive inspection, intrusive 
inspection and cranes. In Extend, there will be a global data array created for each 
location. Within each data array, the parameter is accessed via its specific column and 




















(1,2) (1,3) (1,4) (1,5) (1,6) 
















(6,1) (6,2) (6,3) (6,4) (6,5) (6,6) 
Tscan (7,1) (7,2) (7,3) (7,4) (7,5) (7,6) 
 
 
Table G6:  Organization of Sensor Parameters in Data Array for Each Location 
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Variable Simulation Parameters 
The following table lists the 17 input simulation parameters that will be varied for 
all simulation runs.  For each simulation, there will be different combinations of sensors 
selected, as well as different percentages of selection for various purposes. 
 







APPENDIX H: SSTG ALTERNATIVE PARAMETER SETTINGS 
The container screening model is configured to simulate the performance of the 
status quo system and its alternatives formulated during alternative generation. This 
appendix describes the model configuration of the status quo systems and its six 
alternatives. 
• Status Quo 
• “100% (Volume) Non-Intrusive Inspection” Alternative 
• “Improved Loading Search” Alternative 
• “Minimize Port Operations” Alternative 
• “High Performance” Alternative 
• “100% (Volume) Intrusive Inspection” Alternative 
There is a limitation in how precise the model configuration can represent each of 
the alternatives exactly as described earlier. The container screening model was designed 
to be sufficiently general in order to answer the bigger issue of optimal sensor mix. 
Hence it does not model precise container handling procedures that could be unique to 
one single alternative. Nonetheless, concessions are made to represent the alternatives in 






Alternative eScales eAnimals eRad eGamma 
Status Quo Yes No No Yes 
 hRad hGamma   
 No No   
 iAnimals iRad iGamma iBio iChem 
 Yes Yes No No No 
 cScales cRad cGamma  
 No No No  
 ATS eScanPrc iRdmSelPrc  
 ATS - StatusQuo 5% 6%  
 
Figure H1.  Experiment Configuration of Status Quo 
 
The first system to be modeled is the status quo system, which represents the 
current state of affairs. The performance of the alternative systems will be benchmarked 
with the status quo system, wherever appropriate. 
The status quo system has the default ATS system, scales and Gamma scanners at 
fixed point of entry (equivalent to X-ray scanners, which are not modeled in the 
simulation), and scans 5% (eScanPrc factor) of incoming land containers at its fixed point 
of entry.  A random percentage of containers (iRdmSelPrc = 6%) is selected for 
examination by the intrusive inspection team, which is equipped with trained animals and 
radiation detectors. The status quo system does not have any mobile non-intrusive 
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scanning teams nor does it equip its cranes with scanners, which means that transhipment 
cargo is not inspected at all. 
 
“100% (Volume) Non-Intrusive Inspection” Alternative 
 
 
Alternative eScales eAnimals eRad eGamma  
1 Yes No Yes Yes  
 hRad hGamma    
 No No    
 iAnimals iRad iGamma iBio iChem 
 Yes Yes No No No 
 cScales cRad cGamma   
 Yes Yes Yes   
 ATS eScanPrc iRdmSelPrc   
 None 100% 0%   
 
Figure H2: Experiment Configuration of Alternative 1 
 
The “100% (Volume) Non-Intrusive Inspection” alternative scans 100% of 
incoming land containers (eScanPrc = 1) at the fixed point of entry and 100% of all 
containers while loading on the cranes. Both the fixed point entry and cranes are 
equipped with scales radiation detectors and Gamma scanners (equivalent to X-ray 
scanners, which are not modeled in the simulation). The intrusive inspection team, 
equipped with trained animals and radiation detectors, only processes previously failed 
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containers and nothing is randomly selected for inspection. Given that 100% of all 
containers will be non-intrusively searched, there is no need for ATS profiling. 
 
“Improved Loading Search” Alternative 
 
 
Alternative eScales eAnimals eRad eGamma 
2 No No No No 
 hRad hGamma   
 No No   
 iAnimals iRad iGamma iBio iChem 
 Yes Yes No No No 
 cScales cRad cGamma  
 Yes Yes Yes  
 ATS eScanPrc iRdmSelPrc  
 ATS - StatusQuo 0% 0%  
 
Figure H3.  Experiment Configuration of Alternative 2 
 
The “Improved Loading Search” alternative is an incremental solution on top of 
the status quo system in place. This alternative emphasizes sensors on the crane for 
loading containers for shipment, i.e. scales, radiation detectors, while skipping the rest of 
the sensors. It includes the current ATS risk profiling to select high risk containers for 





“Minimize Disruption to Port Operations” Alternative 
 
 
Alternative eScales eAnimals eRad eGamma  
3 No No No No  
 hRad hGamma    
 No No    
 iAnimals iRad iGamma iBio iChem 
 No No No No No 
 cScales cRad cGamma   
 Yes Yes Yes   
 ATS eScanPrc iRdmSelPrc   
 ATS - Plus 0% 0%   
 
Figure H4.  Experiment Configuration of Alternative 3 
 
The “Minimize Disruption to Port Operations” Alternative seeks to improve 
probability of detection and deterrence with better pre-emption of high-risk containers, as 
well as smooth-integration of its inspection processes within port operations. Thus this 
alternative includes the ATS-plus system that targets dirty containers better and 
emphasizes crane sensors, i.e. scales, radiation detectors, while skipping the rest of the 
sensors. 
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“High Performance” Alternative 
 
 
Alternative eScales eAnimals eRad eGamma  
4 No No No No  
 hRad hGamma    
 Yes Yes    
 iAnimals iRad iGamma iBio iChem 
 Yes Yes Yes No No 
 cScales cRad cGamma   
 Yes Yes Yes   
 ATS eScanPrc iRdmSelPrc   
 ATS - Plus 0% 0%   
 
Figure H5.  Experiment Configuration of Alternative 4 
 
The “High Performance” Alternative seeks to improve probability of detection 
and deterrence with better pre-emption of high-risk containers and layered inspections. 
This alternative focuses on transhipment containers, which form the bulk of container 
traffic in this port simulation. Thus sensors are deployed in the holding area and during 
crane loading. It also includes the ATS-plus system that targets dirty containers better. 
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“100% (Volume) Intrusive Inspection” Alternative 
 
 
Alternative eScales eAnimals eRad eGamma  
5 No No No No  
 hRad hGamma    
 No No    
 iAnimals iRad iGamma iBio iChem 
 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 cScales cRad cGamma   
 No No No   
 ATS eScanPrc iRdmSelPrc   
 None 0% 100%   
 
Figure H6.  Experiment Configuration of Alternative 5 
 
The last alternative, “100% Intrusive Inspection”, is a brute-force solution by 
examining every container that passes through the port. While it is expectedly resource 
consuming and productivity-stopping, it is still interesting to model it to compare its 
performance with the alternatives. This alternative includes a comprehensive sensor suite 
of trained animals, radiation detectors, biological detectors and chemical detectors for the 
intrusive inspection team. Since all containers are intrusively inspection, there is no need 
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APPENDIX I: SSTG MODEL DATA ANALYSIS SUPPLEMENT 
1) Logistic Regression Model and S-Plus output for basic model without 2-way 
interactions. 
 
*** Generalized Linear Model *** 
 
Call: glm(formula = Detected ~ eScales + eAnimals + eRad + eGamma + hRad 
+ hGamma + iAnimals + iRad + iGamma + iBio + iChem + cScales + cRad + cGamma + 
ATS + 
 eScanPrc + iRdmSelPrc, family = binomial(link = logit), data = 
IPDataAnalysis.25May07., na.action = na.exclude, control = list(epsilon = 
0.0001, 
 maxit = 50, trace = F)) 
Deviance Residuals: 
     Min         1Q    Median        3Q      Max  
 -3.1105 -0.7095312 0.4073242 0.7620027 2.209216 
 
Coefficients: 
                   Value Std. Error     t value  
(Intercept) -3.098069316 0.15530329 -19.9485111 
    eScales  0.035894339 0.06052711   0.5930291 
   eAnimals  0.038208799 0.05860065   0.6520200 
       eRad  0.022254942 0.05879198   0.3785371 
     eGamma  0.220332374 0.06440027   3.4212957 
       hRad  0.286455958 0.06152093   4.6562361 
     hGamma  1.237160697 0.06070090  20.3812588 
   iAnimals  1.298526573 0.06248584  20.7811330 
       iRad  0.489334406 0.05950026   8.2240724 
     iGamma  1.586675979 0.06197039  25.6037767 
       iBio  0.397018826 0.05908367   6.7196038 
      iChem  0.317137116 0.06014602   5.2727866 
    cScales  0.099687004 0.05877058   1.6962058 
       cRad  0.009215452 0.05866183   0.1570945 
     cGamma  1.931360243 0.06556379  29.4577271 
        ATS -0.086769601 0.04184448  -2.0736211 
   eScanPrc  0.193242236 0.09388888   2.0582014 
 iRdmSelPrc -0.308788933 1.03856075  -0.2973239 
 
(Dispersion Parameter for Binomial family taken to be 1 ) 
 
    Null Deviance: 10028.47 on 7786 degrees of freedom 
 
Residual Deviance: 7512.23 on 7769 degrees of freedom 
 
Number of Fisher Scoring Iterations: 4  
 















Terms added sequentially (first to last) 
           Df Deviance Resid. Df Resid. Dev  
      NULL                  7786   10028.47 
   eScales  1    2.247      7785   10026.22 
  eAnimals  1    0.112      7784   10026.11 
      eRad  1    1.413      7783   10024.70 
    eGamma  1    3.362      7782   10021.34 
      hRad  1    8.744      7781   10012.59 
    hGamma  1  316.130      7780    9696.46 
  iAnimals  1  324.847      7779    9371.62 
      iRad  1   69.160      7778    9302.46 
    iGamma  1  643.163      7777    8659.29 
      iBio  1   44.175      7776    8615.12 
     iChem  1    3.715      7775    8611.40 
   cScales  1    0.871      7774    8610.53 
      cRad  1    0.731      7773    8609.80 
    cGamma  1 1087.109      7772    7522.69 
       ATS  1    6.046      7771    7516.64 
  eScanPrc  1    4.327      7770    7512.32 
iRdmSelPrc  1    0.088      7769    7512.23 
 
    iGamma  1  641.895      7775    8658.30 
      iBio  1   44.093      7774    8614.21 
     iChem  1    3.597      7773    8610.61 
   cScales  1    0.753      7772    8609.86 
      cRad  1    0.663      7771    8609.20 
    cGamma  1 1087.070      7770    7522.13 
       ATS  1    6.092      7769    7516.03 
  eScanPrc  1    4.634      7768    7511.40 
iRdmSelPrc  1    0.085      7767    7511.32 
 
 
2) Logistic Regression Model output from Minitab 
 
Logistic Regression Table 
 
                                                  Odds     95% CI 
Predictor        Coef    SE Coef       Z      P  Ratio  Lower  Upper 
Constant     -3.09808   0.155474  -19.93  0.000 
eScales     0.0358970  0.0605623    0.59  0.553   1.04   0.92   1.17 
eAnimals    0.0382102  0.0586279    0.65  0.515   1.04   0.93   1.17 
eRad        0.0222567  0.0588220    0.38  0.705   1.02   0.91   1.15 
eGamma       0.220334  0.0644292    3.42  0.001   1.25   1.10   1.41 
hRad         0.286458  0.0615533    4.65  0.000   1.33   1.18   1.50 
hGamma        1.23716  0.0607261   20.37  0.000   3.45   3.06   3.88 
iAnimals      1.29853  0.0625399   20.76  0.000   3.66   3.24   4.14 
iRad         0.489337  0.0595368    8.22  0.000   1.63   1.45   1.83 
iGamma        1.58668  0.0620209   25.58  0.000   4.89   4.33   5.52 
iBio         0.397020  0.0591111    6.72  0.000   1.49   1.32   1.67 
iChem        0.317141  0.0601905    5.27  0.000   1.37   1.22   1.55 
cScales     0.0996895  0.0588044    1.70  0.090   1.10   0.98   1.24 
cRad        0.0092159  0.0586880    0.16  0.875   1.01   0.90   1.13 
cGamma        1.93137  0.0656199   29.43  0.000   6.90   6.07   7.85 
ATS        -0.0867702  0.0418620   -2.07  0.038   0.92   0.84   1.00 
eScanPrc     0.193241  0.0939325    2.06  0.040   1.21   1.01   1.46 





a) Residual Deviance 





















b) Normal QQ Plot 

























c) Partial Fit Plots 
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APPENDIX J: HARBORGUARD TEST PLAN 
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SECTION 1 – Introduction to the Project 
 
1.1 Purpose  
 
The purpose of this project is to plan the testing requirements for the 
HarborGuard System.  The aim of the project is to develop a combined 
Development Test (DT) and Operational Test (OT) Test plan. In addition, a 
methodology will be generated that will provide a sequence of steps to 
follow in order to obtain, verify and provide data for assessment on the 
performance, suitability and relevancy of the HarborGuard System. 
 
1.2. System Description  
 
The HarborGuard integrated waterside security and surveillance system 
provides high performance sonar, radar sensors, Automatic Identification 
System (AIS) and Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) for tracking vessels, 
swimmers and suspicious underwater objects. This system can be 
adapted as a waterside security solution for both military and commercial 
customers worldwide. The US Navy can provide effective port security for 
a wide variety of scenarios including those for domestic and foreign 
installations. It provides real-time situational awareness for Ports, Harbors 
and offshore facilities. HarborGuard uses the latest technology to provide 
the most capable measures and cost effective solutions for Waterside 
Security applications.  
 
SECTION 2 – Mission Need and Operational Requirements 
 
2.1 Mission Need  
 
Port Security is a very high interest area of concern for the United States 
and many of the World’s leading economies that depend on ports for trade 
and commerce. Ports are critical gateways for the movement of 
international commerce. More than 95 percent of our non-North American 
foreign trade (and 100 percent of certain commodities, such as foreign oil, 
on which we are heavily dependent) arrives by ship. This tremendous flow 
of goods creates many kinds of vulnerabilities. Drugs and illegal aliens are 
routinely smuggled into this country, not only in small boats but also 
hidden among otherwise legitimate cargoes on large commercial ships. 
These same pathways are available for exploitation by a terrorist 
organization or any nation or person wishing to attack us surreptitiously. 
Protecting against these vulnerabilities is made more difficult by the 
tremendous number and variety of U.S. ports. Some are multibillion-dollar 




Therefore there is a critical need for a system such as HarborGuard to 




2.2 Operational Requirements  
 
The following is a list of operational requirements for the HarborGuard 
System: 
 
a. HarborGuard shall integrate all sensors into a Common Operating 
Picture for an accurate portrayal of real time events to develop 
domain awareness. 
b. HarborGuard shall provide remote control operations of all sensors. 
c. HarborGuard shall provide selectable Security Zone layers based 
on threat conditions. 
d. HarborGuard shall generate alarms based on threat criteria. 
e. HarborGuard shall provide continuous logging of target tracks and 
alarm data for playback and analysis. 
f. HarborGuard shall enable automatic camera tracking of targets. 
g. HarborGuard shall stop small surface threat of size up to 5 tons. 
h. HarborGuard shall be able to transmit verbal warnings to deter 
inadvertent intruders. 
i. HarborGuard shall detect and track swimmer size surface targets. 
j. HarborGuard shall be able to identify detected targets. 
k. HarborGuard shall provide monitoring of all transponder-equipped 
vessels. 
l. HarborGuard shall provide detection and tracking of underwater 
targets including Autonomous Underwater Vehicles (AUVs). 
m. HarborGuard shall be able to detect the presence of suspicious 

















SECTION 3 – Scope of the Evaluation 
 
3.1 Critical Technical Parameters 
 
Capability Technical Parameter Performance Criteria 
Tracking Capacity >= 1000 tracks 
Range Resolution 3.5 m 
Tracking Capability 
Azimuth Resolution 2 mrad 
Search rate 80 rpm 




Probability of Detection (small 
target) 
0.85 
Average Transmit Time < 100 ms 
Average Retrieval Time < 150 ms 
Data  
Processing Capability 
Average speed network file 
transfer 
> 1 Gbps 
Monitoring 
Transponder Vessels 
Signal Reception Range > 27.4 km 
Detection Depth  > 20 m 
Detection Range > 2 km 
Detection of Objects 
on Sea Floor 
RCS > 0.1 m2 
Warning Capability Signal Strength > 85dBA @ 1 km 
Sea Fence Capability Kinetic Dissipation > 2160 KJ 
Identification 
Capability 
Minimum # of resolvable lines 
across minimum dimension 
> 12.8 resels 
Response Capability Average Time required to 
Respond to Threat 
< 3 min 
Acoustic Sensitivity Underwater Transmission Level > 40 dB 
Interoperability Number of messages 
transmitted 















General Function and Capability Dendritics 
 















User Friendly Display 
Insert Portable Sensor 
Reliability 
Operate in a degraded state 
Survivability 
Protection against Environmental 













































3.3 Critical Operational Issues 
 
3.3.1 COI 1 – Is the HarborGuard System able to track all targets 
detected by the sensors in the operational area?  
3.3.2 COI 2 – Can the HarborGuard System detect and track swimmer 
size surface targets? 
3.3.3 COI 3 – Is the HarborGuard System able to record and playback 
target tracks and alarm data for analysis? 
3.3.4 COI 4 – Can the HarborGuard System provide monitoring of all 
transponder equipped vessels? 
3.3.5 COI 5 – Can the HarborGuard System detect suspicious objects on 
the sea floor? 
3.3.6 COI 6 – Can the HarborGuard System transmit verbal warnings to 
intruders? 
3.3.7 COI 7 – Can the HarborGuard System stop small surface threats? 
3.3.8 COI 8 – Can the HarborGuard System identify detected targets?  
3.3.9 COI 9 – Is the HarborGuard System able to respond appropriately 
when threat levels are changed? 
3.3.10 COI 10 – Can the HarborGuard System detect and track 
Autonomous Underwater Vehicle(AUV)? 
3.3.11 COI 11 – (Human Factors) Can the HarborGuard System be 
manned by 2 operators?   
3.3.12 COI 12 – (Interoperability) Is the HarborGuard System able to 
integrate all existing sensors into an easily interpreted 
domain awareness? 
 
3.4 Measures of Effectiveness/ Suitability and Measures of Performance 
 
3.4.1 COI 1 – Is the HarborGuard System able to track all targets 
detected by the sensor in the operational area?  
MOE 3.4.1.1 Probability of targets track 
MOP 3.4.1.1.1 Percentage of targets track 
DR3.4.1.1.1.1 Coverage area 
DR3.4.1.1.1.2 Max number of targets track 
DR3.4.1.1.1.3 Number of targets track 
DR3.4.1.1.1.4 Target size 
MOE 3.4.1.2  Probability of targets track lost 
MOP 3.4.1.2.1 Percentage of track lost 
DR3.4.1.2.1.1 Time of track lost 
DR3.4.1.2.1.2 Target ID of Track lost 
MOP 3.4.1.2.2 Target resolution 




3.4.2 COI 2 – Can the HarborGuard System detect and track swimmer 
size target? 
MOE 3.4.2.1 Proportion of targets detected 
MOP 3.4.2.1.1 Number of targets detected 
DR3.4.2.1.1.1 Range of detection 
DR3.4.2.1.1.2 Time from target entry into monitored 
area until detection 
DR3.4.2.1.1.3 Average target acquisition time 
MOE 3.4.2.2 False detection 
MOP 3.4.2.2.1 False alarm rate (Type II error) 
3.4.3 COI 3 – Is the HarborGuard System able to record and playback 
target tracks and alarm data for analysis? 
MOE 3.4.3.1 Recording Capability 
MOP 3.4.3.1.1 Recording capacity 
DR3.4.3.1.1.1 Number of tracks recorded 
DR3.4.3.1.1.2 Maximum time of recording 
DR3.4.3.1.1.3 Speed of recording 
MOP 3.4.3.1.2 Recording quality 
MOE 3.4.3.2 Storage capacity 
MOP 3.4.3.2.1 Number of tracks stored 
MOP 3.4.3.2.2 Capacity of time store 
MOE 3.4.3.3 Playback Capability 
3.4.4 COI 4 – Can the HarborGuard system provide monitoring of all 
transponder equipped vessels? 
MOE 3.4.4.1 Monitoring Capability 
MOP 3.4.4.1.1 Mean Variance of monitoring range 
DR3.4.4.1.1.1 Position of ship 
DR3.4.4.1.1.2 Range of ship 
MOP 3.4.4.1.2 Percentage of dropped transponder 
equipped vessels from the system 
DR3.4.4.1.2.1 Number of tracks lost 
DR3.4.4.1.2.2 Average time to reacquire a dropped 
transponder equipped vessel 
3.4.5 COI 5 – Can the HarborGuard system detect suspicious objects on 
the sea floor? 
MOE 3.4.5.1 Detection Capability 
MOP 3.4.5.1.1 Mean Variance of detection range 
DR3.4.5.1.1.1 Number of targets 
DR3.4.5.1.1.2 Orientation of object to sensor 
MOE 3.4.5.2 Probability of detecting a false object 








3.4.6 COI 6 –Can the HarborGuard system communicate verbal 
warnings to intruders? 
MOE 3.4.6.1 Capability to broadcast 
MOP 3.4.6.1.1 Signal Quality 
DR3.4.6.1.1.1   Broadcast Signal to Noise Ratio (S/N). 
DR3.4.6.1.1.2   Decibel level at 100, 200, 500, 1000, 
1500 and 2000m 
DR3.4.6.1.1.3   Cone of useable signal strength 
DR3.4.6.1.1.4   Broadcast power level 
MOE 3.4.6.2 Ability to broadcast in languages specific to the region 
MOP 3.4.6.2.1 Percentage of foreign boat operators that 
are able to understand the broadcast 
message. 
3.4.7 COI 7 – Can the HarborGuard system stop small surface threats? 
MOE 3.4.7.1 Ability to fully restrain a 5 ton small boat moving at 60 
knots. 
MOP 3.4.7.1.1 Percentage of attacks by a 5 ton boat that 
penetrate the barrier and are not stopped 
DR3.4.7.1.1.1 Boat weight  
DR3.4.7.1.1.2  Boat speed 
DR3.4.7.1.1.3  Angle of attack 
DR3.4.7.1.1.4  Time to fully restrain boat 
DR3.4.7.1.1.5   Average Distance traveled by the boat 
before stopping 
3.4.8 COI 8 – Can the HarborGuard System identify detected targets? 
MOE 3.4.8.1 Identification Capability 
MOP 3.4.8.1.1 Average Time from Detection to 
Identification 
DR3.4.8.1.1.1 Time at detection 
DR3.4.8.1.1.2 Time at Identification 
MOP 3.4.8.1.2 Average Range of Identification 
MOE 3.4.8.2 Probability of Identification 
MOP 3.4.8.2.1 Proportion of Correct Identification 
3.4.9 COI 9 – Is the HarborGuard System able to respond based on 
different threat levels? 
MOE 3.4.9.1 Responsive Capability 
MOP 3.4.9.1.1 Average Time taken to respond to threat 
DR3.4.9.1.1.1 Time at threat identification 
DR3.4.9.1.1.2 Time at response initiation 
DR3.4.9.1.1.3 Time at threat neutralization 




3.4.10 COI 10 – Can the HarborGuard system detect and track AUVs? 
MOE 3.4.10.1 Probability of detecting AUV 
MOP 3.4.10.1.1 Ratio of AUVs detected to AUVs missed 
DR3.4.10.1.1.1 Number of AUVs detected 
DR3.4.10.1.1.2 Number of AUVs totally missed 
DR3.4.10.1.1.3 Range of AUVs when detected 
MOE 3.4.10.2 Probability of tracking detected AUVs 
MOP 3.4.10.2.1 Ratio of AUVs tracked to those track lost 
DR3.4.10.2.1.1 Number of AUVs tracked 
DR3.4.10.2.1.2 Number of AUV tracks that were lost 
DR3.4.10.2.1.3 Time from detection until track is lost 
3.4.11 COI 11 – (Human Factors) Can the HarborGuard system be 
sufficiently manned by two operators? 
MOE 3.4.11.1 Probability of operators missing a contact of interest 
shown on one of the displays 
MOP 3.4.11.1.1 Percentage of contacts on the displays the 
operators cannot adequately describe 
during a task saturated environment 
DR3.4.11.1.1.1 Number of contacts on the display 
DR3.4.11.1.1.2 Number of contacts the operators 
have sufficient knowledge 
DR3.4.11.1.1.3 The time required for operators to 
react to threats 
MOE 3.4.11.2 Capability of the operators to maintain a consistent 
level of performance regardless of state of fatigue 
MOP 3.4.11.2.1 Percentage of successful target 
interrogations at the beginning of the watch 
compared to those at the end of the watch 
DR3.4.11.2.1.1 Number of successful interrogations at 
the beginning of watch 
DR3.4.11.2.1.2 Number of total interrogations at the 
beginning of watch 
DR3.4.11.2.1.3 Number of successful interrogations at 
the end of watch 
DR3.4.11.2.1.4  Number of total interrogations at the 
end of watch 
3.4.12 COI 12 – (Interoperability) Is the HarborGuard system able to 
integrate all existing sensors into an easily understood and interpreted 
domain awareness? 
MOE 3.4.12.1 The capability of systems to be successfully 
integrated 





DR3.4.12.1.1.1 Number of sensors integrated at one 
time 
DR3.4.12.1.1.2 Number of sensors missed due to 
system limitations 
DR3.4.12.1.1.3 The number of sensors transmitting 
data at certain moments 
MOE 3.4.12.2 The transmission capability of the sensors for 
integration 
MOP 3.4.12.2.1 Average Transmission backlog 
DR3.4.12.2.1.1 Transmission rate of the sensors 
DR3.4.12.2.1.2 Receiving rate of the receptors 



































3.5 Test Objective Matrix 
 





To determine the tracking capability 
of the HarborGuard 
• Number of targets tracked E-
1a 
• Size of targets tracked E-1b 




To determine the detection capability 
of the HarborGuard 
• Range of detection E-2a 
• Average time from target 




To determine the data processing 
capability  of the HarborGuard 
• Number of tracks recorded E-
3a 





To determine compatibility of 
transponder equipment with 
HarborGuard. 




objects on sea 
floor 
To determine detection range and 
probability of false object. 
• Mean variance detection E-5a 





To assess the effectiveness of 
verbal warnings. 




To assess the ability to stop surface 
threats. 
• Number of successful stops 











To determine the identification 
capability of the CCTV and Thermal 
Imager 
• Range of identification E-8a 
• Ratio of correct identification 
E-8b 





To determine the ability to respond 
to different threat levels 
• Time available to respond E-
9a 




To assess the ability to detect  AUV  
• Detection Range E-10a 






To determine the effectiveness of 
the crew size in performing the 
required tasks 
• Crew of 2 S-1a 
• Crew of 3 S-1b 
S-1 
12. Interoperability To determine the interoperability with 
other hardware. 
• Wireless communications S-
2a 
• Wire transmissions S-2b 
• Digital/Analog S-2c 
S-2 
 
3.6 General Test Operations, Test Vehicles and Scenario Overview  
 
3.6.1 Scenario Overview 
a. Scenario A: Defending against AUV  
b. Scenario B: Small Boat Attack on Critical Infrastructure 
c. Scenario C: Detect and track large vessel 
d. Scenario D: Detect and track surface and subsurface swimmers. 
 
3.6.2 Instrumentation Requirements  
 
The list below shows a list of the additional equipments needed for 






 Additional Equipments 
Scenario A AUVs, Launching platform, dummy bottom mine, 
GPS, Mk 107 Mod 0 Hydrographic mapping Unit 
Scenario B 3 5-ton boats, Notice to Mariners, LRAD, Sea 
Barrier, GPS 
Scenario C AIS equipped Large Vessel, GPS 
Scenario D Scuba Diver, Surface Swimmer, GPS  
3.6.3 Limitation to Scope of Test   
 
a. Realism – The use of actual mines for HarborGuard to detect on 
the sea floor. [Limited Effectiveness Evaluation] 
b. Uncontrollable Boat Traffic – The presence of commercial and 
pleasure craft in the testing area. [Limited Tactical Evaluation] 
c. Test Operator Proficiency – Uniqueness of the system limits the 
operators’ evaluation. [Limits HSI Evaluation] 
d. Threat Neutralization – Limited use of LRAD to avoid harm to test 
participants. [Limited Tactical Evaluation] 
  
 
SECTION 4 – Operational Effectiveness 
 
4.1 Scenarios and Run Profiles 
4.1.1 Scenario  A :  Defending against AUV threat 
4.1.1.1 Overview 
a.  Scenario begins with two AUVs launched from an 
anchored ship in the Oakland harbor that is awaiting port 
entrance. 
b.  The AUVs mission is to penetrate HarborGuard 
undetected, to plant an explosive on a large container 
ship berthed at the pier and to deploy a bottom mine in 
the shipping channel near the port. 
c. The HarborGuard mission is to detect and track the 
AUVs. The system will alert the operator and notify the 













Figure 1:  Scenario A- Defending against AUV threat 
 
4.1.1.2 Run Profile 
a. The launching ship will be anchored at one nautical mile 
from the Port of Oakland. 
b. A large container ship will be berthed at pier 37 at 0000. 
c.  AUV 1 carrying explosives will be launched at 0100. 
d. AUV 1 will cruise at 3 knots towards the large container 
ship in a direct path and attempt to attach the explosives 
to the container ship. 
e. AUV 2 carrying a bottom mine will be launched at 0130. 
f. AUV 2 will move to the shipping channel near the port 
and attempt to deploy the bottom mine. 
g. HarborGuard will attempt to detect the two AUVs and to 
maintain the tracks. 
h. HarborGuard will attempt to identify the AUVs as 
perceived threats and notify the appropriate agencies. 
i. HarborGuard will attempt to detect the suspicious object 
planted by AUV 2. 
j. The launching ship will attempt to recover the two AUVs. 
 






a. Scenario begins with 3 explosive laden 5-ton boats 
leaving a local marina and heading towards a critical 
infrastructure target located in the Port of Richmond. 
b. The mission of the 3 boats is to detonate the explosives 
next to the Chevron oil refinery storage tanks. 
c. HarborGuard’s mission is to detect, identify and track the 
3 boats, and to prevent access to the restricted waters. 
 
 
Figure 2:  Scenario B - Small Attack on Critical Infrastructure 
 
4.1.2.2 Run Profiles 
a. 3 5-ton boats are loaded with explosives. 
b. The 3 boats depart a local marina in the vicinity of the Port of 
Richmond at 1300. 
c. 3 boats will head north towards the Port of Richmond at 20 
knots. The speed will be ramped up to 50 knots within 0.5 
nautical miles of the Chevron oil refinery storage tanks. 
d. Two boats will attempt to penetrate the HarborGuard sea 
barrier during the high speed run to detonate the explosives 
next to the oil tanks. 
e. One boat will attempt to bypass the HarborGuard sea barrier 
and pull along side the tanks and detonate the explosives.  
f. HarborGuard will attempt to detect, identify and track the 3 





g. The Long Range Acoustic Hailing Device (LRAD) will 
attempt to deter the boat trying to bypass the sea barrier by 
transmitting verbal warnings. 
h. If verbal warnings are not heeded, LRAD will use the laser 
Dazzler to disorient the boat operator. 
i. HarborGuard will attempt to notify the appropriate agencies 
of the perceived threats. 
 
4.2 E – Tests 
4.2.1 E-Test 1  
 
4.2.1.1 Objective. To determine the capability of HarborGuard 
tracking different sized targets traveling at various speeds.  
 
4.2.1.2 Procedure. The HarborGuard tracking capability will be 
assessed by its ability to register targets on its radar screen 
and maintain the contacts while the targets are inside the 
HarborGuard operational area.  Different sizes and types of 
targets of various Radar Cross Sections (RCS) will be used 
to penetrate the HarborGuard operational area.  The targets 
will travel in a random pattern at a rate of 3 mph to 75 mph.  
All targets will be equipped with GPS.  The target tracks will 
be recorded by the HarborGuard sensors system. 
 
4.2.1.3 Data Analysis. The assessment will be quantitative in 
nature.  The range and time of the targets when it is first 
registered on the radar screen will be recorded, and 
continuously tracked on screen.  The time when the targets 
are registered will also be recorded.  The recorded track 
data will be compared to the actual routes the targets 
traversed.  The correlation between the actual and the 
tracked data will determine the accuracy of tracking 
capability.  In addition, the percentage of tracks lost and the 
time it took to re-acquire the same target will also be 
recorded to calculate the tracking error rate. 
 
4.2.2 E-Test 2   
 
4.2.2.1 Objective. To assess the detection capability of the 







4.2.2.2 Procedure. The HarborGuard detection capability will be 
assessed by its ability to register a target on its radar 
screen.  Different size and type of targets of varied RCS will 
be used to penetrate the HarborGuard operational area.  
The moveable targets will travel in a random pattern at a 
rate of 3 mph to 75 mph.  The non-moving targets will be 
placed at multiple locations near the water surface and at 
varied water depth.  All targets will be equipped with GPS. 
 
4.2.2.3 Data Analysis. The assessment will be quantitative in 
nature.  The range and time of the targets when it is first 
registered on the radar screen will be recorded, and 
continuously tracked on screen. Range data will be used to 
establish a correlation between target sizes and detection 
range.  For the non-moving targets, the total number of 
targets registered will be recorded and compared to the 
total number of targets available to get an assessment of 
probability of detection. 
 
4.2.3 E-Test 3  
 
4.2.3.1 Objective. To determine HarborGuard ability to record 
and playback target tracks and alarm data. 
 
4.2.3.2 Procedure. HarborGuard’s ability to record and playback 
target track movement will be assessed.  HarborGuard’s 
ability to track vessels over various water and weather 
conditions is evaluated.  Testing will be conducted by 
seeing how many contacts HarborGuard can manage and 
track within a recorded period.  The storage capacity of the 
media function for playback and reload is also monitored 
and evaluated.  After the end of a recording period, a new 
storage media is loaded for further recording and 
evaluation. 
 
The scenarios will dictate movement of the 
watercraft through the water.  It is the responsibility of the 
HarborGuard system to record the movement of these 








The HarborGuard system must meet the storage capability 
and playback criteria without placing undue stress or strain 
on the system. 
 
 
4.2.3.3  Data Analysis.  HarborGuard’s ability to record, 
playback, and reconstruct threat track profiles is 
quantitative in nature.  A NO GO criterion would be 
achieved when HarborGuard and recording media do not 
coincide and a fault is determined.  Processor speed and 
capacity of the media will be quantitative in nature.  A GO 
criterion is achieved if HarborGuard is able to record and 
playback target track movement for playback and analysis. 
 
4.2.4 E-Test 5  
 
4.2.4.1 Objective. To assess the HarborGuard ability to detect 
suspicious objects on the sea floor. 
 
4.2.4.2 Procedure.  Within the HarborGuard system the 
underwater aspect of the side scan sonar will be assessed. 
Scanning of the sea floor around the ship and in the critical 
facilities is evaluated.  Detection range is determined by 
the placement, size and orientation of a suspicious object 
at a distance away from the sonar and then evaluated.  
Distance of the suspicious object to the sonar is reduced 
until discovered by the sonar thus providing maximum 
effective  range.  As the reliability of the sonar is 
increased multiple suspicious contacts are placed on the 
sea floor.  The sonar is assessed for accuracy and number 
of false contacts.  The side scan sonar must sustain certain 
levels without placing undue stress on the total system. 
 
4.2.4.3   Data Analysis. The ability to detect suspicious objects 
on the sea floor is quantitative.  Average time to scan a 
distance of uncertainty would be assessed by number of 
unknown objects and speed. In addition, the time taken to 
conduct one scan of the area is recorded to determine the 
sonar mean operating envelope of performance. A GO 
criterion would be achieved if the operators/system can 
manage the sonar so that it will safely and effectively 






achieved if multiple unknown contacts are ignored and not 
prosecuted for threat relevance. 
 
4.2.5 E-Test 8  
 
4.2.5.1   Objective. To determine the identification capability of the 
CCTV and Thermal Imager. 
  
4.2.5.2   Procedure. The identification capability will be assessed by 
the ability of the operator using the CCTV and Thermal 
Imager to identify targets of various tonnage. Throughout 
the surveillance operation as described in the detailed 
scenario, the operator will use a combination of CCTV and 
Thermal Imager to perform target identification. A laser 
ranger finder will be used to measure the range of the 
target when the operator has completed the assessment of 
the target identity. The result of the identification 
assessment will be compared with the actual target identity 
to ascertain the success of identification process. 
  
4.2.5.3   Data Analysis.  The HarborGuard must be able to 
identify a small boat of length 3 m at a range of 8 nautical 
mile with a probability of success of 0.85. The probability of 
detection will be determined at 8 nautical miles. If the 
probability of detection is less than 0.85 at 8 nautical miles, 
the range will be determined where probability of detection 
will be at least 0.85. Confidence level will be calculated 
using t-statistics.  
 
4.2.6 E-Test 10   
 
4.2.6.1  Objective. To assess the ability to detect  AUV 
 
4.2.6.2   Procedure.  The capability to detect an AUV will be 
assessed by the ability of the HarborGuard to detect the 
AUV using sonar. In the scenario on defending against an 
AUV threat, the AUV will be equipped with the Mk 107 Mod 
0 Hydrographic Mapping Unit to record the position and 
time of the AUV. The HarborGuard’s sonar will attempt to 






4.2.6.3 Data Analysis.  The HarborGuard must be able to 
detect the AUV at a range of 2.5 nautical miles. The 
variability of the azimuth accuracy should be within 2mrad. 
The probability of detection will be determined with the 
confidence level calculated from the t-statistics. 
 
SECTION 5 – Operational Suitability 
 
5.1 S – Tests 
5.1.1 S-Test 1   Human Factors  
 
5.1.1.1 Objective.  To address whether the HarborGuard system 
can be adequately manned by 2 operators 
 
5.1.1.2 Procedure.  The situational awareness and the time of 
response to the emergent threats by the HarborGuard system 
operators will assess whether 2 operators can adequately man the 
system.  The actual scenario will require the operators to respond to 
perceived threats and recall the sequence of events leading to the 
engagement. 
 
Several contacts (some hostile) will be indicated on the 
operator’s system interface.  The time from system alarm 
generation of a hostile contact to operator acknowledgment will be 
recorded.  Upon acknowledgment of the alarm, the operator will be 
questioned regarding the characteristics of the threat, location, and 
speed to ensure the alarm was not blindly acknowledged.  Each 
second in the delayed response in alarm acknowledgement and 
missed questions will be noted and recorded and tested against an 
expected 85 percent threshold. 
 
5.1.1.3 Data Analysis.  Whether the operators can sufficiently 
operate a system is a combination of situational awareness and 
task saturation.  Situational Awareness will be tested by the 
questions following an alarm.  Task saturation will be measured by 
the time taken from initiation of the alarm to acknowledgement.  The 
operators must be able to acknowledge the alarm in two seconds 
and then answer a short quiz regarding the hostile threat and other 








The data will be analyzed on the operators’ ability to respond 
and answer questions correctly.  Missed alarms and incorrect 
answers will be noted and analyzed along with the scenario 
workload.  Success is achieved whenever the operators can meet 
the acknowledgement time and answer sufficient questions 
correctly.  Confidence levels will be calculated using the t-statistic 
and HSI questions asking perceived workload will be recorded after 
the test. 
 
5.1.2 S-Test 2 Interoperability  
 
5.1.2.1 Objective. To assess the interoperability of inorganic 
sensors with the HarborGuard system 
 
5.1.2.2 Procedure. Multiple contacts will approach several 
inorganic sensors simultaneously. The number of contacts 
displayed on the operator’s interface versus the total number of 
contacts detected by the inorganic sensors will assess the degree 
of interoperability of the HarborGuard and other platforms. The 
elapsed time from contact detection to display on the operator’s 
interface will measure the inorganic sensor transmission backlog. 
 
5.1.2.3 Data Analysis.  The quantity of sensors integrated 
simultaneously coupled with the transmission backlog from the 
sensors to the system operator interface will assess the 
interoperability of the HarborGuard and the various sensors. The 
rate of sensor assessment will be quantitative in nature.  
HarborGuard must be able to integrate all associated sensors in 
order to provide an accurate and timely Common Operational 
Picture.  The time from sensor detection to integration into the 
Common Operational Picture should be almost instantaneous. 
 
Data will be analyzed on the HarborGuard ability to timely 
integrate all sensor data into the operator’s interface.  Dropped 
transmissions and untimely delays will be counted as failures and 
technically analyzed why they occurred.  Any operator errors will not 
be recorded or analyzed for this test.  A success is achieved for 
every sensor whose contact is successfully integrated into the 
Common Operational Picture instantaneously.  The number of 
successes to the number of total transmissions must exceed 95%. 





ANNEX A - RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS 
 
 
Type of Resource Required Remarks 
Test Articles  1 HarborGuard SA 
System, 1 LRAD, AIS, 2 
Small Target Detection 
Radar,  1 Long Range 
Radar, 2 Video  
Surveillance Camera, 2 
Thermal Imager, 1 Diver 
Detection Sonar, 
 
Test Site Port of Oakland, Port of 
Richmond and local 
marina. 
 
Instrumentation Laser Range Finder, Mk 
107 Mod 0 Hydrographic 
mapping Unit, GPS, 
Standard Test Equipment
 
Threat system simulators 3 5-ton boats, 
Dummy mine, 2 AUVs 
 
Simulation/ Models Modeling effect of LRAD 
on Human hearing, Full 




2 weeks at Port of 
Oakland 
 
Special Requirements All test data including 
video recording & voice 
recording will be 







































Number of target tracks 




Range of detection 




Number of recorded tracks 
Number of tracks stored 
 
E-5 
Range of detection 
Number of false contacts 
 
E-8 
Range of identification 
Number of correct identification 
Time to perform identification 
 
E-9 
Average time to respond 







Time to process contacts 
 
S-2 
Number of dropped messages 
Transmission Queue size 
  450
Operator Situational Awareness Assessment 
Contact/Time of Ack Course Speed Location
Type 
Threat Correct Incorrect 
1             
2             
3             
4             
5             
6             
7             
8             
9             
10             
11             
12             
13             
14             
15             
16             
17             
18             
19             
20             
21             
22             
23             
24             
25             
26             
27             
28             
29             
30             
31             
32             
33             
34             
35             
              
   26         
              
 
Was the operator’s 
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ANNEX D – Data Analysis Plan 
 
Test Design Variable Categorization Matrix 
 
Variables/ Factors Control1 Factor Level 
Command and Control 1 Self-control, Supported 
Force control 
Light 1 Low, High 
Combat Intensity 1 MARSEC 1, 2, 3 
Threat Type 1 Surface, Sub-surface 
Method of employment 1 With LRAD, With Sea 
Fence, With Sonar 
System/ Equipment Failures 1 Induce Partial System 
Failures 
Crew Rest 2 As per SOP 
Ammunition 3 Blanks; Live ONLY for 
demolition gun test within 
Live Firing Ranges 
AUV 3 Aries AUV 
Software 3 Current Version 
Tactical Organization 3 User Specified 
Doctrine 3 User Specified 
Training 3 User Specified 
Personnel – Motivation 4  
Weather 4  
Sea State 4  
Ambient Noise 4  
Temperature 4  
Notes: 
1. Under the control, the variable conditions are (1) Systematically varied, (2) 
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